A study of Tawfiq al-Hakim’s Equilibrium doctrine and philosophical narratives by Shaw, Shereen
 1 
 









Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the University of Liverpool for the 











Department of Philosophy  
University of Liverpool  
7 Abercromby Square  





































For my Mother 
 









































Translation of Tawfiq al-Hakim’s Equilibrium  ...................................................................... 14 
 
Introduction: Background and Influences  ......................................................................... 53 
I. Arab Existentialism  ............................................................................................... 54 
II. Jean Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir in Egypt  .............................................. 64 
III. Tawfiq al-Hakim and Others  ................................................................................. 75 
Chapter One: The Equilibrium Doctrine ............................................................................. 89 
I. Introduction  ........................................................................................................... 90 
II. The Doctrine  ......................................................................................................... 94 
III. Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 102 
IV. Summary .............................................................................................................. 107 
Chapter Two: Spiritual Imbalance  .................................................................................... 109 
I. Models of Polarity in Equilibrium ....................................................................... 113 
II. A Series of Dualities ............................................................................................ 118 
III. Dualities in Philosophical Narratives .................................................................. 127 
Chapter Three: The Equilibrium doctrine and Existentialism............................................. 137 
I. Existential Characteristics .................................................................................... 138 
II. Political Commitment .......................................................................................... 145 
III. The issue of Freedom ........................................................................................... 147 
IV. Existential Estrangements in al-Hakim’s Pygmalion .......................................... 153 
Chapter Four: Criticism  ..................................................................................................... 157 
I. Philosophy and the Arab mind ............................................................................. 158 
II. The Treatment of Women .................................................................................... 162 
III. Criticisms ............................................................................................................. 167 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................... 175 
Appendix One ........................................................................................................................ 180 
Appendix Two ........................................................................................................................ 196 








Fig. 1. A group photo taken upon the guests’ arrival at Cairo airport 
Fig. 2. Simone de Beauvoir, Sartre, al-Hakim and Haykal at a local café 
Fig. 3. Lanzmann, de Beauvoir and Sartre at the Pyramids of Giza in Cairo  
Fig. 4. Haykal, al-Hakim, Sartre, de Beauvoir and Okasha at the Cairo Opera House 
Fig. 5. Simone de Beauvoir, Sartre and Lanzmann on a Nile cruise 
Fig. 6. Simone de Beauvoir, President Nasser and Sartre at Nasser’s Heliopolis residence 
Fig. 7. A scene from ‘Huis clos’ at Cairo’s Theatre Institute 
Fig. 8. Sartre giving a public lecture at Cairo University 
Fig. 9. De Beauvoir and Lanzmann at the Ben Ezra Synagogue in Cairo 
Fig. 10. A private conversation between de Beauvoir, al-Hakim and Sartre 
Fig. 11. Egyptian Singer Um Kulthoum, Naguib Mahfouz and Tawfiq al-Hakim 
Fig. 12. Tawfiq al-Hakim with Naguib Mahfouz and Yusuf Idris 
Fig. 13. The young al-Hakim with a group of French women 






















A Study of Tawfiq al-Hakim’s Equilibrium Doctrine and Philosophical 
Narratives 
 





Tawfiq al-Hakim is known across the Arab world as a pioneer dramatist. He is one of many 
misunderstood writers and philosophers. My aim is to introduce him to the English-speaking 
public in order to shed some light on a specific period known to be one of the best in Egypt 
intellectually and culturally. Former President Nasser’s ideologies, and those of former 
President Sadat such as his “open-door” policy to the West, have contributed positively to the 
forming of an intellectual renaissance in Egypt. This rich period in Egyptian history is one that 
can directly shed light on the literary and philosophical contributions of al-Hakim, and on the 
social and cultural issues that should be revisited in order to gain an understanding of the 
problems that face Egyptians today. With this said, it is my hope that by reviving al-Hakim’s 
philosophical doctrines and by examining the major issues he addresses in his texts, I will be 
able to explain and clarify some misconceptions about this author, his philosophy and his work. 
I would also like to show ways in which his distinctive doctrine of equilibrium can be of use 
to us both in the East and the West. The objectives, accordingly, are twofold: (1) To introduce 
and critically examine al-Hakim’s equilibrium doctrine; and, (2) To identify the philosophical 
traits and Western influences that had an impact on his character and philosophy. The core 
problem that this work will indirectly address is the problem of how philosophy in the Arab 
world, according to Sari Nusseibeh’s article “The Arab World: What role for philosophy?” has 
been blatantly used as a tool in order to defend one version or another of the religious beliefs 
of those who pursued it. I ask what specific role a philosopher or intellectual can play in his or 
her society and how his philosophy can be put to use. This question is one that has been long 
forgotten in the Arab world. Freeing the Arab world from the colonizer, back in the 1930s, was 
clearly a goal for many intellectuals. Today, freeing the Arab mind by introducing a philosophy 
or an ideology that can be of use to the Muslim world as well as to the West would be a great 
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NOTE ON TRANSLATION  
 
I would like to emphasize that, unless otherwise noted, all translations of Arabic materials 
throughout this thesis and al-Hakim’s texts are mine. In my analysis, I am relying on the 
translation of al-Hakim’s book al- Taʿaduliyya (Equilibrium)1 to provide evidence of what I 
believe to be foreign influences within his proposed doctrine.2 I carried out the translation from 
Arabic to English in order, first, to revive the work and, secondly, to be able to link the doctrine 
of equilibrium to some of al-Hakim’s philosophical narratives written from the early 1950s to 
the late 1960s.3 Thus, as part of my thesis, I am offering the first English translation of al-
Hakim’s main book, al- Taʿaduliyya (which I will refer to as Equilibrium throughout this 
thesis. The book was published in 1955. Equilibrium is important to us today for many reasons. 
It is not only al-Hakim’s only attempt to compile the essence of his philosophy all in one work, 
but it is also a work which shows his experimentation with philosophical ideas in a literary 
framework.  
I encountered much difficulty in translating al-Hakim’s works into English and I have 
attempted to remain faithful to the styles and expression in the two cultures. Fortunately, I was 
able to seek editorial help from Dr J’annine Jobling, to whom I owe thanks for reading and 
editing the earlier versions of my translations and for giving me feedback and suggestions to 
clarify some obscure words. Having said that, I also rearranged some sentences and made some 
sacrifices to stay faithful to the source language text and to its author. The system of 
transliteration applied is based on that used by the Library of Congress in Washington, D. C., 
omitting macrons and subscript dots. In this connection, it must be mentioned that I was unable 
to obtain some of the European translations of al-Hakim’s works that already exist and hence 
                                                          
1 Throughout this thesis, I will be using “Equilibrium” or “the Equilibrium doctrine” to refer to al-Hakim’s al- 
Taʿaduliyya, or “madhhab al- Taʿaduliyya”.The doctrine suggests that within every individual, there are forces 
of weakness and of strength that are in a relationship of contention and dependence. In struggle, the individual 
ought not to fall into despair but try to discover where the forces of strength reside from within oneself in order 
to compensate for any shortage or weakness. And through this process, he or she can make individual and social 
progress. The relationship between the forces (i.e. as one of compensation, contention and dependence), is one 
that presents to us more than a mere act of restoring balance (al- Taʿadul). 
2 Tawfiq al-Hakim published, a few years later, a supplement titled al- Taʿaduliyya wal-islam (Equilibrium and 
Islam), in order to compliment his main book, al- Taʿaduliyya. The supplement explains al-Hakim’s philosophical 
position in relation to Islam. I have not included a translation of the supplement in this thesis as it does not add to 
my initial enquiry (I.e. examining the foreign influences on al-Hakim’s thought). There is an analytical study by 
Dr Zaki Naguib Mahmoud, an Egyptian philosopher, available only in Arabic titled al- Taʿaduliyya wa- al- 
Taʿaduliyya wal-islam published on the first of February 1968 in a special edition of al- Helal magazine. This 
study is more of a commentary than an analysis of al-Hakim’s text. It does not aid readers’ understanding of al-
Hakim’s philosophy, influences or identify the misconceptions that affected his readership. The study offers no 
translations. 
3 This is the period when he began to write philosophically. 
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the majority of quotations from his works are my own unless otherwise noted. In addition, the 
problem that every translator and researcher is faced with is to find adequate material to support 
the research. Unfortunately, I hardly found any of the biographical materials on al-Hakim’s 
philosophy present in Egypt during my search, perhaps because they were corrupted.4 Those I 
did find were of little help because they focused mainly on al-Hakim’s life and theatrical works. 
It became apparent that the interest in al-Hakim’s work in Egypt, and in Middle Eastern 
countries generally, has always concentrated solely on the theatrical productions, since they 
were, and still are, the most popular of his works. But this means that there is a gap in the 
market for a new assessment, if not a revival, of al-Hakim’s philosophical doctrines and 
narratives.  
Finally, I have felt that the research would not be complete without providing 
supporting materials and translations of al-Hakim’s text. In appendix one (p.180), I included 
al-Hakim’s family consent, rare personal images of al-Hakim with his family and other 
intellectuals and translations of key texts. Appendix two (p.196) includes a chronology of al-
Hakim’s philosophical publications,5 a literature review, a survey of his readership, two 
interviews with present journalists (October Magazine and al-Ahram newspaper) and finally, 











                                                          
4 In July 2014, I visited al-Ahram newspaper’s archive and found a single folder (no. 122) on al-Hakim. The file 
has articles (from 1963 to 1980) focusing on al-Hakim’s character, events in his life and a few of his theatrical 
works. The file is in a very bad state; papers are dated and falling apart, and of poor quality (hardly readable). 
Also, I was informed by staff that printing some articles was prohibited. Materials prior to 1963 were only 
available on microfilm. 
5 The chronology (p. 197) was compiled based on my readings of William M. Hutchins’s detailed chronology. 





The initial impulse for the research and translation presented here was due to an interest that 
arose through reading Tawfiq al-Hakim’s writings during my undergraduate education. Little 
did I know that his writings had interesting philosophical dimensions. I began this research 
with the belief that there was evidence of foreign influence in al-Hakim’s equilibrium doctrine 
which was prompted by a trip he made to Paris in 1925. The ostensible purpose of the trip was 
to study law, but instead he immersed himself in French arts, literature and philosophy. I later 
discovered that there was indeed a dialogue between Tawfiq al-Hakim and Jean Paul Sartre, as 
well as Simon de Beauvoir, as a result of a trip that they made to Egypt in 1967 during President 
Nasser’s reign. The meeting of all three authors supported my speculation that al-Hakim had 
been subject to Western influence. So I began investigating further al-Hakim’s philosophy on 
this basis, and especially the period between 1950s and 1987, the year he died.6 I was surprised 
to find that although some research had been carried out on a number of significant plays,7 
there had been less attention paid to al-Hakim’s philosophical narratives and, more importantly, 
to his equilibrium doctrine. This discovery fuelled my enthusiasm and interest. It highlighted 
not only the value, but also the originality of my research in a context in which questions like 
“Who is the Arab subject? Can this subject think of himself in terms and language that would 
be organic to his history? Can Arabs have an authentic existence, and is it possible for Arabs 
to become modern on their own terms?” are very much current today.8 On such a basis, the 
hope is that my work will offer readers an innovative assessment, if not a revival, of al-Hakim’s 
philosophical works, where I believe answers for these questions may be found.  
 
With this in mind, I began to ask why an author like al-Hakim is overlooked in Egypt 
and in the Arab world and why he is less read compared to other writers of his time. I can only 
assume that one of the reasons for overlooking his philosophy, in particular in the Arab world, 
is due to the sensitivity of the issues that he had addressed and discussed, directly or indirectly, 
as underlying themes in his works. A further possible conclusion is that we, the Egyptians, have 
become less and less occupied with our past and our heritage in the midst of today’s 
                                                          
6 I believe he was 89 years old, although some speculate that he was past 90 due to the uncertainty around his 
exact date of birth. 
7 I found a doctoral thesis dated 1952 presented to the University of Paris by Suhayl Idris entitled “Le Roman 
Arabe et les influences étrangères de 1900 à 1950” This has some information about the French influences on al-
Hakim’s novels but without specific details. There is an unpublished doctoral thesis by G. V. Tutungi submitted 
in 1966 to Indiana University titled “Tawfiq al-Hakim and The West”. The latter has been beneficial to this thesis. 
8 That is to say post the 2011 revolution in Cairo, Egypt.  
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distractions. Some of the issues discussed in al-Hakim’s philosophical works, mostly in the 
mid-50s, were connected with the questioning of Islamic dogma and organised religions. He 
pin-pointed the social and political flaws in the Egyptian culture and attempted in the process 
to familiarise Egyptians with Western ideas. His views were communicated in different forms. 
For example, in addition to his literary and philosophical publications, he wrote regularly for 
al-Ahram newspaper and had a daily column.9 I must say, when I first read al-Hakim, I also 
found his discussions to be unconventional in terms of what is expected of an Egyptian who 
has had an Islamic upbringing. What was astonishing is the way in which he was persistent in 
experimenting equally with Eastern and Western ideas regardless of norms and restrictions put 
upon him. The way in which he made his views explicit in the 50s (and continued to do so till 
the year before he died in the late 80s) led to many controversies. But regardless of the obstacles 
put in his path from the ever-changing political system, and from society, colleagues, friends 
and members of his family who might have advised him otherwise, he continued writing. I 
found myself sympathising with his position. It seemed to me that his struggle (which I might 
be experiencing as well), as a generality, is with the problem that the West does not accept and 
the East does not forgive. Yet regardless of the criticisms that he received in abundance (in the 
early 50s), he continued to make explicit his beliefs and predictions about the future of mankind 
(the state of man in a modern society) and challenged clerics of prominent religious institutions 
such as al-Azhar in Egypt about their interpretations and practices of Islam as a religion.  
The answer to the question “what fuelled al-Hakim’s enthusiasm and love for 
experimentation in the fields of both philosophy and literature to such an extent that he was 
suddenly, from the early 50s, constantly questioned, criticised and attacked for his boldness 
and for what he implied?” is one that will be addressed throughout this thesis. What I can, 
however, say at this stage is that during the course of my examinations it has become evident 
to me that al-Hakim’s literary and philosophical career can be seen as a successful example of 
a merging between Eastern and Western ideas or of a “borderless” view of literature, 
philosophy and culture. I choose to use the term “borderless” or “borderless thought” as an 
indication of al-Hakim’s belief in a “non-categorical division” between Eastern and Western 
thought.10 In fact, he made remarks in various texts, especially in Zahrat al-‘Umr, on how he 
had always found past works by Eastern and Western authors to be valuable “treasures” that he 
                                                          
9 He began doing so on the 3rd of January 1938. He was on the board of al-Ahram from 1961 and won the state 
prize for literature. Between 1981- 1983, he was an honorary President of al-Ahram’s administrative board. 
10 This, I believe, was a common belief held by authors of his generation who were attending mainly French 
schools in Egypt. Authors who grew up in a colonial era were embracing and yet resisting the colonizer. 
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believed should be read and studied thoroughly before one could begin a literary or 
philosophical career. He writes:      
I left no aspect of intellectual endeavours unstudied: I plunged into the literatures, the 
philosophies, the arts of all nations, not allowing myself to ignore any branch of 
knowledge, since I believed that a writer in our age must have as broad an outlook as 
possible. So, I exerted myself in an attempt to encompass the most important products 
of human genius.11 
 
The young al-Hakim did not explicitly convey this view in some of his early works 
such as al-Dayf al-Thaqil and ‘Usfur min-al Sharq. The reason for this, I believe, lies in the 
hostility towards the British occupation and the high sense of nationalism that was present in 
Egypt during this period. This attitude, naturally, overshadowed any of his interests, and he 
channelled his efforts towards protesting with the young minds of his generation. Yet, from the 
late 40s to the mid-80s, from al-Hakim’s work as shown in my chronology (see appendix 2 p. 
196), it is evident that his attitude developed and that there was a clear transition in his life and 
career. He moved from conveying in his writings a strong sense of nationalism towards an 
“openness” towards the West and to a conception of a “borderless thought”. And with such 
openness to Western ideas, he, as a writer and a philosopher, had in my view dramatically 
changed not only the course of modern Arabic literature, as did many of his generation, but 
also, he particularly changed the course of modern Egyptian philosophy.12 
Finally, any good researcher would know that one cannot delve into al-Hakim’s 
philosophy without the need to shed light on the factors that had affected his personality, career 
and reputation. This approach is vital because it will not only enable readers to understand 
clearly al-Hakim’s formation, transitions and the trends in his thought, but also it will formulate 
an essential foundation from which the next chapters will build on. For this reason, in the 
following chapter, I would like to share with readers some of the background information and 
influences on al-Hakim which I came across during my research. In doing so, my aim is to 
identify who he mixed with at the height of his intellectual career and in later life; secondly, to 
know more about his reputation and readership; and finally, to have a better grasp of the 
scholarly work that has been carried out on al-Hakim to date.13 By the end of this thesis, I hope 
                                                          
11 Tawfiq al-Hakim. (1943) Zahrat al-‘Umr, Cairo, p. 58 
12 Upon returning from France for the first time (1929), al Hakim found the Egyptian theatre hardly in existence. 
People paid less attention to plays and assigned a negative stigma to playwrights. He decided to change this with 
the help of a few of his colleagues in order to revive theatre. He wrote extensively and encouraged groups to hold 
theatrical productions. This means that during this period (till the late 1940s) al-Hakim was trying to revive a 
genre that was not appreciated by the people. He was met with criticisms from those who considered theatre to be 
solely a means of entertainment. His reputation during this early period was accordingly as a playwright. 
13 See survey of al-Hakim’s readership and a literature review in appendix 2, pp. 196-199. 
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it will become clear why al-Hakim emphasizes the necessity of a synthesis of ideas from two 
philosophical traditions, European and Islamic (Western and Eastern), which leads him to a 
conception of “borderless” literature or thought. His philosophical narratives raise the question 
whether these two systems of thought are as distinct as they may at first appear, and this goes 
hand-in-hand with a questioning of such monolithic categories as “Western” and “(Middle) 
Eastern”. With this in mind, through examinations and analysis, I hope that it will become 
apparent how al-Hakim, as a writer and philosopher, incorporated his doctrine of equilibrium 
in some of his dramatic works and philosophical narratives of this period.14 In defending his 
stand and doctrine against a few of the criticisms that he had received for making his beliefs 
public, I will analyse in my final chapter some of the main articles and scholarly work directed 
at al-Hakim in the hope that readers and scholars alike may find some inspiration from his ideas 
























                                                          
14 The philosophical narratives I wish to address are: Arini Allah (1953) Cairo; series of short stories. Al-Ahadith 
al-Arbaʿah wa-al-Qadaya al-Dunya allati Atharatha (1983) Cairo; series of religious dialogues. And finally, 



















The Equilibrium: My Doctrine in Life and Art 
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These pages are nothing but answers to a question. A brief answer to a very important question 
addressed to me by a serious reader. I have made my answer open to the public so that it may 
shed light on my published writings. After all, this work in particular embodies what I may be 
able to describe as my doctrine in life and art. You ask me what my philosophy in life and art 
is. You say that you have read all my books and have come to the conclusion that my work 
attempts to explain in general human nature in relation to the temporal and cosmic status of the 
universe, and in particular human nature in relation to the generations and environment of 
society. You also claim that this explanation suggests a position which can be called a doctrine 
if we were able to establish its foundations and norms, and here is what you ask me to clarify 
further. I must say that I was pleased with what you said and at the same time, amazed. I was 
pleased because I love a reader who attempts to explore me, and I was amazed because I had 
not thought until that day of what you suggested. The reason for this is, perhaps, that I hate the 
kind of art that is built on a doctrine, yet I do not mind a doctrine that is built on art because art 
is the free explorer of the secrets of the universe. This freedom of emotion, feeling, inquiry and 
thought have always been my primary tactic. Now that I have already expressed myself freely, 
the doctrine that can be extracted from such works does not harm me or chain me. And since 
you invite me to identify a doctrine or a position within my works, I will not decline. Based on 
your idea, I will thus speak on: 
Firstly: The status of the human being in the universe. 
Secondly: The status of the human being in society. 
First of all, what is a human being? This question is as old as human thinking, and will 
remain new as long as human thought remains in this world. Human beings- along with 
thought- prompts this question, and since the question has been asked, it must be answered. 
This answer is what sciences, philosophies, arts and literature attempt to express in changing 
forms and shapes. And no one can know the end result of these attempts because answers 
cannot be definitive when the question is a mystery. The question is a mystery because it is 
generated by two mysterious parents: the human being and thought. If centuries pass by and 
the questions “what is a human being?” and “what is thought?” are asked every day, could we 
then ever reach a final answer to these mysteries? I do not think anyone can reach a final 
resolution or a decisive answer. What is needed is the exertion of effort into observation and 
explanation, each from own angle, method and style. This is all that we are capable of and this 
is our sole duty. Our existence should not come to an end without us asking ourselves the 
question ‘what is a human being?’ and attempting to find an explanation. At this point, an 
assumption here comes into play to help us. We must assume certain facts and accept them in 
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order to be able to proceed in the darkness. Were it not for assumptions in philosophy and 
science, there wouldn’t have been any progress towards explaining any phenomena.  
I will assume, temporarily, that a human being does not need an explanation. He is that 
creature, known to us all, who lives on this globe. I will also temporarily assume that thought 
is the movement of self-consciousness in an orderly and continuous orientation: meaning 
logically. What are, then, the characteristics of this thinking creature who wonders about the 
truth of his nature? The first undeniable characteristic is that he lives on this earth. Then surely 
there must be a connexion or a shared characteristic between him and the earth. But what is the 
earth? We have come out of one difficult question with a more complex question. Let the most 
important feature of the earth be sufficient; it is a sphere that is in equilibrium or in harmony 
with a bigger sphere, namely the sun. If there is disruption of such balance, the earth will be 
engulfed by the sun or lost in space. This equilibrium is, therefore, the first truth of earth’s life. 
Is the phenomenon of equilibrium the primary truth of human existence? Let us look 
first at how a human being lives in terms of his physical life. He lives by breathing. But what 
is breathing? It is of course a balanced movement of inhaling and exhaling. If it is disrupted by 
a longer inhalation that is more than necessary and exceeds exhalation or vice versa, human 
life stops. If we then look at a human being’s spirituality, we find the same law applies. The 
spiritual life of a human being also has its own ‘exhaling and inhaling’ but it is referred to 
instead as ‘thought and emotion’, or in other words, as the mind and the heart. The right 
spiritual life is a balance between thought and emotion. In fact, what we call mental and 
psychological illnesses are nothing but an imbalance or disruption in their equilibrium; either 
through the expansion of feelings to such a point that thought is nullified or its function 
disrupted and a human being acts like a child, or through the domination of thought to the 
extent of impeding emotion, thereby human consciousness gets altogether muddled. We thus 
conclude that a human being is a creature who is both physically and spiritually in balance.  
The human being, however, is not the only creature that fits this description. All 
creatures that exist on this balanced earth are themselves in balance- just like the composition 
of their mother earth; such balance is the secret of all creatures’ life. Animals, plants and matter 
are all subject to the law of equilibrium in their biological, chemical and natural composition 
even from the perspective of modern science, which changed the beliefs of the 19th century on 
‘matter’. Modern science revealed with its theories on ‘matter’ and the ‘spectrum’ that what we 
describe as matter is nothing but strongly concentrated ‘energy’, and it has written new laws 
on the gravitational field between matter particles. Gravity is the foundation of equilibrium 
because it means the existence of two forces, while equilibrium means ensuring that two forces 
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exist without one engulfing the other.  
But let us leave the physical aspect of the human being to men of science. What 
concerns men of arts and literature is the spiritual side of the human being even if sometimes 
both sides seem interwoven. In fact, it is difficult, especially from the perspective of modern 
science, to separate what is material from that which is spiritual. What is even more difficult is 
to find a specific definition for the word ‘spiritual’. What we of course mean here by the use 
of the word is the common concept of the term in arts and literature, which is the meaning that 
refers to the intellectual and emotional life of the human being. If literature or art want to 
explain the human being, they shed light on his intellectual and emotional position towards the 
world he exists in, with its time, place, past, present, future, environment and society etc. The 
literary author or artist’s method for explaining the human being is different from that of a 
scientist or a philosopher. A literary author or an artist does not resort to a research method or 
explanation, but rather they resort to their talent in creation and imitation to form an image of 
the human being. More accurately, they form an image of the human being’s thought and 
emotion that may include implicit or explicit features and qualities that are able to aid scientists 
and philosophers in deducing facts and laws. 
Creativity and imitation alone are not sufficient to explain or provide an accurate image 
of the human being without inspiration from science and the general knowledge that exists in 
the age of the literary author or the artist. For example, Abou al-alaa’s or Shakespeare’s idea 
of the human being is at the same time a reflection of the common concept that was widespread 
in their age, based on the prevailing culture and its knowledge. The literary author or artist will 
not be able to define the position of the human being in his time, world, society or age if the 
relationship between literature and art is disconnected from the science and ideas that surround 
him. The role of the literary author or the artist is not merely to imagine these sciences or to 
personify these ideas. Their duty is to consider these sciences and ideas as resources which 
help them to freely construct a new image of the human being, inspired by their special ability 
to create, to observe and to imitate. When talking about imitation, I do not mean copying 
superficial appearances- but rather simulation of nature in its hidden laws, which an artist can 
detect with his refined emotions. This is how literature and the arts explain the human being. 
You may ask me after that: What is the explanation of a human being from the perspective of 
literature or art in our present age? The answer to this question will need volumes and volumes 
filled with views, doctrines and positions that have occupied people’s thought during the last 
century. I do not think that this is the topic of our conversation at the moment. What is required 
of me in my answer to you is to give you an explanation of a human being that is extracted 
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from my writings, isn’t that what you require? I will not refer to all the books or dwell on the 
details, for I am not embarking on general research but providing a personal view as a starting 
point to whoever it may concern. What is the general status of the human being in this universe 
as I have imagined it? This question ought to be divided into two parts that arise in every age: 
Firstly: Is the human being alone in this universe? 
Secondly: Is the human being free in this universe? 
The answer to these two questions requires determining the ramifications of what it is 
to be a human being and identifying the extent of his activities and his struggles. The new age15 
indeed provided an answer by showing us that the human being is alone in this universe without 
a competitor; he is the God of this existence with ultimate freedom. With this answer, religious 
teachings were demolished and the new age labelled itself with the seal of materialism.16 And 
even though religion remained in many developed countries and continued its message, 
preserving aspects of its strength; the majority of people, even those holding on to their rituals 
and the spirit of scriptures, have fallen victims to materialism without their awareness. Our new 
age is so imbued with materialism that no closed window or sealed doors can prevent it. Its air 
seeps into souls unaware. But what is the reason for this? The cause is obvious: the equilibrium 
that prevailed until the 19th century between the power of the mind and the power of the heart, 
i.e. between activities of thought and activities of faith, has been disrupted ever since the 
supremacy of rational scientific achievements and the continuing stagnation of religion. 
Science, begot by the mind, doubled its strength, renewed its means and widened its horizons; 
while religion, begot by the heart, remained restricted in its horizon and unable to discover new 
springs in the depth of the human heart that would be in counterbalance with new phenomena 
discovered by the human mind. With this imbalance, the new era has swung to the more logical 
side, which has led it to submit to the sole dominance of the mind. As a consequence, human 
beings define the concept of freedom according to their freedom of thought, and reject anything 
that cannot be proved with research and experimentation: hence denying a will other than the 
human will or the existence of another other than him, for he becomes the sole creature in this 
universe. The disruption of this balance has had a natural and inevitable consequence, namely 
anxiety. The widespread anxiety in many souls today emanates from the imbalance between 
                                                          
15 “The new age” is used by al-Hakim throughout his text to refer to the start of what he considers to be the 
beginning of “modernity” where vast scientific and technological advancements were made. This could go back 
to the late 18th Century. 
16 The author wishes to show that in “the material world” “religious teachings and spirituality” declined. 
Materialists in his view believe that the world is made up of a single substance, matter, the motions and properties 
of which could be used to explain all phenomena. This view contrasts his belief that there are unexplainable 
phenomena that are beyond human reach and understanding. 
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the mind and the heart,17 the intellect and faith. This imbalance must repair itself by itself over 
a period of time. There has been evidence over the years of this repair. The new era has 
renounced the notion of the human being as a sole creature in this universe. He has started 
longing for another creature that is superior. Religion, unfortunately, has not offered him a new 
framework for this idea that he desperately longs for. He has continued to wait and hope for a 
miracle to happen, but only within the realm of rational science that still dominates his thought. 
The interest today in flying saucers, and people’s hope that others are coming with a message 
from a better world and superior creatures, are nothing but a general breeze to cool the feeling 
that dried out with the parched spring of religion, to relieve humans of anxiety and to rescue 
them a little from their isolation in this universe. 
The disruption of balance between the mind and the heart within the framework of the 
question of time was the subject of my play Ahl al-Kahf.18 Also, the disruption of balance 
between absolute thought, personified by the character Shahrayar, and emotional faith, 
personified by the character Kamar, within the context of the question of place and its 
recurrence, was the subject of my play Shahrazad. The anxiety that a human being suffers from 
in the new era has another cause, which is associated with his immediate safety. He constantly 
lives in fear of his own physical destruction by his own doing. This cause is in itself a result of 
his intellectual and scientific triumphs. Man has developed tremendous and devastating 
material capabilities that could at any moment escape his control and become his own 
destruction. These capabilities are reined in only by his wisdom, but as he cannot guarantee 
this wisdom, he grows anxious for his safety and existence. Man lives day by day in this new 
era looking at the scale of equilibrium between power and wisdom with wondering restless 
eyes. This counterbalance between man’s power and wisdom, its stability and disruption, was 
the subject of my play Sulayman al-Hakim. From all of this, my point of view on the question 
of man becomes clearer. The human being’s predicament in this era is in my opinion a result 
of the disruption of his equilibrist composition. Thus, it is easy to envisage my answer to the 
two initial questions: Is the human being alone in this universe? And is he free in this universe? 
I have not published a straightforward opinion per se on this subject, and yet it seems 
that I have developed one according to a number of foreign critics who are usually interested 
in extracting such underlying themes. In their commentaries and research on my twenty plays 
that have been translated, most of them mentioned that the dominating philosophy in my plays 
                                                          
17 The heart, according to al-Hakim, is presented as having a cognitive component which not only counterbalances 
the force of the mind, but also is influential enough to alter one’s decisions and actions. 
18 Qur’anic story (that of the sleepers of Ephesus) 
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is that human beings have limited capabilities before their destiny, and that human fate, in my 
opinion, is always linked to man’s struggle against invisible forces. Some critics stressed this 
by claiming that, for me, beliefs have been liberated from their sacredness and become more 
mundane, but the human being has continued to be anxious and threatened by hidden forces. 
Whatever the case, it can be understood from what these critics wrote that they have concluded 
from my theatre that I support neither the notion of man’s solitude in this universe nor the idea 
that man possesses absolute freedom. And this indeed I do not deny. I feel deep inside me that 
the human being is not alone in this universe, and this is what I call faith. No one has the right 
to ask faith for an explanation or proof. Either we feel or we do not feel and it is not up to the 
mind to intervene here to prove anything. Those who resort to the mind and its logic to prove 
faith are, in fact, harming faith itself because faith needs no external proof. I believe that I am 
not alone in feeling this way, and I have not lost my faith because I am an equilibrist. Yet, on 
the other hand, I think with my mind, not to support my faith that I am not alone, but to present 
the issue to my mind independent of faith itself. Would the mind accept the notion of a superior 
being? Meaning a ‘superior being’ than a human being? One that is far ‘superior’ to a human 
being?  
Even animals of the highest rank do not recognise superiority but they are aware of the 
notion of power. The world, for these animals, is divided into: (a) weak creatures that they can 
defeat, (b) creatures that match their power and strength, or (c) stronger creatures that need to 
be avoided. Strength for animals is entirely physical. Human beings, however, are capable of 
recognizing with their minds the notion of superiority or in other words, of recognizing a being 
that is superior both, mentally and spiritually. They can see around them evidence of a powerful 
mental strength and a superior spirit a million times stronger than their own mind and spirit. 
So what is preventing human beings, then, from accepting the notion of a superior being? 
Animals have accepted the notion of power within their material and physical domain and 
avoid confronting the stronger. This avoidance shows the animal’s faith in the other’s 
existence, so why doesn’t the human being accept the notion of superiority in his mental and 
spiritual domain and believe in the existence of a superior being? My mind acknowledges the 
notion of superiority, yet it is incapable of creating a convincing and clear image that matches 
its majesty. This is because the mind can only create images that suit its logic, which is based 
on assumptions and observations that fall within its experiences. The mind will, thus, only 
create a familiar image of the superior; an image that is exceedingly personified based on the 
mind’s prior knowledge and perspective. And this will only produce a distorted image that 
devalues the idea, which is perhaps one of the reasons for atheism. We ask the mind to create 
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an image of God but it fails. Instead of laughing and mocking the mind, we laugh and mock 
the idea of a God. Let us then believe in the heart only, for this is its strength, and let us leave 
the mind thinking in its realm only, for this is its strength as well. This counterbalance between 
the two forces ensures the integrity of the human character.  
What remains for me to answer is the question: Is the human being free in this universe? 
We can only find the answer to this question in the two forces that are responsible for awareness 
and conscience, i.e. the mind and the heart. Each of them can provide an answer based on its 
own way, its own style and methods. The mind, before giving its view, will search, observe, 
compare and conclude. It will look at the bird skilfully building its nest and the bees’ wonderful 
activities in the hive and wonder in which school birds and bees learn these astonishing 
activities? Observation answers: the birds and the bees, and the majority of animals and insects, 
do not learn or train but are born with this deep seated innate knowledge called ‘instinct’. 
Instinct strongly drives and moves animals to create these miracles, and only then do the mind 
and the human being start to wonder why they are born incapable of building beautiful houses 
and planting gardens without being taught or trained to do so. Why is man born incapable of 
walking and speaking, and why doesn’t he innately carry his civilization within him like the 
bees and the ants? Why is he born left to his own devices, devoid of the prime instincts, in need 
of acquiring knowledge by himself step by step? Indeed, an animal is born bound with firm 
knowledge, i.e. instinct, and the human being is born unbound, i.e. free. He is the one expected 
to uncover knowledge over and over every time he is born. The solid knowledge that is innate 
in animals is an obligatory knowledge that they cannot avoid, abandon, change or renew in 
essence or in form. The beehive will remain a beehive until bees’ extinction. Bees cannot make 
a different hive, intentionally refrain from making one, or live to make something else. This is 
an obligation that is devoid of freedom. The human being, on other hand, is not obliged by any 
kind of knowledge that would chain, restrict or force him to do something all his life in a 
particular way that he cannot avoid, change or divert from. The bee is born with a specific 
knowledge of its role in life because its purpose is obvious and specific. A child, on the other 
hand, is born without anyone’s knowing what he will do in life because his purpose is unknown 
and undefined, unlike the bee and the ant. It is only the child’s behaviour in life that will be the 
determining factor. The mind, thus, deduces from this observation and comparison that the 
determinism that is imposed on the bees and ants to do specific tasks in specific ways is not 
imposed on the human being, who was left free to face his destiny. Yet, this freedom that is left 
for the human being - is it absolute or restricted? 
Perhaps the mind would agree with science, which is one of its sources and tools, that 
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human freedom is restricted, based on the freedom of movement in relation to matter. Newton, 
and Galileo before him, said that a moving body remains in motion in its course unless an 
external force intervenes. This is the famous law of self-limitation of matter, which can also 
apply to human freedom, meaning that human freedom remains in motion in its course unless 
an external force intervenes. And here we should ask the mind or science this complex question: 
what is this external force? From the viewpoint of the heart, or faith, the answer is simple. But 
the mind will always attempt to search for an answer in its material world, meaning that the 
mind will attempt to avoid the field of inner human emotion, which cannot be justified by logic. 
The mind will say that the external force is the sum of the direct or indirect external conflicting 
or resisting wills, in a simple or complex society. The mind can also resort to science to compare 
magnetic deviation and the deviations of the human will. It can also compare the field of human 
motion in society to that of electric magnetism in matter. The mind, therefore, comes up with 
explanations likely to be accepted by its factual logic for the external forces that affect the 
freedom of human motion. The mind may be persuaded, and even if it is not; it will continue 
to seek evidence and proof within its usual framework. As for the heart, it is persuaded without 
proof, as there is no need for evidence in the world of the heart and faith because proof here 
obviates persuasion. Persuasion itself is not a function of the heart because persuasion comes 
after doubt, but the heart does not doubt because it does not think, it feels; it suddenly lightens 
like a lantern. 
The human heart sometimes feels an emotion that cannot be explained; it is neither 
alone nor free in this universe. Do you not sometimes feel that someone somewhere is staring 
at you? And if you raised your head and searched, you would indeed find that your emotion 
was true. Have you ever noticed once or twice in your life that a particular incident happened 
to you on a certain occasion that changed the course of your life in a certain way? You attempt 
to link it to a coincidence, but you fail because an external will has intervened in an orderly 
manner emanating from an awareness that is conscious of what it does and knows what it wants, 
in order to provoke specific results that would not have happened were it not for this unexpected 
external intervention. An external will that has all the elements of a sage and intelligent will 
which descends on your ordinary will and changes its direction and paints for it a new path. 
Sometimes your mind, regardless of the stability and precision of logic it may achieve, refuses 
to submit such incidents to the usual and simple logical explanation. Advocates of the mind 
and science can only nod their heads in such instances: and, as for the stubborn and fanatical, 
they cling to their reasoning because, in their view, the mind alone is God. As for me, I believe 
in the mind, science and freedom of the human being; however, I cannot deny the heart and 
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faith. I do not blame the mind for doubting because that is its function, i.e. motion. For if the 
mind is cut off from doubt in undertaking research and making its laws and stops its dynamic 
stirring of facts and results, its work become paralysed and its life ceases. The heart’s function, 
on the other hand, is faith, i.e. stability. Let us then leave for the heart the stable truth that defies 
every solution and questions every explanation. Accordingly, my standpoint on human freedom 
is as follows: Man is free in his own direction until an external force intervenes; I sometimes 
call this ‘divine forces’. Thus, the freedom of the human will, to me, is chained exactly like the 
freedom of movement of matter. The chaining of freedom is a notion that does not appeal to 
the majority of Europeans today because, as I said, they have given too much credence to the 
mind, to science, and to thought which, only deifies the human being in this universe. The 
critics’ views were also evident in their commentaries that I have previously referred to. One 
of them has seen that my standpoint, although its conclusions do not contradict much of what 
modern generations suggest, expresses a doctrine that Europe has no right to mock. This critic 
said that my doctrine shows a tragedy of life that reveals the impotence of human freedom. The 
truth that I would like to confirm is that I am an ‘equilibrist’, meaning that man's will on one 
side is counterbalanced by a divine will on the other; and the human mind on one side is 
counterbalanced by faith on the other. With this equilibrium, man lives and operates. But before 
I developed and formulated my ideas based on the notion of equilibrium, I tried to explain my 
position about human freedom and his condition of solitude, as I wrote in my book Fann al-
Adab: 
I have observed and thought this issue through. The human being, to me, is not the God 
of this world and he is not free. He lives, desires and strives within a frame of divine 
will. This will, that sometimes reveals itself to human beings in hidden images in the 
form of barriers and chains, should be overcome through struggle. The prophets of the 
East themselves were sent by God and were challenged by obstacles put in their way. 
A prophet’s path is not paved; he strives to deliver his message in the midst of 
impediments in the form of people’s desires. Nowadays, the case of human freedom, 
as an individual or as a group, agrees and converges on the same conclusion: the denial 
of God and the denial of the hidden powers that affect human destiny. My feeling 
towards man’s impotence against the forces that affect his fate is not due to pessimism. 
And I do not see in European theories of human freedom from fate anything that calls 
for optimism. The contrary is correct. Deifying man alone on earth was, in my opinion, 
one of the reasons that led to today’s world disasters. The human being, who is free and 
God-like, with no companion and not ruled by fate, denying the presence of another on 
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earth and all powers other than his own, did not find guidance for his war drives and 
struggles aside from himself, so he turned on himself, fighting and destroying his own 
being. But, man's awareness of the superior powers that face him and affect his will and 
freedom pressure him in the end to gather his drives and activities of war and struggle, 
not against himself but against these dominating hindrances and invisible forces. I see 
man's impotence in the face of his destiny as an incentive for hard work and struggle, 
not for procrastination. Ahl al-Kahf strove against time, and one of the protagonists held 
onto life, fighting time with strong determination, with ‘heart’, till his last breath. 
Shahrazad strove to make her husband return to his senses as he renounced his land and 
dehumanized his actions. She struggled to restore his faith in his humanity. And 
Sulayman strove against the temptation of power, which almost silenced the voice of 
wisdom. This is how a human being always was to me: striving against hidden obstacles 
which affect his or her freedom, will and destiny. 
If the contemporary European literature had shifted in this direction and had called for 
summoning human power against the hidden obstacles that chain his true freedom, there would 
have been in such thought some solutions for the crisis of humanity in the last century. The 
crisis of the human being today is his fight against himself, for he has no competitor other than 
himself. In his pride, man can no longer see anything other than his absolute freedom. He no 
longer sees the others’ unseen powers that move his existence, manipulate his destiny, require 
his struggle and call for his thinking. European literature in this age does not want to take a 
direct, honest and sincere standpoint on the human being. Man has assumed, on the basis of 
this image, a theatrical costume of his fate and freedom, both with no limits, and has put a 
divine halo above his head, which shines deceptively. Regardless of the sincerity of his motives 
and the importance of his goals, there are consequences that threaten the truth of his insight. 
Now, that I have revealed to you my view-point on the position of the human being in the 
universe, on the basis that a human being conceives and feels the presence of a superior being, 
and realises that he has a free will within the framework of an external superior power, let us 
now move on to the status of the human being in society, his condition and awareness. What is 
this human being expected to create?  
He is, as I mentioned, not like a bee whose job is innate in it from beginning to end. 
No, all in all, he has been endowed with a thinking machine capable of growing, and a feeling 
machine capable of developing as well. What does he do and which direction does he take? 
Surely, he needs guidance and a model. This model is his realisation that a superior being exists. 
This realisation is his guide that leads him in his human path of life. This is his motive for 
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progress. This realisation of a superior being is not, to me, a simple religious doctrine but rather 
a human necessity, similar in status to that of animals’ realisation of the existence of stronger 
beings. Animals’ realisation of stronger beings is what leads them to discover the source of 
their own power, its development, and to prepare for the moment of confrontation and 
encounter. If we assumed that an animal lived alone on a desert island, felt secure in it, did not 
feel any other power other than its own, and did not feel the need to use or compare it to another, 
there would have been the potential for such a power to wither and disappear. For animals, the 
feeling of the presence of a stronger being stimulates power, just as the feeling of the presence 
of the superior, for human beings, stimulates transcendence. The evolutionary theory of 
Lamarck, Darwin and Spencer is not valid with regard to human existence without the 
realisation of the superior being. The growth of the human being’s mind and heart is a condition 
for this realisation according to the rule that dictates the evolution of the organ according to the 
function. This is the human necessity that I realised on the basis that the human being is not 
alone in this universe. This necessity is what leads him to realise himself, discover the sources 
of his mental and spiritual strength, and develop and prepare it to face those mysteries and 
hidden forces that impress his mind and enchant his core. In this realisation, discovery and 
development, the human being progresses and changes, to transcend his or her being stage by 
stage, individually and socially.  
The human being, indeed, has developed according to his realisation of the superior 
using his mind and heart. But the development of the heart’s faith has ceased, as I mentioned 
and the mental thought has continued to progress alone, making vast and impressive leaps 
which have caused the new age to forget the original form of a superior being, or the notion of 
the divine, for only the victorious mind is in sight. This imbalance of equilibrium between the 
development of thought and faith has obstructed the human path away from complete 
transcendence. This human path was also hindered by another imbalance between the 
development of the individual and the development of society. I have told you that the human 
being is not subject to the obligations that the ants and bees are bound by. A human being is 
created free, his work is conditioned and his direction is determined by the circumstances that 
tie him to life. And regardless of the presence of another force that affects the human will, this 
force does not obliterate the human free will in its many forms. As long as the human being 
has at least some degree of free will, he is responsible because responsibility stems from 
freedom. Unlike the human being, the bee or the ant is not responsible for its work because it 
was born with it.  
Whenever human responsibility is mentioned, good and the evil are mentioned. Good 
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and evil are the positive and the negative in the electricity of human relations. In my opinion, 
good and evil do not make sense for individuals; they only exist in a social context. For if we 
assume the presence of a person on an island, with no one else but himself and fruit trees from 
which he eats, then good and evil do not exist on such an island. But if we assume that another 
person landed on this island and they lived together, good and evil would be born to live with 
them. Perhaps one of them picks a fruit that the other desires or the latter forcefully takes it or 
steals it. In another case, one of them may fall ill and the other may nurse and help him. 
Goodness is, thus, an act of will that leads to benefiting the other, while evil is an act of will 
that harms another. Neither good nor evil exists without the existence of the other. Hence, the 
other’s existence is necessary, or in other words, the existence of society is vital for the 
existence of good and evil. Neither existed with the human being, but they existed with society; 
or to put it rightly, after the birth of society, and here I mean by “society” the coming together 
of two people or more. Here we should ask ourselves: which was born first, good or evil? In 
my opinion, good and evil are like day and night; they are counterbalanced without our 
knowing which is prior to the other. Perhaps evil was the original characteristic of a human 
being because it is connected to the basic human Conscience: which is the awareness of oneself 
and the love of oneself. This love of oneself is an instinct that is present in all living beings, 
including human beings. It drives them to fulfil their being even if it means harming others. 
And the more primitive and barbarian a society is, the more these instinctive drives are 
unleashed without consideration of harm caused to others. But society, in its development 
towards order, saw that harming others must be counterbalanced and equalised by an act of 
goodness, which is benefiting others. Whenever society is refined, benefiting others takes an 
important position amongst the general attitudes where goodness is championed and evil is 
loathed. Society knows that an act of goodness needs an invitation and encouragement because 
loving another being is much harder and more difficult for a human being than loving oneself. 
Goodness is the product of spirit and discipline, but evil is the product of instinct and nature. 
The consequence of a distorted commercial image that has presented the relationship between 
good and evil in an artificial fashion has caused social divisions between good and bad people, 
innocent and criminal. This division is to the benefit of neither the human being nor society. In 
consequence, this division has created an imaginary chasm between human beings and 
stigmatised a minority with a reputation that can never vanish. In addition to paralysing parts 
of society and making it impotent, this also contradicts the reality of things. One of the foreign 
critics has noticed that my theatre is based on defining a person’s positions not according to 
good and evil but rather according to truth and reality. That is true, for I have never created 
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persons who belong to absolute good or absolute evil. I refuse this idea and have always refused 
it in everything I have written. I have refused the idea of a heavenly form of absolute goodness. 
Review my short story Taryd min al-Jannah, where you will find that the prophets and 
messengers have themselves been exposed to God’s reproach, and God cannot be reproach 
goodness. 
The human being, to me, has a constant value that can be affected by changeable 
circumstances of good and evil, and health and illness. The person who can bring harm to 
another can also bring good to another person by committing a beneficial act. Hence, a person 
is neither good nor evil, and neither healthy nor ill in his normal circumstances. This is a state 
of equilibrium where there is a counterbalance between various changeable things. If a human 
being is in a state of illness, he is working on his treatment to regain his health. The human 
being is only a piece in a changeable world. No sooner does he fall into a specific condition 
than he starts moving towards another that is in opposition to or counterbalances it. He does 
not remain in one condition for long unless through artificial means. A person who remains in 
an evil condition more than is necessary and continues to harm others is in most cases the fault 
of society for hindering the person from counterbalancing an evil deed with an act of goodness. 
This is perhaps why I see that the notion of good and evil must change in the eyes of society. 
Society rather than taking an attitude of an avenger towards the evil doer must take the position 
of demanding a state of equilibrium, i.e. it must require him to do good deeds. On this basis, 
the notion of punishment must change. Punishing the evil doer by imprisonment, meaning 
depriving the person of freedom, is a wrong idea. Human freedom must always belong to the 
person and the price of crime must be paid, not at the expense of human freedom, but by doing 
positive work that matches and counterbalances the wrong actions. A person who commits an 
evil act, i.e. who commits a voluntary act that harms another, must pay the price in the form of 
a voluntary act that benefits another. If the wrong-doer pays the price by giving up smoking, 
food and having contact with his family and relatives, this will be a negative process that will 
bring no benefit to others. A wrong-doer will only suffer from the consequences that could lead 
him to lose his humanity and transform him into a human monster. In his confinement, he trains 
to retaliate against the community that stigmatised him as a criminal. This explains to us how 
prisons have been able to breed a dangerously skilful model of professional criminals, and 
continue to do so in different nations regardless of their sophistication. 
The notion of seclusion from society carries within it a danger for society. A society 
that excludes a person, even for a short period of time, transforms the person into a hostile 
enemy. The expulsion of evil-doers from society and gathering of them in one place forms a 
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tie between them and leads them to form a different society among themselves. This criminal 
society will be dominated by other teachings that conflict with general society’s social norm. 
This is how the process of division takes place in a single society where people are divided into 
either good or bad, according to law and norms and not according to reality and truth. For there 
are also amongst society guilty people and wrong-doers who do not get arrested or fall under 
the authority of the law. These members have led normal lives with their families and relatives 
in a society where they had full rights and freedom. Sometimes they commit acts of evil and at 
other times acts of goodness until one state takes over the other. If goodness prevails and 
benefits others, society approves of them, but if evil prevails, and they show harm to others, 
they are called to account. This account makes them professional criminals solely if it takes the 
form of imprisonment, as in the case we previously referred to: meaning a cage where monsters 
train to sharpen the claws of crime. Thus, my opinion is that we should rethink the method of 
judgement and punishment, except for the death penalty for intentional killing, for that must 
always remain; not because it is a punishment, but because it is a natural way. According to the 
laws of equilibrium, nothing counterbalances a human life other than another human life. As 
for the rest of crimes that a human being is punished for by being deprived of freedom, i.e. by 
imprisonment or captivity, they are the ones for which punishment should change based on 
balanced foundations. This balanced foundation should not be between freedom and evil but 
rather between good and evil. In other words, a person who commits an act that harms another 
must counterbalance the evil act with one that benefits others. Based on this notion, prisons 
should be abolished and instead of them factories and production units should take their place. 
Whoever commits an evil act should be sentenced to carry out an act that would benefit society 
without resorting to expulsion, exclusion from family and relatives or deprivation of freedom 
to lead a normal life. All that is asked of him is to pay the price of the evil action committed. 
The wrong-doer must produce for the benefit of society enough to counterbalance the evil he 
committed in terms of time, magnitude and quantity. This positive process is more beneficial 
for society than the negative and sterile notion of imprisonment. It is also dignifying for the 
guilty because it keeps him amongst society and family meaning in one’s righteous 
environment, leading towards repentance and in the direction of goodness.  
The presence of good and evil leads to the existence of conscience. Conscience is 
specific to human beings because good and evil are not known to animals. Animals may benefit 
or harm, but due to instinct and not will. When the will is absent, responsibility is absent as 
well, and when responsibility for good and evil is absent, their meaning is absent as well. 
Conscience, like good and evil, must exist with the existence of others, namely society. A 
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human being secluded on a deserted island lives without conscience because he lives without 
good, evil or the other. But what is conscience? Is it simply the feeling that identifies evil as 
evil and good as good? How can we describe the feeling of relief when one kills for revenge 
whilst aware that the deed he or she is committing is evil? Or the feeling of contentment when 
one steals from the rich to barely survive? There must be a necessary element for conscience 
to exist. This element is the feeling of personal guilt. It is an evil doer’s feeling that he has 
committed an act that harms another and this act is worth fixing. Conscience, thus, is one’s 
awareness of the evil that has been committed against another against another and has not been 
rectified. The guilty person who is punished for his crime or repents enough does not hear the 
voice of conscience in the depth of his soul. Conscience does not speak unless to remind one 
of the debts to others, or in other words to remind the soul that the evil that was committed 
must be counterbalanced by good. This feeling of restoring balance is according to ethics 
referred to as “justice”. Justice is the moralistic appearance of balance, and conscience is, thus, 
the feeling of justice, or more accurately: The self's feeling that justice has not been done 
towards others.  
Conscience is not only present in individuals, but it is also present in society. Society 
can also perceive a feeling that justice has not been done towards another party, or towards a 
particular group that has been harmed by another. Here, social revolutions occur to correct the 
situation and restore the state of equilibrium that is called justice or social justice. In the field 
of ethics, conscience individual or collective is the guard entrusted with calling for justice, i.e. 
balance. In the field of politics and economics, the guards are divine laws that work in their 
own way, like the laws of instincts for animals and plants. In international politics, there must 
always be balance: namely a counterbalance of power. Rarely in history has a single nation 
monopolized power in the world for a long time. When the Roman Empire almost ruled the 
world, it was divided into two forces, one in Rome under the rule of Octavius and another in 
Alexandria under the rule of Antonius. The same scenario repeated itself in the Christian age 
when the Western Roman nation took over Rome and the Eastern Roman nation took over 
Constantinople, and so on. And in internal politics there must always be equilibrium: meaning 
a counterbalance between the power of the ruler and the ruled. Even in the age of absolute 
government, the power of the ruled has always found itself an outlet or a way through the clergy 
or the intellectuals. When the people in modern ages were able to rule themselves, the power 
of absolute government was divided into various powers in the form of parties. These parties 
counterbalanced and checked each other so that they could exist and express the wills of those 
they represented. If a group triumphs in the end and engulfs all enemies from other groups and 
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social classes, uniting in a single power to include a whole nation, then this power is also 
responsible for the birth of a hidden conflicting power that is striving to come to the surface. 
Although this power may be suppressed, defeated or fail, it must one day exist, because the law 
of equilibrium that we see in the process of inhaling and exhaling is what applies here too. We 
can see its representation in the existence of the balance of movement which is the rule of life. 
In economics, the law of equilibrium is strict in its application. There must always be a 
counterbalance between supply and demand, just like the counterbalance between inhaling and 
exhaling. If supply increases beyond demand, the value of the merchandise vanishes. And if 
demand increases drastically compared with supply, the price of the merchandise increases and 
the market suffocates. Thus, equilibrium returns in two ways: either demand is increased so 
that the price counterbalances out and the natural movement of the market is restored, or the 
product becomes scarce allowing another law to emerge: namely the law of compensation. The 
law of compensation dictates that other merchandise, similar in function to the scarce one, will 
take its place in the supply market. The situation is somewhat similar in commerce where there 
is a counterbalance between imports and exports, and in the counterbalance of budget between 
revenues and expenses, and so on. The economy is nothing but a counterbalance between 
different factors that are always dynamic in a financial entity whether for an individual or a 
nation. Thus, if the equilibrium is disrupted for a short period of time, it must restore itself by 
itself on the basis of its own laws.  
Equilibrium has its own effective tool that it always uses in every aspect: whether in 
science, ethics, art, thought, politics, or economics, etc. This tool is what I call a “reaction”. 
Every action has its own reaction and this reaction is nothing but an attempt to restore a balance 
to an action that may have been exaggerated, disturbed or has exceeded its limitation. The true 
meaning of reaction is the re-balancing of an action that has veered to an extreme. Equilibrium, 
therefore, works according to two dynamic factors: reaction and compensation. The cases of 
compensation are amongst the obvious things that we see in all creatures. For example, every 
weakness is compensated with strength and every shortage is counterbalanced by a 
corresponding increase. The bee has delicate wings, yet it has a sharp sting. Also, a person who 
is heavy in weight and body mass often has a light sense of humour and spirit, while the one 
who lacks facial or bodily beauty is often rich in the beauty of the soul, mind or other qualities. 
Thus, equilibrium must take place in any possible form because, as we said, every action has a 
reaction and every shortage must be met by an increase to balance it. Evil and weakness, 
shortage and ugliness are all characteristics in creatures that cannot exist without their 
counterbalances. The problem is that the conscious creature the human being is the only 
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creature who often ignores this truth; if exposed to one of the latter cases, he falls into despair 
and cannot discover the counterbalancing forces that exist within him without his knowledge. 
At the same time an instinctive creature, an animal or a plant, will not despair or become static, 
but rather it will realise with instinctive knowledge where to find the balancing force. I 
previously referred to the role of intellectuals whilst talking about the balance between the 
power of the ruler and the ruled as the conduit through which the power of the ruled manifests 
itself in an era of absolute authority. This may invite us to wonder: what is thought and what is 
authority?  
For us to answer this question, we must go back to imagine the isolated person on a 
deserted island, and ask ourselves how this person spends his life. Without a doubt, this person 
must work in the day to provide food, clothes and shelter; for he picks fruit from trees, makes 
a hut from twigs and weaves clothes from fibre. In other words, he continues to perform the 
duties necessary for a material life. Yet, if the time comes for him to rest under the shade and 
gaze at the clear sky, he starts thinking of his situation, saying to himself: What then? Who am 
I and what is the meaning of my life? Am I satisfied? Indeed, I have beautiful things around 
me, but what is beauty? Is it my awareness of creation that fills me with joy? Since I am aware 
of such impressive creations, I am experiencing something else: longing. I long to be in a state 
that pleases me and fills me with joy, a better form, since I am aware of what is best for me. I 
do not entirely like my present, hence I criticise my situation. But what better form do I wish 
to be? Firstly, this hut must become more spacious and higher so I can contemplate the sea 
from it. I also have to swim in the sea. Therefore, I need to build a boat, because by making a 
boat I would be able to know about everything around the island and its beaches. I may even 
be able to discover another nearby island, etc. This is the thought process, and such thinking 
may drive this man to action the next day to fulfil indeed all or some of what he thought about. 
He may face hindrances or difficulties that divert him from fulfilling his ideas. In this case, 
mere daily work seems sufficient, and the person sits mocking his thoughts and criticising 
himself for questioning his situation. Therefore, either thought succeeds in driving action, or 
action succeeds in suffocating thought. 
If we assume that another person has landed on the island, creating a small community 
with the two living side by side, one stronger in action and the other in thought, what would 
happen? There is no doubt that one would influence the other. This influence would differ in 
extent and character according to the dominance of each of them. Either action dominates 
thought and makes it submit to its will, or thought dominates action submitting it to its will. 
Alternatively, the dominance of each towards the other is kept in balance, avoiding an unfair 
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unilateral dominance. If we moved from a small community on an island to bigger communities 
of nations and societies, we would find a struggle between these two forces, the force of action 
and the force of thought: a struggle which constitutes a big part of human history. Action, since 
the olden days, is represented by the material authority that is indeed responsible for people's 
affairs. Thought, on the other hand, is represented by the spiritual authority that perceives, 
criticises and opens for the people new horizons that may lead to human development. Perhaps 
the first manifestations of the authority of action are kings and the authorities of spirituality are 
clergymen. The conflict between the two, the authority of action and the authority of spirituality 
is known since the olden days. Intellectuals, from philosophers, poets and scientists to writers 
and artists, because of their weakness, poverty and disunity, may in the olden days have had to 
serve the rich and the powerful, mostly kings. The clergy, however, continued to strive until 
their dominance weakened with the weakness of religion itself, especially in the modern ages, 
as a result of scientific progress and the decline of spirituality. Scientific and mental progress 
has restored the lost authority of intellectuals. Intellectuals consequently began to emerge as an 
independent power in a democratic framework which submitted kings, enlightened people and 
enabled intellectuals to acquire an intellectual legacy which guaranteed their continuation. The 
new era was no longer an era of struggle between kings and clergies. What happened in our 
present day then to the power of action and thought? The answer to this question sums up the 
spirit of the present age. The power of action today is represented by rulers from the people 
themselves, who reach power through parties and elections. And whether the authority is in the 
hands of various parties who act as representatives, or in the hands of a single party that 
dominates it alone, the nations today rule themselves by themselves. When it is said that a 
nation rules itself, this means of course that it has chosen its ruler from amongst its people. 
These individuals are those who represent the action force. This modern situation has not 
changed the hidden feeling that action has towards thought. The power of action, represented 
in “implementation”, always hates and fears the power of thought, represented in “criticism 
and guidance”. Action, in every era, attempts to oblige thought to obey. In the era of royalty, 
when the clergy were the ones who criticised and guided the ruling of kings, the kings always 
strove to quiet the loud voices of dissent which were against their will. Sometimes they are 
willing and submitting, other times, they are threatened and afraid, and other times they seize 
forcibly spiritual power and declare that they are the true heads of religion. 
In the new age, thought is exposed to danger, but in a new form. Democratic ruling, or 
the rule of the people, cannot in all cases forcibly suppress the voice of free thought, but it can 
repeal it by luring it into the practical political arena. Whenever an intellectual enters such an 
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arena, criticism, guidance and explanation are repealed and he becomes part of a specific 
system that he follows, adheres to and obeys. Only then can a political party avoid free thought 
that defies its will, and gain an obedient soldier who conforms to its orders. This luring of 
thought in order for it to fall into the arena of action takes place in the modern age through 
skilful traps. These traps come in the form of literary and philosophical theories that all lead in 
the end to thought submitting to action in such a way that it becomes detrimental to its survival, 
or subjecting to it in a way that eliminates its self-identity. Some of the leading authors of these 
theories are intellectuals who did not intend to harm thought, they themselves have diverted 
due to various influences. One of these influences is their nostalgia for the power of work which 
caused them to lose trust in the power of thought, especially in an age where materialism has 
reached its peak and where wars have ravaged values and shaken systems. The destructive 
effects of all this have penetrated the hearts of groups and individuals, and every individual on 
earth has become eager to find a solution for this problem and an answer to this question. 
Intellectuals, consequently, feel that their mission has become more burdensome and their 
responsibilities have increased. They fear that the pen in their hands is not sufficient to provide 
adequate solutions. This shaken faith in the power of thought has led some intellectuals to 
follow one of the parties. This transforms the intellectual into a man of action whose thought 
changes as he becomes an advocate for a specific political party. Other intellectuals find 
themselves in confusion, torn between different parties and striving in multiple fields, in 
relation to multiple concerns and disappointments. Intellectuals end up either forming a party 
of their own where they can confine their thought, or they hire their thought out or they donate 
it to the service of all political and governmental fields. In all these scenarios, we see the 
intellectual weakened, doubtful and defeated. He abandoned his position in fear, rushing to join 
the scientific authorities. In this way, we see the intellectual forsaking his true message which 
considers thought an independent force equal to and in counterbalance with the force of action. 
This counterbalance between the two forces is invalidated if one engulfs the other. Since the 
olden days, the fear has always been for thought because action (or governance) is the strongest 
and it has always tended to engulf thought. The duty of the intellectual, therefore, is to preserve 
the entity that maintains the existence of thought, to protect its independence and freedom, and 
to defend it against the enemy, because it is the only guarantee on this earth today that can stand 
against the deviation of the power of action which is both dominating and devastating. 
But does the freedom of thought and its independence mean that it becomes isolated 
and separated, as has often been asserted? No, independence of thought is one thing, and 
isolation is another. The isolated individual is not affected nor does he affect, since he is a non-
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living being with regard to others, namely society. As for thought that is isolated from action, 
it is similar to thought that has been engulfed by action; neither exists. What is meant by 
independence of thought is that it has its own special existence and will in opposing action so 
that it can be influenced with it and by it. You may ask me: Why do we separate thought from 
action? Can they not merge together and unite? My answer is that this is impossible because 
when they merge and unite, they become one thing, which is action. 
Let us consider a simple example. You are thinking of travelling to the countryside for 
pleasure. If you indeed travel, your thought has changed into an action. If you do not travel, 
then what happened is merely a thought. If thought merged and united with action, this means 
that you have travelled: namely thought became an action. There is no longer thought and 
action, but only action because thought would have ceased and been engulfed by the action. 
You may say that: Every action is the result of a previous thought. That is correct. Action is a 
thought that has been frozen into action, or a will that has been frozen in a final form. Thought 
is a manifestation of free will and is dynamic, adaptable and evolving. When you think of 
travelling to the countryside for pleasure, you can change this will and move it progressively 
as you wish, but if this will is transformed into action by the act of travel, then the thought that 
was free and dynamic has become fixed by its very implementation. An action is a will that has 
frozen, has taken shape in accordance with and become committed to an exclusive mode. 
Commitment, thus, is one of the characteristics of action and freedom is one of the 
characteristics of thought. And thought that is committed becomes an action. This is exactly 
what happens in political and social parties, as manifested in the parties' programmes: namely 
political or social doctrine is thought that has become tied or committed to a single party. An 
intellectual joining a specific party means that he or she is tied down or committed to the 
thought of this party; such a commitment conflicts with the freedom which is the heart of his 
or her intellectual message, because his or her commitment to the party’s principles deprives 
them of the exercise of the intellectual authority of control and review. This free authority is 
the basis for his or her true responsibility. In this case, he or she must choose from different 
scenarios: either to submit to the party willingly and give up being an intellectual to become a 
man of action, or to persist and persevere in the role of an intellectual and continue to question 
the party's thought, to guide it and develop it freely as part of the responsibilities of a free 
intellectual. In this case, the intellectual would find that he or she has become separated from 
the party, disqualified or rejected. 
The weakness of most intellectuals in the present age, that is, their collapsed faith in 
their message and its influence, has tied thought to the wheel of action and meant that their 
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pens are at the service of governments as the balance and equality between these two forces 
has become disrupted. Perhaps the disruption in balance between the power of thought and the 
power of action is one of the reasons for the disasters that threaten this new age. In the absence 
of an opposing spiritual or intellectual power that restores things to their rightful form, the 
dominance of the power of action in this world and its inclination towards enslavement, 
occupation, control and destructive wars is without a doubt one of the world’s important 
sources of anxiety, filling spirits with a feeling that leads people into the abyss. Now, we are 
aware of the two poles of human activity, which are thought and action. We asked: Why does 
each of them have to keep its individual power in accordance with the doctrine of equilibrium, 
until balance occurs between them? This is because balance is what reins them in, restrains 
them and prevents the tyranny that spoils human being. Let us limit the conversation here to 
the subject of “thought”, or more specifically to the area that concerns us the most, which is 
literature and art. Here, we also find that the doctrine of equilibrium assesses literature and art 
on the basis of two forces that must be in counterbalance, which are the powers of expression 
and explanation. The impact of literature or art is not complete in its creation or duty unless 
there is a counterbalance between the force of expression and the force of explanation. But 
what is meant here by expression? Is it the style? No, it is not only style but something more 
than that. Let me give you a simple example: 
Let us assume that you heard a story told by two different persons, one spoken in 
layman’s terms and the other spoken with sophistication and skill. This same story, hence, took 
two different forms. In the first case, the story is told as an incident whilst in the second; the 
incident took a lively form and seemed colourful, lively and dynamic. This is the power of 
expression. It is not, however, merely based on the style of presentation or emphasis, because 
style cannot stand alone without the incident itself. Expression, then, is not simply the form but 
the form and content together. It is the form and the content shaped into it. It is the story and 
the style in which the story is told. Style without the story does not mean anything in itself, nor 
does it express anything. Expression, thus, requires style and content together, because for one 
to express something there must certainly be something to express in the first place. The power 
of expression is, thus, a balance between the power of style and the power of content. If one 
overcame the other, one would feel right away that something was wrong. A skilful style and a 
trivial content trigger a feeling of artificiality. And the word “artificiality” here is not used 
metaphorically or simply as a literary description, but rather with an almost material meaning. 
The literary author or the artist who exaggerates in highlighting a trivial topic creates something 
unnecessary, like a person who dresses into a party dress just to sit alone in a room to eat a loaf 
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of bread. Artificiality is as ugly in style as it is in life, because the condition of aesthetics is that 
it triggers in the soul a feeling that springs naturally. The skill of the artist is always to bring 
about such a natural feeling. If people feel that the artist's source of beauty is an artificial one, 
he or she has failed. The same applies if the topic overshadows the style. A great topic in a 
weak style triggers a feeling of lament, just like a person who inserts a pearl in a ring made of 
tin. Hence, the imbalance in both cases between the power of style and the power of content 
causes a feeling that the situation is not natural. You may ask: What is style in literature and 
art? And what is content? A style is one's own special way of impressing the other with feeling 
and thought; the other must see, feel and understand what you intend. 
This method in literature and art is based on aptitude, acquired learning and personal 
effort. There must be some talent alongside a thorough study of past and present styles and 
methods. Finally, there must be one's individual action of balancing between imitation and 
creativity. Excessive imitation makes you add nothing to your predecessors, and excessive 
creativity makes you sever the ties between you and the others, breaking your work from the 
natural cycle of the life of literature or the history of art. This is what Shakespeare and 
Beethoven did with respect to creativity and imitation. The subject of literature and art is all 
that you can use to raise people's awareness, without exaggeration, frivolousness or tackiness. 
There are no specific features of a great or trivial topic. A topic’s value depends on the author 
or artist’s appraisal. Either of them, the literary author or the artist, may address with great 
magical talent a topic that we, the public, may consider trivial and present it with a pen or a 
brush or hammer or a musical note as something that may interest people of the present 
generation and the generations to come. A topic has no specific feature that determines its 
greatness or triviality until after it is in a literary or an artistic frame. A flower, a vase or an 
apple may be a great or a trivial topic depending on how the artist deals with it, in other words, 
depending on the artist's experience, feelings and ability to reach the truth behind things, or 
according to the method that the artist chooses to use. For example, the story of Hamlet could 
have been presented by a normal author in a trivial way, or as humorously and lightly as the 
story of The Merry Wives of Windsor, if Shakespeare had chosen it as a subject for his frivolous 
comedy instead of an intellectual play. Shakespeare, thanks to his artistic instinct, was aware 
of the significance of balance between style and content, for if he wanted to present something 
in a serious style, he adapted his plays accordingly, while if he wanted to present something in 
a humorous manner, he adapted his style to present fewer of his complex ideas. When 
Shakespeare wanted thought to shine as a pearl to cast light on truths about the universe, he 
would present it in a profound stylistic foundation. Yet if he wished to bring laughter to his 
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audience, as he believed that laughter can ease the troubles of life, he would use a gentle and 
simple style. 
If Shakespeare had done the contrary and written Hamlet in the style of The Merry 
Wives of Windsor, he would have been like a jeweller who cannot tell the difference between a 
jewel and a ring. What is meant by style here is not solely of course the language used, but also 
the forms of images and styles it carried within it. The artist’s style, or character, is without a 
doubt constant in its general features, yet it changes in its consistency or density according to 
the artistic work it produces. The character of Shakespeare is the same in all his work, but the 
density in his style differs from one play to another. In Beethoven's case, the character of his 
music is the same yet again the density differs in some of his symphonies. The density, 
gentleness, depth and lightness are all factors that change like day and night, autumn and spring, 
depending on the artist and without any logical order. Some may believe that an artist ought to 
start his or her life with humour and end it with depth. An artist, however, is not subject to any 
logic; Shakespeare, for instance, after impressing us with his depth in Hamlet, made us laugh 
in All's Well That Ends Well; while Beethoven not only presented a philosophical spirit in his 
great fifth symphony, but also merged the eighth symphony with a light gentle breeze. The 
artist, hence, does not follow a straight line, since progress in his or her view is not the direct 
transformation from good to better or from deep to deeper. Similar to nature’s progression, an 
artist’s progress is a product of personal experimentation in accord with the laws of action and 
reaction. In other words, a progression through mixed experimentations that reveals one's 
capabilities in different ways. An action and a reaction are both tools of experimentation that 
reveal possibilities, not only for the human being, but for all creatures as well. 
Trees, for instance, transform from a green colour in spring to a fading colour in 
autumn, then return again to green and so on. It may seem to us that the tree revolves around 
itself. The revolving motion is in itself a proof of life, as it is the force behind progress: meaning 
a progress that appears in successive generations of trees. The situation is similar to the status 
of the earth and other planets. Life does not progress in a straight line, but rather it revolves 
firstly around itself, and then around the sun. Yet, life follows an order in the cosmos amongst 
other celestial bodies. This also applies to humanity since civilisation moves forward by action 
and reaction; sometimes civilisation falls into darkness or returns to light in a similar motion 
to that of night and day; regardless, it continues towards progress. The word “progress”, 
therefore, does not mean in relation to human nature, thought and art the process of moving 
forward, steadily and directly, but rather a progress through experimentation and hindrances 
due to actions and reaction. All human beings, earth and planets progress whilst revolving. We 
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reach tomorrow through a revolving path similar to that of night and day, darkness and light. 
This notion of progress accordingly is evident in my play Shahrazad. Even though who could 
possibly know the truth of what we call light and darkness, rise and decline, depth and 
shallowness, density and gentleness, they may all well be, with their differences, necessary 
movements for life to be called “life”. And also, it may all well be in the field of literature and 
art, necessary elements that contribute to forming “expression”.  
 The skill of expression for a literary author or an artist cannot reveal all its rays, colours 
and tunes if only a single note is played no matter how strong, eloquent and pure the note is. 
What would we have preferred and what would human art prefer? Is it for Shakespeare to have 
produced plays similar to Hamlet in style, thought and sophistication? Or would we have 
preferred Shakespeare to have articulated for us a variety of expressions where there was 
humour, philosophy, poetry and sarcasm? Shakespeare’s greatness stems from his ability to 
have presented all genres and skilfully mastered the manner of expression whereby he produced 
every colour, tone, sound and, laughter; this is what “expression” really means. Its power 
resides not only in its sophistication, but also in its amplitude. Expression, without a doubt, is 
everything from the perspective of art. It is not; however, everything from the standpoint of the 
equilibrium doctrine, as the power of expression must be in literature and arts in tandem with 
the power of explanation. But what is explanation? 
It is the light that is shed on the situation of the human being in the universe and in 
society. Equilibrist literature or art must have a balance between the power of expression and 
the power of explanation. The power of expression alone is not enough, because it may reveal 
simply its own existence and may not shed light on the existence of any other. The power of 
expression is similar to a pearl, its beauty is trapped and shines on nothing else but itself. It is 
not like a shiny diamond that would sparkle in the dark to reveal things other than its own 
presence. The literary author or the artist may express life, but not explain it; he or she may 
describe the way it is or its beauty in an artificial fashion or intentionally distort it. In all these 
cases, the artist may sometimes want playfully to experiment with expression and at other times 
may want to use it for publicity. But stopping at the limitations of expression is not the role of 
an equilibrist literary author or artist because expression alone, with its heightened literary and 
artistic value, may confine the targets of literature and art in a disciplinary spiritual frame or as 
personal entertainment. No matter how noble and adequate these targets are, what is required 
from the literary author or the artist, especially in the modern age, is to stretch their message 
further beyond this frame. What is required from the artist is to refine, entertain and, at the 
same time, shed a revealing and guiding light on the path of humanity. 
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Literature or art must be expressive and explanatory: meaning that in a work of 
literature or art, both the power of expression and the power of explanation are 
counterbalanced. If the power of expression overcame explanation, a vital part of the literary 
author or the artist’s message would not reach the public. And if the power of explanation 
overcame expression, the very essence of literature and art would be threatened. Therefore, in 
short, a literary author or an artist must first find a great and skilful style before looking into 
the message that he or she will convey. A literary or artistic work would be complete only with 
the presence of expression which includes style and subject, or form and content. As for 
explanation, it is a message that a literary or artistic effect expresses to humanity to present the 
artist or the author’s view on the situation of the human being in the universe and society. Not 
every literary or artistic effect carries an explanation or a message. The impact of literary or 
artistic messages was simply through the greatness in their expression. Al-Buhturi, for instance, 
uses expression, whilst Abu al 'Alaa combines both, expression and explanation, because much 
of his poetry bring to us his view on the status of the human being and his fate. And Shakespeare 
in his flirtatious poetry uses expression, while in his plays like Hamlet and others he combines 
both, explanation and expression. Beethoven's Moonlight Sonata is expressive, while in his 
third symphony he conveys to us his view on human beings and heroism, in the fifth symphony 
he presents his thought on the human condition and destiny, and finally in the ninth symphony 
and many of his concerts, he wants to express to us more than just a fine melody. Expression 
alone can lead to “art for art's sake” if one exaggerates beauty of the form and the sophistication 
of the construction at the expense of meaning and content. Expression alone can also lead to 
“committed art”, if one exaggerates by committing to a specific meaning or a specific content 
and not to freedom and independence. Art for art's sake is imprisoning the artist in the skeleton 
of form and committed art is imprisoning the artist in the prison of content. Prison in both cases 
prevents the artist from delivering his message fully, a message that always springs from 
freedom to promise freedom. 
You may ask me after that: Does freedom in literature or in art conflict with 
commitment? Isn't the literary author or the artist committed to an opinion that he defends and 
delivers to people? As long as we say that literature and art are expressive and explanatory in 
the message they carry to humanity, how can a message be without commitment in its delivery? 
Without a doubt, carrying a message surely means that one is committed to delivering it: and 
yet the difference is always the source of the message that the free artist or author ought to 
carry. Is it right for the free intellectual to carry a message that was issued by the authority of 
action? In this case, he is merely a geared machine, not a thinking tool. And if the free thinker 
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believes in this message, is it possible for him to commit himself to it? In my opinion, the 
answer is yes. But from another perspective: long-term faith is an infirmity for thought because 
correct thought is dynamic thought. This dynamic movement of thought means its freedom to 
doubt, namely freedom to review values and conditions. Hence, to what extent is the 
intellectual allowed to review the message that he is committed to carrying? If he is told: You 
cannot review, discuss or analyse what you committed to, this means that thought is abolished 
and is replaced by faith. We are then facing a problem: long-term commitment to a specific 
opinion leads to faith, and faith leads to the disruption of thought. My opinion is that thought 
must be dynamic for the intellectual to be present. If the intellectual decides to rethink and 
question his commitment, then he is released from this commitment. Therefore, when an 
obligatory opinion springs from an authority of action, dominating authority, the questioning 
of commitment is not permitted or encouraged. In this situation opinion becomes a quasi-faith. 
Faith in Holy Scriptures, however, is acceptable because it is all concerned with a higher topic 
in a different realm than thought. When we believe in the idea of God, we accept the disruption 
of the nature and judgement of our thought and we confine ourselves to the realm of faith. This 
is due to our belief that our human knowledge is not an adequate tool to recognise the laws of 
that which is above humanity. Why is our thought disrupted when faced with a ruling authority, 
or the authority representing action in the country, and why do we commit to the authority’s 
views, believing in it with a faith that does not accept scrutiny, discussion or review? 
Long-term commitment, therefore, when in relation to human authority, is a kind of 
faith that must not be imposed by one human being on another. As for the commitment that is, 
in my view, allowed for an intellectual, an author or an artist, it is one that does not disrupt free 
thought or stop it from discussion or review at any time, whether this commitment emanates 
from a specific or general message, or is addressed to the whole nation or a specific party. I 
have presented before my standpoint regarding the notion of commitment in literature. I said 
in my book Fann al-Adab that the author must be free. If an author sold his opinion or restrains 
his soul, he loses right away the status of an author. Freedom is the well-spring of art and 
without freedom, there would be no literature or art, because whoever were to say to an author 
or an artist “commit to this otherwise you will regret it”, it would be the end for the artist. The 
author or artist’s commitment is something that springs free from the depth of the heart. If 
commitment did not spring freely from his heart, environment and beliefs, neither you nor any 
power in the world can bind him. Commitment must be part of the author or artist’s essence. 
In my opinion, a fruitful commitment is one that springs naturally, here commitment does not 
conflict with freedom. You may ask me to what extent my opinion here conforms to what I 
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have written. I would tell you to go back to my book Fann al-Adab. I mentioned in it that the 
situation is very different in relation to my personal production, as even though I call for 
freedom, much of my written work is committed literature. Since I started writing, I have not 
ever tried to create for myself a beautiful style characterised by an abundance of terminologies, 
but rather a good explanation which appeals to the reader. This style of “art for art's sake” is 
something that I have not thought of practising. I wanted to use the style to serve other aims 
and not just for entertainment. These aims, as clearly appeared to people, were national, popular 
and reforming in ‘Awdat al- Ruh, ‘Usfur min al-Sharq, Yawmiyat Na’ib fi al-Aryaf and Masrah-
al- Mujtama’ and so on. It was a doctrine that was attached to human destiny in Ahl al- Kahf, 
Shahrazad, Sulayman al-Hakim, Pygmalion and Al- Malik Udib etc. These plays were not 
written to reveal the beauty of legends per se, as in the case of Majnun Layla of Ahmad Shawqi 
which revealed the beauty of poetry, feelings and emotions and showed the greatness of art for 
art's sake. These legends and tales were tools to convey another aim, namely the special case 
of the human being and his destiny. I personally did not write only to express, but also to 
explain. Perhaps Awdat al- Ruh represents the life of a humble family in the district of al-
Sayyidah Zeynab, where lively personas live in the heart of the environment, which seems 
sufficient to be art because creating life is art. I committed myself, however, to providing a 
specific explanation for the Egyptian spirit. My tale did not simply end in expression and 
description of an environment of personas, but rather it took a position that reflected a certain 
opinion. This opinion has been grasped by foreign critics from different angles. One critic in 
particular, Jean Destieu said: 
We are dealing with a work that has been characterised by Moris Price19 as a tale of 
national activity that has only a single explanation which is that the returning spirit is 
the ancient spirit of the Egyptian peasants in the countryside. 
And the left-wing author Marcel Martinet said: “It is apparent that there are some 
elements of a kind of literature that is aimed at under privileged classes or at least, without a 
doubt, a popular literature.” The writer Therese Mirbane said that “the book 'Awdat al-Ruh is 
not a product of imagination, but rather a work that describes the social condition of a nation 
at rapid development.” Awdat al-Ruh is not a tale that describes life, as it is a tale that explains 
life. For an author to explain the lives of people, he or she must take a specific standpoint 
towards these people. The notion of ancient sediments that accumulated over many 
                                                          
19 I attempted to transliterate as close as possible all foreign names mentioned by the author in the original Arabic 
text but some were misspelled and so may be different from what I have restored to using here. 
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civilizations in the hearts of Egyptian people, and created in them a hidden force that comes to 
their aid in crisis and return spirit to them whenever they are in danger of evanescence or 
breakdown, is a notion that was espoused by the story's character which, as the critics noticed, 
was in the field of action, namely in politics. This explanation, or opinion or standpoint taken 
towards the government and the governed, was also evident in Yawmiyat Na’ib fi al-Aryaf. This 
work does not simply convey the life of the Egyptian peasant. As mentioned in the British 
magazine The Spectator: 
In this book, about social corruption, there is more than denunciation. And similar to 
what happened to Russian authors in the 19th century20 and with the author, Dickens, an 
Egyptian writer feels that mere sympathy or compassion is simply not enough. 
From the comments that I have referred to, you can find an answer to your question and 
know my standpoint from my books as you requested. And here I will also mention a comment 
from a critic concerning one of my intellectual plays that reveals the human being’s impotence 
in front of his destiny. The critic saw that the human being’s situation in life has already been 
skilfully highlighted by Sophocles in King Oedipus, and furthermore Shakespeare has also 
skilfully presented this in Romeo and Juliet in a perfect form. The Gods willed to destroy King 
Oedipus, and fate directly intervened in the form of continuous coincidences to separate Romeo 
and Juliet. The critic said that in my work, however, there was no direct intervention either in 
the form of divine will or as accidental chances, but rather hidden forces in a natural course of 
motion which limit the human will. The law of time, for instance, in Ahl al-Kahf, functions 
naturally without changing its course or returning 300 years to reunite the characters, Mishlinya 
and Prisca. The power that separated Mishlinya and Prisca is not the divine power that 
separated Romeo and Juliet and caused coincidence to play its part, firstly by Romeo killing 
Juliet’s cousin and then by the plague's outbreak that stopped the messenger from delivering 
the message to Romeo, which of course led at the end to a tragedy. The tragedy that is in Ahl 
al-Kahf is due to a natural force, namely time or the new society. Prisca realises that it is 
impossible for society to accept the idea of her reuniting with a man who lived 300 years ago. 
This power of society is also evident in my play al-Malik Udib, as when Udib was informed 
that he was married to his mother, he could not imagine it, because he has seen her simply as a 
woman in her full maturity. Like Mishlinya, Oedipus wanted to persevere, survive the 
challenge and preserve his family, but Jocasta, like Prisca, was not able to bear this idea. The 
laws of society embedded in the depth of her heart judged that she should fade away, so she 
                                                          




Human will to me, therefore, is free, yet within specific limitations. These limitations 
are laws and standards, but not tyrant wills or accidental chances. The human, to me, is indeed 
impotent in front of his destiny, which he must overcome. If someone watches these plays 
closely, he or she will find this is what Mishlinya is trying to do, and striving to convince Prisca 
to ignore the consequences of time. We find that, firstly, Shahrayār challenged all the laws by 
his attempt to destroy humanity. Sulayman challenged the law of love by entering the heart of 
Belkis, Queen of Sheba. Udib challenged society by continuing to be a husband to his mother 
and finally, Pygmalion challenged the Gods by destroying the statue that the Gods breathed 
spirit into and he considered as ruined artwork. None of these persons has surrendered to his 
destiny without a challenge and a struggle. They have been forced to give up in the end because 
the dominating powers are not man-made. Struggle always remain, even if against the 
impossible, it is the duty of mankind. 
Explanation in literature or art is, thus, the focus of responsibility, because it is the 
opinion and the standpoint, and as long as there is an opinion, there is a commitment towards 
it and responsibility for it. As for expression, it is free, like life itself, only if it does not limit 
itself by exaggeration in form, which transforms it to art for art's sake; or if it does not trap 
itself in a specific content to become committed art. Here, you may think of the question: What 
is the difference between commitment in expression and commitment in explanation since each 
of them leads to committed art? My answer is: commitment in expression may not reflect a 
specific opinion. The standpoint here is simply linked to a specific topic, as if the author or 
artist presents a certain social class that he does not divert from. You do not get from this image 
or creation in this specific environment any personal direction or personal opinion, or namely 
an explanation in itself. Commitment in explanation is not limited by the topic, but limited by 
opinion. The writer or artist here deals with different topics and presents different social classes, 
but you reach at the end of his work a specific explanation, opinion, standpoint or direction. 
And as I said: as long as there is opinion, there is always responsibility. But responsibility, as 
we know, only stems from freedom, because the restricted person has no responsibility. How 
can we then reconcile commitment, responsibility and freedom? You cannot be successful 
unless the opinion is truly yours and the commitment stems from you, as I mentioned 
previously. The opinion and commitment must both be from the depth of your freedom. Your 
responsibility for them both is your responsibility for your freedom. But who would you be 
accountable to? You are accountable to yourself; the self that freedom stems from. This is what 
I see as the essence of a free thinker’s being, the opinion is his and the responsibility is his. If 
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the opinion stems from the authority of action; the authority of governance, and the 
responsibility also belongs to this authority, what would one say? There is nothing to say other 
than the fact that the thinker or intellectual, along with his responsibility, have been replaced 
by the authority of action to take solely the burden and consequences. As I have said before, 
the crisis of the world today is due to the authority of action forcefully taking the full 
responsibility of managing the helm of this life and guiding the destiny of human beings. There 
is no one today who can claim that free thought is what directs our present world. The atomic 
scientists who refused to submit to the orders of the ruling authorities were oppressed simply 
because they were trying to save humanity and follow their responsibility towards themselves 
and their conscience. As for the rest of the scientists and intellectuals, they conformed, 
cooperated and conceded. In every country on earth, we would find the authority of action 
understanding and uniting on one thing: submitting thought to its service. This unity and 
understanding from the side of actions is met by difference and division from the side of 
thought. 
What if thought were able, in all the nations of the world to unite, agree, bind its 
authority, express its views freely on the situation of mankind, and take responsibility? What if 
it rejected, at the same time, in every part of the world, co-operation with the authorities of 
action on what it believed to be harmful to the interests of human beings and humanity? What 
if thought stood in this entire world with this united standpoint? I will leave the evaluation to 
you. I have, therefore, insisted on protecting the authority of thought and its freedom and 
independence in relation to the authority of action. I have always applied this principle to 
myself strictly, for I have stayed away from the practical political arena and refused to join any 
political party. I have considered the intellectual to be a monk; his practice is his freedom. I 
have spoken of an ivory tower and resorting to it, but I did not of course mean isolation from 
life and a separation from society, as many may have mistakenly supposed. I meant isolating 
the intellectual from political parties so that he is not used as a tool in the hands of its men and 
he loses the ability to see things freely. Thus, I strongly insisted on the idea of isolating the 
intellectual from political parties, regardless of the many times that circumstances were 
favourable for me to engage myself in a political party and reach through it the authority of 
action. The idea that dominated my mind and still does is this: that the true responsibility of 
the free intellectual is towards himself alone. It is neither towards one of the political parties 
nor towards one of the governors. The intellectual who deserts his place to submit to the 
authority of action, represented in political parties or government, is an intellectual who is 
escaping from delivering his message. And such an escape to the political arena and governance 
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is what stripped thought from its authority and made it a follower not a leader. 
It has never crossed my mind to isolate thought from any political or social activity. 
The isolation that I have called for is the isolation from politicians and not politics, from parties 
and not society. Thought in its different forms (literature, stories, art, etc.) must, in my view, 
concern itself with everything that happens in its society and era, from politics to social issues. 
Hence, as long as thought concerns itself with humanity, and as long as humanity is linked to 
politics and society, intellectuals, writers or artists must also live in their age and society fully, 
with an interest in politics and social affairs, because that’s what humanity is. In my books 
Tahta Shams al-Fikr, Shajarat al-Hukm, Ta’ammulat fi al-Siyasah and Praksa,21 etc., there is 
an adequate summary of my standpoint on politics and society. One critic said that my 
standpoint did not take a practical position. This is true because this in itself is my doctrine. 
My doctrine rejects strongly that thought should change its character, and become an action. I 
have never lost hope in the power of thought as I consider it an independent power with its own 
components and individual character. When I lose this hope, I will seek right away the simple 
aid of action. And only then will I take the path of literary and artistic doctrines that submitted 
to action or merged with it to an extent that it became difficult for them to be rid of this 
reputation and of the subjugation that they had, rightly or wrongly, undergone. You may ask 
me; to what extent can independent thought affect action? I have no doubt that independent 
thought affects action to a great extent, much more than the effect of integrated thought or 
thought that is subject to action. Integrated thought, or thought subject to action, joins a party 
or becomes a follower of political governance; this way, it loses its credibility and grandeur, 
not in the eyes of other parties, but at times in the eyes of its own party. It is, consequently, not 
allowed to instruct or inspire but receives instructions from the leaders who dictate how these 
should be followed. You may then ask me: Did my independent standpoint have an impact on 
action? 
The truth is that I cannot give a definite answer myself; it is difficult for me to know 
the effect of my works on others in general. And I do not think that a book like Yawmiyat Na’ib 
fi al-Aryaf has had a direct influence in solving what it highlighted in terms of flaws in the 
government, the judiciary and management in the countryside, in spite of my knowledge that 
many influential figures have read it. My opinion always is that men of intellect, literature and 
art are not required to directly reform. Their true role is to prepare the men of action, the nation 
and government to implement reforms. I have written before in one of my books that: “the 
                                                          
21 From the original Greek Praxagora. 
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author or the artist is not a reformer, but a reformer of the reformer.” Nevertheless, I can say 
that I have once seen a direct effect of my book on one of society’s issues. One day, I wrote a 
suggestion to form a ministry for social affairs, and at the same time I also suggested names of 
ministers, among them excellent employees. Not much after two months later, a man was 
elected to government and implemented my suggestions and formed a ministry, calling it “The 
Ministry of Social Affairs”. He chose the exact employees and ministers that I suggested. How 
did this happen? There is no doubt that the independence of my thought made this possible, for 
if I had been a writer for a political party, I would not have come across such knowledge, or 
caused those employees and minsters to be appointed and my suggestions would have been a 
topic for mockery, criticism and snobbery. Independent, free thought can always be a vital 
authority equally counterbalanced alongside the authority of action. In this case, thought 
becomes a progressive, driving force in relation to work. This is my doctrine. 
I have told you that expression is the talent of creation and creativity, and explanation 
is what sheds light on the human condition. To clarify further this definition: If you are 
expressing life without explanation, then you are a writer or an artist. And if you have an 
explanation for life, but do not have the talent of expressing it, then you are anything but a 
writer or artist. If you are able to express and explain life, then you are a writer or an artist with 
an opinion, standpoint and orientation, and hence you are able to influence somehow human 
development and guidance. There are, however, cases where expression alone, if it reaches its 
height, is able to lead indirectly to progress. But there are also, as I mentioned before, cases 
where explanation can ruin the beauty of expression if it goes beyond the limits of artistic 
coordination, which consequently leads to both effects becoming invalidated. As a result, the 
literary or artistic effect would seem artificial, losing the very reason for its existence, its 
sincerity. What is meant here by sincerity is sincerity in art, meaning the feeling that comes 
from deep within us showing that the artistic or literary effect has been naturally delivered. 
This could not happen unless the literary or artistic effect is delivered naturally in a coherent 
and perfectly proportioned way. If one overrides the other, it results in distortions and 
deformations, even if the outcome may look good. 
In the light of all this, there is a necessary condition for the existence of both expression 
and explanation, which is to find proportionality and consistency between them, or namely the 
equilibrium. I also told you that the authority of thought must remain in counterbalance with 
the authority of action, so what is meant here by thought? Is it the mind alone? This is a point 
that needs clarification as well. Thought that is equal and in counterbalance with action 
includes, in my perspective, both mental power and spiritual power, especially within the scope 
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of literature and art. This is an issue on which various contemporary literary and artistic 
doctrines differ. Most of these doctrines neglect the spiritual or religious notions, and all that 
remains then is the mental powers from which these doctrines derive all their activities. This, 
for instance, applies to Sartre’s existentialism, socialist realism and other doctrines that have 
been linked to materialism because they limit the power of thought by focusing solely on the 
logic of the mind. When it comes to the doctrine of equilibrium, one can call two forces 
“thought”: the force of the mind and the force of the heart, i.e. logic and faith. These two are 
sources of human knowledge. An animal, however, cannot comprehend, believe or possess any 
other source of knowledge than its instinct. It does not have faith because it does not 
comprehend the notion of a superior being, as I mentioned earlier. The human being is the only 
creature that realises and is aware of the superior being. There are two ways in which a human 
being attempts to comprehend this notion: first, by logic with the mind and, secondly, faith 
from the heart. The first relies on hard evidence and the other relies on hidden feelings. Since 
these two methods have always been readily available for human beings, they must be 
nourished and developed to a great extent, each in its own way. I have previously mentioned 
that mixing them together is futile, just like submitting one of them to the other is also futile. 
The mind must always doubt and ask for evidence, whilst the heart must always believe without 
proof. Each of them must be seen in its own way and in different circumstances. To get rid of 
one of them for the sake of the other is a disruption of one of humanity’s features, in the same 
way as one intervening to limit the other’s freedom leads to halting the course of humanity’s 
development.  
Equilibrium points towards a balance between the mind and the heart, like two planets 
revolving one around the other, and moving forward in the same direction. I have previously 
shown in my book Tahta Shams al-Fikr in a chapter entitled “An Area of Faith” how the mind 
and faith are able to live side by side in a human being without one engulfing the other or 
affecting its target or way. With mind, logic, heart and faith, the human being can live a full 
life. And perhaps the crisis of modern civilization, as I mentioned before, is what hinders the 
human being from living such a full life; regardless of how much the human mind excels, there 
is a feeling of shortage. This shortage brings to the human being a feeling of anxiety, or at least 
some anxiety, which has become a common feature in the age we live in.  
Now, I shall summarise the doctrine of equilibrium for you through these five 
principles: First, you are an equilibrist if you believed that existence is the counterbalance with 
the other. Earth would not exist without a counterbalance with the sun. There is no single 
creature. And every creature, character, condition and position would exist neither in the 
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sensual world nor in the world of meanings without its “other”. There has to be an “other” for 
you to “be”. Equilibrium, then, is founded on “otherness”, and an “equilibrist existence” can 
be summarised as follows: “Without the “other” there is no existence.” Second, you are an 
equilibrist if you believe that thought must be in counterbalance with action, and that the 
responsibility of thought lies in its freedom and independence from action; this is opposed to 
the views of other doctrines that believe in the merging of thought within action, or its 
submission to it. The doctrine of equilibrium is in agreement with existentialism, realism, 
socialism and many other doctrines that focus on the responsibility of thought for guidance and 
development. It differs from them, however, in that it calls for the independence of thought 
from action and does not allow the intellectual to engage with action, unlike Sartre’s 
existentialism, where he, amongst others, worked to create a political party and supported at 
one time the right party and another, the left party. Hence, equilibrium does not allow the 
intellectual to submit thought to action, like countries that have strict systems and do not allow 
for thought to express an opinion or a standpoint that conflicts with what is believed to be the 
agreed creed.  
You are then an equilibrist if you see it as your responsibility to make of thought a free 
power with its own independent tools and special style, to counterbalance the power of action, 
which also has its own tools and style. Third, you are an equilibrist if you believe that good 
and evil are two modes of human being. Good must equalise and counterbalance evil. One must 
not penalise an evil doer by cropping his personal freedom because the counterbalance is not 
between evil and freedom; there is no link between them but the counterbalance should be 
between good and evil. Reward, thus, is an act of goodness which counterbalances and 
equalises an evil act. Furthermore, weakness and cases of shortage have as well opposite forces 
that compensate and counterbalance them out. It is accordingly the human being’s duty to find 
and extract such counterbalancing forces from within himself. Fourth, you are an equilibrist if 
you believe that the mind, with its logic and doubts, must equalise and counterbalance the heart 
with its feelings and faith; meaning that doubt can exist both separately and in parallel with 
faith.  And fifth, you are an equilibrist if you see that literary or artistic effect must be based on 
a counterbalance and equivalence between the force of expression and the force of explanation. 
You may ask me: What is the future of the idea of thought that is in counterbalance with 
action? I would answer you optimistically and say: I see the whole future belonging to such a 
notion because it is the natural course of things, even if in this present age we still find thought 
following action, that is to say, the dominance of action. This will not be the case in the future, 
as I predict that thought in the coming ages will have a great power that springs from itself, 
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like energy from sunlight. This great power would change the destiny of humans towards 
supreme goals that are formed by thought outside the purposes of authorities. Thought, then, 
acquires enough power and inspiration to bring the authority of action back to the right course 
if it diverts from it or becomes corrupt without thought losing its specific characteristics and 
turning into action, or taking on the style of politicians so it becomes a debate. You may also 
ask: what is the future of the doctrine of equilibrium as regards treatment of human beings? I 
would again tell you optimistically: Equilibrium is a doctrine that resists weakness, shortage 
and ugliness, first, with faith in the existence of a compensating and counterbalancing power. 
Secondly, it declares a clear course of resistance to all of those weaknesses that is human 
advancement (whether individual or social). This human advancement shows the parallel 
power of counterbalance and compensation, highlighting it and developing it.  
This doctrine cancels the effect of weakness and shortage by extracting the forces that 
compensate and counterbalance. Every nation, society, man, woman, artist, employee or writer 
and so on, must ask this question if he or she feels a natural shortage or weakness: If I am weak 
or impotent in a specific area, then I must be strong or able in another, but what is this area? 
There is never a weak human being, but there is a human being who is unaware of where his 
compensating power lies. Rise and resist, search and strive to find the compensating power, to 
reveal it and develop it so that it counterbalances the weaknesses and shortages in you. The day 
when all humanity rises to find these compensating forces, how many sources of power will 
erupt to compensate for all the miseries of humanity’s incompetence? Therefore, I think I have 
presented to you my standpoint and its main principles; if you want details then you will have 
to extract them yourself. It will be easy for you if you re-read my works in this light. I do not 
mean of course for you to read everything I have written, as there is no writer who can commit 
himself to a specific notion in all his work unless he is mad. 
Madness is sometimes holding onto a single idea. I mean, by re-reading my works, re-
reading the works that carry the writer’s message. They are the works that must be read 
thoroughly, which is something that not every reader can do. Hence, reading can sometimes be 
considered an art in itself, and even a positive act equivalent to writing. The avid reader, the 
discoverer, creates something that is initially present, but overlooked. What is the value of 
something that is present if it is unknown? The role of the reader who unravels meanings and 
directions is similar to that of an explorer of islands and continents. These meanings and 
directions were present before the journey of discovery, but the explorer or reader is the one 
who extracts them from void-like fog to light revealed to people. Hence, the blessing and curse 
of books is reading them. Some readers are similar to an ignorant sailor who has no compass 
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and does not know north from south. What the sailor is only good at is spreading his sail and 
blasting off at sea without direction, for if he is lost he will not blame his ignorance, but the 
sea, for its shortage of islands and beaches. If the sailor does not lose his way, he will wander 
around briefly and say that he has taken a leisurely tour but that he did not find anything of 
interest. There are some readers, however, who are more puzzling than that. Those are readers 
who read books, not to extract the author’s opinion, but rather to apply their own view and 
beliefs from doctrines and literary or artistic thought. These readers read books to check if the 
author has a similar opinion or not, for these readers are not interested in knowing anything 
about the author. Here, readers demand something from the author: namely that the author has 
written the book according to what they, readers, want which could be issues that an author 
would not have thought of. This kind of reader is unlike the explorer because, like the sailor, 
he goes out to sea, not to discover islands, but to declare after a swift tour that: the sea should 
have revealed a nearby island that is fit for cultivation that has mines of steel and oil wells. All 
these different types of navigators are unable to discover anything because they do not know 
anything or want or try to and hence they go out to sea and return without saying anything 
fruitful and beneficial about what they saw. That does not include a specific kind of readers 
who attempt to falsify an author’s thought and if unsuccessful, they turn to the truths behind 
the work and tamper with it so that it appears shallow. That of course is the reader’s fault and 
not the author’s. The best of all is the humble reader who attempts with all honesty and kind 
will to follow the author’s thought with patience and car, which is enough whether the reader 
has succeeded or not in understanding what the author intends. This kind of reader does not 
often pretend or boast knowledge or speak without consideration. We can all recognize this 
reader from his or her choice of words and balance of judgment.  
In short, the discoverer reader is not an ordinary one, but a rare reader, because he or 
she has been gifted with patience, accuracy, experience, good reception, lack of pretence and 
love for the author. I say love for the author, because a reader will not exert any effort to 
discover something that he or she does not like. Hence, there are many characteristics that 
qualify this reader to make discoveries: to give more than he or she would take from the author. 
Whoever discovers an island, no matter how small it is, would give it a value in time, place and 
history more than what he or she would take from it. This reader is the one who creates the 
author. Yes, he is the one who created Aristotle, Abou al-‘alaa, al-Khayyam and Shakespeare. 
This creative reader who reads and then writes his thoughts and notes his discoveries is often 
called a “critic” or an “explanatory critic”. He is the “Christopher Columbus” of art and 
literature. Without him, generations would not have known the landmarks and pathways of the 
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human mind’s creation. The explanatory reader is this kind as well. Now, you, mysterious 
reader, were led to discover my truth through the answers I have given you. I hope that you 
will find in them something of value. You have not mentioned once your name and no one 
seems to know you. Yet you may be the only person responsible for introducing me to the 
public; for this I thank you and give you my regards. 
 
What is Equilibrium?22 
 
It is not here to be taken as “equivalence” in its linguistic sense, which means “equality”. 
Neither should it be understood as moderation or mediation in things. The meaning of 
equilibrium here is opposition. And the power of “equilibrium” means the power of “the 
resisting opposition”. If the meaning of the word has not been understood accordingly, 
equilibrium would lose its true meaning and goal. Equilibrium in this book is the opposing and 
resisting motion to another motion. 
True One=Zero 
Positive life begins with the number “two”, because relationship only takes place when 
two things exist: namely, movement and life. Every motion must be met by opposition, 
equalised and a resisting motion. Every force has its opposing balancing force. God alone is 
the almighty and omnipotent one, and yet He created of his own accord another opposing force: 
that is the power of Satan, in order for human life to begin, and take shape, form and motion. 
God created Adam alone, but his presence was neutral. So God created two, Adam and Eve; 
only then did existence start its natural positive movement. The power of the sun alone is a 
negative force, but when it divided into other planets, they counterbalanced and equalised each 
other in a resisting movement in order to survive. Hence, a positive motion started in the 
universe. The power of absolute authority is a negative movement and there must be an 
opposing and counterbalancing power to it: the power of the governed, in order for a positive 
life to begin in society, etc. This is equilibrium in its essence.  
To sum up, the one alone has a negative presence; it is one step from nothingness. It is, 
in terms of positive movement, null. Because it neither resists another, nor is there another 
force that resists it. With lack of resistance, motion ceases. True life, therefore, only begins 
after “two”. And for “two” to continue existing, everyone must protect his or her special power. 
If one overlooks the other or one power engulfs the other, “two” becomes a single “one”: 
                                                          
22 This is al-Hakim’s own summary of his book. 
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meaning a return to negative presence. Equilibrium, therefore, explains the positive life as a 
necessity for opposite resisting forces to exist alongside one another in the universe and in 
society. And nothingness, thus, begins with the engulfment of all the forces into singularity. 
Singularity is tranquillity. 
All opposing forces are balancing and resisting motions; they are life itself; and that is 
equilibrium. Equilibrium is the philosophy of balancing and opposing motion, namely life. 
Keep your special independent power free so that it counterbalances and equates other forces 
that attempt to engulf you. This way you resist, progress, and live. Equilibrium is resisting 
engulfment. If you have a shortage or a weakness, search well within yourself and you will 
find a hidden counterbalancing force and a hidden opposing force. Equilibrate your existence 
like the earth did towards the sun. Weigh yourself towards the opposing forces lest they engulf 
and reduce you to nothingness. This is what equilibrium says. Every power that inflates wants 
to engulf another. In the social and political field, for example, capitalism wanted to engulf 
work and colonialism wanted to engulf nations. The stronger class wanted to engulf the whole 
nation, and the West wanted to engulf the East, and so on. Equilibrium is the philosophy of the 
























 BACKGROUND AND INFLUENCES 
 “The notion that the East was, and still is, spiritual only and the West was, and still is, 
materialistic only is one that overlooks the truth.”23 
 
I.  
One can come up with different answers to the question of who Tawfiq al-Hakim is and who 
influenced him and his writings at various stages in his life. Some consider him to be a 
playwright or a novelist whilst others say he is a mere story-teller.24 For me, he is a skilled 
writer of drama and, more importantly, a philosopher. Al-Hakim’s name is primarily known 
today across the Arab world as a pioneer dramatist although not many of his works are available 
in print or widely translated into foreign languages. He is one of many misunderstood figures 
in Egyptian history. He was called a heretic, and many of his controversial works were banned 
or destroyed. His text Equilibrium (1955) is by far (in comparison with his other writings) the 
most philosophically revolutionary for its time and culture. His experimentation with 
philosophical existential themes in a literary framework bridges the gap not only between 
Eastern and Western traditions, but also between literature and philosophy. The intriguing 
doctrine of equilibrium offers us, the readers, a distinct and particular approach which promises 
to help us cope better with what he referred to as “moshkilat al-‘asr al hadith” (the crisis of 
modernity) which we face in modern societies. The crisis is described as an imbalance between the 
power of thought (the mind) and the power of faith (the heart).25 His view is that, in the modern age, 
the advancements in science and technology were not met with the same level of progress in the area 
of faith. And for this reason, there has been an increasing feeling of anxiety over the years. Before 
exploring further the reasons behind al-Hakim’s belief, I would like, in this chapter, to advance an 
overview of how European existentialism reached parts of the Middle East and, more 
                                                          
23 This is a quote from an interview given by al-Hakim in 1965 on the post-colonial period. Note that in 1975, he 
was awarded an honorary doctorate by the Egyptian academy of fine arts about which he commented very little 
and considered to be of little value to him. This view was expressed by al-Hakim in a phone-call conversation 
(published by al-Ahram newspaper’s archive) between himself and actor Yusuf Wahby who also received the 
honorary doctorate. During this phone-call, Wahby joked about the doctorate they were to receive and wished to 
discuss with al-Hakim who would be giving the speech on this occasion. It is noted that, typical of al-Hakim, he 
declined to be the one to make the speech and asked Wahby to do so instead. 
24 See appendix 2 for a survey of his readership and findings. 
25 See Equilibrium (p.18) where al-Hakim states that there was indeed balance until the beginning of the 19th 
century and now it has been disrupted by the dominance of the mind. 
 54 
 
importantly, how it reached al-Hakim in Egypt and influenced his thought.26 In doing so, I hope 
to also show the interconnection of cultures (the East and the West) and support al-Hakim’s 
aim of calling for a conception of “borderless thought”.27 
It is true, according to Di-Capua that existentialism is commonly thought of as a chapter 
in European intellectual history. Some of the terrible events that took place in this period, to 
mention only a few, were the slaughter at Verdun and on the Somme, the Bolshevik terror in 
Russia, the unrest and terror in Italy and Germany, the Depression of 1929-1935, the Spanish 
Civil War, the Nazi concentration camps and the nuclear destruction of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. In brief, to an outsider, western civilization exhibited a decline of values in 
everything that seemed to matter. Nietzsche had formed an image for modern man that was 
considered by many thinkers to be not far from the truth. Shortly after Nietzsche, there was an 
exciting burst of creative energy from literary figures, artists and philosophers, who were in 
search of lost values and who worked with an increased awareness that “God was dead”. 
Although the founding of European existentialism is attributed to Heidegger (1899-1976) and 
Jaspers (1883-1969), it did not become globally known until after WWII, when it was 
popularised by Jean-Paul Sartre and others. At that point, existentialism quickly began to have 
an impact on the rest of the world. In Egypt, Abd Al-Rahman  Badawi,28 an Egyptian 
postgraduate student of philosophy, was the first to announce in the early 50s that he had 
devised a new philosophy, which he referred to as “Arab existentialism” (al-Wujudiya).29 
Badawi presented this new philosophy as a “series of formulations and adaptations that 
collectively sought to create a new postcolonial Arab subject: confident, politically involved, 
independent, self-sufficient and above all, liberated.”30 To many Arab intellectuals, Arab 
existentialism was the new tradition: “European in origin and Middle Eastern by design”31. Di-
Capua adds that, for many Arab intellectuals, it was considered in the early 1960s to be an 
                                                          
26 I have been inspired in this chapter by the information that I found in an article by Di-Capua, Yoav. “Arab 
Existentialism: An Invisible Chapter in the Intellectual History of Decolonization”. American Historical Review. 
Vol. 17, No 4 (October 27, 2012) pp. 1061- 1091. http://ahr.orfordjournals.org/ [accessed 20/04/2014]  
27 This is a term I will be using often to describe al-Hakim’s own claim that there is no divide (intellectually that 
is) between the East and the West. 
28 Born 1917- Died 2002. See http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/601/cu5.htm (accessed 08/07/2014) Sirat Hiyati 
(The Story of my Life), two volumes, ‘Abdal-Rahman Badawi, Beirut: al-Mawsu’a al-Arabiya lil-Dirasat wal-
Nashr (Arab Foundation for Studies and Publication), 2000. pp382 (vol.1), pp383 (vol.2) 
29 His defence of his Ph.D. dissertation on “existential time” took six hours on May 1944. The doyen of modern 
Arab letters, Taha Husayn, declared it the birth of modern Arab philosophy. The event was covered by al-Ahram 
newspaper as a national event. 
30 Di-Capua,Yoav. “Arab Existentialism: An Invisible Chapter in the Intellectual History of Decolonization”. 




influential intellectual movement with meaningful global connections tying Arab culture to a 
culture of resistance. Badawi, during this period, actively translated the works of European 
thinkers into Arabic and published them amongst many of his own works. One of his most 
influential works was Nietzsche: Kholasat al-Fikr al ‘urubi, published in 1975.32 In this post-
war climate, in Egypt, what appealed to Arab writers, as Di-Capua says, was how existentialism 
became “instrumental in furthering the process of decolonization”. It became “a local 
existentialist tradition that transcended the narrow purview of anti-colonial nationalism, with a 
focus on physical liberation from foreign rule”33 and fostering a sense of collectivity. This 
impacted to a great extent on the writings of many authors who found comfort in the culture of 
resistance which flourished with the rise of existentialism during such a harsh period.34 Di-
Capua has noted the lack of scholarship on Third world intellectuals and those of their ideas 
that informed decolonization. He claims that there is very little done to present a comprehensive 
account of intellectuals of this rich period. He quotes (in his footnote): 
It would be useful if post-colonial scholarship made more effort to situate these writers 
within the class structure of their home societies and the cultural context of a transnational 
intelligentsia so as to avoid simplistic generalizations that their work embodies some 
nationalist or ‘Third world’ essence.35 
 I have also found very little on the matter. Perhaps if one looks at some of the works of 
Arab existentialists regardless of the works’ genres and the philosophical narratives and drama 
of al-Hakim, one may be able to situate this intellectual generation within the global historical 
context of its time. The writings of authors of this period gradually began to convey variants 
of existentialism, in a way that showed their efforts to overcome decolonization and the 
accompanying challenges posed by social injustice, instability, contradictions of ideologies and 
the search or struggle for liberation.36 When Badawi introduced existentialism to the Arab 
                                                          
32 Nietzsche: a Summary of European Thought. This edition included sections on Schopenhauer, Plato, Aristotle, 
Greek thought, Medieval philosophy and German Idealism with a focus on Fichte, Hegel and Shelling. 5th edition. 
Print house Publication, 72 Road Fahd al- Salem, Kuwait. Available as an electronic copy in Arabic on: 
http://monoskop.org/images/b/b6/Badawi_Abdel_Rahman_Nietzsche.pdf (accessed 07/07/2014) See image and 
list of works in appendix 1. 
33 Di-Capua,Yoav. p.1064 Note that Badawi argued that “if a civilisation denied individual identity before a higher 
deity, it would be nearly impossible to produce philosophy to comprehend the spirit of the latter.” See online 
source: http://gulfnews.com/egypt-s-pioneer-intellectual-1.550510 
34 Ibid. And in France, de Beauvoir wrote “not a week passed without the newspapers discussing us; existentialism 
became ‘the first media crazy of the post-war era”. See de Beauvoir, “Force of Circumstance” quoted in R. 
Aronson, Camus and Sartre. University of Chicago Press, 2004. p. 48 
35 Kennedy, Dane. “Imperial history and post-colonial theory” in James D. Le Sueur, ed., The Decolonization 
Reader (New York, 2003) pp. 1-22. In Di-Capua, Yoav’s article; footnote no.8 
36 Di-Capua, Yoav., p. 1062 
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world,37 he did not know that it would become such an important phenomenon, or that it would 
serve a dual role. On the one hand, as an influential movement, Arab existentialism paved the 
way for Arab intellectuals or ‘Third World Arab intelligentsia’ to emerge and enjoy a free 
platform where they could exchange their ideas. And on the other hand, the movement “framed 
decolonization as a process with an extremely broad cultural and intellectual spectrum, ranging 
from the ontology of modern Arab subjectivity and the balance between local and universal 
culture (e.g. the problem of authenticity) to the nexus between politics and culture and the 
desired contract between state and society.”38 Could this movement have had such an influence 
on al-Hakim that he saw it, perhaps along with many other writers, as an opportunity to reinvent 
a new Arab self within a philosophical framework? This is very plausible.  
 Although European existentialism attracted its fair share of criticisms around the same 
time as Arab existentialism underwent scrutiny, it continued to exist and be influential. 
Unfortunately, it was not a unified phenomenon, but rather a “multifocal intellectual system” 
which seemed to be both contradictory and complex. Nevertheless, Badawi’s proposition 
(mainly to fuse European existentialism with Islamic philosophy in order to liberate the Arab 
self from the constraints of colonial culture and religious restraints) was, at the time, very much 
welcomed by intellectuals, scholars and writers who focused on Arab existentialism in its new 
form.39 The existentialist doctrine continued to become dominant, and intellectuals of this 
period like Mahmud Amin al ‘alim attempted to introduce existentialist ideas into politics.40 I 
shall not, however, be concerned here to discuss the case of Arab political existentialism.41 
Rather, in what follows I shall try to defend the impact that European existentialism had on the 
formation of Arab existentialism and highlight some of its developments. Before I do so, I 
believe I ought to briefly put forward ‘Abd al-Rahman Badawi’s philosophy and stress the role 
                                                          
37 From the early 40s, there were two further prominent teachers besides Badawi. Those were Lewis ‘Awad 
(Psychology) and Yousef Murad. Badawi was teaching those who soon became prominent names in the Egyptian 
literary arena, such as Muhammad Amin el ‘alim, Badr al-Din, Fathi Ghunaim and writer Annis Mansour. 
38 Di-Capua, Yoav., p. 1064. 
39 Ibid. Di-Capua writes that existentialism was gradually seen as “a salient characteristic of transnational 
thought”. Also see Badawi, Sirat Hayati, 1:62. (Note that the text is partly translated from Arabic to French by 
Badawi himself during 1967). 
40 It is important to note that Al ‘alim began to marginalise the old-guard intelligentsia, which was a trend that 
began to emerge in the late 60s and became problematic for many writers like al-Hakim and Taha Hussein. (This 
affected authors’ reputations and readership). Al ‘alim, who was one of Badawi’s students in the early 40s, was 
influenced by some of Badawi’s ideas. 
41 I will address this further in chapter three, p. 140 addressing the concept of political “commitment” and the role 
of the intellectual from the point of view of both, al-Hakim and Sartre. 
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that his publications played in narrowing the gap between European existentialism and Eastern 
Islamic thought. 
 Badawi was not only a keen student of philosophy who was taught by the most 
prominent professors of his time, but also he was a linguist, a skilful translator and an avid 
reader. According to an article on Badawi in the al-Ahram national newspaper, “he is the first 
Arab existentialist, emerging in Egypt in the 1940s contemporaneously with, or at least 
immediately after, the rise of existentialism in France and Germany.”42 Hanafi claims in his 
article that Badawi's “central line of argument is that in assimilating the achievements of Greek 
philosophy, the Arabs concentrated on form, and in so doing undermined or denied the spirit. 
Collective generalities were favoured over individual truths, and it is this that makes it 
necessary for any present-day, comprehensive philosophical system to bring that vital 
dimension back into the ongoing process of exchange.”43 Due to Badawi’s determination, 
strong character and Eastern and Western influences, he situated himself amongst the most 
important intellectuals of this period. In the Encyclopaedia of Philosophy,44 he explicitly 
described himself as an existentialist philosopher and confessed to having made much use of 
the philosophies of Heidegger, Bergson and many others. He, an individualist and an idealist 
in the tradition of German idealism, to which he devoted a significant portion of his work, spent 
the major part of his academic career translating the works of Heine, Eichendorff, Goethe, 
Bern, Brecht and Schweitzer, and writing on Kant, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and 
Spengler.45 These works were in addition to Badawi’s own works titled Humanism and 
Existentialism in Islamic thought, Aristotle’s Logic, Sophism, and Ibn Miskawayah:46 The 
eternal wisdom. Badawi influenced Arab existentialists and Egyptian authors so much so that 
                                                          
42 Hanafi, Hassan. “A Philosopher in Extensio” al-Ahram Newspaper, Cairo, 29 August- 4th Sept 2002, Issue No. 
601. http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/601/cu5.htm (accessed 02/04/2014) Note that Badawi began travelling on 
a regular basis to Paris from 1945 to work on his translation and be familiar with the current intellectual and 
philosophical debates. 
43 Ibid. 
44 The Encyclopaedia is available in two parts. It was first published on the 1st of January 1966 by al-mo’asassa 
al-arabiya lil-dirasat wal nashr. Available in Arabic online: www.alexandria.ahlamontada.com. 
45 See appendix 1 for an excerpt on Badawi and his work based on information found in al-Ahram Weekly online 
(Issue No. 601) Badawi produced 33 editions, six translations, six versions of other authors' books and four 
original compositions -- not to mention five books in French, resulting in a grand total of 54 works revolving 
around Muslim and Arab heritage in relation to the West and Western influences. He also translated in 1984 the 
play Faust to Arabic. See Arabic source http://www.maaber.org/issue_january09/books_and_readings3.htm 
(accessed 15/07/2014). 
46 Ibn Miskawayah is a tenth century Islamic historian and philosopher (d. 1030 CE) who expanded on al-Kindi’s 
concept of moderation and wrote in Tahdib al-Akhlaq wa Tathir al-‘Araq that the relationship between virtues 
and vices is one of alternation (similar to the view held by Heraclitus). See Ibn Muskawayh’s Tahdib al-Akhlaq 
wa Tathir al-‘Araq (translated as Refinement of morals), Cairo, Egyptian press, 1977, pp. 22-23. 
www.muslimphilosophy.com/ip/rep/H042.htm (accessed 04/04/2013). 
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many would claim that he should not only be commended for his efforts as a philosopher, but 
also as a translator of vital works which encouraged rising authors at the time (i.e. Al ‘alim, 
Husayn and al-Hakim) to see the merits of combining aspects of the Western traditions, Greek 
heritage and Islamic Civilization. Badawi hoped for others to see these as complementary to 
one another. 
 Perhaps what also contributed to sparking a fierce debate and made Badawi’s name 
known internationally is his famous article ‘Can there be existential morals?’47 This question 
occupied the minds of Arab thinkers48 who began during this period to question the values of 
some of the Islamic schools of thought. They felt challenged by what Nietzsche and others laid 
down in their work.49 The idea that we are free to create value and meaning for ourselves 
became a focal point of debate and, gradually but steadily, Arab writers found that they faced 
a challenge to embrace this freedom and to create meaningful and aspirational values for which 
they are wholly responsible, rather than lapsing into nihilism and the apathy of mass 
consensus.50 Unlike what Arab writers were accustomed to, or grew up to believe in, the 
message that was portrayed by existentialism was that morality is neither rooted in any external 
setting nor in an objective system of values. Nietzsche’s Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (The Gay 
Science) presented “moral codes as mere reflections of existing social structures that serve to 
deaden the impulses of the individual and maintain the interests of the powerful classes”.51 This 
portrayal of morality has left a lasting effect on many Egyptian writers. It led Badawi to 
conclude in his famous article that “existential morality, being dependent on suspicion and 
thereby incapable of lending itself to objective standards, cannot exist.”52 This has continued 
to be a topic of much debate and examination by many Arab writers such as novelist Suhayl 
Idris.53 
                                                          
47 The date of publication is unknown and the text might have been destroyed. 
48 Philosophers, Muhammad 'abid al-Jabiri and Fu'ad Zakariyya discussed the Arab world’s decline as due to an 
inability to historicize the past and a dependence on tradition. Also, Hassan Hanafi touched upon this broadly in 
his discussion of “theology of liberation” on the issue of decadence. 
49 Nietzsche’s ideas where communicated to Arab authors via Badawi’s writings either through re-assessment of 
Nietzsche’s work or offered by Badawi to his readers in the form of a translated text from the original German 
language into Arabic. 
50 I believe the latter view referred to is the idea that morality is herd-instinct in the individual, as expressed in 
The Gay Science §116. 
51 Nietzsche, F. Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (The Gay Science). CUP, 2001 (trans. Josefine Nauckhoff). 
52 Hanafi, Hassan. “A Philosopher in Extensio” al-Ahram Newspaper, Cairo, 29 August- 4th Sept 2002, Issue No. 
601. http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/601/cu5.htm (accessed 02/04/2014). 
53 Dr. Idris wrote about his experience living in Paris; in his letter to al-Ma’addawi he says: “Life here is 
characterized by a kind of freedom that has no parallel in the East. We are in need of such freedom. Freedom in 
our lands is suffocated. In Paris people can say and do whatever they want and live humanism to its fullest extent. 
Our freedom of speech in the East however, is repressed. The freedom of thought is massacred, and the freedom 
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 In order to sum up this section on Badawi and his philosophy, perhaps one should 
present the reasons why he is not positively spoken of today in Egypt, and more generally in 
the Arab world. According to an article by Almubarak published in The Guardian in 2002, the 
question of what has happened to Badawi’s publications and ideas is one that lends itself to 
many interpretations.54 Some say that his ideas have lived on and have taken different forms 
or merged with current ideologies, whilst others disagree and consider him and his work to be 
a mere chapter of the past.55 Although Badawi contributed positively to Arab existentialism 
and paved the way for many writers who came after him, no one can deny that his reputation 
has been, like many other writers of his generation, tarnished by the negative stigma attached 
to their names directly or indirectly. Hanafi notes, “it is remarkable that, for someone of his 
background, he preferred knowledge to homeland, self to subject, individual to group: 
remarkable but sad, for by the end of a life devoted to the existential imperative of existence in 
the world, the world had been reduced to a salutary individual existence.”56 On the one hand, 
some believe that Badawi’s national renaissance revolved around “the idealist and not the 
scientific West,57 and the Sufi and not the artistic East”58 whilst others believe that the source 
of his knowledge remained solely in the West and that “he only paid attention politically and 
practically to the East”.59 Whatever the case may have been, misconceptions and interpretations 
concerning Badawi’s personal life, as to a great extent for al-Hakim, seem to have over 
                                                          
of life outside the boundaries of inherited tradition is virtually non-existent. We need to learn from the West the 
love of freedom as it is this love alone that would guarantee us the freedom we yearn for.” Al-Ma’addawi replied 
jokingly: “Are you spending your time in the nests of existentialists, have you see Simone de Beauvoir, have you 
walked behind the coffin of André Gide?” See Di Capua p. 1073. Also in Muhammad, Anwar al-Maddawi, p.190 
and Suhayl Idris’ Zhikrayat al-adab wa-l-Hubb (Memories of Literature and Love) p.103 Dr. Idris wrote a self-
described existentialist novel, similar in style to that of Sartre’s Nausea, titled “al-Hay al-Latini (The Latin 
Quarter) published 1953 (the same time al-Hakim published Arini Allah). 
54 Almubarak, Khalid. “Abdur Rahman Badawi: Distinguished academic and philosopher known for his work 
on existentialism”, The Guardian, Monday 19 August 2002. See: 
http://www.theguardian.com/news/2002/aug/19/guardianobituaries.obituaries (accessed 17/07/2014) Note that 
Almubarak wrote Badawi’s first name “Abdur” rather than “Abdel” which is a spelling mistake. 
55 In 2006, Alexandria University announced the revival of three books by Badawi; one is a translation of 
Euripides’ Greek tragedies (18 plays), the second is Museion (Muses) on the museum of the library written in 
French, comparing the library to that of Oxford and Cambridge, and finally, a 1986 work by Badawi where he 
writes about his vision for the role of the ancient library and its historical importance. (See 
http://www.bibalex.eg/News/NewsDetails_EN.aspx?id=1110&Keywords=&fromDD=1&fromMM=6&fromYY
=2006&toDD=30&toMM=6&toYY=2006&PageSize=5&searching=&Dir=4) (Accessed 17/07/2014). 
56 Hanafi, Hassan. “A Philosopher in Extensio” al-Ahram Newspaper, Cairo, 29 August- 4th Sept 2002, Issue 
No. 601. http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/601/cu5.htm (accessed 02/04/2014). 
57 Yet he ignored Western rationalism and the Renaissance, omitting such indispensable figures as Descartes and 
Spinoza, as well as the achievements of Italian, Russian and Anglo-American philosophy, and in discussing the 
East, he paid no attention to India, China and the ancient civilisations of Africa and the Near East. 
58 Hanafi, Hassan. “A Philosopher in Extensio” al-Ahram Newspaper, Cairo, 29 August- 4th Sept 2002, Issue No. 




shadowed his scholarly achievements.60 Perhaps, this was evident from the responses he 
received after publishing his autobiography Sirat Hyati (The Story of my Life). Accordingly, he 
was referred to afterwards as a “staunch misanthrope who hates even his own teachers 
(including Taha Husayn), and a miser who does not own a car or buy new clothes”, and 
generally, a not very pleasant or sociable person. Hanafi of al-Ahram newspaper justifies in his 
article on Badawi this image, which is portrayed in the Egyptian (and Middle Eastern) press, 
by saying that the isolation from others and from society is: 
A mere condition of “being a philosopher in extension:61 [Badawi’s] interests covered 
a vast intellectual territory; and even if he didn't always reach the bottom of the subject 
at hand, his understanding spanned its every dimension. Single-handedly he produced 
two encyclopaedias: Encyclopaedia of Orientalists and Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 
(the latter in two parts), in which, though he openly makes use of predominantly foreign 
references, Badawi acknowledges no sources. He is, in his own view, the singular 
philosopher, the Hegel of his generation, without predecessors to speak of (except for 
‘Abdel-Raziq and, before he disowns him, Husayn). Even in resuming Paul Kraus' 
project, Plato for the Arabs, he transcends his starting point.62 
 It is true that Mustafa ‘abdel-raziq,63 whom Badawi admired and spared from his 
criticism, was the pioneer of Arab philosophers, but had it not been for Badawi’s scholarly 
efforts,64 existentialism would have never found a thriving platform from which it could evolve 
in different forms in Egypt. In disagreeing with Hanafi, Badawi has not sacrificed philosophy 
for the history of philosophy. Instead, his contributions are all the more essential for those who 
held the torch of existential thought after him. In several senses, although Badawi drove himself 
out of Egypt, in exile,65 he was right in always considering himself Plato's counterpart, at least 
                                                          
60 Note that he was head of philosophy at ‘Ain Shams University for two decades (the beginning of his career 
coincides with the July Revolution) Following Egypt’s defeat in 1967, he resorted to teaching and living in 
Kuwait. 
61 There is a spelling mistake in the original article as it appears in al-Ahram newspaper. I believe the intended 
word is “extinction”. 
62 Ibid. 
63 “Raziq’s methodical teaching methods spawned specialists in every philosophical discipline”; his death left a 
gap which Badawi devoted himself to fill. “Planting the seeds of reform and what came to be known as 
"enlightenment," abdel-raziq was the most faithful student of Muhammed ‘abduh. ‘Abduh is the progressive 
Shaykh of al-Azhar Islamic establishment who founded the philosophy department at Fouad I University (Cairo 
University today). ‘Abduh saw that rationalism and progress did not mean secularism. He’d be better served by a 
religious renaissance. See Hanafi, Hassan. “A Philosopher in Extensio” al-Ahram Newspaper, Cairo, 29 August- 
4th Sept 2002, Issue No. 601. http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/601/cu5.htm (accessed 02/04/2014). Al-Hakim 
confessed in an interview for al-Ahram that abdel-raziq was the first to believe in him as a writer. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Badawi inverted Geothe's oriental project attempting a comprehensive Eastern Diwan of the West. Hassan 
claims that Badawi’s “scholarly project initially branched out to include editing, translation and adaptation as well 
as authorship; and he pursued all the branches simultaneously till the end of his life.” 
65 Badawi only returned due to his illness and was eager to be treated in his homeland.  
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in the sense that he was "the first teacher” of the Arabs, as Plato was of the Greeks. And this is 
what no one can today deny. 
One can now begin to have a better perspective on the intellectual scene of this rich 
period now that Egypt was thriving culturally and intellectually. As is evident from a front page 
in al-Ahram with the headline “Knowledge for all and Knowledge for society”66 (image 
below), on a speech given by Nasser on the day of celebrating knowledge, it was a priority.67 
This thriving climate allowed for the awakening of the Egyptian mind. 
 
 In an article titled “From Revolutions to constitutions: the case of Egypt”,68 the author 
writes that during former President Nasser’s regime in 1953,69 Badawi was asked to be one of 
the 1950 Egyptians chosen by the President to take part in an independent Constitution 
Committee to draft a new constitution for Egypt.70 Although I have found no evidence to 
suggest that al-Hakim was also on this committee, it is plausible that the two thinkers crossed 
paths in one way or another. This could have perhaps happened during one of Nasser’s 
                                                          
66 Primary education was free to all. Taha Husayn was the one to call for education to be free as “a basic human 
right”. University education was not free until the early 1960s. Prior to the 1960s, the government sent scholars 
abroad as part of an exchange of knowledge programme with France. This programme, during King Farouk’s 
reign, helped many young scholars like Muhammed ‘Abduh (who influenced Hussein’s thought and al-Hakim) to 
travel to France and return to teach in Egypt’s universities. 
67 Dated 7th of February 1967 (available on microfilm at al-Ahram archive). 
68 F. Long, Jr. Antony. (2013) “From Revolution to Constitution: the case of Egypt”, The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, Blackwell Publishing. See: 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/International%20Affairs/2013/89_2/89_2Lang.pd
f (accessed 08/05/2014). 
69 It is my belief that until 1952, al-Hakim had used drama, short stories and plays to conceal to a great extent his 
philosophical views and it was only in 1955 that he began to explicitly publish them in the form of philosophical 
dialogues (essays), presenting his doctrine of equilibrium. 
70 The constitution’s final draft was rejected by the new regime and entirely abandoned in 1954. The result was a 
watered-down version in 1956 which allowed for a political order defined by a revolutionary ideology, but with 
a strong authoritarian Presidential system. At a later stage in his life, Badawi insisted that “President Nasser had 
aborted Egypt’s liberal experiment, which could well have developed into a full democracy." See Badawi, A. Sirat 
Hayati (The Story of my Life) (2000) 2 vols, Beirut. Also see Malik, “The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab 
world”, p. 62 
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intellectual gatherings, or it may simply be that al-Hakim had read some, perhaps all, of 
Badawi’s works.71 What I can confirm, however, is that both Badawi and al-Hakim shared a 
passion for all things Parisian72 and the belief that the West and Islam (or the East) were 
complementary.73 
 In concluding this section, although Egypt at the time was considered to be the heart of 
the Arab world and the centre of culture, sadly this status did not last. By the mid- 1970s, and 
throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century (as al-Hakim predicted in his 
Equilibrium), gradually, Egypt began to lose its edge. Those whom the public once considered 
to be Egypt’s great modern writers, such as Tawfiq al-Hakim, Zaki Naguib Mahmoud74 and 
‘Abdel Rahman Badawi, in addition to novelists like Naguib Mahfouz and the late short story 
writer and playwright Yusuf Idris, were, amongst other intellectuals, attacked by the media.75 
In fact, censorship has restricted the works of many prominent authors not only in Egypt, but 
also in many parts of the Middle East, e.g. Syria. The media attacks in Egypt were initiated by 
Islamic clerics such as Muhammed Metwalli al- Sha’rawi.76 Sha’rawi achieved stardom at the 
age of 59 during the last year of former President Nasser’s reign. He did not approve of 
“intellectuals questioning some of his reactionary fatwas and opinions”.77 A few of the 
intellectuals did in fact express their concern about Sha’rawy’s thought and even warned 
President Nasser against placing Shaykh Sha’rawi “above the possibility of making errors.”78 
                                                          
71 Badawi’s first book was "Nietzsche: a Summary of European Thought" (Cairo, September, 1939). In 1947, 
Badawi edited Aristotle's books on logic from Arabic manuscripts at the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris 
(completed in 1952). He was fluent in many languages, including French and published 120 works (i.e. Greek 
Origins of Political Theories in Islam, Cairo, 1955) and countless translations of Greek thought (i.e. Plato, 1943). 
He also translated material from German Goethe's Western-Eastern Divan collection into Arabic, an introduction 
to Dissidents in Islam (1946) and the controversial work A History of Atheism in Islam. I would not be surprised 
if al-Hakim had knowledge of these works and translations. Badawi had published 14 short books on philosophy, 
the most popular one was “Al-insaniyya wa-l- Wujudiyya” (Humanism and Existentialism in Arab Thought), 
published in 1947.  
72 Note that on 19th February 1967, Badawi considered an invitation to teach temporarily at the Sorbonne in Paris 
to be his opportunity to “escape the frightful nightmare [he] was living through in Egypt. Thus, [he] intended the 
trip to be an 'emigration'.” al-Hakim, at the time, was 69, a famous writer, columnist at the al-Ahram newspaper 
and had just had the opportunity to meet with Jean Paul Sartre in the same year in Egypt. As for Badawi, he was 
living in Paris, and in 1971 the university (‘Ain Shams University in Cairo) sacked him for over-staying his leave. 
See Badawi, A. Sirat Hiyati (The Story of my Life), two volumes, Beirut: al-Muwsu’a al-‘arabiya lil-Dirasat wal-
Nashr (Arab Foundation for Studies and Publication), 2000. pp382 (Vol.1), pp383 (vol.2). 
73 He promoted this thesis in his seminal book Greek Heritage in Islamic Civilization (1940) which ran counter 
to the creeds of modern Islamists. Al-Hakim also was inspired by Greek philosophy and drama which is evident 
in his plays. 
74 Note that Mahmoud wrote a significant book called “The History of Western Philosophies” in 1954. 
75 See chapter four (p.157) on criticisms against al-Hakim. 
76 Sharawi died in 1998 age 87. 
77 Darwish, Adel. (1999) “Shaykh Mohammed Metwalli Shara’wi: Islamisation by Stealth”, World Media, UK 
http://www.mideastnews.com/sharawi.htm [accessed 10/06/2014]. 
78 This is the beginning of a biting attack on intellectuals from religious leaders, and specifically on al-Hakim’s 
Arini Allah (1953). 
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His high status, they believed, was “damaging to the health of the nation’s intellectual being”.79 
Notwithstanding, Sha’rawi became the first ever Islamic cleric to take part in a religious 
discussion on national television. The programme, “Nur ‘ala nur” (Light upon light), turned 
out to be a hit, with an estimated 70 million Arabic-speaking viewers.80 Plausibly, this was one 
of the many critical transitions that left a lasting effect on Egyptian society. Sha’rawi not only 
affected the views of Egyptians towards cultural, intellectual and religious issues, but he also 
condemned intellectuals; his activity marked this period (i.e. the end of Nasser’s reign) as the 
beginning of an unbalanced relationship between human faith and reason,81 and a rift between 
intellectuals and the clergy. 
II. 
 In this section, I would like to give a brief account of Sartre and de Behaviour’s visit to 
Egypt and highlight, on the one hand, the intellectual arena that was already in place and, on 
the other hand, the social and cultural issues that might have affected the guests. Evidently, this 
section would have benefited from a first person’s account of the meetings that took place 
between all three thinkers. Unfortunately, this has not been possible to obtain due to the limited 
information available, lack of resources, poor documentation and facilities. In 1925, it was only 
by chance that the young al-Hakim was lucky enough to arrive in France in the midst of French 
Avant Garde. From biographical material and an examination of the repertory of the theatres 
involved in the Cartel created by Louis Jouvet,82 al-Hakim, as a devoted theatre-goer, saw most 
plays acted in Paris between 1925 and 1928. R. Long wrote of al-Hakim’s trip that on arrival at the 
College des Lois in the autumn of 1925, the still introverted Hakim felt liberated. He immersed 
himself in everything Parisian and chose not to complete his law degree. 
He undertook no organised academic programme, attending only lecture-courses on 
subjects which attracted him (including a good many on art and one given by James Joyce 
on the history of English poetry), and eventually failed to obtain the doctorate he had 
                                                          
79 Darwish, Adel. p.4. 
80 The television programme was not the only mean that Shaykh Sha’rawi used to reach millions; he also took 
part in interviews and made accessible audio cassettes with the financial aid he received from his network of 
wealthy Islamic fundamentalists in Saudi Arabia and parts of the Middle East. 
81 In 1987, in an interview held in London with Shaykh Sha’rawi by ‘Adel Darwish (of World Media UK), 
Darwish claimed that the programme had succeeded in “transforming the public opinion in Egyptian society from 
liberalism to a medieval repression, as Egyptian writer Ibrahim Issa, puts it in his book “Turbans and Daggers” 
(1994), which examined the dual effect of fundamentalists' campaign of terror and that of ''terrorising the 
collective mind'' through media evangelism. The result is the “Islamisation” of society by stealth while the 
government remained complacent, to the horror of liberal intellectuals and human rights activists. 
82 Noted in G.V.Tutungi’s thesis on al-Hakim in 1966 which is a comparative study submitted to the department 
of comparative literature at Indiana University. 
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ostensibly set out for: al-Hakim consequently noted in his epistolary Zahrat al-’Umr, ‘My 
nature is made to fly in space, not to fall into the chains of doctorates and limited university 
knowledge.83 
 Sartre was at the time twenty years old and a student at the École Normale, where he 
took the role of Lanson in a play titled Le Desastre de Langson.84 There is no evidence that 
proves that al-Hakim saw this play or encountered Sartre at this point; however, in al-Hakim’s 
autobiographical essay he noted that he had indulged in the Parisian life-style to its fullest, 
attending plays and meeting with intellectuals. He claimed that he had found it very difficult to 
resist the charms of the popular literary-philosophical cult of the ‘ungodly existentialists’ 
who played such a significant role in the resistance during the Nazi occupation of France in 
WWII. The contrast in culture was clearly significant. It is evident that al-Hakim’s Islamic 
upbringing and educational background had failed to offer him, in Egypt, the same exciting 
and challenging opportunity to develop his fondness of literature, the arts and philosophy 
which he had always longed for, and which he now found in France. And yet, almost 
contradicting himself, his writings from the mid- 40s onwards reflected his admiration of the 
West and, at the same time, showed to a certain extent his criticisms and disapproval of what he 
explicitly referred to as Europe’s ‘Godlessness’. For this reason, I believe that the contradictions 
in al-Hakim’s thought and writings were due to his attempts to try to combine the ideas he so 
much admired from the West with the ideas that he was brought up to cherish and 
believe in from the East. This was an ongoing conflict that had cost al-Hakim many years of 
his life in dedication and perseverance as a writer and philosopher. For example, when asked 
about his contradictory beliefs, he said that the weight of the pervasive cultural struggle and 
the intellectual voracity which seized hold of him in Paris had left him questioning his past and 
future. He wrote: 
 
The tragedy became evident to my eyes one day when I was analysing myself and it 
occurred to me that only a minor proportion of the life I was living was my own, the 
greater proportion being that mixture, kneaded like dough, of contradictory elements 
deposited in the generative fluid of which I was formed.85  
 
                                                          
83 Long, Richard. Tawfiq al-Hakim: Playwright of Egypt. London: Ithaca, 1979. 
84 Sartre says of this period: “Communist students at the time did not appeal to Marxism or even mention it in 
their examination fearing that they would fail. The horror of dialectic was such that GWF Hegel himself was 
known to us. Teacher, L. Brunschwicg, in his La Conscience Occidental devoted no more than a few pages to 
Hegel and not a word about Marx.” See Busch, Thomas W. The Power of Consciousness and the force of 
Circumstances in Sartre’s philosophy. (1990) Library of Congress Catalogue in publication. 
85 See al-Hakim, Tawfiq. (1992) Sijn al-Umr (The Prison of life: An autobiographical essay). Translated by Pierre 
Cachia, The American University in Cairo Press (AUC). 
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And on the French culture he said: 
 
I do not dress like the rest and I do not smoke because it is a habit much in evidence. 
Perhaps I would smoke if the rest gave up.86 
 
 Di-Capua claims that no one could have guessed that what appeared as ‘the decline of 
Arab existentialism’ would be in the hands of its own advocate, Sartre himself. It is believed 
that after Sartre’s visit to Egypt with Simone de Beauvoir (from the 25th of February to the 13th 
of March 1967), and shortly after the Six Day War with Israel, Sartre “abruptly withdrew his 
support from his Arab interlocutors and sided with Israel”.87 This did not signal the decline of 
Arab existentialism (because it continued to influence many writers during this period) as much 
as it assigned a negative stigma to Sartre’s name as a traitor. For many Arab intellectuals, this 
was a betrayal. The reason for Sartre’s visit to Egypt, according to al-Ahram newspaper, was 
“to acquaint the European philosopher with the Egyptian view of the Arab-Israeli conflict, as 
well as to offer him first-hand experience of the ‘Arab path to socialism’ Egypt was embarked 
on at the time.”88 It was also believed that they were invited in order to promote global culture 
and encourage an exchange of knowledge. In brief, this was how the event was documented in 
a typical Egyptian national newspaper: 
In 1967 Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir visited Egypt at the invitation of 
Muhammed Hassanein Haykal, then chairman and editor-in-chief of al-Ahram, during 
which they visited Aswan, Luxor and Palestinian refugee camps in Gaza. They were 
received by Nasser, met members of the country's intellectual community, and were 
entertained by writer Tawfiq al-Hakim at the Pyramids.89 
 Below are rare images which show al-Hakim with the guests on two separate occasions. 
It is not implausible that al-Hakim accompanied his guests on other occasions as well, but these 
were not documented.90 It is difficult to say whether this encounter with al-Hakim was their 
first or whether they had previously met with him during his trip to Paris in 1925, or even on 
one of the many visits that al-Hakim had made to Paris between the two dates,91 i.e. 1925 to 
1967.92 Nevertheless, despite their doctrinal differences, there are some common traits which 
                                                          
86 Ibid 
87 Di-Capua, Yoav. p.1064 
88 Al-Ahram Weekly, 13-19 April 2000, Issue No. 477. 
89 See appendix 2 for an archive image of the official announcements of the guests’ arrival at Cairo’s airport. 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/889/cu1.htm [accessed 20/06/2014] 
90 Most pictures of the visit are from the archive of al-Ahram and from the personal collection of Lilianne al-
Kholi. 
91 Al-Hakim returned to Paris in 1936. There is evidence in his autobiography to show that he was a regular 
traveller to France and other parts of Europe. 
92 In 1959, he was appointed the U.A.R’s representative to UNESCO in Paris where he lived for a year or so. 
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in varying degrees Sartre and de Beauvoir both shared with al-Hakim. These traits are 




(Fig.1.) A group photo upon the guests’ arrival at Cairo airport 
 
 
   (Fig.2.) Left to right: de Beauvoir, Sartre, al-Hakim, and Haykal93 
                                                          




(Fig.3.) Left to right: Lanzmann, 94de Beauvoir and Sartre 
 
 (Fig.4.) Left to right: Haykal, al-Hakim, Sartre, de Beauvoir and Okasha95  
                                                          
94 Image taken from The Patagonian Hare: A Memoir by Claude Lanzmann, Translated by Frank Wynne. 
Lanzmann was invited as a journalist and as Sartre’s friend who also sat on the editorial committee of Sartre’s 
magazine Les Temps Modernes. Although he was 17 years younger than Beauvoir and 20 years younger than 
Sartre, Lanzmann quickly took his place within the ménage, installed by Beauvoir in her own apartment and was 
brought along on her decorous vacations with Sartre.” See: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/12/books/review/the-patagonian-hare-by-claude 
Lanzmann.html?pagewanted=2&_r=0. 
95 Tharwat Okasha, a prominent figure known for owning a theatrical company “Okasha group” and as an 




(Fig.5.) Left to right: Lanzmann, de Beauvoir and Sartre on a Nile cruise 
 
(Fig.6.) Left to right: de Beauvoir, Former President Nasser and Sartre in Nasser’s 
Heliopolis residence 
(Fig.7.) Watching a scene from ‘Huis clos’ at Cairo’s Theatre Institute 
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(Fig.8.) Sartre giving a public lecture at Cairo University  
(Fig.9.) Sartre with de Beauvoir and Lanzmann at the Ben Ezra Synagogue in Cairo 
 
(Fig.10.) Left to right: de Beauvoir, al-Hakim and Sartre  
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 Moreover, in her memoir Tout Compte Fait (1972) de Beauvoir gives an account of 
the event in details. Below is an extract. 
We had been invited to go to Egypt by Haykal, Nasser's friend and spokesman and the 
editor of al-Ahram. Dusk was falling as we landed [in Cairo]. We were welcomed by 
Haykal, a short, broad-shouldered, jolly man, very brown and energetic, and by the 
elderly Tawfiq al-Hakim (his name means the philosopher's success)96 whose amusing 
Journal d'un substitute [Yawmiyat Na’ib fi al-Aryaf] had been published in Les Temps 
modernes fifteen years before: he was primarily a playwright, and he was very well 
known in Egypt.97 On his white head he wore a beret. He was said to be a misanthrope, 
but he cheerfully went about with us whenever it was not too tiring. [Journalist] Lutfi 
al-Kholi was also at the airport with his young and agreeable wife Liliane, who 
belonged to the state tourist organisation -- she was to be our guide and interpreter. We 
were also introduced to Dr [Louis] ‘Awad and his wife. After a short press conference 
we got into Haykal's car and he took us to Shepherd Hotel, with the Nile only a few 
steps away. The river looked much the same as any other, but this was the true Nile, 
and it seemed fabulous that I was actually seeing it with my own eyes. 
We took part in many discussions on Egypt's current problems. We met the editorial 
staff of al-Tali’a; the minister of culture; ‘Ali Sabry, the head of the Socialist Union, 
the single party to which all Egyptians automatically belong; some Marxists and a 
variety of public figures. When we were present, no one questioned the existence of a 
single party, the absence of trade union activity, or the policy of state-direction. They 
were essentially concerned with the difficult struggle against the feudal landowners, 
with over-population, and above all with the existence of a 'new class' which has taken 
the place of the former bourgeoisie but which is also composed of privileged people. 
The greater part of industry has been nationalised, but the state needs large numbers of 
executives and technicians, and to obtain their services it is forced to pay them highly. 
The more the country develops the larger becomes this category of profiteers; and they 
have to be tolerated because they are necessary. The members of this 'new class' are 
individualists and reactionaries who formerly belonged to the petite bourgeoisie. 
Towards the end of our stay Nasser received us at his residence in Heliopolis. We talked 
for three hours, sitting in a large drawing room and drinking fruit juice. Nasser had 
nothing of the 'white-toothed grin' that some ill-natured photographs gave him: his 
voice and his expression had a quiet, somewhat melancholy charm. It was said that his 
friendship for Haykal was explained by the contrast between their natures, the one 
overflowing with jovial vitality, the other uneasy, worried and turned in upon himself. 
Nasser listened attentively; and he answered without haste, weighing his words. I asked 
him about the status of Egyptian women. He was a feminist, and he had encouraged 
one of his daughters to carry on with her studies to an advanced level.  
When the section of the [1962] Charter that called for equality between the sexes was 
being discussed, someone raised the objection, 'So every woman will have a right to 
four husbands, then?' Nasser replied that Islam first appeared in what was a widely 
polygamous society and that in fact the Koran, far from encouraging polygamy, tried 
                                                          
96 Literally, the word “Tawfiq” in Arabic means “success” and the word “al-Hakim” means “the wise”. 
97 In al-Ahram’s archive, file no. 122 on al-Hakim, there are some coverage of al-Hakim’s ‘Usfur min al-Sharq, 
al-Aydi al-Na’imah, Izis and Ya Tali’ al-Shajarah. 
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to make it impossible by laying down a great number of restrictions. For his part, he 
would like to see it disappear. He believed in God, he added; but as far as religion was 
concerned it had thwarted him at every step. Sartre mentioned the eighteen young men 
who were then in prison [accused of being Communists]: he asked whether it would 
not be possible to hasten their trial. Nasser had obviously been told of this approach by 
Haykal; he smiled and said, 'A trial? By all means. But they run the risk of a ten-year 
sentence. Our idea was that it would be better to keep them in a little longer and then 
let them go quietly.' 'That would be the best solution of course,' said Sartre.98 
 De Beauvoir resorted to giving her readers a gist of the trip and a description of whom 
she encountered.99 In fact, some of the attendees of the events hosting the guests, Sartre and de 
Beauvoir, reported their frustration and discontent in letters addressed to the al-Ahram 
newspaper. The content of these letters reveal the social and cultural dynamics at the time of 
the visit and the contradictions around the reception of Sartre and de Beauvoir in various parts 
of Egypt. For example, in an excerpt in the archive of ‘Books’ (which is al-Ahram’s weekly 
supplement online), Muhammed Aboulghar, Professor of Obstetrics at Cairo University writes: 
Dear Sir - I read with great interest your coverage and comments on the visit Jean-Paul 
Sartre made to Egypt in 1967 in your last issue of ‘Books’ (13-19 April 2000). During 
the 1960s I was very interested in the philosophy of Sartre. Naturally, when his visit to 
Egypt was announced, I was very excited and decided to attend one of his meetings. I 
made it to the one which took place in the village of Kamshish, Menufiya. 
On our way there, a few kilometres from Kamshish, we found that all the school 
children were standing on the sides of the roads waving Egyptian and French flags and 
were repeating the slogan "Vive Sartre, Vive Simone." The children looked very happy, 
probably because they were allowed out of school. When we arrived at the meeting hall 
which had belonged to al-Fiki family, we found seats with great difficulty. The hall was 
packed with farmers. They were shouting all the time with different slogans related to 
freedom, socialism and Franco-Egyptian friendship. One hour later Sartre, Simone de 
Beauvoir, Lotfi al-Khuli and several other high ranking officials from the Arab Socialist 
Union and al-Ahram came in. At that time there were around two thousand farmers 
outside the hall who could not find a place inside. They started to force themselves into 
the overcrowded hall. At that point the police interfered. This terrible scene of 
disorganisation and police interference was witnessed by all of us including the French 
guests. It was some time before the police managed to close the door to the hall. At last, 
Sartre gave a short speech which was translated into Arabic, and the floor was open for 
discussion. Several farmers stood up to read questions from pieces of papers they had, 
asking about the most sophisticated subjects of socialism and existentialism and the 
books written by Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir. It was very obvious that these farmers 
had been given the questions to read in correct Arabic. Naturally, Sartre understood that 
                                                          
98 From Tout Compte Fait, translated as "All said and done" by Patrick O'Brian (London, 1974). In de Beauvoir’s 
many volumes of autobiography, starting with Mémoires d'une jeune fille rangée in 1958 and ending with Tout 
Compte Fait in 1972, they constitute both an insider's record of French intellectual life from the 1940s to the 
1970s. 
99 She was interviewed during her visit in Cairo by the Egyptian media and an article on her book The Second Sex 
was published by al-Ahram newspaper. See appendix 2 for the original article as it appeared to the public. 
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and answered politely but very briefly. Two hours later, when the meeting was through, 
I talked to several of the farmers who had "asked" questions to Sartre. Some of them 
had never heard of the philosopher before. I left Menufiyya frustrated by what had 
happened and I am sure that this staged performance had a negative influence on Sartre. 
Unfortunately, similar games are still being played regularly -- though at a smaller scale 
during field visits of Egyptian officials and foreign guests. 
 This passage shows the monopoly of the government on intellectual events and official 
visits, especially ones that involved foreign guests and that also concerned the image of Egypt 
as a country. And consequently, apart from the meeting of the minds between Sartre, de 
Beauvoir and other intellectuals in Cairo, unfortunately the encounter had very little outcome 
in respect of the current social or political situations in what are considered to be rural parts of 
Egypt. Secondly, it is increasingly difficult to ignore the fact that there was already an 
intellectual system in place in Egypt, particularly in Cairo, before Sartre and de Beauvoir’s 
visit in 1967. The story of Arab existentialism did not simply begin with Badawi’s promise to 
liberate the Arab self from the constraints of the colonizer. In fact, Egypt had an active 
intellectual scene even before Nasser’s reign. The reason for this was that King Fuad 
University100 was host to many foreign professors who had fled their country at a time of 
political unrest or in search of a permanent post. These professors, according to Di-Capua’s 
article, included Russian émigré philosopher Alexandre Koyré;101 who left France and settled 
as a professor of Philosophy in the 1930s; André Lanlande,102 a Sorbonne retiree who taught 
from 1926 to 1940s; and French scholars Émile Bréhier and Louis Rougier.103 I would like to 
argue that Koyré was primarily the one who initiated the reinvention of European existentialism 
in the Middle East and, most importantly, in Egypt at King Fuad University. Koyré, who was 
Badawi’s supervisor, inspired him to write his masters’ dissertation about death in existential 
philosophy, a topic which interested Koyré himself. Prior to his journey to Egypt, Koyré was 
already involved in promoting Hegel’s and Heidegger’s philosophies and meeting with those 
                                                          
100 This was founded as a European-inspired civil university, in contrast to the religious university of al-Azhar, 
and became the prime indigenous model for other state universities. In 1928, the first group of female students 
enrolled at the university. It is known today as Cairo University. 
101 Before moving to France in 1912, he was a member of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological circle in Göttingen 
and a follower of Heidegger’s existentialism. He served as a bridge between German thought and French thought, 
between Husserl and Bergson. Like many European intellectuals, he could not find a teaching position at any 
major French universities, so he travelled to Egypt and joined the King Fuad University, which became public in 
1925 and adapted new disciplines and widened its academic professionalization.” See Yoav Di- Capua’s footnote 
no.13, p. 1065. 
102 He was also Koyré’s former professor and for his commitment to Egyptian education he was conceded the 
position of chair by Islamic philosopher Mustafa ‘Abd al Raziq. See Badawi, A. Sirat Hayati (The Story of my 
Life) (2000) 2 Vol. Beirut.  




who would soon become prominent names in the history of philosophy.104 This is why I 
consider Koyré’s role to be of crucial importance. Without a doubt, he gave Badawi a ready 
framework which was founded on the ideas of Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, Gabriel Marcel, 
Jean Wahl, Emmanuel Lévinas and many others. Accordingly, Di-Capua says, Badawi, from 
this partnership, learned to prioritise the problem of being at the expense of knowing,105 which 
marked the beginning of Arab phenomenology and existentialism.  
 To conclude this section, it is, in my view, no surprise that what Badawi promoted, 
namely that “true existence is that of the individual, and that the individual is the subject that 
necessitates freedom and the meaning of this freedom is the existence of possibility”,106 
inspired Arab intellectuals, like al-Hakim, to defend their beliefs regardless of criticisms. And 
thus, the value of the achievements of authors like Badawi and al-Hakim resides not in 
innovation per se, but in their consistency and persistence. This is a trait that is reflected in 
their writings. Badawi not only attempted to create a merger between existential thought and 
Islamic philosophy (Sufism), but also to highlight the opportunity for Arab contemporary 
philosophical thought to (a) reinvent itself, (b) to reject dogma and, more importantly, (c) to 
have a new shape or form in which it can flourish. It is no wonder that al-Hakim found these 
goals worth pursuing. It is also worth noting that Badawi’s Al Zaman Al Wujudi (Existential 
Time), as I mentioned previously, was a widely accessible dissertation and its publication was 
an event that was covered by the al-Ahram Newspaper. Al-Hakim worked there as a journalist. 
He was writing literary and philosophical columns in abundance for the newspaper on a regular 
basis.107 It is, thus, my belief that he was directly and indirectly influenced by the ideologies 
                                                          
104 In 1933, he started a journal, Recherches Philosophique and a seminar where he taught Heidegger’s philosophy 
and a new reading of Hegel. Participants were Alexandre Kojéve, Henry Corbin (an Orientalist and first translator 
of Heidegger’s Being and Time), and Raymon Aron (who allegedly introduced Sartre to phenomenology and 
Heidegger). Between the 50s and 60s participants were George Bataille, Jacque Lacan, Maurice Merleau- Ponty, 
Eric Weil and many more. “What happened in this seminar changed the face of modern French philosophy.” 
Kleinberg, Ethan. Generation Existential: Heidegger’s Philosophy in France, pp. 65-66, p.69. See also, 
Descombes, Vincent. Modern French Philosophy, trans. L. Scott-Fox and J. M. Harding (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 
9-48. 
105 He held that (a) existence precedes essence and (b) time is of the essence (humans are time-bound, the lived 
time experienced is different from measured clock-time) similar to Bergson’s notion of durée. In Badawi’s 
memoirs (pages 179-180), he noted that he would like to think of his work as “complementary to that of 
Heidegger”. See Badawi’s Le Problème de la mort dans la Philosophie Existentielle, pp. 1-7. 
106 He embraced Heidegger’s Dasein and, interestingly, introduced it as ‘Aniya’, a medieval Islamic term to denote 
not a conscious subject but the way human beings are in the world among things in which a relationship is not 
that of one subject to another or between the subject and things, but a relationship between the subject and itself, 
See p. 239 in Badawi, A. Dirasat fi-il Falsafa Al Wujudiya (Studies in Existential philosophy) Cairo, 1966, pp. 
236-263. 
107 He began writing columns for al-Ahram from 3rd January, 1938 titled “Debates”. He was on the board of al-




that affected authors at this time, by Badawi in particular, and more importantly, by the charm 
of European existentialist thought. 
III. 
 In the final section of this chapter, the aim is to identify the influential figures that al-
Hakim mixed with from the East at the height of his intellectual career and in the years just 
before he died in 1987 aged 89. Just as al-Hakim found his inspiration in Western works, he 
also found inspiration in many Eastern writers’ works who were before him and whose names 
were prominent at his time. It is often said that al-Hakim was influenced by almost everything 
he read, saw, heard or encountered in one form or another: “everything found an echo in his 
work, making it a heterogeneous mass of disparate elements, the basis of which is almost 
always the romantic’s search for completion and perfection.”108 His adaptations of Western 
plays such as Pygmalion, King Oedipus (al-Malik Udib), Shahrazad and People of the Cave 
(Ahl al-Kahf) and presentation of them in an “Arabised” form marked him out from other 
writers. In doing this, he brought to light his proposition that the two systems of thought, 
European and Islamic -Western and Middle Eastern- are not as distinct as they may at first 
appear, and so confirmed his conception of “borderless thought”. Folklore tales, stories and 
legends from Egyptian culture, biblical stories, hadiths and even verses from the Quran, as well 
as tales, stories and legends from the Western traditions, seem to have been his long-found 
treasures which he admitted in his autobiographical work to viewing as rich resources for his 
inspiration and writings. This tactic (adapting and using materials to inspire him) should not be 
looked down upon since it does not take away from al-Hakim’s skill of combining ideas from 
Eastern and Western traditions, or from his status as a dedicated writer of multiple genres.  
 Unquestionably, there were many factors that affected al-Hakim as a writer and a 
philosopher. What I have concluded from my readings of his time in Paris, the intellectual 
capital of the world in 1925, is that on the one hand, Paris nurtured his growing fondness for 
literature and aided his search for the knowledge that he so desired, while, on the other hand, 
the East, continued to serve as a constant source for his beliefs and traditions. The latter may 
have held al-Hakim back, to a certain extent, from fully expressing himself and his ideas with 
ease as a thinker and writer of philosophical works such as al Ta’aduliya (Equilibrium) (1955), 
al- Taʿaduliyya wal- islam (Equilibrium and Islam) (1983) and others. This is evident in the 
contradictory aspects of almost all of his writings. These particular works are, in my view, of 
                                                          
108 This was noted by G. V. Tutungi in his thesis on al-Hakim in 1966, which is a comparative study submitted to 
the comparative literature department at Indiana University. 
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vital importance today, as they primarily mark a critical transition in al-Hakim’s thought and 
reflect on the end of the intellectual renaissance in which they were written. The transition in 
al-Hakim’s writings is evident from my chronology109 and from the explanatory overview of 
trends in the following paragraphs.  
 First of all, during the 20s and the early 30s al-Hakim had followed the current fashion 
at the time of writing plays which were merely for entertainment. And from the mid-30s, after 
his return to Egypt from Paris, he began to introduce his readers to plays that were only meant 
to be read, a trend that he had admired and was emerging in Europe at the time. Al-Hakim 
continued to write these purely literary plays despite the criticisms he received from both his 
colleagues and critics. He did not leave behind his adaptations of the classics till after the late 
30s, when he began to experiment with philosophy in his philosophical short stories and essays 
such as ‘Ahd al-Shaytan and Himari qal Li,110 published in 1938 and 1940. By the 50s, he had 
written four novels, a couple of essays, a short story collection and two main collections of 
plays. One collection was titled Masrah al-Mujtama’, published in 1950, and the other 
collection titled al-Masrah al-Munawwa’ published in 1956. There is a clear transition in al-
Hakim’s literary career: he shifted his writing from merely following a trend to formulating his 
own philosophical views and making use of them in his literary outputs. This transition or shift 
in trends of writing also highlights the point at which al-Hakim was wholeheartedly in favour 
of close cultural contact with the West and, more specifically, with France as he began to make 
multiple trips to the country and became engrossed in ongoing explorations and adaptations of 
Western themes. As a result, we have an equilibrium doctrine and an author whose personality 
and work progressed dramatically from one stage to the other throughout his career adapting, 
merging and forming ideas from both traditions, Eastern and Western. 
 Secondly, generally speaking, the product of al-Hakim’s hard work, the doctrine of 
equilibrium, is an interesting text to us today due to the historical context the work was 
published in and the political and social events of this period. For the purpose of this thesis, 
however, there are two main reasons why the text is of value. First, the doctrine outlines what 
al-Hakim saw as “the crisis of modernity”, based on his own underlying comparative 
observations and analysis of East and West. And, secondly, the doctrine presents the 
consequences which al-Hakim saw as characteristic of his time (and, he predicts their 
                                                          
109 See appendix 2, pp. 196-197. 
110 There is a short article dated 20th March 1975 in al-Ahram newspaper that says that al-Hakim was angry at the 
Syrian government for allowing his book al-Himer (The Donkeys) to be plagiarised and published without his 
consent. This is one of many books where al- Hakim tells of an imaginary dialogue with his donkey. 
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reoccurrence on a rapid scale in the years to come). These consequences were, in his view, a 
result of factors that affected human nature on a personal level and social and political trends 
on a general level. What we, the readers, are faced with as a result is a doctrine of equilibrium, 
“al- Taʿaduliyya”, which argues that the crisis of modernity or of modern man has led directly 
or indirectly to trends such as atheism, and attempts to rationalise faith and submit oneself 
solely to the dominance of the mind instead of maintaining a “counter-balanced resistance” 
(i.e. a state of equilibrium). To clarify, in the final pages of al-Hakim’s book, he writes to clarify 
his use of the word “al- Taʿaduliyya” and says:  
[al- Taʿaduliyya / Equilibrium] is not here to be taken as ‘equivalence’ in its linguistic 
sense, which means ‘equality’. Neither should it be understood as ‘moderation’ or 
‘mediation’ in things. The meaning of equilibrium here is opposition. And the power of 
‘equilibrium’ means the power of ‘the resisting opposition’ if the meaning of the word 
has not been understood accordingly, equilibrium lose its true meaning and goal. 
Equilibrium in this book is the opposing and resisting motion to another motion. 
 
This resistance is between various dualities that al-Hakim points out such as good versus evil, 
the mind versus the heart (reason versus faith), human will versus divine will and the power of 
expression versus the power of explanation. His predictions during this period reveal something 
significant about the trends that affect human nature and the social and political predicaments 
that continue to haunt modern man, regardless of whether this is the case in the East or in the 
West. 
 
 Thirdly, in order to support my argument that al-Hakim found his inspiration in Eastern 
and Western traditions, I would like to offer my own translation of an excerpt that I have come 
across written by al-Hakim himself, reflecting on Egyptian culture and Western adaptations 
through his own comparisons between the East and the West. These passages also highlight 
social and cultural constraints on Egyptian authors at the time. He writes: 
Until the 1920s, respected authors were those who wrote articles for newspapers. Those 
who wrote plays or novels were looked down at and considered unworthy of the title of 
an “author”. They were “the clowns”, as the intellectual circle used to call them and 
despise them. When I travelled abroad, I found the opposite. Playwrights and novelists 
were famous and their works were taught in universities and through the educational 
curriculum. There was always a text or two by Molière, Racine111 or Shakespeare. Their 
greatness was not acquired by simply writing texts to be staged or for mere 
entertainment, but rather they wrote knowing that they were writing a work of literature. 
So how did we, Egyptians, introduce our own work to the literary canon? In Europe, 
they wrote on the basis that an ancient literary and cultural heritage was already 
                                                          
111 In order to clarify speculations regarding the figures al-Hakim refers to, I provided an image of the text and 
underlined the figures in question.  
 77 
 
established by writers Corneille,112 Racine and Shakespeare. These writers adapted 
works from Greek literature. Greek theatre presented myths.  
   
 
 
Al-Hakim continues to write: 
 
And because we do not have myths in our Arab heritage, I resorted to adaptations from 
the Quran such as in the case of Ahl al-Kahf. I figured that this was our real Arab 
heritage. I also adapted Arabian tales from A Thousand and One Nights. Doesn’t our 
[Egyptian] heritage seem similar to that of myths which began with the works of Homer 
and others? It is true that I re-presented Ali Baba, an adaptation from A Thousand and 
One Nights’ tales, but what I took from it was the comical side, the entertainment which 
appealed to the audience and was right at the time. When I revisited the work again, I 
found in these tales Shahrazad, but I only adapted ideas from it. She wanted to awaken 
the mighty Shahrayar from his ignorance to an extent where he deserted our temporal 
world in search for the secrets of our existence. When she attempted to retrieve him 
from his fantasies and bring him back to reality, it was too late. Thus, through a contrast 
between fantasy and reality, I brought to light the intriguing tale which unfolded a chain 
of events. I did not clarify my intentions in rewriting the tale by publishing an 
introduction to Shahrazad because I was at the time working in a governmental post. I 
feared that they113 would say I returned to theatre, which was in their eyes trivial and 
cheap, something that is not expected of a respectable man in government.114 
 
 From this passage, one concludes that al-Hakim’s appreciation of Western literature 
and philosophy, and his eagerness to compare and contrast between cultures, inspired him to 
                                                          
112 See image of the text; note that there is a typo in the original Arabic. 
113 This refers to those who disapproved amongst colleagues, family members and critics. 
114 Gamal al- Gheitany, (1998) Al-Hakim Reminisces, Supreme council of culture, pp. 130- 143. 
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merge what he already had access to from the Eastern literary heritage and what he experienced 
and learnt from Western heritage. Moreover, in an article by al-Enany, al-Hakim’s encounter with 
Europe is described as one that led “to unending probing of the self.”115 This is evident in al-Hakim’s 
journalistic writings during the 30s and 40s, which are scattered in numerous collections of essays. 
The encounter was to provide al-Hakim with the inspiration he needed to begin his literary and 
philosophical journey, borrowing Western themes and undertaking philosophical investigations. 
This, according to al-Hakim’s autobiography,116 he does not deny. The parallelism between al-
Hakim’s life and his writings in his novel ‘Usfur min al-Sharq (1938) is one that should not be 
believed in the strictest sense. ‘Usfur min al-Sharq does not by any means convey al-Hakim’s 
tolerance or openness to Western ideas. But, on the contrary, if we agree with al-Enany that the 
novel mirrored al-Hakim’s life experiences, especially his experiences of living in France, then the 
novel shows al-Hakim’s strong sense of nationalism and rejection of everything that is Western at 
this period, instead of one of admiration. Let us assume that this is true of the early period of al-
Hakim’s life, precisely true of the period prior to his trip and discovering more about French 
literature, philosophy and the arts. From the early 40s onwards, al-Hakim’s writings convey the 
opposite (that is: an indulgence in everything Parisian). I would even go further to claim that the 
image portrayed by al-Hakim of himself during this period (as evident in his letters to his French 
friend André, reminiscing his time in Paris) is that his intellectual and artistic development, began 
almost entirely under the influence of Western culture. Now, the question that seems to posit itself 
is can one consider a work of fiction to be reflective of an author’s entire life or career? Surely not.  
The question that al-Enany should have considered instead is whether the novel merely 
shows al-Hakim’s tactful experimentations with “the treatment of cultural encounter/clash between 
East and West and the notion of the spirituality of the East and materialism of the West”,117 which 
was in fact a popular trend and a current subject at the time, or whether it was the beginning of 
something else.118 If we take al-Hakim’s novel, a work of fiction, and rely on it to extract anything 
constructive about al-Hakim’s character, his progression or career development (or even his 
relationship with the West), our assessment will not only be partial, but also it will be unreliable. 
This is because the assessment will be primarily based on a work of fiction in which the content 
                                                          
115 Al-Enany, Rasheed. “Tawfiq al-Hakim and the West: A New Assessment of the Relationship.” British 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 27 No. 2 (Nov, 2000) pp.165-175, www.jstor.org/stable/826090 
(accessed 04/03/2013) See p, 170. 
116 Al-Hakim, Tawfiq. (1992) Sijn al-‘Umr (The Prison of life: An autobiographical essay). Translated by Pierre 
Cachia. American University in Cairo (AUC) Press. 
117 Ibid p. 166 
118 For example, al-Hakim’s transitional stage from youth to adolescence (intellectual maturity) and the 
beginning of an artist’s search for the self.  
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carries within it the possibility of being true or false. Moreover, our assessment will fail to show the 
various shifts that occurred during al-Hakim’s life as a whole. In fact, the novel, which was written 
in the late 1930s, has only been able to highlight, if we agree with al-Enany in the first place al-
Hakim’s observations or reflections on a period in which Egypt was undergoing social and political 
pressures, on the one hand from the West and on the other from neighbouring countries such as 
Israel. It is, thus, natural that ‘‘Usfur min al-Sharq echoes what an author like al-Hakim felt to be 
right at a time of a nation’s struggle.119 
 I shall try now to show links between al-Hakim and the influential figures from the East 
whom he mixed with and was influenced by throughout his career, whether as acquaintances 
or close friends. According to Pierre Cachia’s translation of al-Hakim’s autobiography Sijn al- 
‘Umr (The Prison of Life), Cachia claimed that al-Hakim “belongs to a generation of Arab 
writers who were remarkably bold in their questioning of the values inherited from their 
immediate past and immensely influential in pioneering a form of modernism manifestly and 
often frankly shaped by the example of Western Europe.”120 In this rich period in Egyptian 
history,121 there was a rise in intellectuals who clearly had profound views and were, in various 
ways, influenced by the West in one way or another (because they were either educated in 
French schools in Egypt or sent abroad to be educated in France). These intellectuals, along 
with al-Hakim, were:  
                                                         
Tawfiq al-Hakim          Taha Husayn            Naguib Mahfouz              Yusuf Idris 
Born     1898                               1889                                 1911                             1927  
Died     1987                               1973                                 2006                              1991 
 
                                                          
119 There are speculations that he wrote this during his time in Paris. The story tells of a girl who sells cinema 
tickets and how she broke his protagonist’s heart. Al-Enany considers this story to be an allegory for al-Hakim’s 
own experience and relationship with Western women, especially one encounter that mirrors the story’s details. 
120 Al-Hakim, Tawfiq. (1992) Sijn al-‘Umr; (The Prison of life: An autobiographical essay). Translated from the 
Arabic by Pierre Cachia. American University in Cairo (AUC) Press. 
121 The Egyptian Nahda, “renaissance” or “rebirth”, is best known for its renewed interest in Egyptian antiquity. 
The cultural liberation began on the hands of Rifa’at al-Tahtawi who introduced “Enlightenment” ideas (i.e. 
secular political rights, authority and rights) to his students and the Egyptian intelligentsia. His ideas, as a 




 There are two main reasons why I believe al-Hakim’s writings stood out from those of 
other authors of his age. First, al-Hakim was particularly explicit and bold in questioning 
philosophically social and political issues that crossed his path. And secondly, he made no 
division between philosophical and religious investigations: meaning that he saw no 
restrictions on discussing religious matters openly and in a philosophical manner. The latter is 
an attitude that has of course angered many religious institutions and members of the public 
and created a negative stigma that was gradually but steadily assigned to his writings. Unlike 
others, he was unbiased by his Eastern roots and, perhaps in taking a position of an observer in 
most cases, he was able to reflect with frankness and openness on his experiences of both 
worlds, the East and the West. He was after all a more travelled author than Husayn, Mahfouz 
or Idris. Below I advance an overview of al-Hakim’s relationship with these other writers and 
provide some images to support my claim that there was indeed a dialogue between al-Hakim 
and other Egyptian authors of this period, and, in particular, intellectual meetings between them 
along with a few literary collaborations.  
 
 
(Fig 11) From left to right: Egyptian Singer Um Kulthoum, Naguib Mahfouz and al-Hakim122 
 
                                                          
122 On Naguib Mahfouz’s 50th birthday celebration at al-Ahram Newspaper, he was seated between Egyptian 






(Fig 12) al-Hakim with Naguib Mahfouz and Yusuf Idris. 
 First, Taha Husayn,123 the oldest of the three, had a strong relationship with al-
Hakim.124 It was not, however, as widely discussed as the relationship which was evident in 
the media between Mahfouz and al-Hakim. Nevertheless, in an article by an Italian reviewer,125 
he wrote that the collaboration between Husayn and al-Hakim in his novel The Enchanted 
                                                          
123 He was known as the dean of Arabic literature. He was sent to study in France and became the first Egyptian 
to have obtained an MA from the University of Montpellier and a PhD from the Sorbonne despite being blind and 
poor. His career focused on investigating pre-Islamic Arabic poetry and literature and theories of criticism in 
Arabic history. And he occasionally wrote political and social articles attacking poverty and ignorance in national 
newspapers. In 1926 his book Pre-Islamic poetry got him dismissed in the mid- 30s from his university post as a 
result of claims he had made about the pre-Islamic period which fundamentalists objected to. He continued 
teaching, advising the Minister of education and held a post as a director of the University of Alexandria until he 
retired in 1944. There are some translations of his work by Mona al- Zayyat in print. 
124 In al-Hakim’s letter to Husayn in September 1933, he wrote: “We are not issuing decrees in these hastily 
written letters, but raising questions and offering hypotheses which dedicated researchers will collect and gather 
together when the nation wakes.” (p.70) See R. Long, p.181; Background and assessment. 
125 Veglieri, Laura and Rubinacci, Roberto.  "al-Qasr al-Mashour" in Naples, Instituto Orientale, Taha Husayn 
(Naples, 1964), pp. 93-113. 
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Palace published in 1936 was a successful one. The authors’ styles complemented one another 
in such a way that the imaginative symbolism and humour of al-Hakim was combined with the 
thought, sentiment and style of Husayn. The book, therefore, benefited from both authors’ 
talent and, accordingly, had a delightful discussion of time, art and women. This shows how 
al-Hakim was open to dialogue with peers and colleagues of his age and in fact enjoyed a close 
friendship with some whilst maintaining a strictly professional relationship with others. 
Secondly, Idris,126 who was considered by many people to be the literary equal of Naguib 
Mahfouz, came to fame when he received Naguib Mahfouz’s medal for literature for his novel 
City of Love and Ashes in 1997.127 It is worth noting that Idris was openly a leftist who, although 
he initially supported Nasser’s reforms, was imprisoned later in 1954 for opposing Nasser’s 
policies128. His relationship with al-Hakim flourished when he realised that he shared with al-
Hakim a love of theatre (although his theatrical contributions did not appear until the late 50s). 
The reason for the delay, I believe, was the negative stigma given to theatre and playwrights at 
the time. Al-Hakim, for example, says: 
I saw before me no scope for staging varied plays I had written. The only companies 
still active were amateur ones, such as the Association of Patrons of the Theatre. I sent 
them A Bullet from the Heart which I wanted to be a departure from the adapted 
comedies, which were mere caricatures, depending for effect on verbal quips and 
farcical surprise turnabouts in action. I wanted lifelike characters to be the sole source 
of effect, but regardless of my effort, the play remained unproduced.129 
 
 Similarly, Idris felt the same lack of opportunity and support for his theatrical work. 
Unlike al-Hakim, he decided to delay publishing any of his plays and immerse himself instead 
in writing essays on plays, titled “Towards a New Arabic Theatre,” where “he sought to create 
a uniquely Egyptian dramatic form using colloquial language and elements of traditional folk 
drama and shadow theatre.”130 And in the following years, he made public The Critical Moment 
(1958), Al-Farafir (1964) which was translated to English as The Farfoors in 1974, and The 
Striped Ones (1969) which is a series of plays.131  
                                                          
126 Idris worked originally as a medical doctor between 1945 and 1951, during which time he wrote about social 
and political reforms that led to the 1952 revolution. Like other authors, he felt the need to hold a position that 
was considered to be respectable by society. If he did not work within government like al-Hakim or within the 
ministry of Education like Hussein, he would work within the medical system.  
127 See Idris, Yusuf. 1999. City of Love and Ashes, The American University in Cairo Press (English translation) 
128 In the same year, Idris published an anthology of short stories, some of which were The Cheapest Nights 
followed by Isn’t That So? Published in 1957.  
129 Al-Hakim, Tawfiq. (1992) Sijn al-Umr. (The Prison of Life: An autobiographical essay), translated from 
Arabic by P. Cachia. AUC press. pp. 188-189.  
130 Roger, Allen (ed.), Critical Perspectives on Yusuf Idris (1992); Dalya, Cohen-Mor, Yūsuf Idrīs: Changing 
Visions (1992). See also Idris’ novels, The Forbidden (1959) and The Sin (1962) which reflect his religious views. 
131 Idris was nominated several times for the Nobel Prize, but he never received it. When Mahfouz received it 
instead in 1988, Idris objected and claimed that he was disfavoured by the Swedish Academy because of his 
 83 
 
 Last but not least, Mahfouz was, unquestionably, not only the best known author 
nationally, but also internationally after becoming a Nobel Prize winner.132 Like others, 
Mahfouz influenced al-Hakim and fellow writers of his period. When Mahfouz was approached 
by Gordon,133 who was writing a book titled Mahfouz’s Existential themes, Mahfouz told 
Gordon that he had never been labelled an existentialist or considered himself to be one (unlike 
Badawi and others for instance who explicitly claimed so). This was because the Nobel laureate 
considered himself to be first and foremost a story-teller, as evident from his stories, novels or 
novellas. In 1989, once again in correspondence with Mahfouz, Gordon reported that Mahfouz 
had informed him that Western writers such as “Shakespeare, Goethe, Tolstoy, Proust, 
Faulkner, Hemingway, Kafka and ancient Greek tragedies” have greatly influenced the 
writings of his generation.134 Mahfouz’s protagonists are depicted “struggling with the 
absurdities of contemporary existence”, a notion that was adapted from Western literature and 
introduced to Egyptian culture in different forms (since the birth of Arab existentialism).135 
The absurdity of life seems to have been a constant underlying theme throughout the works of 
both authors Mahfouz and al-Hakim. And thus, in agreeing with Gordon, it is easy to see 
                                                          
explicit anti-Israeli views. This was possibly true at the time as Egypt had just turned to the United States for 
assistance to resolve and negotiate a peace treaty with Israel and had as well asked for economic support. There 
was no doubt that many Arab authors, like Idris, had expressed their discontent and concerns about a relationship 
with Israel, yet these concerns were dismissed by those in power. Idris, regardless, continued to write in various 
political magazines and newspapers and appear as a public figure on national television to talk about social and 
political reforms. This has contributed to the fact that two of Idris’ collections, In the Eye of the Beholder: Tales 
of Egyptian Life from the Writings of Yusuf Idris (1978) and Rings of Burnished Brass (1984), became widely 
translated. Similarly, in al-Hakim’s case, translator Denys Johnson-Davies has translated and edited a book titled 
The Essential Yusuf Idris: Masterpieces of the Egyptian Short story. This was published in 2009. 
132 Compared to al-Hakim, during Mahfouz’s 70 years literary career, he published approximately 34 novels and 
350 short stories and only five plays. In fact, his literary career began with his first series of historical tales, ‘Abath 
al-Aqdar (The Futility of Fate) set at the time of the Pharaohs. The series was published in 1939 during WWII 
and received little notice. 
133 Gordon, Haim. (1990) Naguib Mahfouz’s Egypt: Existential Themes in His Writings. Greenwood Press, 
chapters 1, 5 and 7. See also his appendix pp.131- 138. Gordon and Mahfouz were involved in Israeli-Arab peace 
efforts. Mahfouz was one of the few who supported former President Anwar Sadat’s peace treaty with Israel. 
134 See Gordon’s final chapter “Coping with the absurdity of existence”, pp. 113- 130. 
135 To give a specific example, Mahfouz’s experimentation with the absurd is evident in his short story Under the 
Shed which is also similar in style to Ya Tali’ al-Shajarah (1962) a play written by al-Hakim. However, in the 
late 1940s, publications consisting of more than forty articles dealt with philosophical and psychological issues 
that some claim were heavily influenced by Henri Bergson. See Gordon’s appendix, where he refers to Mahfouz’s 
works “What is Philosophy?”, “Bergson’s Philosophy” and “Pragmatism”, all written by Mahfouz and which 
were- and still are- available in print, but only in Arabic 
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Mahfouz’s work, which was written in the absurd tradition,136 in light of existentialism, or 
perhaps it may as well be called a “Kafkaesque tradition”, as Gordon claims.137  
 The most important transition, in my view, was not until the mid-50s, when both 
authors’ careers, al-Hakim and Mahfouz’s, took a different turn. On the one hand, according 
to Gordon, Mahfouz’s name emerged as an important writer as fame smiled on him in the Arab 
world. He received the State Prize for Literature in 1957 for his trilogy A House in Cairo, 
published in 1952.138 And in the West,139 he received the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1988.140 
At the same time, on the other hand, the controversy around al-Hakim’s philosophical 
narratives, which was at its height, hindered him from achieving the same fame, or even 
anything close to it. Arini Allah (1953), Equilibrium (1955) Equilibrium and Islam (1983), A 
Dialogue with the Planets (1974) and al-Ahadith al-Arba’ah (1983) display al-Hakim in a very 
different light from other writers, and critics did not approve of this difference. I will present 
evidence for this in due course.141 Some might even argue today that in allowing the publication 
of these works, al-Hakim had doomed his career.142 This, I believe, is far from the truth. From 
his perspective, as well as mine, these works are an expression of not only following his own 
mind and heart in founding his own doctrine of equilibrium, but also are an explicit rejection 
of conforming to the norm or what was expected of him as an Egyptian and as a Muslim writer. 
The price that he had to pay for his daring attitude was cost him the international recognition 
which he, in my view, deserves, and the wider distribution of his publications.  
 To conclude, Mahfouz and al-Hakim, like their fellow writers, made their thoughts 
widely accessible for others of this golden period to adapt from and tailor to their needs. It is 
no wonder that the overshadowing negativity towards a movement like existentialism, which 
had extended beyond Europe, and its various trends and development over the preceding years, 
                                                          
136 I am using the word, like Gordon, in its two meanings; metaphysical and social absurdity: first, the 
metaphysical absurdity of human existence articulated by Camus and emerging in Kafka’s works, and secondly, 
social absurdity, also in Kafka’s works, in the sense of “the absurd mess human beings made of their social, 
political and personal life.” See Gordon, p. 115. 
137 This was true of al-Hakim’s style in his play Ya Tali’ al-Shajarah, which has led to him being referred to as 
“the father of the theatre of the absurd”. 
138 A year before al-Hakim published one of five of his controversial works of this period, Arini Allah (1953). 
139 Gordon advised Mahfouz to try and get more of his books translated into European languages as they would 
sell well; Mahfouz replied “you’re talking like my wife”. When asked about the $390,000 received from the Nobel 
Prize award, he said “That is my wife’s job.” See Gordon, Haim (1990) noted in his appendix, p. 132 that many 
of Mahfouz’s novels were translated into Hebrew, providing welcome reading material for Israeli students of 
Arabic culture.  
140 Mahfouz declined travelling to Sweden to receive the Nobel Prize because of his ill health, age, diabetes and 
death threats from Muslim brothers targeting him. Instead, his two daughters flew there to receive it on his behalf. 
Former President Mubarak held a ceremony in Egypt, where Mahfouz also received a medal. 
141 Chapter four (p.157) outlines the criticisms that al-Hakim received as a result of making these works public. 




overshadowed in some sense the efforts and the achievements of some of these writers. It is 
fair to say that the common criticisms that I have come across in Arabic texts assessing the 
works and views of writers of this period, which I will analyse in the fifth chapter of this thesis 
(especially the views of Yasser Hegazy,143 mainly pinpoint al-Hakim’s contradictory views 
(amongst other criticisms against him). What many readers have seen writers like al-Hakim 
accused of is not conforming to what was expected of them; i.e. to instruct. Al-Hakim’s views 
were perhaps not contradictory as much as they aimed at bringing to light unfamiliar ideas. 
Mahfouz, for example, when asked if his works conveyed a particular message, replied: “No, 
my views are not what I wished to convey. If you ever find the views I express contradict what 
emerges in my books, don’t believe me, and believe my books.”144 Thus, although the idea of 
an author contradicting himself in his works was a common one, it was held against al-Hakim 
due to the fierce stream of attacks against him by fundamentalists and clerics ever since the 
publication of Arini Allah in 1953. I will address this point in detail in due course, but what I 
can assert for now is that what made his situation worse is that a movement in Egypt referred 
to as “the awakening of Islam”, which began to emerge in the early 70s, and its leaders, like 
Shaykh Abdel Hameed Keshk, Sha’rawy and others (whom I will identify in chapter four), 
continued to discredit the writings of al-Hakim even after he died. 
 Although during Nasser’s reign authors were allowed to pronounce on political matters, 
the social and political arena greatly influenced, and indeed pressured, authors into altering the 
contents of their publications so as to conform to the norm and what was considered 
acceptable.145 One may think in the first instance that there was fierce competition or rivalry 
between al-Hakim and like-minded authors of this period. I hope that in this section I have 
succeeded in showing the opposite. This was never the case, although it may have been true of 
other writers. Al-Hakim enjoyed an amicable intellectual dialogue between himself and many 
authors, especially those I have mentioned.146 The distinction between these authors, in terms 
                                                          
143 Some of the main articles are: Hegazy, Yasser. “Al-Hakim’s conversation with God: A dare or a faux pas?” 
(2009) Muntada al-Muhamin al-‘Arab (The Forum of Arab lawyers) http://www.mohamoon-
montada.com/Default.aspx?action=DISPLAY&id=90737&Type=3 (accessed 12/08/2014) and Fayez, Sameh 
(2014) “Tawfiq al-Hakim: The writer who spoke to God” Al Tahrir newspaper 
http://www.altahrir.com/details.php (accessed 18/07/2014) The latter article has links to videos of Shaykh ‘abd 
al-Hamid Kishk attacking al-Hakim’s work. 
144 Ibid, p.18 quoted recollections from personal meetings with Mahfouz. 
145 On some occasions, al-Hakim attempted to withdraw a play and other literary works from becoming public. 
Mahfouz was lucky enough to have begun his literary career with writing short stories and novels instead of 
writing plays. Al-Hakim, on the other hand, since his return from Paris in the 30s, perceived the decline of the 
Egyptian theatre as an opportunity to intervene and revive theatre in order to fulfil his passion for plays and drama 
and convey his philosophy. 
146 See images pp 81- 83. 
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of ideas, influences and directions, was clear and evident in their works. Although they all 
experimented with multiple literary genres, i.e. novels, shorts-stories, articles, essays or plays, 
their general reputations today remains as follows: Husayn was an educational reformist, Idris 
was the father of the Arabic short story, Mahfouz was mostly a novelist and known in the West 
as a Nobel Prize winner, and finally, al-Hakim was known as the father of the theatre of the 
absurd. The latter, of course, is one who I see as more than a playwright and as someone who 
is worthy of our reconsideration and whose philosophical works deserve a thorough 
reassessment. These distinctions in reputation are formed by critics and the general public 
based on what they believe each author excelled at. The truth of the matter, however, is that the 
writings of all four authors, Husayn, Idris, Mahfouz and al-Hakim, overlapped between 
























 AL-HAKIM’S EQUILIBRIUM DOCTRINE 
“My intention is not to convince you, but to invite you to think and to analyse.”147 
 
In this chapter, my aim is not only to introduce to the English speaking public Tawfiq al-Hakim 
as an Egyptian writer who attempted to consolidate in his writings ideas from the East and the 
West, but also to analyse, critically assess and examine his equilibrium doctrine and ask 
whether or not it offers the human being a solution or a way to overcome the consequences of 
what al-Hakim referred to as “the crisis of modernity”. I shall argue, firstly, that al-Hakim is 
affected by Eastern and Western social and political ideologies which led him to this position, 
and, secondly, that the doctrine of equilibrium is a product of his experimentations with 
philosophical themes within a literary framework. I hope that in doing so, I will also be able to 
identify the philosophical traits in al-Hakim’s work and outline Western influences that affected 
his character and doctrine. These influences were the main cause, in my view, for the criticisms 
that he, as an author and as a philosopher, incurred for making his doctrine and his beliefs 
available to the public. With this in mind, I conclude that the doctrine of equilibrium does not 
offer human beings a solution per se, but an understanding of al-Hakim’s conception of our 
“tragic existence”. To clarify, al- Hakim explains in his doctrine of equilibrium that man’s state 
of being can be described as “tragic”. It is so as a result of how one’s existence is altered by 
external events and factors that are beyond one’s control (i.e. age, time, knowledge of the truth 
or even death). Influenced by the Greek tragedies, al-Hakim also saw that one’s life unfolds, 
often as a struggle, to lead to one’s fate or destiny. In understanding one’s status in life, finding 
the strength and the ability to cope with these struggles, one adapts, accordingly to al-Hakim, 
an “equilibrist” approach towards life. This is what I believe he hoped to achieve by writing 
“al-Ta’duliyya” (Equilibrium). He encourages readers to acknowledge that: 
(1) There are various hidden forces (in the form of obstacles and hindrances) which are out 
of human beings’ control and which affect or change the course of one’s life; some of 
these are, for example, age, time, death, the will of the “other” and the knowledge of 
the truth. These are mainly manifested in al-Hakim’s dramatic works. 
(2) Regardless of any knowledge that failure is inevitable, resilience and striving against 
the unknown on a daily basis are both of crucial importance to one’s transcendence (i.e. 
individual and social progress). 
                                                          
147 Al-Hakim, Tawfiq, (1974) Hadith ma’a al-Kawakib; Cairo. 
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 On this basis, it is my belief that the doctrine of equilibrium presents an approach to 
life where, in human beings’ realisation and acceptance of the existence of hidden forces or a 
superior being,148 they will be able “to transcend [their] being stage by stage, individually and 
socially.”149 This is an optimistic view, which was put forward by al-Hakim in his texts and 
which I intend to discuss further in the following chapters alongside some of Sartre’s 
existentialist ideas such as the power of circumstances (“la force des choses”) and, of course, 
the issue of human freedom. 
 Without further ado, the first section in this chapter will introduce Equilibrium in the 
hope that by making it accessible to English readers, I will revive the work, increase its 
readership and enhance its value and appreciation. The purpose of this introduction is also to 
accompany al-Hakim’s translated text and to highlight aspects of the translated work which 
readers should take into account. I will then endeavour to outline al-Hakim’s attacks on the 
changes that took place in attitudes and behaviour and become most apparent at the start of the 
modern age150 in regards to, first, our status in the universe as superior creatures and, secondly, 
our belief in possessing absolute freedom. The second section sets up al-Hakim’s doctrine of 
equilibrium, while the third section illustrates the ways in which al-Hakim’s objections (i.e. 
criticisms of the modern age) are relevant to it and further supports my conclusion.   
I. 
 An investigation of Equilibrium can be justified on the basis that it is a work that 
explicitly provides readers with al-Hakim’s answers to questions directed to him by a reader 
regarding his doctrine of equilibrium. The book was published in 1955 and is written in the 
form of a philosophical dialogue between al-Hakim and an interlocutor. This is the reason why 
al-Hakim wrote his text in an informal manner, varying in themes and ideas. Some of the 
questions and answers are not necessarily philosophical in the strict sense. Nevertheless, they 
are of interest to us today because they reveal al-Hakim’s position on various issues and reflect 
a number of intellectual debates which dominated this period. The main questions that are 
                                                          
148 He uses the term “divine” forces to mean that which is “unknown”. He also uses later on in his text the idea of 
the existence of “superior being” alternatively- also without direct reference to any particular religion and away 
from preconceptions of the “divine”, i.e. God. 
149 The word “transcend” carries no religious meaning. Its use here means improving oneself (individual action) 
and improving society (social progress). It can also be understood as rising above a current condition and 
developing towards an improved one. See the translated work, Equilibrium (pp.13-52) 
150 According to al-Hakim, “the new age” is the age of significant revolutionary movements that occurred in many 
parts of Europe and the Americas, i.e. 18th C. He uses the term freely to signify the scientific and technological 
discoveries, the religious conflicts and the debates in modern states between the origins of science and faith.  
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important to our understanding of the doctrine of equilibrium (according to the order of their 
appearance in al-Hakim’s text) are: 
(1) What is the general status of the human being in the universe as [he] imagined it to be? 
(2) What is the human being’s status in society? 
(3) What is the reason why the “new age” is so imbued with materialism? 
Accordingly, we, the readers, are led to ask: 
1. What is the “crisis of modernity” from al-Hakim’s perspective? 
2. How is the “crisis of modernity” presented in the equilibrium doctrine and in al-
Hakim’s other works?  
 Al-Hakim seeks to justify his answers to question (1) and (2) based on his answers to 
the latter questions. It is worth noting that these answers are based on ideas that lingered in his 
mind from the late 1930s to early 1950s and were subtly expressed in some of his dramatic 
works published during this period. With this in mind, this section discusses al-Hakim’s first 
claim that the new age is imbued with materialism. This bold claim, which readers might 
question from looking at al-Hakim’s doctrine alone, leaves us wondering about possible 
reasons behind his position. His first argument is that scientific advances and the progress made 
by human beings in various fields of knowledge in past centuries has been an indication that 
the power of the mind has succeeded in dominating the power of the heart.151 But let us first 
ask: what does al-Hakim mean by these two forces, the power of the mind and the power of 
the heart? And secondly, what has led him to this conclusion? 
 In Equilibrium, al-Hakim describes the mind, on the one hand, as the domain of rational 
thinking where reason or logic resides, and it is also the domain which signifies the power of 
scientific and technological discoveries. By contrast, the heart is the domain where faith and 
human emotions reside; the heart also signifies the power of religion.152 The distinction 
between these two domains, the mind and the heart,153 is not a novelty. It was discussed in early 
Eastern debates regarding where the soul resides: whether in the heart or in the mind?154 This 
debate is not one that al-Hakim engages in. Instead, he uses this distinction in his doctrine of 
                                                          
151 This is the first of many dualities highlighted by al-Hakim. I will outline them in relation to his narratives in 
chapter two, p.118- 127. 
152 Note that al-Hakim refrains from referring to a specific religion. 
153 His description is purely from a literary and artistic perspective which overlooks any other functions or qualities 
that both organs may have other than those that are important to him.  




equilibrium primarily to argue that there is an imbalance that has become most apparent at the 
start of the new age between these domains; the mind, on the one hand, and the heart, on the 
other. This mind and heart distinction is used by al-Hakim in a parallel analogy to also claim 
that there is a widening gap between science and faith. This, from his view is what causes 
“imbalance”; namely that science has progressed and continued to develop whilst religion took 
a much slower path which is one of many factors for the secularism of modern societies. He 
writes:  
The evolutionary theory of Lamarck, Darwin and Spencer is not valid with regard to 
human existence without the realisation of our superior being. The growth of the human 
being’s mind and heart is a condition of this realisation according to the rule that 
dictates the evolution of the organ according to function. This is the human necessity 
that I realised on the basis that the human being is not alone in this universe. This 
necessity is what leads him to realise himself, discover the sources of his mental and 
spiritual strength, and develop and prepare it to face those mysteries and hidden forces 
that impress his mind and enchant his core. In this realisation, discovery and 
development, the human being progresses and changes in order to transcend his being 
stage by stage, individually and socially.155 The human being, indeed, has developed 
according to his realisation of the superior using his mind and heart. The development 
of the heart’s faith has ceased and mental thought has continued to progress alone, 
making vast impressive leaps which have caused the new age to forget the original form 
of a superior being,156 or the notion of the divine, for only the victorious mind is in 
sight.157 
 
 There is little clarification in al-Hakim’s text as to how exactly the alleged imbalance 
occurred or developed. Nevertheless, let us try to understand what might have led al-Hakim to 
his position. First, it is my belief that he detects an imbalance between the mind and the heart 
as a direct consequence of the ideological transitions that accompanied the growth of modernity 
over the past centuries. In general, these transitions precipitated changes in people’s views and 
attitudes towards life. And in particular, they led to changes in the conceptions of human nature 
in relation to the question of human existence in the universe and in society. One can also 
deduce that al-Hakim is referring to the changes that occurred as a result of the development 
of the scientific revolution as being the origin of the problem as he sees it and the drastic 
advances in science and technology during the 19th century and, perhaps more importantly, 
questions raised regarding how religion or human faith is able to withstand modernity. Based 
on these transitions, I believe al-Hakim’s argument to be, from his reflections and observations, 
                                                          
155 As clarified, the meaning here indicates overcoming individual or social hindrances and instead, making 
progress. 
156 By this, he means the existence of a powerful force or the sum of unknown forces opposing the human will. 
157 Equilibrium, p.25 
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that the vast body of new knowledge produced by modern science has effectively rewritten the 
relationship between human beings and their surroundings: by which he means (a) the status 
of human beings in the universe and (b) their relationship to others in society.   
 Before I endeavour to outline al-Hakim’s attacks on the changes in attitudes and 
behaviour in regards of (a) and (b), let us also look at the way in which al-Hakim begins 
Equilibrium in order to have a better grasp of his position. In his opening pages, he is doing 
several different things. First, he confronts us, the readers, with the questions “What is a human 
being?” and “What are the characteristics of this thinking creature who wonders about the truth 
of his nature?” Readers expect to find in the following pages, if not in al-Hakim’s doctrine of 
equilibrium, at least some answers to these questions. He goes on to say that he has observed 
that there have been changes in past centuries in the way in which people think about their 
surroundings and their existence. These changes, he adds, are, in his view, a response to the 
advances in science and technology that have given human beings a new scope and freed them 
from the limitations of previous eras. Although readers’ expectation at this point is to see 
further explanations for his position from past advances, al-Hakim quickly abandons his 
mission and writes instead: 
You [the reader] may ask me: what is the explanation of the human being from the 
perspective of literature or art in our present age? The answer to this question will need 
volumes filled with views, doctrines and positions that have occupied people’s thought 
during the last century. I do not think that this is the topic for our conversation at the 
moment.158 
 In posing this question and diverting the reader from it, al-Hakim, although he would 
be capable of providing an answer from past views and doctrines, 159 does not in fact do so;  
rather, he claims, right at the beginning of his book, that his doctrine of equilibrium and his 
position regarding these particular questions differs from, or even opposes, some of the efforts 
made by others in previous centuries. By this phrase, I mean the efforts to re-evaluate human 
existence and to theorise about the meaning of life by such movements as pragmatism, 
existentialism and secular humanism. It is questionable how successful al-Hakim’s approach 
is in attempting to distance the doctrine of equilibrium from these other doctrines, especially 
from existentialism. Then, abandoning what he led the readers to believe to be the purpose of 
his doctrine, he goes on to claim in the same passage that what he will offer instead, over the 
                                                          
158 Equilibrium, p. 17. 
159 See al-Hakim’s autobiography, Sijn al-‘Umr, which outlines his vast readings and his literary reflections. 
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next few pages, is “an explanation of a human being that is extracted from [his] writings.” He 
writes:  
I will provide a personal view as a starting point to whoever it may concern. What is 
the general status of the human being in this universe as I have imagined it? This 
question ought to be divided into two parts that arise in every age: Firstly, is the human 
being alone in this universe and secondly, is the human being free in this universe?160 
II. 
 In the doctrine of equilibrium, al-Hakim holds that the general status of the human being 
in this universe as he imagines it to be is that the human being suffers from an imbalance in his 
“spiritual domain”. By this, he means an imbalance between the intellectual domain (the mind) 
and the emotional domain (the heart). This imbalance generates the ‘crisis of modernity’ where 
modern man has become accustomed to rationalise and to explain life incidents. As I noted, 
these domains (the mind and the heart), as described in the doctrine of equilibrium, represent 
the power of science and the power of religion. Only at the start of the 20th century, al-Hakim 
claims, has it become apparent that the scientific advances and the progress made over the past 
centuries, though they have benefited human beings, have also had negative effects on their 
thinking and attitudes. But why was this imbalance not problematic prior to the new age? Two 
answers can be extracted from al-Hakim’s text. First of all, al-Hakim implies that the way in 
which people began to think about their status in the universe and their status in society has 
seen radical change with the changes that came with the founding of modern societies.161 
Secondly, and more importantly, he goes on to say in the passage below that prior to the new 
age, religions (or perhaps, religious practices) were able to maintain their position and aspects 
of strength and act as a counterbalancing force for the force of the human mind with its progress 
in various fields. And, thus, we deduce from this statement that, with the start of the 20th 
century, religion or religious practices seemed to al-Hakim to be in decline. It is my belief that, 
because of this counterbalance of forces (between faith and reason or religion and science), al-
Hakim implies that the change, which developed over time in social cultures, happened so 
slowly that it was barely noticeable prior to the 20th century. Given these two answers, it seems 
that, after all, the argument that al-Hakim seeks to put forward is that the shift in human beings’ 
attitudes (a. towards their status in the universe and their status in society, and b. of fearing for 
                                                          
160 See Equilibrium, p. 18 
161 This reason is of central importance to question (1) and (2) raised at the beginning of this chapter. 
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their own safety) is one that not only hinders progress162 (individually and socially), but also, 
and more importantly from his perspective, has negative effects on human beings’ general well-
being.163 Al-Hakim writes:  
The balance that prevailed until the 19th century between the power of the mind and the 
power of the heart, i.e. between activities of thought and activities of faith, has been 
disrupted ever since the supremacy of rational scientific achievements and the 
continuing stagnation of religion…With this imbalance, the new era has swung to the 
more logical side which has led it to submit to the sole dominance of the mind.164 
 The question then becomes, what are the reasons for al-Hakim’s pessimism which is 
reflected in this passage? Is it that materialism, the astonishing scientific and technological 
advancements, have destroyed any comforting faith in the modern human being’s inherent 
goodness or have stymied healthy outlets for his passions? Yes, al-Hakim seems to be 
implying, this is indeed the case. In the 1950s, Egypt was undergoing political and economic 
unrest, and was engaged in conflict with Israel; meanwhile in the West, many European 
countries were recovering from the aftermath of WWII.165 Although some 
scientific/technological discoveries have had a major impact on human beings’ lives during the 
1950s, such as the invention of a heart-lung machine, with its first use in 1953, al-Hakim is 
arguing that some human inventions have not had positive implications on human beings’ lives, 
such as the hydrogen bomb or the discovery of other such devastating weapons.166 The 
argument that al-Hakim therefore stresses is that past advances in science and technology came 
with an inevitable development of deadlier weapons, capable of being deployed for political 
and economic gains. He writes: 
As science doubled its strength, renewed its means and widened its horizons, religion, 
begot by the heart, remained restricted in its horizon and [is] unable to discover new 
                                                          
162 Al-Hakim’s idea of “progress” (meaning in Arabic “Ruqiyy”) implies “social progress” which was one of the 
19th century social theories. He emphasizes the importance of the power of human beings to make, improve and 
reshape their society. Progress can be an individual’s effort or a result of a collective action which, through 
continual change, drives one, or society, towards improvement. This modernist idea is expressed more explicitly 
in al-Hakim’s Thawrat al- Shabab (The Youths’ Revolution), published in 1983. 
163 The appeal to one’s general well-being is one that is more explicit in some parts of the text than others. He 
holds that one’s understanding of one’s being (i.e. the presence of conflicting forces that attempt to engulf one 
another), and one’s status in the universe (i.e. striving towards unattainable goals and in a limited framework 
against circumstances that are out of one’s control), can ease the anxieties of living in a modern society. What he 
calls “an equilibrist composition” is one who recognises the latter and thus, feels, to a great extent, content. 
164 Equilibrium, p.18 
165 That is to say, WWII (1939- 1945) and in the East, the Arab-Israeli War (1948-1949). 
166 Al-Hakim familiarised himself with what he referred to in his autobiography, Sijn al-‘Umr, as “the news of the 
world”. He often wrote columns for various national newspapers expressing his views and reflecting on news 
stories and foreign discoveries that he had come across during his travels to parts of Europe. 
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springs that [will be] in counterbalance with new phenomena discovered by the human 
mind.167 
 The gloomy image painted by al-Hakim of human beings driven by unrestrained greed 
and arrogance, starting wars for profit, poisoning the earth in a desperate bid to exploit every 
possible resource and assembling enough nuclear weapons to destroy the world, is one that 
reflects the loss of faith in mankind’s ability to manage his own destiny.168 This aspect of al-
Hakim’s criticism is of central importance to both questions raised in this chapter, and to his 
overall conception of human beings’ living a ‘tragic existence’ where modern man faces 
various life struggles that cross, and often alter, his path. The troubling imbalance between the 
two domains, the mind and the heart, is not only a result of how we, throughout the years, have 
become accustomed to thinking rationally about all aspects of life and resorting to reason alone 
for explanation, but also is caused by how we overlook the importance and the force of the 
heart. Al-Hakim, accordingly, sees that intellectual and emotional developments169 are not 
keeping pace with humans’ progress and technological advances. And as we are unable to 
discover other opportunities where we can fulfil our desire for knowledge, the rift between both 
domains (the mind and the heart) will continue to exist and to widen. 
 Why would al-Hakim see the shift in behaviour and attitudes as problematic and how 
is it presented in his doctrine of equilibrium? He gives two reasons. First, he claims that there 
are situations in life where the mind alone with its logic fails to give an adequate explanation 
of a specific incident, its implications for one’s life, and the reason behind its occurrence. These 
incidents are those which are beyond human understanding and, in their case, one would need 
to employ, along with the mind, the heart with its faith and emotions, in order to accept a form 
of non-rational understanding.170 Secondly, because he wishes to stay faithful to his doctrine, 
he claims that the force of the mind ought to be in counterbalance with the force of the heart, 
i.e. thought and emotion, in order for the human being to retain a “healthy” equilibrist character 
(i.e. a counterbalanced human composition). To clarify, he wishes to put forward a proposition  
that every human being should acknowledge that there are two powerful domains which are 
each an integral part of the human composition.171 In an ideal case, these domains form a 
                                                          
167 Equilibrium, p 18 
168 This is a common view that was shared by many writers and is understandable after WWII. 
169 This is referred to in the text as the “spiritual” domain. 
170 See al-Hakim’s passages on the existence of external hidden forces in his Equilibrium. He holds that a rational 
understanding of some incidences is unavailable to us as human beings and thus, a non-rational understanding is 
needed (i.e. via “faith” or “belief”). 
171 This is the beginning of a pattern which al-Hakim will follow to discuss opposite forces, or series of dualities, 
such as: the mind and heart, the power of explanation and expression, evil and good and so on. 
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counterbalance for one another; the mind counterbalances the heart. This, in al-Hakim’s view, 
was unachievable at the beginning of the new era.172 His suggestion is, thus, for one to 
recognise that each of these domains, the mind and the heart, has its own way and method of 
explanation and, that we should acknowledge and employ them accordingly in different aspects 
of our lives. But how plausible is this suggestion?   
 He gives us no further clarification on this matter, but instead he confesses that 
although, in past centuries, it seems that the mind has indeed succeeded in overpowering the 
force of the heart,173 there are many sceptics like himself who see the heart’s domain as one of 
crucial importance. This view will become clearer in the next passages in his descriptions of 
how he sees that there is reason for optimism regardless of the dominance of the mind. He goes 
on to say that it is unfortunate that religions and religious practices have been in decline and 
are unable to strengthen the heart’s domain in order to continue its function as a counterbalance 
for the domain of the mind. With this in mind, he introduces for the first time in the text the 
idea that an “equilibrist” person, like himself, has a mission which entails always striving to 
employ each domain, the mind and the heart equally, regardless of succeeding or not in doing 
so.174 The important thing is, al-Hakim adds, for one to understand the functions of these two 
domains (the mind and the heart) as a counterbalance for one another and to know that the 
nature of their relationship is one of opposition and conflict. This, which according to him is 
sufficient, aids the equilibrist’s mission to continue to strive towards an unattainable goal.175 
 In addition, to further understand the interplay between these two domains, the mind 
and the heart, which exist within every individual, al-Hakim gives an example of a scenario in 
which he personifies the mind and the heart in order to show their answers to the question of 
“what is the external force [which affects human being’s destiny]?”176 His aim here is to show 
that the heart and the mind’s answers will differ. He writes: 
                                                          
172 His reason for believing so is that we have been reliant over the past years on the dominance of rational thinking 
and thus, there is a rift between rational and non-rational thought, between science and emotion. He writes, “The 
balance that prevailed until the 19th century between the power of the mind and the power of the heart, i.e. between 
activities of thought and activities of faith, has been disrupted ever since the supremacy of rational scientific 
achievements and the continuing stagnation of religion.” See Equilibrium. p.18 
173 He claims this to be a “spiritual imbalance” (strictly within our emotional and intellectual domains) which 
affects us in the modern age, and leads to negative consequences (which I outline in section III, p.99). 
174 The idea of striving towards an unattainable goal and the emphasis on human struggle rather than success in 
achieving the goal is one of the core principles of the equilibrium doctrine. 
175 This is his first attempt to put forward in a subtle manner his conception of a human being “striving” towards 
a goal, namely balance between the mind and the heart. The emphasis is on the act of “striving” and not the end 
result of succeeding in employing both domains equally. This is clear in various parts of al-Hakim’s text. 
176 I will return to this question to discuss it at length in chapter three section III on the issue of freedom, p. 144. 
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From the viewpoint of the heart, or faith, the answer [to “what is the external force 
which affects human being’s destiny?”] is simple. But the mind will always attempt to 
search for an answer in its material world. The mind will attempt to avoid the field of 
inner human emotion that cannot be justified by human logic. The mind will say that: 
The external force is the sum of direct or indirect external conflicting or resisting will 
in a simple or complex society. The mind can also resort to science to compare magnetic 
deviation and the deviations of the human will…The mind, therefore, comes up with 
explanations likely to be accepted by its factual logic for the external forces that affect 
freedom of human motion. As for the heart, it is persuaded without proof as there is no 
need for evidence in the world of the heart and faith because faith annuls persuasion. 
Persuasion itself is not a function of the heart because it comes after doubt, but the heart 
does not doubt because it does not think, it feels.177  
 Based on these two answers, al-Hakim argues that a. the widespread of materialism, b. 
the imbalance between the mind and the heart and c. the change in people’s behaviour and 
attitudes have contributed to the forming of what he believes to be the “crisis of modernity” 
which arose at the beginning of a new century. For us to understand what he really means by 
this “crisis”, we need to also take a closer look at his text. He writes: 
As a consequence [of the sole dominance of the mind], human beings (i) define the 
concept of freedom according to their freedom of thought, and (ii) reject anything that 
cannot be proven with research and experimentation; hence (iii) deny another will than 
the human will or the existence of the Other, for he [the human being] becomes the sole 
being in this universe.178 
 These three consequences identified by al-Hakim are his main concerns. They show 
human beings’ shift in behaviour and attitudes towards (i) their freedom, (ii) their conception 
of faith versus their use of rational thinking and (iii) their denial of the “other”. This shift, as 
discussed earlier, is in al-Hakim’s view a direct response to the rapid progress of the human 
mind in the fields of science and technology, accompanied by the decline in religions and their 
practices. The question, therefore, becomes why religion, or human faith in general, is unable 
to form (following from al-Hakim’s logic) a counterbalance for the power of the human mind 
with its rational thinking and progress at the start of the new age? This should not be taken as 
a matter of al-Hakim’s speaking of Islam in particular, but rather of his speaking about religions 
in general. To clarify, there are two ways of understanding al-Hakim’s position. It could be 
either understood as al-Hakim’s claiming that (a) human faith is not withstanding the force of 
modernity or (b) that religions are not maintaining their credibility. It is my belief that al-Hakim 
meant both (a) and (b). The reason for my belief is that there were several political and social 
                                                          
177 Equilibrium, p.22 
178 Ibid, p.18  
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ideological trends in Egypt and the West at the time of Nasser and Sadat’s regimes.179 These 
ideological trends in Egypt, which had an effect on al-Hakim’s position, were: pan-Arabism,180 
the call for the separation of state and religion,181 the rise and fall of the Wafd party,182 the 
forming of an Islamic identity,183 and the appearance of the Muslim Brotherhood.184 Events 
and ideologies in the West were the aftermath of WWII and, generally, the new waves of 
globalization in Europe. It is worth noting that these ideological trends in Egypt have also led 
to debates regarding the position of faith and whether religion is capable of keeping pace with 
the changes of a modern society. Al-Hakim maintains in his doctrine of equilibrium that: 
The disruption of balance has had a natural and inevitable consequence, namely 
anxiety. The widespread occurrence of anxiety in many souls today emanates from the 
imbalance between the mind and the heart, the intellect and faith. This imbalance must 
repair itself by itself over a period of time.185 There has been evidence over the years 
of this repair. The new era has renounced the notion of the human being as a sole 
creature in this universe. He has started longing for another creature that is superior. 
Religion, unfortunately, has not offered [the human being] a new framework for this 
idea that he desperately longs for. He has continued to wait and hope for a miracle to 
happen but in the realm of rational science that still dominates his thought.186 
 In this passage, al-Hakim is claiming various things. First, is his claim that the modern 
human being suffers from a growing sense of anxiety due to the imbalance between the mind 
and the heart (science and religion).187 This anxiety is a characteristic of the modern society. 
And secondly, he talks of the inadequacy of (institutional) religion, which has not been able to 
nurture the idea of our search for the Other. Although the latter has been a factor in increasing 
                                                          
179 See appendix for images of al-Hakim with Presidents Nasser, Sadat and later on, President Mubarak. 
180 In the 1930s-1940s, the dominant mode of expression of Egyptian political activists was Egyptian Nationalism. 
It was not until the 1950s, that Egypt began to be interested in pan-Arabism. By the late 1980s, pan-Arabism 
began to be eclipsed by both nationalist and Islamist ideologies. And, in the 1990s, many people voiced their 
opposition to pan-Arabism. See Rashid Khalidi, e.d. The Origins of Arab Nationalism. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1990, (section on James Jankowski "Egypt and Early Arab Nationalism" pp. 244–45). 
181 In 1925, Ali ‘Abdel-Raziq published his book Islam and the Foundations of Governance and in 1947, his book 
Consensus in Islamic Law (al-Ijma´ Fi Ash-Shari´ah al-Islamiyyah), where he argued against a role for religion 
in politics or the political prescriptive value of religious texts. See Adams, Charles C. Islam and Modernism in 
Egypt. Russell & Russell, New York, 1968 (2nd Edition). pp. 259-68 
182 Raymond Hinnebusch, “The Re-emergence of the Wafd Party: Glimpses of the Liberal opposition in Egypt,” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 16.1, March 1984, p. 101 
183 This is in relation to the 1952 Egyptian revolution, tension and hostility towards Israel and economic losses for 
the country. 
184 They made their first appearance in 1928 and since then have played a role in politics and policy making. 
185 This is the moral imperative. 
186 See Equilibrium, p.18  
187 Al-Hakim says that, from the perspective of modern science, it is difficult to separate what is material from 
that which is spiritual. And what is even more difficult is to find a specific definition for “spiritual”. In a huge part 
of the text he uses a distinction between the two domains, the mind and the heart. By “science”, he clarifies that 
he means the “realm of rational thinking”, and also in some parts of the text, he implies by “science” the 
discoveries and humans’ achievements in the field, whereas by “religion”, he refers to human faith and its 
representation. The idea of “institutional” religion is avoided. 
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our sense of anxiety at the start of the new century, he sees one reason which calls for optimism, 
namely our longing for a superior creature. From this we understand that al-Hakim believes 
that the hope in coping with the crisis of modernity resides in our attempt to make sense of our 
existence in the universe and, most importantly, resides in our search for the Other.188 He 
writes: 
The interest today in flying saucers and people’s hope that others are coming with a 
message from a better world and superior creatures, are nothing but a general breeze to 
cool the feeling that dried out with the parched spring of religion, to relieve human 
beings of anxiety and to rescue them a little from their isolation in this universe.189  
And also, he writes in a different paragraph: 
Animals’ realisation of stronger beings is what leads them to discover the source of 
their own power, its development, and to prepare for the moment of confrontation and 
encounter. If we assumed that an animal lived alone on a desert island, felt secure in it, 
did not feel any other power other than its own, and did not feel the need to use or 
compare it to another, there would have been the potential for such a power to wither 
and disappear. For animals, the feeling of the presence of a stronger being stimulates 
power, just as the feeling of the presence of the superior, for human beings, stimulates 
transcendence.190 
 The search for evidence in order to shed light on the nature of one’s existence, or the 
existence of the will of a superior being, is al-Hakim’s reason for holding that with adequate 
time, we will be able to restore our faith in the existence of “others” away from the dominance 
of the mind and rational thinking. This claim is, however, misleading on al-Hakim’s part. This 
is because he is not making a claim that we humans will indeed be able to restore our faith in 
another will other than our own (he doesn’t really care about that), as much as it is a claim to 
emphasize the importance and necessity of continuing our search and our act of “striving” to 
unravel that which is unknown to us (i.e. with the merits of science and with the awareness of 
our limitations and of our knowledge and, accordingly, the necessity of “belief”). The 
conception of striving to unravel the unknown is an important recurrent theme in many of al-
Hakim’s narratives where protagonists either strive to fulfil a need or to reach a goal whilst 
fully aware of their inevitable defeat against forces that are outside of their control.191 Another 
plausible argument al-Hakim proposes in Equilibrium is that, although there is no concrete 
                                                          
188 I.e. Outside institutional religion 
189 Equilibrium, p. 19 
190 “Transcendence”, away from the common religious or spiritual meaning, in this context implies the need for 
self-improvement and rising above the present condition by finding a purpose and meaning to one’s existence. 
For al-Hakim, transcendence is an act of self-fulfilment of one’s being. 
191 I engage with this idea further in chapter two (section ii, p.118) on al-Hakim’s dualities and I present examples 
from his narratives in support of my claim.  
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evidence of the existence of another will in our immediate experiences, "belief" alone in 
another will’s existence (or belief in the existence of a better world) can help us to make sense 
of our own existence and to improve our general state of well-being (i.e. relieves the sense of 
isolation and anxiety).192 Although this may be an optimistic and naïve view, it is a coherent 
proposition put forward by al-Hakim in the context of his doctrine of equilibrium.193  
 Moreover, a further argument advanced by al-Hakim is that there is another reason for 
human beings to worry, which is their fear for their own physical destruction at their own 
hands. He clarifies this idea: 
Man has developed tremendous and devastating material capabilities that could at any 
moment escape his control and become his own destruction. These capabilities are only 
reined in by his wisdom, but as he cannot guarantee this wisdom, he grows anxious for 
his safety and existence. Man lives day by day in this new era looking at the scale of 
equilibrium between power and wisdom with wondering restless eyes. [And thus] a 
human being’s predicament in this era is in my opinion a result of the disruption of his 
equilibrist composition.194 
As discussed earlier, this passage supports al-Hakim’s belief that there have been 
devastating consequences as a result of the progress made in different fields of science and 
technology for the sake of increasing material gain. Anxiety is one of many side-effects that 
we suffer from in a modern society. As we grow more anxious every day, the fear for our own 
safety grows accordingly. This disruption of our equilibrist composition by which al-Hakim 
means a disruption of the relationship between forces within every individual as one has a 
tendency to swing towards one side more than another, is in his view inevitable. What matters 
to him, therefore, is how we can find ways to cope with the new era’s predicament regardless 
of the end result of our efforts and struggles (because one’s act of striving is more important in 
his view that reaching a goal or succeeding). With this said, the question becomes the 
following: what is this predicament or “crisis of modernity” as presented in Equilibrium? And 
what is he proposing that we do?  
III. 
In his doctrine of equilibrium, al-Hakim identifies “the crisis of modernity” as one which 
affects us, modern human beings, in many ways: (i) we suffer from a growing sense of anxiety, 
                                                          
192 See Equilibrium, p.19 and discussion on pp.97-98 where al- Hakim considers one’s longing for a superior 
“other” as a sign of the need for/ or the restoration of ‘faith’. 
193 It is important here to keep in mind that his purpose of writing is not to instruct as much as it is to make the 
readers think, as al-Hakim expresses at the beginning of his text. 
194 Equilibrium, p. 19 
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(ii) we have developed a fear of our own self-destruction, (iii) we deny another will or the 
existence of the “other”, and, most importantly (iv) we believe in a false sense of freedom. I 
ought to explain the latter two problems (iii) and (iv) since I have previously discussed the 
earlier two and showed how they appear in al-Hakim’s doctrine of equilibrium. First, al-Hakim 
addresses issue (iii) by arguing that the modern human being has denied the existence of 
another will on the basis that the human mind is unable to accept and conceive of anything 
other than a human being’s own existence. There are two claims here made by al-Hakim. On 
the one hand, al-Hakim is claiming that the mind is incapable of constructing an image of a 
superior being and, on the other hand, he is claiming that the human being is the one who is 
responsible for denying the existence of another being. The latter is more explicit in the 
following passage:  
In his pride, man can no longer see anything other than his absolute freedom. He no 
longer sees the others’ unseen powers that move his existence, manipulates his destiny, 
requires his struggle and calls for his thinking. Man has assumed, on the basis of this 
image, a theatrical costume of his fate and freedom, both with no limits, and has put a 
divine halo above his head, which shines deceptively. Regardless of the sincerity of his 
motives and the importance of his goals, there are consequences that threaten the truth 
of his insight.195 
 We, accordingly, have made two assumptions: one, of our superiority in this universe 
and another, of our absolute freedom. Both beliefs, from al-Hakim’s perspective, are false for 
reasons that I will explain further. It is worth noting first that al-Hakim came to this conclusion 
from readings, observations and experiences during his frequent travels to the West.196 This is 
confirmed by his references to European critics and contemporary European literature.197 In 
the latter case, he explicitly states that “had contemporary European literature shifted its 
direction in such a way as to call for the summoning of human power against the hidden 
obstacles that restrict [human beings’] freedom, there would have been in such thought some 
solutions for the crisis of humanity.”198 So why are these beliefs (that of our superiority in this 
universe and our absolute freedom) considered false and problematic from al-Hakim’s 
perspective? First, in the doctrine of equilibrium, al-Hakim argues that (i) there are “hidden 
forces” that affect, directly or indirectly, human beings’ destiny. This bold claim is neither 
supported in al-Hakim’s text by examples nor is it explained further against doubts or 
                                                          
195 Ibid, p.24 
196 Al-Hakim writes in Zahrat al-‘Umr that, besides his visits to France, he visited parts of Europe and carried 
on writing during his trips. He specifically spoke of a regular skiing trip that he used to make in the company of 
close friends. During these trips, he admits, he found his inspiration. 




criticisms. He simply refers to the occurrence of unexplained incidences that change the course 
of human beings’ lives as proof of his belief in the existence of “hidden forces”. This belief is 
one of the reasons which led him to form a conception of human beings’ tragic existence (as 
influenced by the Greek tragedies where one’s life story unfolds towards one’s destiny). I 
would like to argue that al-Hakim deliberately did not clarify his claim (i) or support it with 
examples, in order that he might encourage the readers to “think” about the issue without any 
social or religious preconceptions.199 By doing so, he did not limit the readers’ understanding 
of these “hidden forces” by giving too many details of what exactly they are or what they mean 
since he is also unaware of their nature.200 We come to conclude that these hidden forces can 
be age, death, divine interventions or even, as some may wish to believe, sheer unexplainable 
coincidences. Once again, the “belief” alone in these forces is, in his view, considered to be of 
vital importance to all human beings’ well-being and character.  
 The second important argument that al-Hakim puts forward is that (ii) human beings 
have an “extent of freedom” and not absolute freedom (which I will clarify further in chapter 
three, section III). He writes that the notion of “the chaining of freedom” is one that “does not 
appeal to the majority of Europeans today because they have given too much credence to the 
mind, to science and to thought which only deifies the human being in this universe.”201 But 
how did he come to this conclusion? It is my belief that he formed this opinion either from 
reading directly the comments he was accustomed to receive from critics or, alternatively, from 
his readings of articles published in foreign journals and newspapers about his published 
translated works in some foreign languages, and particularly in French. He writes that a number 
of foreign critics envisaged his answers to the two questions: Is the human being alone in this 
universe? And is he free in this universe? In critics’ commentaries and research on al-Hakim’s 
twenty plays that have been translated,202 it is mentioned that: 
The dominating philosophy in [al-Hakim’s] plays is that human beings have limited 
capabilities before their destiny, and that human fate, in my opinion, is always linked 
to man’s struggle against invisible forces. Some critics stressed this by claiming that, 
for me, beliefs have been liberated from their sacredness and become more mundane, 
                                                          
199 He was receiving at the time a few letters of disapproval addressed to himself and his editor, from his readers 
and critics, objecting to the contents and direction of his writings. It became clear gradually that making his views 
public began to create a negative stir assigned to his name and raise speculations and controversies. 
200 In my view, his experimentations with the concept of “hidden forces” is most apparent in his dramatic works. 
See p.116 on dualities. 
201 This is a criticism of European ideas regarding human freedom, and, to some extent, a criticism of J. P Sartre’s 
conception of freedom (chapter three, section III) p. 144.  
202 A few plays were translated into French by al-Hakim himself. 
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but the human being has continued to be anxious and threatened by hidden forces. 
Whatever the case, it can be understood from what these critics wrote that they have 
concluded from my theatre that I support neither the notion of man’s solitude in this 
universe nor the idea that man possesses absolute freedom. And this indeed I do not 
deny.203 
 What then is al-Hakim’s position on these particular issues regarding one’s status in the 
universe and regarding the notion of absolute freedom as core questions raised in his text? He 
first explicitly claims that his position is an outcome of mixed readings from Eastern and 
Western traditions, his own writings and what he has developed over the years to become his 
doctrine of equilibrium. This is because he holds that “the literary author or artist will not be 
able to define the position of the human being in his time, world and society or age if the 
relationship between literature and the arts is disconnected from the science and ideas that 
surround him.”204 On this basis, regarding the status of the human being in the universe, he 
goes on to say that we can extract an immediate answer to the question of “what is the status 
of the human being in the universe?” from reflections made on past advances and progress of 
the last few centuries. This answer, as I previously mentioned, based on the rapid progress of 
the human mind, is that the human being came to believe that “[he] is alone in the universe 
without a competitor; he is the God of this existence with ultimate freedom.”205 He adds, in the 
same passage, “with this answer religious teachings were demolished and the new age labelled 
itself with the seal of materialism”.206 It is al-Hakim’s belief, therefore, that these two positions, 
assumed by us, human beings, (that of (i) our superiority in the universe and (ii) our absolute 
freedom) were formed on the basis that we have not found in our immediate experiences 
evidence of the existence of a superior being. Al-Hakim considers this to be a flaw on our part. 
He makes clear that, although there is “evidence of a powerful mental strength and a superior 
spirit a million times stronger than [our] own mind and spirit”207 which exists all around us in 
this universe, the mind (although it acknowledges the notion of superiority) is “incapable of 
creating a convincing and clear image that matches [the superior being’s] grandeur.”208 We, the 
                                                          
203 Equilibrium. p. 20 
204 Ibid 
205 Ibid, p. 18 
206 He wishes to show that in what he considers to be “the material world”, religious teachings and the concept of 
faith and spirituality have declined. Materialists, for him, believe that the world is made up of a single substance, 
matter, the motions and properties of which could be used to explain all phenomena. This view contrasts with his 
belief that there are unexplainable phenomena that are beyond human reach and understanding. 
207 Although he does not say what he think this evidence is, it is not implausible that his claim is formed on the 
basis of his Islamic beliefs and upbringing, and thus, refers to the process of creation. I think so because of how 
al-Hakim in other parts of the text made observations in regards of the creation of the bees and the birds. See 
Equilibrium, p. 21. 
208 Ibid, p. 45 
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readers, are not given any further explanation in support of his argument for the existence of a 
superior being; instead, he resorts to identifying the limitations of the human mind and the 
benefits, in regards of human beings’ general well-being, of having “belief” in this idea.209 Al-
Hakim writes: 
This is because the mind can only create images that suit its logic, which are based on 
assumptions and observations that fall within its experiences. The mind will, thus, only 
create a familiar image of the superior; an image that is exceedingly personified based 
on the mind’s prior knowledge and perspective. And this will only produce a distorted 
image that devalues the idea, which is perhaps one of the reasons for atheism. We ask 
of the mind to create an image of God but it fails. Instead of laughing and mocking the 
mind, we laugh and mock the idea of a God.210 
 Before examining the question of absolute freedom and showing al-Hakim’s position 
as presented in his doctrine of equilibrium, it is worth first going back to al-Hakim’s conception 
of human beings’ “tragic existence” and explaining it since it is of crucial importance to 
understanding al-Hakim’s overall philosophy. He argues, based on a comparison between 
human beings and other creatures, that human beings are not bound by an innate knowledge 
which binds all other animals. For example, on the one hand, the birds and the bees, from 
observations, “do not learn or train but are born with a deep-seated innate knowledge called 
‘instinct’ which drives them to create”,211 but on the other hand, the human being is born 
unbound, free to uncover knowledge. This is al-Hakim’s declaration that the human being is 
indeed born free. He quickly adds, however, that this freedom is not absolute as it may initially 
seem or as many misunderstand it to be. Al-Hakim builds upon his preliminary declaration by 
saying that with human freedom come responsibility. The human being is created free, but “his 
work is conditioned and his direction is determined by the circumstances that tie him to life.”212 
These circumstances “do not obliterate the human free will in its many forms”.213 This means 
that, although they interfere with human freedom in different ways, the human being still 
possesses “some degree of free will”. What is important for al-Hakim is his conviction that 
with this freedom come a sense of responsibility, namely a responsibility towards oneself, 
towards others and towards society as a whole. In this passage, al-Hakim gives an analogy in 
order to clarify further his position: 
                                                          
209 This is not al-Hakim’s way of stressing the “man of faith” rather than the “man of will”. He simply identifies 
that the state of alienation which affects modern man is caused by the chasm between the two.  
210 Equilibrium, p.21 
211 Ibid 
212 Ibid 
213 Ibid  
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Perhaps, the mind would agree with science, which is one of its sources and tools, that 
the human being is restricted based on the freedom of movement in relation to matter. 
Newton, and Galileo before him,214 said that a moving body remains in motion in its 
course unless an external force intervenes. This is the famous law of self-limitation of 
matter, which can also apply to human freedom, meaning that human freedom remains 
in motion in its course unless an external force intervenes. And here we should ask the 
mind or science this complex question: What is this external force?215  
 The restriction placed on human freedom from the day the human being is born 
(whether in the form of interference from another will or from an external force) is what al-
Hakim shows as a state of “tragic existence”. Our freedom is not absolute because “an external 
force or the sum of direct or indirect conflicting forces or resisting wills” (by which he also 
means other human beings in society) can, at any moment, influence one’s choices or affect 
one’s freedom in one way or the other. If we look closely at al-Hakim’s overarching theme in 
his narratives (in addition to the claims made in his doctrine of equilibrium) in order to answer 
the question “What is this external force?”, we come to the conclusion, as I previously implied, 
that his understanding of external forces varies from one work to another. Al-Hakim saw the 
human being as primarily defeated by external forces that are beyond human understanding 
and human capabilities. To give a brief example, in his play Ahl al-Kahf, the external forces 
affecting the characters’ destiny were time and age. In his adaptation of King Oedipus, the 
external force that affected protagonist’s destiny was knowledge of the truth and, in his play 
Shahrazad, the characters’ destiny was affected by the force of faith and emotion versus the 
force of absolute thought. Al-Hakim writes in support of his position: 
The human heart sometimes feels an emotion that cannot be explained; it is neither 
alone nor free in this universe. Do you not sometimes feel that someone somewhere is 
staring at you? And if you raised your head and searched, you would indeed find that 
your emotion was true. Have you ever noticed once or twice in your life that a particular 
incident happened to you on a certain occasion that changed the course of your life in 
a certain way? You attempt to link it to a coincidence, but you fail because an external 
will has intervened in an orderly manner emanating from an awareness that is conscious 
of what it does and knows what it wants, in order to provoke specific results that would 
not have happened were it not for this unexpected external intervention. An external 
will that has all the elements of a sage and intelligent will which descends on your 
ordinary will and changes its direction and paints for it a new path. Sometimes your 
mind, regardless of the stability and precision of logic it may achieve, refuses to submit 
such incidents to the usual and simple logical explanation. Advocates of the mind and 
science can only nod their heads in such instances: and, as for the stubborn and 
fanatical, they cling to their reasoning because, in their view, the mind alone is God.216 
 
                                                          
214 His remarks show the breadth of his knowledge. 






Given the above examination of some of the core issues raised in al-Hakim’s Equilibrium and 
the questions concerning his positions, it seems that one must take into consideration the varied 
influences and philosophical positions that affected al-Hakim before making any judgement on 
his work (and his career as a writer and a philosopher). To conclude, as the work currently 
stands, it is a successful attempt if and only if it is seen as a product of al-Hakim’s philosophical 
experimentations and as one which offers us a distinct and particular approach to life in order 
to cope with some of the problems that exist in a modern society. With this in mind, and given 
the above discussions, I conclude the following: 
(i) The doctrine of equilibrium is a product of al-Hakim’s observations and experiences 
(as a result of living in the East and the West) which were only brought together, or 
compiled in his book Equilibrium and published in 1955, in order to give himself 
the opportunity to reflect, in a literary and philosophical manner, on issues that he 
sees us facing us in the 20th century, i.e. in modern societies. 
(ii) Equilibrium presents to us the consequences of an imbalance between the two 
domains (mind/science or heart/faith) that has gradually developed throughout the 
past centuries and became most apparent as a “crisis” at the start of the 20th century. 
The imbalance is a result of a shift in our attitudes and behaviour whereby, in our 
modern era, we have come to believe in (a) our superiority in this universe and in 
(b) our absolute freedom.  
(iii) Both beliefs (a) and (b), from al-Hakim’s perspective, are false and problematic for 
reasons that I have outlined.217 He argues that the sum of wills or “external forces” 
have the power and ability to restrict or change the course of human freedom. And 
on such a basis he concludes that human beings possess freedom to a limited extent 
and not absolute freedom. This limited freedom is within a specific framework 
which is affected by the existence of other wills in society (i.e. other people) and 
the existence of various external forces (which are beyond human understanding 
and control). He refers to our state of existence as “tragic” as influenced by Greek 
tragedies (which is an underlying idea in his narratives as it is also an idea that has 
been explicitly presented in his doctrine of equilibrium; namely that we live a 
                                                          
217 Although he was unable to support his claim (regarding the existence of “other wills” in the universe) or provide 
adequate evidence for believing so solely through his text, it is worth noting that his experimentations with this 
idea are better articulated in his dramatic narratives. I assume the latter on the basis that all of the scholarly works 
on al-Hakim to date mainly discuss his dramatic works. I intend to engage with this in the next chapters. 
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tragedy which unfolds accordingly and leads us to our destiny. All we can do in this 
tragedy is to exert effort in overcoming the struggles in our paths in order to fulfil 
our beings/ existence). 
(iv) And finally, for the sake of one’s social, intellectual and emotional progress and 
development, al-Hakim seems to imply that it is more advisable to have “belief” 
than to not have one at all. The realisation of a “super being” (or belief in the 
superior’s existence) is, accordingly, considered to be a “human necessity”. 
 From these conclusions, it is evident that the doctrine of equilibrium encourages us to 
consider life to be a series of inevitable struggles that require us to channel all our efforts into 
productive methods, not to achieve a specific goal (though that might be one’s initial 
motivation), but to overcome our individual and social problems. The means by which we can 
do so is for us to know how to improve and develop ourselves (intellectually and emotionally) 
and our society in its social, political and economic aspects. And only in so doing, will we 
come to realise the importance and necessity of our struggles (striving against that which is 
























“The human being’s predicament in this era is, in my opinion, a result of the disruption of his 
equilibrium composition”218  
 
In the previous chapter, I introduced and examined some of the core issues in al-Hakim’s 
equilibrium doctrine, specifically those regarding the question of our status in the universe and 
in society. These two questions were presented by al-Hakim at the beginning of his text, 
Equilibrium (1955). From my examination of the content of this text, I concluded that the 
equilibrium doctrine offers us an approach towards life in which, if we adopt it, we are able to: 
(i) Cope with modernity 
(ii) Transcend our existence individually and socially and; 
(iii) Come to realise and accept that regardless of the tragic nature of our existence, we have 
a certain extent of freedom and that there are sources of strengths within us.219 
 To clarify the last of these, al-Hakim sees human existence as “tragic” in nature as a 
result of the influence of variants of existentialism which presents life as a struggle. Albert 
Camus’s philosophy of the absurd comes to mind. His presentation of struggle in The Myth of 
Sisyphus is similar to the one presented by some of al-Hakim’s protagonists who experience 
the absurdity of life and yet continue to struggle regardless of the futility of the tasks in order 
to find some meaning in, and purpose for, existence.220 This idea is evident in al-Hakim’s play 
Ya Tali’ al-Shajarah (The Tree Climber) published in 1962.221 This was a new genre introduced 
for the first time to the Egyptian theatre using Camus’ idea of the absurd and Samuel Becket’s 
style of writing in his play Waiting for Godot.222 As a result of the play’s production, he was 
referred to, in Egypt, as “the father of the theatre of the absurd”. It is questionable whether al-
Hakim considered this play in particular a success or not as he did not write more plays in this 
style. Regardless, it was a fair attempt at experimenting with a new genre and an existentialist 
                                                          
218 Equilibrium, p. 19 
219 This lends itself to al-Hakim’s belief in the notion of reaction and compensation in which within every 
individual there is a source of power or a force which compensates for any shortage or weakness. 
220 It is not implausible that al-Hakim read Le Mythe de Sisyphe (1942) in French.  
221 This play was al-Hakim’s first play to be translated into English by Denys Johnson Davies who published it 
through Oxford University Press. The Economist published on the 1st of January 1967 that a trend of Egyptian 
authors were following Camus’ theatre of the absurd in Egypt. 
222 The similarity between al-Hakim’s Ya Tali’ al-Shajarah and Becket’s Waiting for Godot is one that was 
discussed in the works of literary criticism by Egyptian and foreign critics. See Hutchins The Reader’s Guide. 
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idea. His view in his Equilibrium, in which he say that the barriers or hindrances in one’s life 
give one enough reason, not for defeat and despair, but for exerting more effort to reach a 
specific goal, regardless of the outcome of the struggle, is one that echoes Camus’ statement in 
his play: “The struggle itself towards the heights is enough to fill a man's heart. One must 
imagine Sisyphus happy.”223 
 The multiple influences on al-Hakim, whether from his readings and admiration for 
Greek literature or from dialogues with other thinkers, make it difficult to pinpoint his ideas to 
a specific source that may have inspired him the most.224 Nevertheless, a recurrent theme in his 
writings is how he sees that our ultimate struggle is in finding meaning and purpose to our lives 
regardless of any obstacles in our paths. It is important to note that the exact nature of these 
obstacles is one that is left obscure in his Equilibrium. This is to allow for a wider scope of 
understanding or, perhaps, to leave room for readers’ interpretation. By this, I also mean that 
al-Hakim manifested in his dramatic works and philosophical narratives examples which 
suggest that these obstacles or hindrances can possibly be the wills of others (i.e. antagonists) 
or, as he explicitly claimed in his text, they can be the sum of direct or indirect hidden unknown 
forces (i.e. time, death, knowledge or age). The emphasis as I understand it to be rests on the 
importance of our struggles in life. Struggle, in his view, is not only inevitable, but also a human 
necessity.225  
 The second idea is one where al-Hakim holds that, within every individual, there are 
sources of strengths that act as coping mechanisms or forces corresponding to weaknesses or 
shortages. Although this is a reason for optimism, he criticises how we upon approaching 
modernity (i.e. the 20th century) have shown how we often fall into despair and lament our 
position rather than look for the whereabouts of these forces, find them and, more importantly, 
use them to overcome or to compensate for a predicament. To clarify, our predicament is falling 
victim to “spiritual imbalance”.226 At the first incidence, the nature of this imbalance is left 
                                                          
223 Camus, Albert. The Myth of Sisyphus. 
224 An influence on al-Hakim is Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid (1873-1963) who was a close friend of his father and the 
one who advised al-Hakim’s father to send the young al-Hakim to France to complete his education. Al-Sayyid 
was a scholar who translated a substantial amount of work on Aristotle and worked as a rector of Cairo University. 
In founding al-Garida newspaper, al-Sayyid nurtured the young talents of modernist writers like al-Hakim and 
continued to be an influential figure in Egyptian politics and literature. It is, therefore, my speculation that al-
Hakim had read or come across Eastern and Western theories addressing the issue of equilibrium whether during 
his studies at Cairo University or upon recommendation from al-Sayyid (or others) whom he admired.  
225 This is because only through struggle, can we improve ourselves and our society, make progress and fulfil our 
existence. This idea is clearer in the context of his dramatic work where a protagonist fails or is defeated at the 
end of a story or a play but nevertheless, his struggle is emphasized by al-Hakim as one that was worthwhile.  
226 He began his work by questioning if it is possible to give a definition of a human being from the perspective 
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obscure in the text, but gradually, he clarifies, and explains it as our inability to avoid falling 
victim to the sole use of rational thinking or the sole use of emotions. This is a fault on our part 
in previous years because we have not been able to maintain a balance between the intellect 
and emotion.227 This conclusion is of vital importance to this chapter for reasons that will 
become gradually apparent. With this in mind, I will commence by identifying the underlying 
theories in al-Hakim’s text.228 Some may not see them as philosophical per se; nevertheless 
they are vital to the understanding of the doctrine of equilibrium as a whole. These theories 
are: (a) the models of polarity which al-Hakim uses freely to describe the relationship between 
any two forces (as will become evident through my analysis); and (b) a series of dualities that 
present themselves accordingly throughout his text. The latter, in my view, are presented more 
clearly in al-Hakim’s dramatic narratives than in his Equilibrium.229 Let us first look at how 
both (a) the models of polarity and (b) al-Hakim’s dualities, are discussed in his text and, more 
importantly, how they develop to form his doctrine of equilibrium which underlies his works 
(i.e. those written between the early 1950s and late 1960s).  
 One should not, first of all, overlook the fact that the common understanding of the 
doctrine of equilibrium does not lay stress on the importance of “reaction and compensation” 
as a phenomenon that al-Hakim both asserts and maintains. In fact, in al-Muwsu’ah al-
Mu’asyra fi-al Fikr al-Falsafi wa il-ijtima’i (The encyclopaedia of contemporary philosophical 
and social thought) the given definition of equilibrium (often translated as “equivalency” 
which is the meaning that al-Hakim rejects) is “a philosophical theory that maintains that there 
                                                          
of different fields such as the arts, literature or science. The definition that he reached from his enquiry, and the 
one that he personally agreed with, was that a human being is a balanced creature physically and spiritually. This 
is based on his belief that equilibrium is human beings’ natural state. We are balanced physically because our 
bodily organs function in an orderly manner. Bodily organs are naturally able to restore or compensate for one 
another in case of any shortages or weaknesses they may experience. The problem that al-Hakim faced was in his 
claim that humans are likewise “spiritually” balanced. This is problematic because he would be claiming that the 
power of the mind is in balance with the power of the heart, something that he was sceptical of and doubted on 
many levels during this period, and began to investigate it.  
227 This is left obscure to start with. He clarifies later on in the text that modern person is unable to avoid falling 
victim to either rational thinking or to using one emotions, rather than maintaining a balance between both 
domains. 
228 This function as a continuation of al-Hakim’s doctrine outlined in the previous chapter. Note that he has 
intentionally or unintentionally adapted, developed, polished and presented a theory of equilibrium that has been 
present primarily in Islamic medieval philosophy and in Greek (i.e. Aristotle and Heraclitus) and somehow in 
European philosophies (i.e. Newton’s third law; although his theory begins in some sense as Newton’s, it diverges 
from it). Also note that via his Egyptian education, he became familiar with Newton’s theories (which were 
available in Arabic), the works of al-Kindi and French naturalist, Jean Baptise Robinet (1835-1820). See Hutchins, 
A Reader’s Guide, footnote no 22, p.220. 
229 This is possibly because he enjoyed the style of literary and philosophical experimentation where he is free to 
challenge ideas through fictional characters. After every discussion of a specific duality, I will give examples from 
his text in support of my claims. 
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is a group of powers in life that converge and balance, making ‘equilibrium’ an essential and a 
basic purpose. Life is like two scales that have to be always balanced; otherwise, life loses its 
positivity.”230 This definition is not the same as the one maintained by al-Hakim because the 
use of the words “converge and balance” suggests a “joining or meeting” of forces, perhaps 
also on an equal level. In al-Hakim’s definition, however, forces exist as separate entities 
forming a counterbalance for one another and attempting to maintain continuous opposition. 
The act of opposing one another in the form of “resistance” ensures that both entities’ existence 
is “dependent” on one another. Al-Hakim writes: 
 
True One= Zero. Positive life begins with “two” because relationship only takes place 
when two things exist: namely, movement and life. Every motion must be met by 
opposition and a resisting motion. Every force has its opposing counter-balancing 
force…The one on its own is a negative presence; it is a step from nothingness. It is, in 
terms of positive movement, null. Because it neither resists another, nor is there another 
force that resists it. With lack of resistance, motion ceases.231  
 
 From this passage, one extracts that the forces described by al-Hakim act (in relation to 
one another) as a “counterbalance”. This is, in his view, a natural way of ensuring that the 
process of reaction and compensation always occurs. In the first scenario, for example, if one 
force emerges, another force will emerge as well, at the same time, in order to form a 
counterbalance, and in doing so, equilibrium will be maintained. In the second scenario, if a 
force becomes weak or suffers from a specific shortage, another force will quickly emerge in 
order to “compensate” for this weakness or shortage and, once again, equilibrium will be 
maintained. These scenarios are two of the main frameworks from which al-Hakim begins to 
form his own doctrine. With this in mind, the relationship between forces, as described in 
Equilibrium, reveals to us three models of polarity. These are (i) dependency, (ii) resistance and 
counterbalance (i.e. an act of “reaction and compensation”), and (iii) engulfment. All three are 
believed, by al-Hakim, to be natural processes which define the relationships between forces. 
It is perhaps worth noting here that the three models of polarity are not explicitly identified by 
al-Hakim in the text; rather, they are presented in an allegorical and ambiguous alternating 
manner. In describing these relationships, as will become apparent from the following sections, 
al-Hakim shows that these models of polarity are not only inevitable, but also occur in a natural 
way, whether within our human composition or in the universe. What this process simply 
requires in order for a state of equilibrium to be restored, is time. 
                                                          
230 K. al Hag, al-Muwsu’ah al-Mu’asyra fi-al Fikr al-Falsafi wa il-ijtima’i, Beirut, Maktabat Lebanon, 2000, 
p.153.  






“There has to be an “other” for you to “be”. Equilibrium, then, is established on 
“otherness”. Without the “other” there is no existence.”232 
 
First of all, al-Hakim applies a general notion of ontological dependency to all creatures in the 
universe. Is it possible that he sees it as a way of describing not only human relationships, but 
also a way of describing relationships between forces in our universe and the forces that exist 
within our composition? This seems to be the case. He argues that one force or entity must rely 
on the other to exist. If one force grows to be more powerful than the other and attempts to 
swallow or engulf the other force, the stronger force behaves in an imbalanced manner, leading 
to various consequences.233 It is important to understand that equilibrium’s role is, therefore, 
to ensure that ‘action and reaction’ forces continue to exist alongside and in opposition to one 
another. Based on this logic, al-Hakim’s equilibrium does not suppose the existence of two 
corresponding forces or powers from the beginning to the end of their relationship. Instead, it 
acknowledges the dynamic nature of the relationship and the presence of two parallel forces 
that rely entirely in their existence on one another in order to drive themselves forward from 
instability, or imbalance, i.e. towards a state of equilibrium.  
 
Resistance and Counterbalance: An act of “reaction and compensation” 
 
Every action has its own reaction and this reaction is nothing but an attempt to restore 
a balance to an action that may have been exaggerated, disturbed or has exceeded its 
limitation. The true meaning of reaction is the re-balancing of an action that has veered 
to an extreme.234 
 
 Secondly, the relationship between (A) and (~A) is said to be one of “resistance”. Both 
should ideally be balanced as it is their natural state. However, there are numerous factors 
which lead to their imbalance. (A) is a counterbalancing force for (~A). If there is a shortage 
or a weakness in (A), because both react and compensate one another, this shortage or weakness 
will be restored by (~A). Al-Hakim gives in the below passage examples of weakness or 
shortage (i.e. from nature) that has been “compensated for” by counterbalancing features of 
strength present in another force. He writes: 
The bee has delicate wings, yet it has a sharp needle. Also, a person who is heavy in 
                                                          
232 Ibid, p. 48 
233 Note that these consequences are considered to be temporary. 
234 Ibid, p. 30 
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weight and body mass often has a light sense of humour and spirit, while the one who 
lacks facial or bodily beauty is often rich in the beauty of the soul, mind or other 
qualities. Thus, equilibrium must take place in any possible form because, as we said, 
every action has a reaction and every shortage must be met by an increase to 
counterbalance it. Evil and weakness, shortage and ugliness are all characteristics in 
creatures that cannot exist without their counterbalances. The problem is that the 
conscious creature, the human being, is the only creature who often ignores this truth; 
if exposed to one of the latter cases, he falls into despair and cannot discover the 
counterbalancing forces that exist within him without his knowledge. At the same time 
an instinctive creature, an animal or a plant, will not despair or become static, but rather 
it will realise, with instinctive knowledge, where to find the balancing force.235  
 
 We can gather from this passage some fundamental factors about his notion of reaction 
and compensation in relation to human beings and other creatures. He argues, first, based on 
observations and enquiries that all creatures have the ability to recognise the multiple sources 
of strengths that exist within in order to recover from any weakness or shortage.236 This is true 
if we assume that in all creatures there are indeed parallel forces that are capable of 
counterbalancing one another.237 With this said, the issue that al-Hakim finds problematic is 
how we, humans, are the only creatures that are ignorant of where our forces of strength reside. 
Our inability to discover the means by which we can overcome any predicament is one that he 
says hinders our progress.238 But why is this so? A possible explanation is al-Hakim’s 
pessimism regarding the progress made in various fields by the new Egyptian generation who 
seem to overlook their past or even reject it entirely.239 Gradually, his criticisms developed into 
a more positive approach in his doctrine of equilibrium whereby he calls for (a) our 
understanding of ideas concerning our position in life (as a “tragic” existence that requires our 
struggle to transcend it), and (b) a recognition that just as we are the most capable of our own 
destruction, we are also capable of overcoming our own predicaments. The latter seems to have 
been a common view which dominated the intellectual arena at the time, especially after 
                                                          
235 Ibid, pp. 30-31 
236 Although he mentions “all” creatures, in some parts of the text, he makes a comparison between animals who 
are capable of doing so (i.e. realising the sources of strength within them) and human beings as creatures who fail 
to recognise the forces of strength in order to compensate or overcome their weaknesses and thus fall into despair 
and become unable to overcome their present condition. 
237 Note that al-Hakim is not the first to try to theorise about this “opposition”. Both Eastern and Western 
philosophers have long discussed the opposing qualities or the forces that exist in relation to one another. For 
example, see Heraclitus on the duality between day and night and Aristotle on opposition. 
238 The meaning of “progress” (Ruqiyy - - in Arabic) should be understood as rising above a current state 
and development towards an improved condition. 
239 This was a general criticism that was evident in al-Hakim’s regular columns in al-Ahram (used as a forum for 
articles on a confused renaissance) titled “Debates”. There, he called for the new generation to learn from their 
past and to appreciate what their ancestors have achieved in order to have the tools to build a better future for 
themselves. He also expressed that the rejection of everything that is Western is unjustified. See “The al-Hakim 
Debates”. Al-Ahram: A Diwan of contemporary life. (634) Al-Ahram online: 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/787/chrncls.htm (accessed 20/06/ 2014). 
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Egypt’s defeat in 1967 and the increasing debates concerning the loss of value or meaning in 
religions and religious practices.240   
ENGULFMENT 
 
A power that inflates wants to engulf another. In social and political fields, for example, 
capitalism wanted to engulf work, and colonialism wanted to engulf nations. The 
stronger class wanted to engulf the whole nation, and the West wanted to engulf the 
East and so on.241  
 
 Thirdly, the common understanding of engulfment is the act of “swallowing up” or 
overwhelming by, or as if by, overflowing and enclosing. Al-Hakim describes all forces, 
whether in our universe or within our own composition, as prone to an act of engulfment. For 
example, one star or a planet may engulf another if resistance between two parallel pairs fails. 
The stronger force would supersede the weaker force. Or, in another example, as al-Hakim 
describes in his series of dualities, the mind engulfs the heart. Similarly, other forces within our 
composition may engulf one another. He proposes that in some cases (for example the mind 
versus heart scenario) engulfment leads to psychological or mental illnesses as a result of an 
imbalanced relationship between these forces. This disruption of our composition is not 
perceived by him as negative per se, but rather it is perceived as a “temporary” state of 
imbalance which is both necessary and inevitable at the time of its occurrence.  
 
 What is the proposed solution for engulfment according to al-Hakim? When engulfment 
occurs, another force emerges in order to compensate for the weaker force or for the shortage. 
Although I would like to claim that, steadily but gradually, an equilibrium state is restored, this 
is not the highlight of the process. Instead, the importance of this process rests on one factor 
alone, which is: one force’s ability to “compensate” for another. In the case of human 
imbalance, he explains that the situation is slightly different. It is unfortunate that we are not 
only ignorant of where the sources of strength reside, but we are also often in denial about our 
own predicaments and about the occurrence of engulfment (such as in the case of the sole 
dominance of the mind). Accordingly, we fall into despair instead of finding a force from within 
us to compensate for any shortage or weakness that we may be experiencing. This denial 
                                                          
240 By this, I am referring to a period where human discoveries were at their peak and had major impact on our 
lives between 1950 and 1980 (see appendix for the front pages of some of the newspapers- archive materials) such 
as the invention of a heart-lung machine and its first usage on humans in 1953, building a hydrogen bomb, the 
introduction of colour television and the discovery of new brain cells etc. Note that al-Hakim was one who 
familiarised himself with what he referred to in his autobiography as “the news of the world” and thus, he was 
personally influenced and involved to a great extent in many intellectual and social debates of his time. 
241 Equilibrium, p. 52. 
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increases our sense of anxiety and hinders us in modern society from finding solutions for our 
problems. The duality of night and day, for example, is one which describes the process of 
engulfment as a “circular relationship that is based on the principle of swallowing rather than 
equilibrium.”242 This, however, is not a feature that can be said of all of al-Hakim’s dualities. 
Evidently from his text, his emphasis is on the relationship of “resistance” between forces and 
the necessary opposition between them as counterbalancing forces for one another (as I will 
show in the next section). Contradictorily, the relationships he describes, on the one hand 
sometimes appear as one of engulfment or swallowing such as in the case of the mind and the 
heart (or in his drama, in the case of how evil triumphs over the good) and, on the other hand, 
in other cases they appear as one of strict resistance and dependence (such as the relationship 
between the human will and the will of the superior). This means that al-Hakim’s dualities 
cannot be grouped or discussed under one type or frame.  
 As we examine further the state of equilibrium, we come to realise that “engulfment”, 
although plausible as a relationship between action and reaction forces, is a non-ideal. 
Engulfment, as an act of “swallowing”, is not strictly the static condition of humanity and 
human life as Khoury believed.243 But one finds the equilibrium doctrine, as a whole, to be one 
that presents relationships not as “static”, but rather “dynamic”, as I have shown in my previous 
paragraphs. Swallowing or engulfment is presented as an aspect or a mode of al-Hakim’s 
equilibrium, and he wanted to show that he was not only aware of its existence, but was also 
aware of its regular occurrence. To clarify this difference further (in terms of what al-Hakim 
meant in relation to engulfment and what Khoury may have misunderstood al-Hakim to be 
saying), I would like to investigate this passage from Khoury’s article in relation to al-Hakim’s 
doctrine: 
 
By swallowing, I mean alternation or substitution of the fading of power by a rising 
power, in a constant alternation between two powers. This is what happens in the 
relationship between day and night. There is always a day that is followed by night and 
this is also the case of inhaling and exhaling. We cannot unite them in one static 
condition. There is either “inhaling” or “exhaling”, but there is no simultaneous 
existence of one activity or power with its contrast and this is the secret of human 
existence and continuity.244 
 
 The very fact that Khoury had used the terms “alternation and substitution” shows that 
                                                          
242 Khoury, Jeries, N. (2007) “al-Hakim’s Equilibrium under the microscope. A study in al-Hakim’s Philosophy 
through his plays”, Arabica, T.54, Fasc.2 April, 2007 T. 54, pp. 189-219. www.brill.nl 





there is a clear difference between what he understands and what al-Hakim’s doctrine envisages 
in relation to the notion of engulfment. Al-Hakim explicitly shows that forces must continue to 
exist parallel to one another and continue to be in a relationship of mutual resistance. When 
engulfment occurs (in other words, when one force exceeds in strength resulting in the weaker 
force’s engulfment), imbalance occurs. This, in his view, is not a bad thing, first because 
imbalance is temporary and, second, because it gives the weaker force the opportunity to find 
in itself a source of strength by which it can rise again. The weaker force is not substituted or 
altered by the rising power. Even when engulfment occurs, the weaker force continues to exist 
separately and awaits, naturally with time, its chance to rise again to correspond and 
counterbalance the powerful force in order to restore the mutual resistance that was once in 
place. al-Hakim’s references in both examples, (a) the day and night analogy and (b) the 
inhaling and exhaling analogy (mentioned in his discussion of engulfment), can be both 
confusing and misleading. Neither example, in fact, conforms to any of the examples that he 
referred to in his discussions of the dualities that were described as consequences of 
imbalance.245 One possible speculation is that al-Hakim was drawing upon his knowledge of 
Greek philosophers and displaying his readings of similar theories (not very cleverly) and, thus, 
wanted to give examples that would contrast, in the simplest sense, two forces that are opposed 
to one another, reacting and compensating.246 Ironically, in spite of his attempts to form his 
own doctrine and to distance himself from his Western and Eastern influences, he did not, in 
my view, wander too far. His choice of examples may have been flawed and, of course, at times 
contradictory, but nevertheless they should not be viewed as an indication of the nature of, or 
the importance of, his dualities that are described in his doctrine of equilibrium or presented in 
his narratives. 
 
 Based on the above discussions of the three models of polarity, one concludes that the 
kind of equilibrium claimed by al-Hakim in his doctrine is one that can be easily misunderstood 
to be, in the general sense of the word, “balance”.247 But balance, as an end result, is not his 
focus or intention. The emphasis of his theory is on the relationship of “resistance” between 
forces in opposition that react and compensate for one another. He holds that the existence of 
“resistance” is not only vital between these forces, but is also an integral trait of all creatures’ 
                                                          
245 This will be addressed in my following sections. (pp.116- 134). 
246 See similar ideas noted by Greek and Islamic medievalist philosophers like Heraclitus, al-Kindi, Ibn 
Miskawayah, Ibn Tufayl and others. Note that al-Hakim read also the works of Plato, Aristotle and Newton, which 
were all translated to Arabic by Badawi. 
247 That is to say a state of stability and balance between two disharmonious powers which move in contradictory 
directions. (See Khoury p. 195). 
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composition. For example, though the relationship between entity (A) and entity (~A) may 
appear to be “balanced” in the first instance, al-Hakim holds that these two entities are in fact 
in a relationship of resistance and conflict. They are dependent in their existence on one another 
and the relationship between them is one of opposition and correspondence. The relationship 
between action and reaction forces, although it may appear as static to some, is in fact a 
dynamic one. Al-Hakim adds that there is a probability, as an outcome of such resistance 
between forces, for one force to “engulf” or “overwhelm” the other. Every force should ideally 
maintain “resistance” from engulfment. He clarifies that this resistance is not always efficient 
or even possible. Engulfment occurs when one force suffers from a shortage or shows signs of 
weakness which allows for another force to supersede. In our situation, as humans, his proposed 
solution for overcoming engulfment is for one to “weigh [oneself] towards the opposing forces” 
and “lest they engulf and reduce [one] to nothingness”,248 it is one’s duty to find a force or an 
entity that will compensate for the shortage or weakness by the strength in another. Only then 
can the law of equilibrium promote an indefatigable resistance.249 
II. 
 I would like to explain in this section the series of dualities as described by al-Hakim 
in his text. First of all, the relationship between these dualities cannot be based on one particular 
principle that al-Hakim applied or followed. It is noteworthy to mention that these dualities are 
presented by al-Hakim as consequences of the predicaments that face modern man in the new 
age. As I mentioned, al-Hakim firstly claims that we are affected by a “spiritual” imbalance in 
the new age.250 By this, he meant an imbalance in our emotional and intellectual domains.251 
In Equilibrium, the series of dualities present themselves in a non-orderly manner. They are in 
fact scattered in the text, which is typical of al-Hakim’s style of writing and perhaps, also, 
typical of an Arabic dialogue (which is what he intended for his text to be). It is impossible, 
according to Khoury, for one “to join all dualities under one type of relations since there is 
                                                          
248 Ibid 
249 I think in comprehending his three models of polarity (Dependency, reaction and counterbalance and 
engulfment), we have a better chance of comprehending his analogies in the same passage regarding the universe’s 
natural process of restoring itself over time to overcome a shortage or a weakness, and his strong belief in human 
beings’ ability to be able to do just the same. This is can also be seen as a common view held by European 
philosophers who believe that human beings have an internal desire to return to their natural balanced conditions. 
250 Note that al-Hakim’s use of the word “spiritual” is mistaken by many critics and readers to refer to one’s 
religious life. To clarify this, al-Hakim explicitly states that he was solely referring to one’s “intellectual and 
emotional life” and not referring to any other implied religious meaning that the word may carry.  
251 He notes “what we call mental and psychological illnesses are nothing but an imbalance or disruption in [one’s] 
equilibrium; either through the expansion of feelings to such a point that thought is nullified or its function 
disrupted and a human being acts like a child or through the domination of thought to the extent of impeding 
emotion. Human consciousness, thereby, gets altogether muddled.” 
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discrepancy and differences in the quality of these relations.”252 Secondly, the significance of 
the dualities lies in how they are outlined and discussed in the equilibrium doctrine and how 
they also represent themselves accordingly in al-Hakim’s dramatic works. For example, one 
could claim that in al-Hakim’s drama, we can identify not just one, but different types of 
conflicting powers (dualities) as a result of a state of imbalance. Often, in drama, the conflict 
of powers would be represented in various degrees by al-Hakim’s characters. In doing so, 
characters lose their human traits or “their relationship with reality”253 as they allegorically 
embody certain ideas. The influence of this technique on style and narrative is one where the 
work appears as a philosophical dialogue presenting to us, readers, a stream of consciousness 
through characters’ internal or external monologues that reflect their engagement in one, if not 
many, philosophical debates. Thirdly, the conceptual progression of these dualities relies 
entirely on how they appear in his text, given that he only conformed to some stylistic or 
linguistic restrictions. He spoke freely of each duality and jumped back and forth in his 
discussions making the task of extracting them from the text even more challenging for the 
reader. Nevertheless, I have attempted to explain them in every way possible and, in the 
process, I found myself selective in choosing those I saw important to this chapter (in that they 
parallel al-Hakim’s core claims and arguments in his doctrine of equilibrium). 
 
 The first appearance of these dualities is in the early paragraphs of the book where he 
claims that there is an imbalance between the mind and the heart. This duality is used loosely 
in order to represent another duality; namely that between science (signified by logic and 
reason) versus faith (or religions). The duality between the mind and the heart, science and 
faith, is one that is presumed by al-Hakim to be most apparent at the start of the 20th century, 
“the new age”. He sees this duality as the source of the problem or at least, as what has triggered 
what is yet to come in his text. To clarify, the consequences of the sole dominance of the mind 
in contrast to the decline of religion (or its practices) meant, to him, that we have come to 
believe that we are (a) superior to other creatures in the universe and that (b) we possess 
absolute freedom. As I have shown and discussed in the previous chapter, both positions are 
problematic from his perspective for the reasons I outlined. With this said, I wish to present a 
summary of these dualities, as described by al-Hakim in his text, in order to support his 
position. These dualities are: (i) mind versus heart, (ii) the human will versus the divine will 
                                                          
252 Khoury, Jeries, N. (2007) “al-Hakim’s Equilibrium under the microscope. A study in al-Hakim’s Philosophy 
through his plays”, Arabica, T.54, Fasc.2. April, 2007 T. 54, (pp. 189-219) www.brill.nl 
(http://www.jstor.org/stable/4057813), pp.191- 197. 
253 Ibid, p. 197 
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(or the will of the unknown “other”, or that which is “superior”), (iii) God versus Satan (or 
good versus evil). And finally, (iv.) thought versus action.254 In discussing these dualities, I aim 
to show how they form an integral part of the doctrine of equilibrium, and how they relate to 
the majority of al-Hakim’s philosophical narratives. 
(i) Mind versus heart (Reason versus Faith)255 
I believe in the mind, science and freedom of the human being; however, I cannot 
deny the heart and faith. I do not blame the mind for doubting because that is its 
function, i.e. motion. For if the mind is cut off from doubt in undertaking research 
and making its laws and stops its dynamic stirring of facts and results, its work 
become paralysed and its life ceases. The heart’s function, on the other hand, is 
faith, i.e. stability.256 
 
 In order to fully understand why an author like al-Hakim would claim that there is a 
duality between the mind and the heart, one should consider the implications of his multiple 
trips to France and around Europe on his thought and character. The common view is that he 
was (during his first visit in 1925) a young Egyptian who experienced a culture shock as a 
result of leaving the East behind to discover the West. This naturally affected him and, initially, 
his experiences seem to have led him to think that the West represents rational thinking and 
science, whilst the East represents faith and emotion.257 This analogy evolved into his doctrine 
of equilibrium and became an issue which he attempted to resolve. His first proposition is that 
modern man suffers, at the beginning of the 20th century, from an increasing anxiety as a result 
of the dominance of the mind, i.e. rational thinking (as opposed to employing both domains for 
example, the mind and the heart). He adds, because we have swung towards the more logical 
side in attempting to explain all aspects of our being or existence or even our relationship with 
our surroundings, it has become gradually more difficult to believe in anything that cannot be 
proven by science or experimentation (hence we resort to rationalising incidents in our daily 
                                                          
254 I have decided to give close attention to this duality in the following chapter in order to form a comparison 
between al-Hakim’s concept of “commitment” and that of Sartre and also to use it as a reflection on European 
existentialism as a movement that has inspired many intellectuals to free the Arab mind. 
255 This is a different duality from the Western duality of mind-body duality or body-soul duality. The biological 
function of the heart is overlooked and it is viewed instead as having cognitive attributes as well as signifying 
faith and emotions.   
256 Equilibrium, pp. 22-23 
257 This is a common view shared by many writes at the time who had similar experiences of the West. This view 
is evident in his novel ‘Usfur min al-Sharq published in 1938. He opposed gradually in his career this view and 
tried to prove otherwise. Thus, taking into consideration that he was still at an early stage of his career in the 30s 
where he had not yet embarked per se on any philosophical investigations, and had found it sufficient to mask his 
thoughts and present them in drama and fictional writings, one should neither take his discussion (regarding the 
rift between science and faith- mind and heart) as an indication of his hostility towards modern science or 
technology, nor as an expression of his discontent at the thought of employing one’s mind or reason alone. There 
is a documentary film with the same title, ‘Usfur min al-Sharq, directed by Ahmad Rashid on 20th February 1976 
produced by the Egyptian Union of Cinema. 
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lives). And although we expect some clarification or examples to explain his position, he gives 
us none. Instead, he says that there are incidents that are inexplicable and beyond our 
comprehension. The nature of these incidents and the reasons for their occurrence are left 
ambiguous in the text, as he writes: 
Do you not sometimes feel that someone somewhere is staring at you? And if you raised 
your head and searched, you would indeed find that your emotion was true. Have you 
ever noticed once or twice in your life that a particular incident happened to you on a 
certain occasion that changed the course of your life in a certain way? You attempt to 
link it to a coincidence, but you fail because an external will has intervened in an orderly 
manner emanating from an awareness that is conscious of what it does and knows what 
it wants, in order to provoke specific results that would not have happened were it not 
for this unexpected external intervention. An external willpower that has all the 
elements of a sage and intelligent will which descends on your ordinary will and 
changes its direction and paints for it a new path. Sometimes your mind, regardless of 
the stability and precision of logic it may achieve, refuses to submit such incidents to 
the usual and simple logical explanation.258 
 
 This position is an indication of al-Hakim’s realisation at the time that people see 
religion in a different way and perhaps there is more a chance for societies to become secular 
(especially with the emergence of atheism in a few countries). It is worth noting that, 
historically, Egypt experienced secularism for the first time during the French occupation of 
1798-1801 and later on, the British occupation between 1882 and 1952. The latter date being 
three years before Equilibrium was published. The occupation allowed for the propagation of 
Western ideas and pro-secularist intellectuals found it to be an opportunity to speak freely. One 
influential intellectual who addressed the issue of “the secularisation of the Muslim state” 
during al-Hakim’s time was Egyptian Shaykh Ali Abd Al Raziq (1888- 1966).259 When al-
Hakim graduated in 1925 from law school and was ready to travel to France, Raziq’s 
controversial book Al Islam wa usul al-hukm (Islam and The Principles of Ruling) was 
published early the same year. Raziq argues in his book that Islam as a religion should not 
interfere with political authority on the basis that God called on the Prophet Muhammad to be 
a “religious advisor or counsellor to his people” and not as a head of state. The book, as anyone 
can imagine, created a negative stir amongst Muslims fanatics and caused political unrest 
between Turkey and Egypt. Egypt was under the ruling of the protection of the new Republic 
                                                          
258 Ibid, p. 22. 
259 Although Raziq’s book brought him fame in 1925, he was condemned as a precursor of secularist philosophy 
in Muslim societies and in 1940, al-Azhar stripped him of his office then later on, he was reinstituted. Al-Azhar 
feared the implications of Raziq’s writings on the youths and they were right in believing so as he began to attract 
many followers. He says, “Islam does not advocate a specific form of government (unlike what the Muslim 
brotherhood group claim today) and that, in the past, the Caliphs used religious law in order to protect their 
thrones.” See Kassab, Elizabeth Suzanne. Contemporary Arab Thought: Cultural Critique in Comparative 
Perspective. Columbia University Press, 2010. 
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of Turkey. In response to the 1924 decision to abolish the Islamic caliphate,260 Raziq said that 
Caliphates used a “religious justification” for their ruling, “as a shield protecting their thrones 
against the attacks of rebels).261 Raziq was, accordingly, accused of promoting atheism, his 
works were censured by al-Azhar scholars, and he was stripped of his office and title as 
“Shaykh”.262 He was also relieved of his duties as a religious judge. This is not to say that Raziq 
was not supported then by many writers who admired him and followed in his footsteps. Those 
who played an influential role and were supporters of Raziq were Taha Husayn263 and 
Mohammed Hassanein Haykal,264 both close acquaintances of Tawfiq al-Hakim. 
 
 
 Moreover, the view that there is a duality between the power of the mind and the power 
of the heart is one that was commonly touched upon by Islamic philosophers and 
theologians.265 The mind signifies reason and the heart signifies faith and emotions. To briefly 
clarify this without delving further into details, two particular figures come to mind: the Islamic 
philosopher and psychologist, Muhammed Zakariyah al-Razi (864-930CE), and the 
philosopher al-Ghazali (1058 – 1111CE). First, in Tib al- Fennoon (The Art of Medicine), Razi 
postulated some claims regarding the emotional condition as a mental state (i.e. he held that, 
in children, fear is a learned condition). He did not form explicit division per se because he was 
primarily concerned with mental conditions and their treatment within the field of medical 
ethics. Al-Ghazali,266 on the other hand, who also spoke of fear as a learned condition either 
gained through negative experiences or taught to children, made clear distinctions. In his 
discussion of the spirit (rûh or soul)267, he identifies two domains, that of the intellect (‘aql), 
                                                          
260 Mustafa Kamal (Atatürk) had abolished the Islamic caliphate in 1924 and because many Muslims wanted to 
elect or appoint a new one, King Fuʾad I proposed himself as a candidate for the caliphate. See Fauzi Najjar, “The 
debate on Islam and Secularism”, Arab Studies Quarterly; 1996, Vol. 18 Issue 2. 
261 Kemal H. Karpat. (2001) The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in 
the Late Ottoman State. Studies in Middle Eastern History. Oxford University Press. 
262 So’ad T. Ali. (2009) A Religion, not a state: Ali 'Abd al-Raziq's Islamic justification of political secularism. 
University of Utah Press. 
263 See Glicksberg, Josef Benjamin. The 1926 Uproar over Taha Husayn’s On Pre-Islamic Poetry: Islamist-
Secularist Debate and the Subversion of Secular Identity in Monarchical Egypt. University of Pennsylvania, 
delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 28 - August 31, 2003 
264 See previous chapter and images of Haykal with al-Hakim with Sartre. Haykal was an editor-in-chief of 
Cairo national newspaper al-Ahram for 17 years (between 1957 and 1974) and has been a respected commentator 
on Arab affairs for more than 50 years. See also images of him with former President Nasser as a close friend. 
265 See medieval philosopher, al-Ghazali on the mind and heart divide. Najub-ud din Muhammed, (lived at the 
same time as al-Razi) also wrote extensively about mental disorders such as depression, paranoia, persecution 
complex, sexual dysfunction and obsessional neuroses, amongst a host of other mental ailments. 
266 Ghazali studied philosophy (Falsafah) for six years upon joining the entourage of his patron, Nizam al-Mulk, 
who promoted literary and intellectual disciplines among his entourage. It is fair to say that once again, we find 
an intellectual ruler nurturing the search for knowledge and the process of learning (as during President Nasser’s 
reign). 
267 The difference between the rûh and the nafs – both which can be translated as “soul” or “spirit” – is a difficult 
one. The word nafs is used in the Qur’ân in various ways. One use of the word refers to the human being as a 
“body and a soul”. This meaning is the one most frequently encountered in the Qur’ân.   
 121 
 
which is the mind, and (qalb), which is the heart. Although al-Ghazali occupied himself with 
finding out how we can integrate intellectual and rational activity with inner experiencing of 
truth in a balanced and harmonious way, he did not reach far in his examination. He, did, 
however, speak of the duality between the body and the spirit (unlike the Western duality of 
mind and body), as one where the body is “the 'riding-animal' for the spirit (rûh). The essential 
reality of the human lies in the spirit (rûh), the soul (here, referred to as nafs), the heart (qalb), 
and the mind (‘aql) or intelligence. The image (below) clarifies these division and how al-
Ghazali sees in the human self (nafs) two domains, the body (jism) and the spirit (rûh) where 
the mind (‘aql) and the heart (qalb) both reside. 
 
 Al-Hakim’s examination did not engage with any of al-Ghazali’s ideas regarding the 
body and soul duality. Instead, the dilemma for him, as I understand it to be, seems to be in 
how we treat claims derived from either domains; should we listen to the mind or follow the 
heart? Perhaps, at the first instance, he believes that one should listen to and employ both, 
although he gradually concedes that, in many cases, this is impossible. The force of the mind 
and the force of the heart should continue to “resist” attempts of engulfing or superseding one 
another in order for equilibrium to prevail. This conflict is inevitable to al-Hakim’s doctrine of 
equilibrium, especially in that it recognises the difficulties that one faces in attempting to 
employ both domains, the mind and the heart, equally.  
The mind must always doubt and ask for evidence, whilst the heart must always believe 
without proof. Each of them must be seen in its own way and in different circumstances. 
To get rid of one of them for the sake of the other is a disruption of one of humanity’s 
features, in the same way as one intervening to limit the other’s freedom leads to halting 
the course of humanity’s development.268 
 
 A plausible argument would be to say that there is a genuine relation of contention in 
which neither the mind nor the heart ought to prevail. In theory, al-Hakim wishes for his 
doctrine of equilibrium to reflect a relationship of contention between two domains or forces, 
namely the mind and the heart. They should be able to live side by side without one engulfing 
                                                          
268 Equilibrium, p. 47. 
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or affecting the other regardless of any conflicts.269 However, he felt that modern man’s 
predicament was already the sole dominance of the mind which questions his surroundings and 
puts to test the credibility of all he believes in. He writes: 
The balance that prevailed until the 19th century between the power of the mind and the 
power of the heart, i.e. between activities of thought and activities of faith, has been 
disrupted ever since the supremacy of rational scientific achievements and the 
continuing stagnation of religion.270 
 
 This means for al-Hakim that the power of intellect overwhelmed or engulfed the power 
of faith. As a result of doubt and suspicion, modern man suffers from an ongoing disruption in 
his “equilibrist composition.”271 With this said, we understand from the text that al-Hakim 
neither agrees, for example, to the prioritization of faith to an extent where it becomes 
positively irrational, nor agrees to attempts to rationalise faith as many thinkers of his time 
continued to do. Instead, he maintains, as in the above quotation, that faith and reason govern 
their own domains and that we ought to recognise both powers of these domains to recognise 
the elements that constitute our “equilibrium” character. I would like to claim that attempts by 
logical positivists and others to say that all ideas and statements must be subject to thorough 
rational examination are the kind of claims that al-Hakim warns us from believing or following 
because, in his view, there are still aspects of our existence and about our universe that are a 
mystery to us and are not subject to any logical explanations and experimentations.  
 The claims that champion the use of reason solely as a source of human knowledge 
have challenged religious thinkers in every age. In some parts of al-Hakim’s text, on the one 
hand, the tone is one of sympathy with religious thinkers who not only struggle to aid our 
understanding of some of our personal problems, but also are expected, as knowledgeable 
clerics, to tame our desire for knowledge of the unknown. And on the other hand, al-Hakim 
talks of his fear of clergy’s hidden agendas by which they use the power of the heart (faith and 
emotion) to overwhelm the power of the mind (i.e. reason replaced by blind faith) and thus 
influence the decisions of the people.272 The mind and heart duality is, on this basis, an analogy 
for al-Hakim’s feeling towards the divide between the East and the West, the ongoing conflict 
that he sees as inevitable when trying to employ both domains (the heart and the mind) and 
                                                          
269 See al-Hakim’s essay, Tahta Shams al-Fikr, section titled “Mantikat al- Iman” (An Area of Faith) where he 
expresses this idea. 
270 Equilibrium, p.18 
271 By this he is referring to the opposing forces in resistance to one another that make-up the human being. 
272 This is a subtle reference to clerics who use their positions and use faith to influence the decisions and actions 
of others in order to reach, or to protect, their positions in the state (similar to some extent to the attack on the 
appointment of Caliphate in the olden days). It is also a criticism of the Muslim brotherhood groups who were 
kept under control by President Nasser and who later on became a powerful political threat after Nasser’s reign. 
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finally, the struggle between those who represent faith and emotion (the clergy) and those who 
represent science and rational thinking.273  
 For example, in what seems like a thought experiment, typical of al-Hakim’s style, he 
asks the human heart and the mind two vital questions. Firstly, “is the human being alone in 
the universe? And secondly, “is the human being free in this universe?” On the one hand, he 
claims that the human mind would reply, based on immediate experiences, observations and 
experimentations, that in the modern age, the human being is indeed alone in this universe 
without a competitor and that he is the God of this existence possessing ultimate freedom.274 
The heart would reply, based on faith and emotions, that it rejects the idea of man’s solitude in 
the universe and having ultimate freedom. The reason why the mind believes so, and the heart 
does not, is because the mind’s reply alone is based on reflections on modern man’s triumphs 
throughout the past years (where the idea of man’s solitude or absolute freedom gradually 
became familiar). Optimistically, al-Hakim argues that, regardless of the sole dominance of the 
mind, there has been a longing on our part for something that could shed light on our existence 
or give meaning and purpose to our lives. This longing is, in his view, a step towards having 
“faith” or “belief”. At this point, al-Hakim did not identify whether he meant having belief (in 
the sense of having a moral stand) or belief in the existence of a superior “other” as he later on 
specified. He considers the heart’s rejection to be of great value because not only does it give 
hope for faith to exist, but also (following again from the logic of his doctrine of equilibrium) 
the heart acts as a counterbalancing force for the force of the mind. This inevitable relationship 
of contention has not only caused us, throughout the past years, an increasing sense of 
“anxiety”275 but also has been the cause for us falling victims to mental or psychological 
illnesses. 
 Another point to consider is that, from al-Hakim’s perspective, the heart’s objection to 
the notion of solitude and absolute freedom is evident in how people differed over the years in 
their methods of searching or longing for a superior “other”. This, he saw as a common 
phenomenon in the modern age, which indicates that there is still hope to find a solution for 
human anxiety and for the problems that face us as a result of the imbalance caused by the 
duality between the mind and the heart. He writes: 
 
“The interest today in flying saucers and people’s hope that others are coming with a 
                                                          
273 In Equilibrium, p.32, he outlines some of the historical conflicts between the men of religion and the men of 
science (also between the men of power and the men of action). 
274 Ibid, p. 18 
275 Al-Hakim’s exact word used in his text is “Qalaq” which can be translated as “restlessness” and an increasing 
sense of anxiety which he predicts will persist throughout the modern age. 
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message from a better world and superior creatures are nothing but a general breeze to 
cool the feeling that dried out with the parched spring of religion to relieve human’s 
anxiety and to rescue them a little from their isolation in the universe.”276  
 
 
 In concluding this discussion of al-Hakim’s mind and heart duality, it is worth stressing 
that we understand from it two fundamental things. Firstly is that, because modern man fell 
victim to the dominance of the mind (or that the mind has succeeded over the past years in 
overwhelming the heart) there are, with the start of the new age, tremendous consequences 
affecting us. These are: 
1. We define the concept of our freedom according to our freedom of thought. 
2. We reject anything that cannot be proved with research and experimentation, and hence; 
3. We deny another will other than our will or the existence of another than ourselves. 
 And accordingly, these consequences, outlined by al-Hakim and seen as negative, 
affect, if not alter, our moral choices and actions.277 There is no doubt that al-Hakim considers 
humans’ search for a superior “other”, in various ways and forms, (along with what he sees as 
the heart’s objection to the idea of humans’ solitude and possessing absolute freedom) as a 
reassurance that our “equilibrist composition” is capable of restoring itself by itself naturally 
and over time. This is an idea that is underlying his doctrine of equilibrium from the start. Can 
we, by taking a step back from al-Hakim’s doctrine, see the relevance of his examination of 
such duality (the mind and the heart) in our 21st century? There are clearly no signs of stopping 
human beings’ curiosity or desire for knowledge. The extent of technological and scientific 
achievements in our present day is vast. Some may even go on further to say that the 
psychological and mental illnesses and the increasing anxiety are simply a small cost that we 
have to endure for modernity. And also, as a result of the sheer amount of experimentations 
that had lethal results or have sprung out of human control, resulting in deadly catastrophes in 
many countries over the past years, we have, as al-Hakim predicted, grown more and more 
fearful than ever of our own physical destruction. He writes: 
Man has developed tremendous and devastating material capabilities that could at any 
moment escape his control and become his own destruction. These capabilities are only 
reined in by wisdom, but as [a human being] cannot guarantee this wisdom, he grows 
anxious of his own safety and existence. [And thus he] lives day by day in this new era 
looking at the scale of equilibrium between power and wisdom with wondering restless 
eyes.278 
                                                          
276 Ibid. p. 19 
277 The first and third proposition are interrelated and al-Hakim discusses them further in his doctrine of 
equilibrium when he examines the question of human freedom in relation to the divine will (the subject of the 
next duality). As for the second proposition, addressing the rejection of anything that cannot be proven by 
experimentation, I have attempted to explain it above as discussed and presented in his text.  
278 Equilibrium, p. 19 
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Mind and Heart duality in Shahrazad 
 
 If one attempts to examine al-Hakim’s dramatic works in relation to his doctrine of 
equilibrium (especially in relation to the duality between the mind and the heart), by looking, 
for example, at Shahrazad (1934), one can see in the way the characters represent specific traits 
how this technique reflects al-Hakim’s discussion of the mind versus heart duality. At the 
beginning, al-Hakim puts man’s “intellect [the mind] and the heart in an alternate dialogue with 
nature in order to show us in the end that none of these [characters] can live independently of 
the other or can achieve universal nature and stability if [they] live in separation, loneliness 
and seclusion.”279 An equilibrist individual should recognise the power of both domains; the 
mind and the heart, and acknowledge that they should be employed wisely in different 
situations in life. To clarify, in al-Hakim’s narrative, the character Shahrayar is presented as a 
representative of the mind whereas the character of Minister Qamar is a representative of the 
heart. Shahrayar, who is restless, looks at Shahrazad, representative of nature, with both doubt 
and fright. He is able to acknowledge the power of the heart only through the attractive traits 
that nature (Shahrazad) possesses such as stability, tranquillity and serenity. He, as a 
representative of the mind, relentlessly searches for knowledge only to find at the end of his 
quest that his search was in vain. He is lost “suspended between the earth and the sky”280 unable 
to restore himself to a state of equilibrium. As for the Minister Qamar, representative of the 
heart, he also, like Shahrayar, has failed in his quest and is unable to maintain balance between 
pure love and bodily lust. As for nature, Shahrazad, she triumphs at the end by remaining 
unmoved, constant. The allegorical events of this play, therefore, present to us, in this manner, 
three extreme characters who are in desperate need for a restoration of balance in order to 
achieve what al-Hakim refers to as a sound human nature, or as he claims “a healthy equilibrist 
composition”. 
(ii) Human will versus divine will 
The truth that I would like to rightly be in place is that I am a dualist 
(Ta’aduli), meaning that man's will is on one side corresponded by the will 
of the divine on the other, just as the human mind is on one side and faith is 
on the other.281 
 
 The common understanding of what al-Hakim writes here is that, unlike the Greek's 
polytheistic duality between man and multiple Gods, he, being a monotheist, suggests a duality 
                                                          
279 See Muhammad Mandur for a dramatic analysis of al-Hakim’s Shahrazad, pp. 58-65 
http://www.yabeyrouth.com/pages/index1107.htm. 
280Al-Hakim. Tawfiq (1934) Shahrazad. Cairo. Maktabat Misr, p. 23. 
281 Ibid, p. 23 
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between man and God. This understanding is not strictly correct. What al-Hakim is saying here 
is that, as an equilibrist, one should believe that one force, such as man's will, is opposed by 
another, in this case, the will of the divine or a superior (a will that is capable of changing one’s 
destiny and works in mysterious ways to do so). The counterbalance between the two, the will 
of man and the will of the unknown is evident in different scenarios in life. It is my belief that 
the concept of the “divine” here is used in the context of that which is “superior” (i.e. works in 
mysterious ways) than as a reference to a specific God per se. The will of the unknown, the 
“other”, or that which is “superior” is presented in different ways in al-Hakim’s narrative. For 
example, age, death, knowledge of the truth and the will of the other are all external factors 
that affect one’s course of life. We cannot control these factors put in our paths or grasp 
incidents that our mind fail to find explanations and answers for. It is plausible that al-Hakim 
avoided in his text giving further clarifications on this matter so as not to delve into a debate 
with fanatics. He resorted, more importantly, to highlighting the power of human emotions as 
a domain that is not always easy to explain; especially when it comes to explaining having 
“faith” in the presence of a superior. Moreover, al-Hakim claims that the mind, over the past 
years, has been a powerful source of knowledge and as a consequence of that, it has led us into 
thinking (and believing) that our will is the only will present in this universe. There are three 
ways of understanding this claim: (1) He is saying that there is still a lot about our universe 
and about our being that we are unaware of, or (2) We have very limited capabilities that cannot 
allow us to see or to find in our immediate experiences proof of anything else beyond our own 
existence, or (3) We have become accustomed to how our minds provide rational explanations, 
and when it fails to do so, we construct our own versions of the truth or what we perhaps are 
comfortable believing. Each of these claims pose a new set of questions for al-Hakim. The 
ambiguity of his writing means that I cannot say with certainty which of these claims he wishes 
to address. However, his approach encourages us, the readers, to think (and question) all of the 
above.  
 It would be erroneous to believe, based on the mind’s denial of another will such as the 
will of the divine, that there is or appears to be no evidence of the existence of another will 
regardless of the many ways or aspects the other will may be able to manifest itself.282 This, 
seemingly inevitable process in every man’s life (where he doubts faith in the existence of the 
other) is, according to al-Hakim, because our search is primarily and strictly in our immediate 
                                                          
282 It would also be erroneous to ignore the past scholarly work that deals with just that; the question of the 
existence of the other (in our universe and in regards to our existence). 
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experiences. This is something that al-Hakim sees as problematic.283 He asks consequently, 
why can’t the mind accept the notion of a superior being?284 He answers, although the mind is 
capable of recognising the notion of superiority, it is incapable of creating an image that 
matches the idea’s grandeur. So going back to his initial question of “are we alone in the 
universe?”, the immediate answer given by the mind is “Yes, we are alone in the universe”, 
since we can neither find evidence in our immediate experiences that indicates the existence of 
a superior being with certainty, nor can we imagine the superior being’s existence. But surely, 
this is an argument that has long been debated and refuted by both European and Islamic 
philosophers of metaphysics.285 Could al-Hakim be here merely echoing their debate by asking 
his readers: if something does not exist in our immediate experience, and we cannot see it (or 
be certain of its existence using any of our senses) and our minds fail to create an image for it 
when it is required to do so, can we still claim, with certainty, that it does not exist? This 
question is the essence of what al-Hakim is implying and challenging his readers with in his 
explanations of the duality between the human will versus the existence of a divine will. He 
writes: 
This realisation of a superior being is not, to me, a simple religious doctrine, but 
rather a human necessity, similar in status to that of animals’ realisation of the 
existence of stronger beings… For animals, the feeling of the presence of stronger 
being stimulates power, just as the feeling of the presence of the superior, for human 
beings, stimulates transcendence.286 
 
Human will versus divine will in King Oedipus 
 If we look at the dramatic works, we will find that al-Hakim’s play King Oedipus (1949) 
is one that shows a duality or conflict between the Godly will and the human will. Influenced 
by the Greek text by Sophocles (d. in 405 B. C.), he describes a conflict between truth and 
                                                          
283 G. V. Tutungi notes that al-Hakim was at a very young age obsessed with the unseen. “He believed in the 
existence of spirits and insisted they filled the house at night. He also believed that he was capable of foretelling 
events. He was deeply upset by death” See examples given from al-Hakim’s life reflecting this in G. V. Tutungi’s 
thesis on al-Hakim in 1966, which is a comparative study submitted to the Comparative literature department at 
Indiana University. pp. 2-34. Chapter 1 on al-Hakim’s Early Upbringing. 
284 See Equilibrium, p.20. Here, al-Hakim argued that human beings’ realisation that a “superior being” exists is 
a human necessity rather than a religious doctrine. 
285 See Secada, Jorge. (2000) Cartesian Metaphysic: the Scholastic Origins of Modern Philosophy. Cambridge 
University Press. P.67 In particular, discussions of Descartes’ a priori knowledge and arguments for God, as well 
as other arguments for and against the existence of God by Aquinas, Ibn Rushd, al-Ghazali, al-Razi (Besides, as 
early as the 9th century, there are also arguments for and against the existence of God by the Mu’tazilite and al-
Baghdadi. See History of Philosophy in Islam (1903), London. p. 159. 
286 The notion of “transcendence” in this context means for one to rise above a present condition by exerting 
individual or collective effort to improve and progress. Equilibrium, p.25. 
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reality, or, at times, imagination and reality.287 Tiresias is both the messenger, who tells of 
Oedipus’s origin, and the author of the message, in that he is the one telling of Oedipus’ fate. 
Tiresias shows that truth can become malleable; shaped by the force of the will. He says, "I see 
nothing. And I see no God in existence save our own volition. I willed, and to that extent was 
divine, that you [Oedipus] are on the throne is nothing other than a manifestation of my will".288 
He is capable of altering, or shaping, the absolute divine truth with his mind in the absence of 
a divine will. Unlike Sophocles, al-Hakim gives more significance to the character of the 
modern Tiresias as one who is parallel to the character Oedipus and is aware that his fate and 
that of Oedipus are tied to one another. Allegorically, and perhaps also ironically, Tiresias is 
not a spokesman for the God Apollo, but he possesses enough power to play with Oedipus’ 
fate.289 In a dialogue with Oedipus Tiresias says, “I am withdrawing my hand this time in order 
to see what will happen",290 as if possessing the upper hand in changing Oedipus’ fate and in 
doing so, he is encouraging Oedipus to abandon his quest for the all-encompassing truth. By 
the end, Tiresias’s prophecy is fulfilled and Oedipus’s family is, accordingly, tormented as a 
result of this master/slave relationship between the two characters that represent the interplay 
of human will versus divine will. Tiresias adds, “You [Oedipus] truly had free will. But it was 
always operating, without your knowing or sensing it, within the framework of heaven's will. 
You fell. But you swept us along with you."291 And with this statement, according to al-Hakim, 
Tiresias has become a mad slave to the heavens. The events of the play unfold rapidly to reach 
the end which echoes al-Hakim’s own belief in his equilibrium doctrine; namely that we must 
submit to a notion of truth that is present outside of our immediate experiences, especially in 
relation to the existence of a divine will or the existence of a superior being. 
(iii) God versus Satan (Good versus Evil)292 
God alone is the one almighty and omnipotent, and yet he created with his own 
accord another opposing force, that is the power of Satan in order for human life 
to begin.293 
 
 It is a common view in religions such as Islam and Christianity that, on the one hand, 
Satan is an embodiment of evil and darkness and, on the other hand, God is an embodiment of 
                                                          
287 Khoury, p. 200 
288 Conway, Stephen. (1995) “Truth and Tiresias in Sophocles’ Cambridge University Press, 1995 and al-
Hakim’s Oedipus” See also al-Hakim’s al- Malik Udib (King Oedipus). pp. 89-90 
289 Also see Hutchins’ The Reader’s Guide, p. 103 chapter on al-Hakim’s “Plays of the mind”. 
290 Conway, Stephen. (1995) “Truth and Tiresias in Sophocles’ and al-Hakim’s Oedipus”. Cambridge University 
Press. 
291 Ibid, pp. 123-124 
292 Although this has been an analogy in religions, al-Hakim uses it freely without a specific reference to any. 
293 Equilibrium, p.51. 
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peace, light and goodness. Satan, perhaps throughout the history of mankind, is constantly 
blamed for attempting to lure us, humans, into committing evil deeds and, accordingly, 
diverting our path from the righteous one. Al-Hakim’s representation of Satan is one that is far 
more interesting than blaming Satan for all our sins. Satan is presented as a necessary, 
dependent and counterbalancing force to that of the good. Without the good, there cannot be 
evil and vice versa. Not just that, but also al-Hakim goes on further to give Satan, in his writing, 
human attributes to show that Satan is not after all “the bad guy”. The duality between God 
and Satan is not explicit in Equilibrium as it is in his philosophical narratives. In Equilibrium, 
he talks of the duality between good and evil in terms of crime and punishment, I will not focus 
on this discussion here, rather I will discuss in the following sections the duality between God 
versus Satan in light of a few of al-Hakim’s selected works, such as his play Izis (1955), his 
short story ‘Ahd al-Shaytan (1938) and, more importantly, his philosophical narrative Arini 
Allah (1953).294  
 In Izis (1955),295 first of all al-Hakim introduces the character Osiris as a representative 
of the power of good parallel to the character of Tifan who is a representative of the power of 
evil. Following from the logic of the doctrine of equilibrium, al-Hakim describes the 
relationship between his characters as one of contradiction, conflict and counterbalance. 
Osiris’s role extends to also represent the “isolated intellectual”, who was torn between 
“activity” or action and politics. This duality was touched upon explicitly in al-Hakim’s 
doctrine and rejected as the intellectual should refrain from joining any political party because 
he will be representing the party’s agenda when he should instead maintain freedom of 
thought.296 Tifan, as an active politician, was trying to lure Osiris and involve him in political 
activities. Osiris’s resistance eventually failed and he was “engulfed” by Tifan’s attempts. I 
would like to argue that Osiris’s failure meant that there was a need for resistance and struggle 
against the opposing force. For example, in a parallel scenario, in regards of the character of 
Izis, who was a constant symbol in al-Hakim’s work,297 was on her way back to authority; she 
                                                          
294 Note that this was two years before Equilibrium in 1955. 
295 Izis is a Goddess in Ancient Egyptian religious beliefs of motherhood, fertility and a patroness of nature and 
magic. Her myth was popular in the Greco-Roman period. Al-Hakim, Tawfiq. (1955) Izis, Maktabat Misr, Cairo. 
Egypt. p. 156 
296 See Equilibrium, pp. 33-34 on the duality between thought and action. Al-Hakim criticised Sartre’s political 
engagements and claimed that an intellectual’s duty was to maintain freedom of thought. See chapter three, page 
140 on the role of the intellectual in society. 
297 He refers to Izis as a Goddess in his novel ‘Awdat al-Ruh, al-Ribat al-Muqadas, Shahrazad and the character 
of Prisca in Ahl al-Kahf. All heroines were Isis figures according to Hutchins’s A Reader’s Guide. (2003) Three 
Continent Press. p. 99. 
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and her sons, as Khoury claims,298 were able to drag “the good ones to do some evil in order 
to regain equilibrium and rights”. And in doing so, al-Hakim succeeds in showing that good 
by itself was not sufficient enough to achieve balance. The role of evil was just as necessary 
and as important as the role of the good.  
 Secondly, in the case of ‘Ahd al-Shaytan (1938), al-Hakim takes a different approach 
to the work. He begins his work by setting the scene, whereby he himself is sitting at his desk 
surrounded by many books, one of which is the story of “Faust”.299 He admits he has only 
managed to read a few pages of it.300 He then tells the story of Faust in his own way.301 He 
narrates that there was an old scientist who was lamenting (via a personal monologue) his life 
and how he spent it searching for knowledge rather than enjoying it as others of his age had 
done. The scientist, who was sitting alone quietly reading a book on astronomy, was suddenly 
disturbed by a voice addressing him from a dark corner claiming that he had heard what the 
scientist had said to himself. We, thus, have a dialogue between Faust, the scientist, and the 
devil. The identity of the speaker from the dark corner is not revealed to us, the readers, until 
this point, which is when the scientist persistently asks who was speaking to him from the dark 
corner. The voice answers, firstly, “you mortals always want to know, are always in love with 
knowledge. Is it not enough that I can give you everything you wish for?” And, after a few 
moments of mystery and tension, and when the scientist asks again, the reply is finally “I am 
the devil”. The significance of this work lies, in my view, first, in the fact that al-Hakim gives 
the devil explicitly both human and divine traits, and secondly, in that the work shows the 
beginning of al-Hakim’s use of extensive dialogues whilst being inspired by Goethe’s Faust. 
There are no specific plots per se other than al-Hakim’s own narration of what has happened 
in parts of Faust’s story and his own thoughts, reflections, imagination and descriptions of a 
specific night. Regardless of the literary value of this work, it is an example of al-Hakim’s 
experimentation with Western texts and his own philosophical ideas. Al-Hakim narrates, when 
the devil revealed himself to the scientist, he did so as a human being, claiming, “there, I am a 
human like you, must I be a human like you for you to understand me? You do not see anything 
else, but that which appears only in your own form.”302 This echoes al-Hakim’s view that we 
are incapable of seeing or reaching beyond our own existence and beyond the limits of our 
                                                          
298 See Khoury, p. 200. 
299 Goethe’s Faust. 
300 This is the translated version of Goethe’s Faust by Arab existentialist ‘Abdel Rahman Badawi. See 
Introduction: Background and Influences on Badawi and his work. An image of the front cover of Badawi’s Arabic 
translation can be found in appendix I, p.180 
301 Al-Hakim, Tawfiq. (1938) ‘Ahd al-Shaytaan, p.17. 
302 This is my own translation of the Arabic text. 
 131 
 
knowledge (in regards to that which is unknown, i.e. the existence of a superior being, for 
example). This is presented in the doctrine of equilibrium.303 
 On the one hand, in a parallel scenario, the narrator, al-Hakim says that Faust’s story 
concludes by the devil granting Faust what he wished for: namely, youth in return for his 
soul.304 And on the other hand, al-Hakim, in a shift in his dialogue, presents himself as a 
character who (on a specific night) calls for the devil to come and take his soul in return for 
“knowledge” (or the “love of knowledge”). In the following sections of the text, al-Hakim tells 
of another imaginary dialogue between himself and the devil in which he asks the devil to be 
granted Faust’s soul (which the devil had previously acquired) in order to spend all his life 
devoted to knowledge. The devil, who is sympathetic, advises him against his ill choice saying 
that he is not accustomed to giving positive advice305 and that nothing can replace his youth. 
Al-Hakim, determined, rejects the devil’s advice and seals the deal. The story ends with al-
Hakim narrating how he has spent almost thirteen years since this night (since the imaginary 
incident), delving into every work of literature, art, science and philosophy he can find. He has 
immersed himself in the search for knowledge so much that one day an old woman306 says to 
him “Look at yourself in the mirror, what is this life you are living?” When he perceives his 
own reflection, he shouts “The devil has stolen my youth!” I should perhaps note that, 
regardless of its success or failure in the eyes of readers and critics, this story is not an 
indication of all of al-Hakim’s other short stories. He wrote extensively and, perhaps, this is a 
reason for me to conclude that what one can say of one story, cannot be said of another. The 
simplicity reflects al-Hakim’s personal ideas regarding a duality that, at the time, began to 
interest him and occupy his mind, namely that between God and Satan. Thus, the way in which 
he presents this duality in his drama varies in style, quality and degree. But the main general 
framework of al-Hakim’s thought has always been constant as an underlying tone in his texts. 
This underlying tone, or view, is that Satan is God’s counterbalancing force; each depends on 
the other to exist in order for the equilibrium of the world to be maintained. This, again, is 
something that is conveyed in his Equilibrium. 
 The third and final work that one should look at in order to understand al-Hakim’s 
duality is his series of philosophical short stories, Arini Allah (1953). One of the many stories 
                                                          
303 See text, Equilibrium, p. 20 on the mind’s incapability to accept or grasp the notion of the existence of the 
superior. 
304 Al-Hakim, Tawfiq. (1938) ‘ahd al-Shaytan. Maktabat al-Adab. 
305 Humour plays a vital role in this tale as well as irony. 
306 She is presumably a cleaner in his household or office. 
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in this book is “al- Shahid” (The Martyr)307. This story is significant because it highlights not 
only the duality between God and Satan, but also shows the importance of distinguishing 
between the force of goodness and the force of evil. The story begins with a stranger’s arrival 
to the Vatican where the Pope resides and the church bells are ringing as an indication that 
there is some sort of a religious ceremony taking place. The stranger walks directly up to the 
Pope and, in a dialogue, reveals to him that the reason for his visit is to ask for forgiveness and 
to repent of all his sins. From this dialogue, we, the readers are able to identify that this stranger 
is in fact Satan who is repenting because he has had enough of being the “embodiment of evil 
and darkness”. As he expresses his discontent with his situation and willingness to join the 
Christian faith and join those who represent goodness, the Pope is astonished at how remorseful 
and sincere Satan’s plea is. Satan has put forward a very convincing case for himself as an 
individual and he has also quoted Jesus on the right of every individual to repent and be 
forgiven. The Pope, still puzzled and reluctant to grant Satan forgiveness or to allow him into 
the Christian faith, faces a dilemma.  
 In a monologue, we are presented with a series of questions that occupy the Pope’s 
mind. Some of these are: “If Satan is allowed to repent, how will people continue to commit 
sins? Will there still be a belief in a judgement day? Will those who commit evil acts, who have 
been lured by Satan, be also forgiven for what they have committed? Or will they be judged 
for what they have committed prior to Satan’s act of repentance? What will be the use of the 
bible, religious tales, myths and legends that all depict evil? What will happen to the world if 
it is void of evil?”308 The Pope, although humbled by Satan’s request and the manner in which 
he chose him rather than others to come to first, realises that the matter is a dangerous one and 
that there are many unanswered questions. In the end, he rejects Satan’s request and dismisses 
him. Al-Hakim’s skilful use of this scenario shows how Satan’s role is crucial in maintaining 
the scale of the equilibrium in the world; evil is of great value to goodness and vice versa. 
Following from his doctrine of equilibrium, he thus confirms that without the one, there can 
be no other. 
 In a second scenario, Satan knocks on the door of a Kohen, the Jewish priest, and asks 
to join Judaism so that he can worship God and join others in their good deed under the Jewish 
faith. Again, questions such as “If Satan repents, what will differentiate between some people 
from others? If we allow Satan to join Judaism, what consequences will this have? This time 
                                                          
307 Al-Hakim, Tawfiq. (1953) Arini Allah, second story in the book titled “al- Shahid” (The Martyr), pp. 10-21. 
308 Ibid, my own translation, see appendix I. 
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too Satan is dismissed after the Kohen tells him that the implications of what he requests are 
far more serious than in the case of any other individual. Satan leaves disappointed, but still 
determined to join a faith and repent his sins, since he believes that he is the most religious of 
all God’s angels. He makes his way to al-Azhar to meet a Shaykh to make a final plea to join 
Islam. In this third scenario, the Shaykh, like others before him, patiently listens to Satan’s 
plea and request. He thinks to himself, as did the others, “If Satan repents, how will Muslims 
be able to read the Quranic verse without abolishing Satan in the name of God?309 How can I 
support Satan’s act of repentance without affecting adversely the Islamic faith?”310 Once again, 
Satan’s quest is rejected and he is sent away by al-Azhar Shaykh who informs Satan that a 
Shaykh’s sole role is to promote Islam as a religion.   
 The finale of this story is one that highlights the human traits that al-Hakim attributes 
to Satan. He describes how Satan’s feelings palpitated at the sight of everything that is pure, 
good and innocent. He yearns to commit a good deed that will compensate past sins. He feels 
deprived of goodness and cursed by the mere fact that his role is essential if goodness is to live 
on. In anger, he flies towards the gates of heaven and is met by Gabriel. In a dialogue, Satan 
tells Gabriel that he wants forgiveness for his sins. Gabriel informs him that he has come “too 
early”. His presence, as Satan, on earth is vital for the cosmic order to be maintained. He says, 
“Good has no meaning without evil, there is no righteous path without the presence of a sinful 
one, there is no justice without that which is unjust and no light without darkness. People will 
not be able to see God’s light without the aid of your darkness.”311 Satan, finally, with 
happiness and relief, realises the importance of his role and his duty; namely, that his presence 
on earth is vital for goodness itself to exist. His dark nature must remain in order to be able to 
reflect God’s light. And by this, he, Satan, according to al-Hakim, is “the martyr” who 
sacrifices himself, tolerates a false reputation as “the angel who rebelled against God”, when 
the truth of the matter is that he is God’s most faithful worshipper. 
 In conclusion of this chapter, I hope that my analysis of al-Hakim’s works and my 
                                                          
309 In the Quran, Surat The Bees (al-Nahl), verse 16:98, God commanded, “when [you] recite the Qur’an, seek 
refuge with Allah from the accursed Satan. Abolishing Satan in God’s name (known as Ista’aza) is the act of 
saying, before reading the Holy Quran, “Audhu billahi min ash-Shaytan-ir Rajeem”. Its purpose is to help to 
protect one against the manoeuvrings of Satan (shaytan). It is also mandated to be said in a low tone during prayer 
in order for one to seek protection against Satan who is waiting for a chance to lure one into sin. If Ista’aza is not 
said, it is believed that Satan will succeed in luring one away from God. It will also be an act of disobeying God, 
who commanded us to do so. Al-Hakim uses humour and sarcasm in presenting the position of the Shaykh, who 
represents Islamic dogma. If similar questions are asked, in his view, the clergy will not be able to answer or 
clarify. Al-Hakim holds that one should attempt to understand such dilemmas and possibilities regarding one’s 
faith and religion to avoid it becoming a case of “blind faith”. 
310 See Al-Hakim’s Arini Allah (1953), second story in the book titled “al- Shahid” (The Martyr) p. 12 
311 Ibid, p. 19 This is my translation of Gabriel’s speech to Satan.  
 134 
 
explanation of the most important dualities in his doctrine aid the readers to grasp how these 
dualities are used and described in relation to the doctrine of equilibrium and are shown in al-
Hakim’s dramatic works. Satan, from al-Hakim’s perspective, is clearly more than just a 
counterbalancing force for goodness. He has made of Satan a hero: a martyr who sacrificed 
himself for others. Satan’s refusal to bow to Adam is viewed as an act of “a true worshiper” 
whose only wish is to continue solely to worship and to love God. Hence, he, Satan, is 
misunderstood. With this in mind, I would like to highlight al-Hakim’s passage (below), taken 
from Equilibrium in order to further support my discussions. He writes: 
You are an equilibrist if you believe that good and evil are two modes of human being. 
Good must equalise and counterbalance evil. One must not penalise an evil doer by 
cropping his personal freedom because the counterbalance is not between evil and 
freedom; there is no link between them but the counterbalance should be between good 
and evil. Reward, thus, is an act of goodness which counterbalances and equalises an 
evil act.312 
 
             From this passage, we conclude that we, accordingly, have within us two conflicting 
forces, that of evil and good. When one side overcomes or engulfs the other, we are sinful or 
evil and vice versa. Al-Hakim explains that a person, who commits a crime or an evil act on 
the one hand, can equally commit a good deed on the other.313 Such a moralistic polarity puts 
forward al-Hakim’s belief that evil-doers should be punished not by depriving them of their 
freedom (i.e. imprisonment), but on the contrary, by giving them the opportunity to commit 
good deeds in return, in order to benefit society and as commensurate with their evil actions. 
A society, he says, should take an attitude of “the demander of a state of equilibrium” from the 
evil-doer to commit good deeds, rather than taking an attitude of an avenger. 314 The price of 
crime is, thereby, paid not at the expense of human freedom, but by partaking in positive work 





                                                          
312 Equilibrium, p. 48 
313 Ibid, p. 27 
314 In his view, this is a restoration of balance. 
315 Ibid. The idea of “rehabilitating” the wrong-doer is not a new one. It is not perhaps implemented strictly as al-
Hakim suggests in his doctrine of equilibrium, nevertheless it is one that has been long debated by sociologists 




EQUILIBRIUM AND EXISTENTIALISM 
“I analyse my readings into elements which suit my conscious and unconscious 
composition.”316  
 
The overarching aim of this chapter is to show the relationship between al-Hakim’s doctrine 
of equilibrium and existentialism. It is fair to say that at the heart of al-Hakim’s philosophy is 
the belief that every man has a unique experience of life rather than has a being or essence. He, 
fascinated by Sartre’s ideas on freedom, examined it further in his own doctrine of equilibrium. 
His philosophical and literary experimentations highlight man’s estrangement from his own 
true self and from others.317 And gradually, it becomes apparent to al-Hakim that throughout 
the experiences in life, there is a necessity which is laid upon oneself to make moral choices. 
Freedom, he says, comes with responsibility. As a result, his protagonists, in struggling to make 
moral choices, experience emotions like despair, love, hate, alienation, guilt, anxiety and 
fear.318 These, in his opinion, are experienced as a result of one’s coming to terms with the 
nature of one’s existence and realising one’s impotence in the face of the superior “other”.319 
With this said, I would like to identify and critically assess what I may refer to as existentialist 
characteristics in al-Hakim’s thought, and in his doctrine of equilibrium and, perhaps more so, 
in a selection of his narratives.  
 In this chapter I will use a comparative approach to discuss each of al-Hakim’s and 
Sartre’s conceptions of commitment and freedom.320 In doing so, I hope to show their different 
understandings of the role of the intellectual in society (and perhaps also, the role of 
                                                          
316 This is my translation of a quote from al-Hakim’s series of autobiographical letters, Zahrat al-’Umr, p. 42 
317 The theme of spiritual bareness and the absence of God is recurrent in the literature of this century i.e. Eliot’s 
“Hollow Man”. As expressed by Nietzsche’s “God is dead” which echoes through the majority of existentialists’ 
writings, modern man finds himself the only creature who is “self-surpassing” (he can become something other 
than he is through his own actions and decisions). This is because there is no God to give purpose to the universe, 
each man must accept individual responsibility for his own becoming, a burden made heavier by the fact that in 
choosing for himself, he chooses for all men “the image of man as he ought to be.” Sartre says, a man is the sum 
total of the acts that make up his life- no more, no less- and though the coward has made himself cowardly, it is 
always possible for him to change and make himself heroic. 
318 From reading Zahrat al-’Umr (series of letters), I conclude that al-Hakim formed his beliefs based on his 
readings of Western prominent names, some of which he explicitly mentioned, such as Aristotle, Bernard Shaw, 
Dickens, Nietzsche and Shakespeare, while others seem to have had an indirect influence on his character and 
writings.  
319 To be understood as either: (a) a superior being or (b) the sum of unknown forces. Both affect one’s course in 
life. 
320 I do not think I will be able to address this issue without also speaking of al-Hakim’s conception of tragic 
existence as a result of his belief in the existence of hidden forces that alter our destiny. 
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philosophy). The comparison between al-Hakim and Sartre in respect of their different 
conceptions of freedom will address the question of whether, in their view, freedom is absolute 
or restricted. For al-Hakim, freedom is restricted by direct and indirect forces whereas, for 
Sartre, freedom is absolute. And to conclude, I will identify, from some examples from al-
Hakim’s writings, what I believe to be existential characteristics. I will look at his play 
Pygmalion. Generally speaking, the existential characteristics present themselves in the form 
of estrangements towards oneself and “the other” leading, naturally and also inevitably, to 
struggle, conflict and a growing anxiety as a result of the necessity of making moral choices. 
I. 
 From my previous chapters, I hope that it has become clearer that al-Hakim recognised 
an opportunity to form a comprehensive philosophy for his generation, as ‘Abdel Rahman 
Badawi attempted to do before him. Badawi, inspired by existentialism as the future of post-
World War II European philosophy, found himself in the same boat as al-Hakim and other 
intellectuals in his attempts to fuse existentialism with suitable strains of Eastern philosophy. 
But whilst Badawi fused existentialism with Sufism,321 al-Hakim fused existentialism with his 
own equilibrium doctrine. I believe that al-Hakim’s fusion works best but the general public’s 
view has been varied. For example, the first quotation supports my view whilst the second 
shows that others, to a certain extent, disagreed:  
Even though during the 1950s and 1960s, Badawi was the most serious existentialist 
philosopher in the region, his existentialism was not, so to speak, “operational” enough, 
for it lacked a real-life application and a political and ethical community to support it.322 
It [Badawi’s existentialism: Western and Sufi] was, as the philosophy itself held, a one-
man project of radical individualism that eventually functioned primarily as an 
important philosophical reference source for future writers in the Arab world as well as 
in Africa.323  
 This varied view has been common amongst intellectuals and scholars of this period. 
Perhaps, more now than before, they would agree with me that al-Hakim’s fusion works best 
on the basis that he used philosophical narratives, i.e. drama, to communicate his ideas. This is 
what Badawi lacked: namely an approach that seemingly entertains and, at the same time, 
encourages the readers to think and continue to be intellectually engaged. Al-Hakim is a master 
                                                          
321 See Hiwar ma’ al mufakir el Taqaddumi Mahmud Amin al-’alim, Adab w Naqd 1, no. 21 (1986): p 99-117  
322 Di- Capua, Yoav. “Arab Existentialism: An Invisible Chapter in the Intellectual History of Decolonization”. 
October 27, 2012. http://ahr.orfordjournals.org/ [accessed 20/04/2014] p.1069.  
323 Mourad, Wahba, “Contemporary Muslim Philosophies in North Africa,” in Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, ed., 
African Philosophy: An Anthology (Oxford, 2000), pp.50-55. 
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of just that. There is a lack of objective material on Badawi’s philosophy, character and work. 
In fact, excluding the above quote, his name has not once been mentioned in a positive light. 
And some have gone even further, to say that his name has been long forgotten and that his 
philosophical legacy is (sadly) gone.324 For example, one critic writes: 
Badawi has left behind no family, no friends, no disciples, and no school. Now that 
both national life and world philosophy have taken radically new turns, his books may 
not be perceived as the most relevant. Thus, the Sufi imperative of the world as 
existence finds poignant expression in his death: now that he no longer exists, there is 
not the slightest sign of the world he occupied.325 
 The development of al-Hakim’s philosophy in relation to European existentialism, on 
the other hand, has appeared and reappeared in a few scholarly discussions over several 
years.326 The most recent of these attempts was by Rasheed el- Enany. He argues in his article327 
that al-Hakim used Arabic fiction in order to offer a treatment of the theme of cultural encounter 
or conflict between the East and the West. This is partly true given that the plays written 
between 1923 and 1925 (before his travels) show that he was adapting French plays prior to 
any contact with the West. These plays were: Khatim Sulayman (Soloman’s Ring), adapted 
from a French play La Fille De Narbonne, al-Hakim’s Al ‘Aris (The Groom), adapted from a 
French play Le Couple Artnun,328 and his version of Ali Baba, which he adapted from Alf Layla 
wa- Layla (A Thousand and One Nights). These texts are, unfortunately, either lost or damaged. 
However, in an interview with Dr Muhammed Najm in Beirut in summer 1965, he said that the 
literary figure, Fuad Dawwara, owns a stage copy of Khatim Sulayman.329 It would be an 
erroneous argument to dismiss these early plays and say, as Dawwara has done, that al-Hakim, 
as a writer, was still (prior to 1925) unaffected by European literature. Al-Hakim’s travel to 
Paris nurtured an interest in Western literature which he was already developing.330 
                                                          
324 The question of what Badawi’s philosophy or work can offer us today is one that can be a topic of interest and 
further investigation. 
325 Al-Ahram Weekly Online, 29th August- 4 Sept. 2002, Issue No. 601. 
326 See my literature review in appendix 2, p. 200. 
327 El-Enany, Rasheed. “Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm and the West: A New Assessment of the Relationship” British Journal 
of Middle Eastern Studies, Jstor. Vol. 27, No. 2 (Nov., 2000), pp. 165-175. 
328 The authors of these French plays are unknown. On The Groom (Al ‘Ar’is), critic, Muhammed Abd al-Majid 
Hilmi said, he did not like it because “it has been copied entirely from the French with only the names of the 
characters changed so that it is a European play in all its manners, events and meanings, but with its personages 
bearing Egyptian names.” Fu’ad Dawwara, “Masrahiyaat Tawfiq al-Hakim al- Majhula”, VIII, (May 1964) p. 60 
329 See on Dawwara: http://kfip.org/professor-mohammad-yousef-najm (accessed 05/06/2014). 
330 At the end of WWI, there was a dramatic surge of theatrical activities led by refugees from Syria and Lebanon, 
such as Marun Naqqash and George Abyad. The latter formed a group who used to stage al-Hakim’s plays. 
Naqaash and Abyad were trained in Europe and chose to live in Egypt rather than in their own countries due to 
Turkish oppression. Also, in 1918, many European plays were translated and staged by amateur groups of 
Egyptian actors. See Tutungi, G. V. "Tawfiq al-Hakim and the West." Indiana University, 1966, pp. 15-17. 
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 From these Western influences, I conclude that al-Hakim’s philosophical doctrine of 
equilibrium promulgates his own individual experimentations with the existential ideas that he 
admired (this will become apparent in section III of this chapter). Although some may argue 
that he was simply following the fashion at the time (just as he himself admitted in respect of 
the plays that he wrote in his early career), in fact the contrary is true because the ideas he 
expressed in his early experimentations continued to develop in his later works and actually 
became more explicit. For example, the idea of seeking knowledge or truth, which he presented 
in his adaptation of Sophocles’ King Oedipus in 1949, is one that emerged as an underlying 
theme in his Equilibrium in 1955 (as an inevitable necessity for struggle in order to uncover 
the unknown). Furthermore, the duality of good and evil and their relationship of dependence 
and correspondence, presented in his short story ‘Ahd al-Shaytan in 1938, re-emerged more 
explicitly in his philosophical short stories Arini Allah in 1953. This supports the claim that the 
inspiration that al-Hakim found during the earlier period of his career continued to linger in his 
mind and form the basis for his doctrine of equilibrium.  
 Moreover, an important point to consider, and which is also worth noting here, is that 
Sartre’s name was known in the Middle East not for his major oeuvre Being and Nothingness 
(1943), but for his articles in Les Temps Modernes. His major work was not translated into 
Arabic until 1966, but the fact that al-Hakim was educated in French makes it plausible that he 
had read Sartre’s work in the original language. In fact, in a recent article titled “Auction Hall 
in Paris, presents rare letters written by misogynist Tawfiq al-Hakim to two French women”,331 
it is claimed that one of the letters reveals the inspiration for al-Hakim’s ‘Awdat al- Wa’y as 
one that is due to al-Hakim’s close relationship with Sartre and de Beauvoir. ‘Awdat al- Wa’y 
was published after Nasser died and raised controversies as a result of al-Hakim’s criticisms of 
Nasser’s polices. The claim is that al-Hakim’s book was inspired by a series of articles written 
by himself in French and published in Sartre’s Les Temps Modernes. Al-Hakim criticises in 
these articles the absence of democracy and, upon Sartre and de Beauvoir’s invitation, he 
expresses his views explicitly in the magazine. The letters show that there is a close friendship 
between the thinkers and that these articles became, later on, the subject of al-Hakim’s book. 
They also support the claim that al-Hakim was communicating with Sartre in French and was 
                                                          
331 Yousef, Ahmad. “Auction Hall in Paris presents rare letters written by misogynist Tawfiq al-Hakim to two 
French women” al-Masry al- Youm (National newspaper online), 30th April 2014, Paris. Not available in English. 
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also a respected fellow intellectual who enjoyed this international dialogue. Below is how the 
information in the letter appeared in the Egyptian article:332 
 
 Besides this, and also in support of the claim that al-Hakim had read Sartre and that 
there was a dialogue between them, in 1965 al-Hakim published Adab al-Hayah (The 
Literature of Life), in which he included a chapter titled “A Response to Sartre”. There he 
quotes, at the beginning of the text, Sartre’s view that literature must reflect the struggle of the 
people and that this struggle should be the motive for social progress and for freedom. Al-
Hakim explains that he heard this from Sartre. It is not implausible that it was said during a 
personal meeting or during a lecture given by Sartre in Cairo during the 1967 visit. Al-Hakim, 
in defending the role of Modern Arab literature, argues in his chapter that Modern Arab 
literature has always been fulfilling this distinct goal (i.e. using the nation’s struggle as a tool 
for progress and liberation). For example, he says, the Yawmiyat Na’ib fi al-Aryaf (Diary of a 
Countryside Prosecutor), as a work of Arabic literature, has been doing just that since the 
publication of his work in 1938, before Sartre’s name came to fame. He adds, when Sartre 
published sections of this novel in Les Temps Moderne, that he was fully aware that the novel 
reflected precisely these goals which he, Sartre, strongly believed in and wrote about; the work 
defends humanity against tyranny and calls for freedom and social progress.333 With this said, 
al-Hakim identifies in his “Response to Sartre” two different positions, his and Sartre’s in 
relation to France’s policies concerning war in Algeria.334 
                                                          
332 The article presents information regarding other letters sent to al-Hakim which I will present in relevant parts 
of this thesis. One letter is from de Beauvoir following her visit to Egypt and the other letters are from the public 
regarding the attacks that al-Hakim received after the publication of Arini Allah in 1953. 
333 The novel speaks of the struggle of the people in rural Egypt against a corrupt government. 
334 Al-Hakim, Tawfiq. (1965) Adab al-Hayah (The Literature of Life). The letter to the French ambassador was 
published on 6th July 1947 in national newspapers. As a result, al-Hakim was not granted a visa to enter France 
when he wished to return to the country in 1949, until the Egyptian government intervened and threatened to apply 
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 Moreover, the common belief among Arab scholars is that Dr. Taha Husayn,335 a fellow 
intellectual, was the first to introduce Sartre’s articles to Egyptians in the form of public lectures 
and articles.336 Husayn was wary of Sartre’s conception of “commitment” (engagement). The 
latter is apparent in Sartre’s analysis of the relationship between the writer and society (post 
WWII). Husayn did not share with Sartre the view that “since writing is a consequential form 
of acting/being, intellectuals should assume political responsibility for their work and the 
circumstances that condition it.”337 For example, in The Age of Reason (1945), Mathieu, 
Sartre’s protagonist, says “My freedom is a burden to me; for years past I have been free, and 
to no purpose. I agree with you that no one can be a man who has not discovered something 
for which he is prepared to die.”338 The idea of commitment as a “total submersion in the 
political”, as Sartre proposed it to be,339 is one that neither appealed to Husayn nor to al-
Hakim.340 By the late 50s, however, this idea rapidly became the basis for ‘Sartrean 
existentialism’ in Egypt to an extent where Arab scholars argued that it overshadowed 
Badawi’s philosophy. Although al-Hakim was initially attracted to the culture of resistance that 
came along with existentialism and what it represented, he expressed in his doctrine of 
equilibrium a position that is different to some extent from the “two Sartrean choices of 
engaged/ progressive versus detached/reactionary.”341 
 In Equilibrium, al-Hakim speaks of the role of the intellectual whilst talking about the 
balance between the power of the ruler and the ruled as the conduit through which the power 
of the ruler manifests itself in an era of absolute authority.342 What he puts forward as his first 
proposition is that there are two domains: the domain of thought and the domain of action. On 
the one hand, thought can drive an individual to take action (i.e. acts of personal development), 
                                                          
the same treatment to French citizens visiting Egypt. See appendix 1 for a translated passage from al-Hakim’s 
chapter “al- rad ‘ala Sartre” (A Response to Sartre) 
335 Note that there is another Arabic translation of Goethe’s Faust written by Taha Hussayn.  
336 Husayn saw a clear message in Sartre’s articles and, accordingly, spoke of the “Nahda” (the Renaissance) as a 
mid-nineteenth century project which covers the Arab experience of modernity, or “cultural modernization”. See 
Di-Capua , p. 1070. 
337 Ibid. “Although the philosophical concern of commitment was human freedom and authentic existence, its 
practical application was something for which [one] is prepared to die.” p. 1070. 
338 Sartre, J. P. The Age of Reason (1945) trans. Eric Sutton (1947) New York, 2001 p. 122. 
339 Sartre’s political writings began after WWII. Pre-war works were apolitical and inward. Scholars seem to agree 
that the transition in his political thought is reflected by him replacing the term “consciousness” with the term 
“praxis” as an active term in his works.   
340 Dr Husayn was not only al-Hakim’s fellow intellectual, but was also a close friend and a fan of al-Hakim’s 
work. In 1951, al-Hakim was appointed the director of the National library by Husayn who was the Minister of 
Education at the time. 
341 Di- Capua, p. 1070 Note that this is not true of the young al-Hakim who demonstrated in Egypt’s 1919 
revolution and who also was imprisoned for a few days for his political activities before his father intervened to 
help issue his release. 
342 Equilibrium, p. 31. 
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and on the other, action may succeed in suffocating thought (i.e. diversions that may hinder 
one from fulfilling one’s ideas). He illustrates this as follows: if an isolated person on a deserted 
island is joined by another person, creating a small community where the two live side by side, 
“one stronger in action and the other stronger in thought”,343 then one person will influence the 
other. In other words, there will be between the two persons a relationship of a conflict of 
interests which al-Hakim sees as leading to the result that “either action dominates thought and 
makes it submit to its will, or thought dominates action making it submit to its will.”344 The 
same idea applies to bigger communities; there is a struggle (between the force of action and 
the force of thought) which is visible throughout the course of human history.345  
 If we ask how these two domains (i.e. duality between thought and action) are 
represented in a modern society, and how they are in conflict, we will find that those who 
represent the power of action are people who came to power to rule. These rulers, who represent 
the action force, have been elected by the people, whether as individuals or elected as 
representatives of a certain political party.346 Although this is a positive change in the political 
arena in many modern societies (as opposed, for example, to hereditary ruling or one forcefully 
seizing power), al-Hakim holds that it “has not changed the hidden feeling that action has 
towards thought. The power of action, represented in implementation, always hates and fears 
the power of thought, represented in criticism and guidance”.347 In every era, al-Hakim adds, 
those who represent the power of action (the rulers) attempt to “oblige thought to obey.” In 
Equilibrium (1955), he writes that an intellectual should remain “free” and must not join in any 
political organisation or follow any party’s agenda lest he represents a single party’s ideology. 
I will talk more about the latter in my concluding chapter, in which I shall defend al-Hakim’s 
apolitical attitude in relation to the criticisms he received. It is not implausible that al-Hakim 
                                                          
343 Equilibrium, p. 208 
344 Ibid  
345 In the previous passage in the text, al-Hakim reminds his readers of how in the olden days kings and clergymen 
were in conflict (one represented action or authority and the other represented spiritual thought). This is true of 
the Islamic medieval period where kings wished to influence the clergy. It is also true that in “the era of royalty, 
when the clergy were the ones who criticised and guided the ruling of kings, the kings always strove to quiet the 
loud voices of dissent which were against their will. Sometimes they are willing and submitting, other times, they 
are threatened and afraid, and other times they seize forcibly spiritual power and declare that they are the true 
heads of religion.” Equilibrium, p. 32 
346Al-Hakim is referring to the case of the free officer’s movement in 1952 and how people chose their ruler from 
amongst themselves, meaning choosing former President Nasser as Egypt’s leader. Although there are debates 
among historians and regional experts as to whether this movement is to be considered as a “revolution”, for the 
purpose of my study, I will consider it to be so because it has led to major political and social reforms in the 
region. 
347 Ibid. This is very true and relevant today to Egypt’s intellectual arena where intellects are engulfed by the 
force of power, i.e. by government and society. 
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had discussed his stance with Sartre during their correspondence and explained to him that 
Egyptian writers’ fear for themselves from organisations and governments. For example, after 
the assassination of Yusuf al-Seba’i (1917-1978),348 a fellow writer and head of al-Ahram 
newspaper (where al-Hakim worked), he sarcastically writes:  
A writer must engage in politics or he is denounced a prisoner of his ivory tower or of 
his freedom of thought. The writer’s betrayal carries different meanings. Influential 
writers are seen as traitors in their countries. 349 
 
 From Sartre’s perspective, the concept of “engagement” or commitment is not only a 
response to specific European realities at the time, but is also an objection to the passivity of 
his generation prior to the war. But al-Hakim, and Husayn, in Egypt, found no parallel 
circumstances to justify Sartre’s idea (at least in this specific period).350 This, however, is not 
to deny that other writers,351 such as Salama Musa,352 embraced Sartre’s concept of 
commitment and saw it as “a model for intellectual action which Sartre himself practised 
throughout his life.”353 Husayn took up an apolitical stance and responded to Sartre’s work 
What is Literature? (1949), by appealing to the notion of literature as ‘art for art’s sake’. This 
idea (art for art’s sake) emerged as the focus of debate in the mid-50s as Husayn continued to 
disparage “committed literature”.354  
 
                                                          
348 In 1953, the Egyptian short- story association was founded. It was led by Taha Husayn and Yusuf al-Seba’i 
was the secretary. “Tawfiq al-Hakim was one of the regular visitors at the association’s Tahrir propositions. Also 
writer Yehia Haky and Ihsan ‘Abd al-Quddus who was first to suggest the founding of the association to al-
Siba’i”, says Mahmoud Badawi. See Badawi, Mahmoud. "Memories unfolded" Magazine of Egyptian culture. 
No. 76, 1980. (January issue).   
349 Al-Seba’i stressed in his writings the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and statehood. 
However, he was assassinated on February 18, 1978 by an extremist Palestinian group in Nicosia, Cyprus, where 
he was attending a conference dedicated to peace and security for the nations of the world. 
http://samarkeolog.blogspot.com/2008/02/cyprus-1978-al-Seba’i -assassination.html (accessed 07/03/2014). 
350 This is on the basis that Egypt has a history of political engagements or revolutions (or revolutionary moments) 
as far as the sixteenth century as subject to the Ottoman rule, and later on to French and British rule in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. These often result in political order and constitutional dynamics. 
351 Abbas Mahmud al ‘Aqqad’s work showed on the one hand his objection to existentialism’s individualism, and 
on the other, his praise for existentialism’s focus on human freedom. 
352 Musa studied in France in 1907. He was exposed to a modern, secularized Europe and in the 1920s he formed 
a socialist party (soon dissolved). He continued his career as an active politician and was no stranger to a prison 
cell. During Nasser’s regime, he remained an important figure and was appointed supervisor of the science section 
in Akhbar al-Youm (a newspaper founded in 1952 for which al-Hakim worked as a journalist). Musa held this 
position until his death in 1958. According to Di-Capua, Musa challenged Husayn by asking “what is the purpose 
of his writing and how does it serve humanity?” In 1945, he published Freedom of Thought in Egypt (a work 
which clearly shows how much he was influenced by European culture and in particular by Voltaire), and, amongst 
many of his publication, in 1961, he published Literature to the Masses (al-Adab lil-Sha’b).  
353 Di- Capua, p. 1071. 




 To complement the images I presented in my previous chapter of al-Hakim, Sartre and 
de Beauvoir, I hope in this section, by investigating the relation between the doctrine of 
equilibrium and European existentialism (as a literary and philosophical movement), that I am 
able to shed light on some of the fundamental differences between al-Hakim and Sartre’s views. 
It is, of course, not an easy task because what one can say of one existentialist may not be true 
of another. Nevertheless, I am relying in my investigation on al-Hakim’s degrees of 
existentialism and the main areas of disagreement (taking into consideration also any common 
ground) between him and Sartre. It is worth noting that one must be wary of applying too 
rigidly existentialist characteristics to al-Hakim’s doctrine because it lends itself to various 
interpretations as al-Hakim deliberately did not want to be tied down and so is purposely non-
committal.  
To clarify, my objectives in this section are as follows: 
(1) To draw a comparison between al-Hakim’s and Sartre’s conception of freedom and 
address the question of whether freedom is absolute or restricted according to these 
authors’ doctrines.  
(2) To identify existentialist characteristics in al-Hakim’s doctrine as manifested in his 
version of the play Pygmalion. 
 
 I would like to begin by suggesting that the general existential characteristics of al-
Hakim’s doctrine, which I shall describe, may be al-Hakim’s reaction to reading the works of 
Western writers/philosophers who were affected by various historical movements. To mention 
a few that come to mind: the failure of the enlightenment project to live up to its promise; the 
rise of a counter-enlightenment as inspired by the works of Nietzsche; and the social, political 
and intellectual reforms of post-WWII France. Al-Hakim was open to Western ideas and 
beliefs (primarily, because of his upbringing and his French education and also because of his 
love for world literature). In his Zahrat al-‘Umr, he admits, as part of his personal formation 
as a young Egyptian living abroad, he was keen to familiarise himself with Western culture, 
comparing and contrasting historical changes. Existentialism was one of the significant literary 
and philosophical movements that left a lasting effect on the young al-Hakim’s character. The 
extent of this effect is evident in how he incorporates existential themes in his drama and in his 
equilibrium doctrine.  
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It is questionable whether al-Hakim’s examinations of the ontology of being, being-for-
others or the extent of human freedom, situate him strictly among the “Godly” existentialists 
or the “ungodly” ones. Al-Hakim approached such investigations with restless, wondering 
eyes. Self-contradictory, he on the one hand criticises religion’s rigidness and its inability to 
provide us, humans, with firm answers, while on the other hand adapting what seems to be a 
religious tone, calling for one to maintain “faith”. Al-Hakim’s relationship with existentialism 
began with his readings of French existentialist authors and with his attending plays during 
visits to Paris. He was unaware that existentialism would have such a profound influence on 
him and turn out to be an important movement that would also influence literature, the arts, 
philosophy, theology and the social sciences. For one to learn about existentialism, to an extent 
where one is able to incorporate it (or some of its features at least) in one’s own doctrine, surely 
requires thorough investigations and experimentations with existential ideas. From his 
autobiography and letters, it is evident that he undertook during this period, extensive mental 
exercises and readings before finally sitting down and putting together what he calls his own 
doctrine of equilibrium. Regardless of the simplicity of Equilibrium as a text, in terms of its 
style of narrative and informality, it still is fair to say that it is the most comprehensive work 
which reflects directly the influence of existential thought on al-Hakim. Unfortunately, he does 
not explicitly say much about this influence. Instead, he mentions the sheer amount of readings 
he had undertaken as part of his belief that it was his duty to do so.355 The results of this appear 
as works that reflect a stream of consciousness more than anything else.356 Let us now look at 
how he approached some of the fundamental issues that Sartre (and more generally, other 
Western thinkers) dealt with. 
III. 
The Issue of Freedom 
“I am a prisoner in what I have inherited, free in what I have acquired.”357 
Man is free in his own direction until an external force intervenes; I sometimes 
call this ‘divine forces’. Thus, the freedom of the human will, to me, is chained 
exactly like the freedom of movement of matter. The chaining of freedom is a 
notion that does not appeal to the majority of Europeans today because, as I 
                                                          
355 One can clearly grasp the scope of his dedication and effort from the sheer amount of names of both Eastern 
and Western authors which he read and commented on their work. His comments appear in his autobiographical 
essays and memoirs, Sijn al-‘Umr and Zahrat al-‘Umr. 
356 He spent hours in silence in solitude thinking; whether in Cairo’s cafes or at his desk at home, or at his office, 
which gradually led critics to claim that he was an author living in “il- burj il-‘agi” (an ivory tower). 
357 See al-Hakim’s Sijn al-‘Umr 
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said, they have given too much credence to the mind, to science, and to thought 
which, only deifies the human being in this universe.358 
 
 Al-Hakim was fascinated by Sartre’s idea of freedom to an extent where he attempted 
to integrate it in his own equilibrium doctrine. The question whether his attempt is a successful 
one or not is something for readers to decide. To begin, in order to pave the way for his 
investigation of the subject of freedom, he puts forward two fundamental questions in his 
doctrine. These questions are “Are we alone in the universe? And are we free in the universe?” 
The first question he answers, based on observations and investigations from nature and from 
examples extracted from our daily lives, that we are not alone. It is due to materialism and the 
dominance of the human mind in various fields of science that we believe that we are Gods of 
this universe. This, he holds, is a result of the extensive knowledge that we acquired over the 
past years which affects how we see ourselves and how we feel about our existence. He writes, 
“The human being is alone in this universe without a competitor; he is the God of this existence 
with ultimate freedom.”359 The denial of the other, or of the idea of the superior being’s 
existence, in his view, has led us to believe exclusively in the power of the mind, i.e. rational 
thinking. We, accordingly, assume a freedom which is, in truth, not absolute but restricted. We, 
he explains, have “defined the concept of [our] freedom according to [our] freedom of thought and 
rejected anything that cannot be proved by research and experimentation, hence denying another 
will other than the human will, or the existence of another being.”360 
 
 Through a comparison between us and other creatures, in addressing the question of 
whether freedom is absolute or restricted, he claims, through an analogy, that all non-human 
creatures are bound by an innate knowledge of their own purpose and function in life. “[It is] 
an obligation that is devoid of freedom”.361 We, humans, on the other hand, are born free and 
unbound, left to choose our own course. Our unique experience of life is primarily defined by 
our choices and actions, which is a view that al-Hakim as well as Sartre share in common. 
Embracing Sartre’s la force des choses (the power of circumstances), al-Hakim in his 
equilibrium doctrine asserts his belief that our purpose in life is “unknown and undefined”. 
This is contrary to the Quranic teachings about “the predestined life” where everything has 
already been willed by God.362 Al-Hakim speaks of how human freedom remains in motion in 
                                                          
358 Equilibrium, p.23 
359 Ibid, p.18 
360 Ibid.  
361 Ibid. p. 21 
362 There are ongoing debates in Islam on predestination which raise questions regarding fate, God’s 
omniscience and religious determinism which show how they are incompatible with paradox of human free will. 
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its course unless an external force intervenes. This is the first time that al-Hakim puts forward 
that although we are born free, unbound (and that, for example, a child’s behaviour in life is 
the only determining factor), he quickly acknowledges that “our freedom is affected by direct 
or indirect external conflicting or resisting wills.”363 When one asks what he meant by the latter, 
one finds no specific answer in his text other than the remark that these “external wills” are 
collective forces. By looking at his dramatic works, these forces, or “resisting wills”, present 
themselves as death, age, and knowledge of the truth. He admits that the latter view is one that 
will not appeal to Western thought. He writes: 
Europeans have given too much credence to the mind, to science and to thought which 
deifies the human being in this universe.364  
 
 The concept of fate and determinism is deeply rooted in Eastern Islamic thought. This 
is an issue I would like to identify as problematic for the process of introducing al-Hakim’s 
conception of freedom to the West. On the one hand, al-Hakim’s ideas about freedom have 
close links with the idea of fate. This has also been evident in debates concerning “free will” 
which occupied the minds of Christian theologians, such as Augustine and, in the later stages 
of the Enlightenment, Hobbes, Spinoza, and Locke. With this said, al-Hakim’s belief namely 
that we have an extent of freedom and that our freedom is restricted by external forces may 
still appeal, generally speaking, to others, on the basis that such a belief may bring comfort to 
one’s anxieties concerning the reality of one’s free will. On the other hand, Sartre’s conception 
of freedom as presented in Being and Nothingness (1943) has seen a shift. Sartre began to 
recognise in 1944 his obligation to involve himself politically. Busche writes “the shift was not 
simply one from thought to action, but one which involves a new understanding of 
consciousness, situation, freedom and Others.”365 In “Sartre by himself”, Sartre claims that 
“there is no question that there are some basic changes in the concept of freedom. I still, 
however, remained faithful to the notion of freedom.” 366  His understanding of freedom became 
shaped by his recognition of solidarity and social relationships. In an interview, he says: “I 
abandoned my pre-war individualism and the idea of pure individual and adapted the social 
individual and socialism. That was the turning point of my life: before and after.”367 This means 
                                                          
363 Equilibrium, p.22 
364 Ibid 
365 Busche, Thomas. W. (1990) The Power of Consciousness and the Force of Circumstances in Sartre's 
Philosophy Indiana University Press. p. 58 
366 “Sartre by himself” (1977) tr. Sartre: un film réalisé / par Alexandre Astruc, et Michel Contat. By Richard 
Seaver. New York: Urizen Books, 1978. 
367 “Self-Portrait at Seventy” tr. of “Autuportrait à soixante- dix ans” (1976) by Paul Auster and Lydia Davis. In 
Life/Situations: Essays written and spoken. New York: Pantheon Books (1977) 
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that the understanding of freedom which begins with one’s responsibility towards others, as 
held by al-Hakim in 1955, is one that is influenced by Sartre’s understanding of freedom after 
WWII. The extent of political involvement and social responsibility, however, of al-Hakim and 
Sartre differed. To clarify, while al-Hakim chose to engage himself with society’s issues from 
behind his desk (through his writings), Sartre took a proactive role. 
 The Equilibrium is not the only text that put forward the view that we have an extent of 
freedom and that our freedom is restricted by external forces. Al-Hakim’s Fann al-Adab also 
presents (indirectly) this idea to the readers. The human condition is one where we live a tragic 
existence. This is a concept inspired by Greek tragedies. Al-Hakim adapts it and implements it 
in his philosophical doctrine, as well as being a recurrent theme in his literary works. Initially, 
the claim he maintains is that we are (as existentialists also hold) left to our own devices in this 
world to make our own choices in life. This is not to say that he agrees fully with Sartre’s idea 
that our freedom is absolute; on the contrary, he explains that freedom of choice is always 
accompanied by a great sense of “responsibility”. al-Hakim’s message, in a nutshell, is 
(initially agreeing with Sartre) that we are indeed free to make choices in life, but that these 
choices are all made within a framework which is beyond us, and are unable to grasp. An 
example to clarify his point is this: if an individual is left in a room to choose from a bowl of a 
selection of fruits, regardless of the free will that this person has to make his own choices, these 
choices are limited by the sheer fact that the bowl of fruit has already been arranged in a certain 
way and left in the room for the person to choose from. In using this analogy, one understands 
that our freedom is not absolute. We are free to make choices, but these choices are restricted, 
in actual fact, by something that we have no control over or can change. And, in al-Hakim’s 
view, “we live, desire and strive within a frame of divine will. This will, that sometimes reveals 
itself to humans in hidden images in the form of barriers and chains, should be overcome 
through struggle.”368 Could al-Hakim be influenced by Sartre’s “facticity” in relation to one’s 
freedom? Al-Hakim, like Sartre, feels that one's place, body, past, position, and fundamental 
relationship to the Other are among the limitations that are placed upon one’s freedom (in 
Sartrean terms; they are among the “facticities” of freedom). Al-Hakim says “I am a prisoner 
in what I have inherited, free in what I have acquired.” Is it right to understand that modern 
man (as Sartre claims) is condemned to be free with complete responsibility over his freedom? 
 
 Moreover, for al-Hakim, the examination of freedom did not stop at the proposition that 
existence preceded essence. But unlike Sartre, the comparisons between us and other creatures 
                                                          
368 Equilibrium. p. 23 
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concerning the question of whether freedom is absolute or restricted led him to argue that 
although we are free to make mistakes, decisions and choices, our freedom is ultimately 
restricted. Our freedom is constrained by “others’ wills” that conflict with our own. By “others’ 
wills”, he means not only the wills of other individuals or the collective wills in society’s 
customs and norms, but also a divine will that is capable of changing the course of one’s life. 
He says that, at times, our freedom seem to us as absolute but that we then find out that it is 
restricted when unexplainable incidents happen. He writes: 
You attempt to link it to a coincidence, but you fail because an external will has 
intervened in an orderly manner emanating from an awareness that is conscious of what 
it does and knows what it wants, in order to provoke specific results that would not 
have happened were it not for this unexpected external intervention.369  
 To clarify the latter passage, al-Hakim says that when a specific incident occurs in one’s 
life, one tends to try and find a rational explanation for its occurrence. This attempt is not 
always a successful one because some incidents occur as a result of the intervention of a 
superior will which leads to specific results that change the course of one’s life (the change 
may have not occurred otherwise). Although for the sake of argument, this proposition  would 
have benefited from further explanation by al-Hakim or examples in support of his claim (that 
some incidents in our lives have no rational explanations because they occur as a result of the 
intervention of a superior will), we, the readers, are given none. Instead, he concludes by saying 
that although the human mind naturally desires to explain these incidents using logic, it fails. 
The reason is that because although we are rational, we are impotent beings who strive within 
a frame of a divine will. He writes: 
Nowadays, the case of human freedom, as an individual or as a group, agrees 
and converges over the same conclusion: the denial of God and the denial of 
hidden powers that affect human destiny. My feeling towards man’s impotence 
against the forces that affect his fate is not due to pessimism. And I do not see 
in European theories on human freedom from fate anything that calls for 
optimism. The contrary is correct.370 
 The claim that one must struggle with others’ wills or with what al-Hakim refers to as 
‘hidden or unknown forces’ is one that shows his view that man is impotent in the face of his 
destiny. Optimistically, he explains this to be an incentive for hard work and struggle, and not 
for procrastination. The image that we begin with in Equilibrium, where “deifying man alone 
                                                          
369 Equilibrium, p.22 
370 Ibid, p.23 
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on earth is one of the reasons that led to today’s world disasters”,371 has quickly been replaced 
with a positive view in regards of human struggle as an incentive for progress or 
transcendence.372 I would like, accordingly, to raise a few questions: How was the latter view 
translated or presented in al-Hakim’s philosophical works and in his drama? And how was the 
notion of striving against others’ wills portrayed and, more importantly, how was “man’s 
impotence in front of his destiny” really an incentive for hard work as al-Hakim urges us to 
believe? Did his protagonists tragically lead themselves to their end (perhaps, in vain)? Or are 
they perfect examples that embody the existential characteristics in al-Hakim’s thought? Let 
us look at al-Hakim’s play Pygmalion in order to find some answers to these questions. But 
before doing so, there are a few things that I should raise for us to consider (also, as reminders 
of the logic behind al-Hakim’s doctrine of equilibrium). 
 Firstly, in Equilibrium, al-Hakim explicitly claims that due to the widespread practice 
of materialism in the modern age and the extent of human achievements, man “desires to be 
God”. Sartre also writes of this desire in Being and Nothingness373 and also in Notebooks for 
an Ethics.374 He suggests the need to free oneself from being-necessary-God project and to 
accept our “for-itself” as a contingent God in that it is the sole creator of values. The concern 
here is not the second part of the claim as it is the first in which Sartre speaks of an inevitable 
“necessary-God-project”. The choices for Sartre are either that an individual (1) strive in a 
project that is doomed to fail, or (2) accept that he is the creator of his own values (meaning, 
that God is missing and the for-itself is the only God). One may argue that, in either case, Sartre 
is choosing to be God because he is either striving to be eternal and necessary in-itself-for-
itself, or accepting his fate to be the contingent God of his own world as a for-itself. Was al-
Hakim affected by Sartre’s claims and this religious bareness? And how does this “desire to be 
God” present itself in the Equilibrium and other writings regardless of how the idea contradicts 
the teachings of Islam?375 Is it possible that al-Hakim, as Hutchins claims, has adapted yet 
again a “what-if” approach in this scenario? The relationship between the creature and the 
creator seems to be one that occupies al-Hakim’s mind. Here are examples from Equilibrium 
where he claims that the modern man is one who has already assumed such a role: 
                                                          
371 Ibid. 
372 To be understood as an act of rising above a present condition to better oneself and develop.  
373 pp.797-98 
374 pp.478-79 
375 It can also be asked if it does not also raises criticisms and speculations regarding his belief and faith. 
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The new age indeed provided an answer by showing us that the human being is alone 
in this universe without a competitor; he is the God of this existence with ultimate 
freedom.376 
The human being, who is free and God-like, with no companion and not ruled by fate, 
denying the presence of another on earth and all powers other than his own, did not find 
guidance for his war drives and struggles aside from himself, so he turned on himself, 
fighting and destroying his own being.377 
 The idea that human beings are considered deities by themselves or by others is one 
that existed in Ancient Egypt and was depicted in Pharaonic art. Pharaohs were kings who were 
also considered Gods by the Egyptian culture. Titles such as the hawk (God Horus), the vulture 
(Goddess Nekhbet), and the cobra-Goddess (Wadjet), associated them with the characteristics 
of these animals. Egyptians believed that when a Pharaoh died, he would continue to rule them 
in the after-life (which explains the grand burial and preparations). The idea of “deification” is 
not limited only to the Pharaohs, but also appeared in Greek Mythologies (mortal born heroes 
such as Hercules elevated to divinity) and is also present in Christian theology (i.e. Virgin 
Mary). This idea, deification, plays no role in Islam and is against Islamic teachings. This, in 
fact, did not limit the scope of al-Hakim’s experimentations with this idea in his drama and in 
Equilibrium (as shown above) he blames the change that came with the birth of modern 
societies as a negative influence on people’s attitude and behaviour towards their freedom and 
status as beings in the universe. He, however, sees that even “the prophets of the East were sent 
by God and were challenged by obstacles put in their way”, which means that regardless of 
one’s status, one is destined to struggle to fulfil one’s being. He adds: 
A prophet’s path is not paved; he strives to deliver his message in the midst of 
impediments in the form of people’s desires. Nowadays, the case of human freedom 
agrees and converges on the same conclusion: the denial of God and the denial of the 
hidden powers that affect human destiny.378 
 In al-Hakim’s dramatic works, whether plays or short stories, there is a recurrent theme 
which shows that there is a relationship between the creator and the creation. Images in 
Pharaonic art depicts offerings given to Pharaohs by the people as a sign of their love and 
worship. A distinct image from ancient Egyptian mythology shows a strong link between the 
sky, or the heavens, and the Earth.379 The image (below) captures what may have inspired al-
                                                          
376 Equilibrium, p .18 
377 Ibid, p. 24. 
378 Ibid, p. 23 
379 Nut (the sky) and her husband, Gab (the Earth) opposite one another, meet every evening when Nut comes 
down to meet Gab, causing darkness. See Egyptian myths of Nut and Gab.  
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Hakim in regards of (1) the relationship between the heavens and the earth and (2) the 
relationship between evil and darkness (as presented in Izis and, as a theory, in Equilibrium). 
Al-Hakim, thus, found inspiration for his “creature-creator” idea in myths in which he used to 










Existential Estrangements in al-Hakim’s Pygmalion 
 
 The conflict between the creature and the creator is one that presents itself clearly in al-
Hakim’s version of Pygmalion. Al-Hakim holds that human will is on one hand, and the divine, 
or Godly will, is on the other. Between the two is a relationship of resistance, rebellion and 
continuous opposition. He explains that the existential conflict that he sees in Pygmalion’s 
announcement that Venus has failed to grant life to Galatia in Act three,381 is in reality, 
Pygmalion’s own failure. This is because the creature (in this case, Pygmalion), is “the 
evidence to the existence of the creator and his genius”.382 If one is to be defeated, the other is 
defeated as well and vice versa. The imbalance that is evident in this relationship emerges when 
Pygmalion wishes to “infiltrate into the borders of the other.” This is also true on the Gods’ 
part: they interfere and tamper with the creatures’ affairs and thus, add further to the tension 
and imbalance in this relation. Apollo expresses that “the war between us [creators] and him 
                                                          
380 Note that Isis is published at the same time as Equilibrium, both in 1955. Hutchins says “al-Hakim went beyond 
the Bible story to the Egyptian Goddess Isis, who is clearly not an approved Muslim source for guidance. He 
refers to this Goddess in other works as ‘Awdat al-Ruh, al-Ribat al-Muqaddas, and Shahrazad. The heroines are 
all Izis figures.” See Hutchins’ A Readers’ Guide, p.99. 
381 See al-Hakim’s own adaptation of the play Pygmalion published in 1942. Also see Masir Sirsar (The Fate of 
the Cockroach) where he shows individualism and a representation of le force de choses.  
382 See Khoury, p. 209. 
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[creature] is always with alternate success and the situation will never be different.”383 Yet, 
from another perspective, Pygmalion is similarly the “creator” of Galatia. His powers parallel 
those of the Gods in their interference with his affairs when he himself crosses the border 
between him, the creator, and his creation, Galatia. Nevertheless, in the concluding act of this 
play, in both cases, Pygmalion’s and the Gods’, they recognise the abyss between them and 
their creation and the imbalance that they have caused. Their creations originate from their 
need to “assert their existence”. Thus, in the relationship between the human will and the Godly 
will, there should always be separation and resistance of engulfment or “crossing of borders” 
by one another, even though the play shows that this has not successfully occurred between all 
parties involved in the relationships portrayed, i.e. Pygmalion climbs up to the Gods and wishes 
to be with Galatia, and the Gods interfere with his affairs by descending to earth.  
 Another interesting aspect of this play that should be noted here is that al-Hakim shows 
that the “created creator”, Pygmalion, is more privileged in status than the “non-created 
creator”, i.e. Apollo and Venus. This is because Pygmalion is always in a dynamic state which 
is the nearest level to equilibrium and, thus, often appears to be in a superior position. He is 
able to rise upward, ascend higher than himself, or descend to identify with his creation, 
Galatia. To clarify, Pygmalion is able to rise to the position of the Gods when he created 
Galatia, and in doing so he transcends himself. And at the same time, he is able, as a creature 
created by the Gods, to also identify with Galatia’s nature and beauty as a fellow human being. 
Al-Hakim has supported his claim that human struggle against the Gods is actually a positive 
motive for one to exert more effort in the hope to excel or triumph. I would like to assert though 
that the end result never really concerned al-Hakim. It is true that his protagonists usually lead 
themselves to their tragic ends, but in the process they exert extreme effort and show an 
extensive struggle and resistance against all odds and hindrances facing them in order to carry 
on. Could this be the key to answering the above questions or the key needed for us, the readers 
of al-Hakim, to unlock his imbalanced equilibrium and to having a better understanding and 
appreciation of his equilibrium doctrine?  
 Finally, in concluding this section, an interesting aspect that intrigues me in the 
discussion of the play given by Khoury in his article384 is the structure of “undulation and 
                                                          
383 Ibid p. 67, footnote. 
384 Khoury, Jeries, N. (2007) “Al-Hakim’s Equilibrium under the microscope. A study in al-Hakim’s Philosophy 
through his plays”, p.191 Arabica, T.54, Fasc.2. Apr., 2007 T. 54, pp. 189-219. www.brill.nl. See also 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4057813, pp. 195- 196. 
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identification”, by which he means an “alternate descent and ascent” present in al-Hakim’s 
Pygmalion.385 In this play, we have the artist’s declaration of art over life and his victory over 
the God, but suddenly this turns into Pygmalion’s submitting his art to the Gods and Venus 
offering it life, which, accordingly, in effect represents victory for the Gods. Al-Hakim shows 
that victory on both sides is provisional; perhaps he says this in order to pave the way to 
claiming that Pygmalion’s freedom of choice is also a provisional one (similar to pleasure 
gained from human achievements). Moreover, Venus and Apollo’s relationship in this play is 
one of counterbalance. The two Gods meet and agree through Galatia. Khoury adds, “God and 
humans met through the same character which was man-made, but its life and wisdom was 
from the Gods.”386 Both Gods here are involved in the same “project”; namely, Galatia, and 
they are assessed by Pygmalion, who declares their failure and asks them to return things to 
the way they used to be. From here, there is a relation of “undulations and descends”. Al-Hakim 
writes: 
Venus: We are only prisoners to this self. Aren’t you the one who said that Pygmalion 
was able to do what we were not? Thus, he ascended higher than his self and destroyed 
its walls when he created.387 
 Even though the Gods have withdrawn the life they gave Galatia and their wisdom, 
Pygmalion falls into sorrow and despair over his creation. The act closes by coming full circle:  
it takes us back to the first act with its still tableau of Pygmalion, kneeling on one knee, staring 
at his creation, Galatia. Through this method of ascending and descending, advancing and 
retreating, and the characters’ dynamic conflicting powers, al-Hakim almost “tests” the 
effectiveness of his doctrine by showing possible treatments of his proposed problem of 
“emotional and intellectual” imbalance. This method could be seen, as Mahmud Amin al-‘lim 
argues, as an equilibrium that is rather “an illusory point which these powers aspire to 
realise”,388 but fail to do so. It is “resistance and conflict” between forces in opposition (and 
not an act of balance per se) that is the true essence of al-Hakim’s equilibrium doctrine.  
 If we consider that al-Hakim’s philosophical ideas389 are presented in the form of his 
experimentations with existentialist ideas put forward by Sartre or others, then he has 
                                                          
385 Also present in al-Hakim’s work, Praksa. 
386 Khoury, p. 212. 
387 Al-Hakim’s Pygmalion, p. 102 
388 M. al- ‘alim, Tawfiq al- Hakim Mufakiran wa Fannan (transl. al-Hakim Thinker and Artists), Cairo. Dar Sahdi 
lil- Nashr, 1985, p. 160, Also in Khoury’s article, p. 214 




succeeded in doing just that, and as a result, we have a genre that is new to the East; namely, 
philosophical narratives. In an ideal world, the divine will and the human will are in accordance 
and in counterbalance with one another. But the reality of the situation is that we are confronted 
with situations that we do not understand and over which we have no control. The relationship 
of relentless imbalance is, thus, at the heart of equilibrium. Could this be the main reason for 
our ‘tragic’ existence in accordance with others, society and the universe? Is it a case of having 

















                                                          
390 Al-Hakim’s concept of destiny does not have a cause and effect influence on the choices made because these  
choices, regardless of their extent or how varied they were from one another, seem to have been all within  
God’s divine knowledge. “The case of predestination or freewill was best turned over to scientists; he was  
convinced that human existence is bounded by divine snares like traps set out to catch foxes.” See Plays,  
Prefaces and Postscripts of T, al-Hakim, 2nd vol. Tr. and Ed W.M. Hutchins (Washington, D. C: Three  





In this chapter, I hope it will become evident to readers that al-Hakim is a writer who was 
misunderstood by many. Through my examinations of common criticisms against al-Hakim, 
my hope is to defend al-Hakim from common criticisms and to spark readers’ interest and 
curiosity to wish to enquire further about him as a writer and a philosopher. Contrary to the 
reputations assigned to his name (i.e. living in an ivory tower,391 a misogynist and a miser), al-
Hakim was very much engaged in the problems of his society and addressed the issues that 
occupied the minds of many intellectuals of his time. He spoke highly of the role of Egyptian 
women in society and went out of his way to show excellent hospitality towards his guests.392  
Regardless of all his efforts, his reputation remained unchanged. Issues that al-Hakim wrote 
regularly about were, but not limited to, the absence of the role of women from the positions 
of power in the Egyptian society, the lack of balance between religion (represented by the 
clerics and Islamic establishments) and reason (here, represented by the intellectuals) and, 
broadly, the social, cultural and political restraints affecting the Arab mind. The conflict 
between religion and reason is one that developed as a result of fierce debates sparked by 
influential clerics (i.e. Shaykh ‘abd al-Hamid Kishk and Shaykh Motwali al-Sha’rawy) and al-
Azhar. First, I will discuss the debates regarding the role of the philosopher or the intellectual 
in his society and the role of philosophy and its use to the Arab world. Next, in the following 
section, I will explain al-Hakim’s position in relation to the attacks by clerics and the opposition 
he faced.  
I. 
The Arab intellectual finds himself at the end of the twentieth century obliged to engage 
in a debate which Arab intellectuals had almost, at the end of the nineteenth century, 
been able to conclude in favour of reason and progress.393 
 The idea that philosophers have no role to play in their societies is one that has been 
identified and debated by Egyptian intellectuals of that specific period (from 1950s to late 
1980s). Debates became fierce as it engaged, on the one hand, clerics and Islamic 
                                                          
391 This is a reputation that was assigned to his name as an indication of elitism and not engaging with society or 
others. 
392 Personal letters by al-Hakim or directed to his publisher. They can be found in Tawfiq al--Hakim Reminisces, 
ed. Gamal al-Ghitani. Cairo: Supreme Council of Culture, 1998. p183. 
393 This is a 1987 interview with Egyptian liberalist philosopher, Fuad Zakariyya on philosophy in the Muslim 
world. See Nusseibeh, S. “The Arab World: What role for philosophy?” Al Quds University, lecture notes, Paris 
24th January, 2011 http://sari.alquds.edu/doc/philosophy1.pdf (accessed 03/06/2014). 
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establishments of al-Azhar, and on the other hand, intellectuals and writers. Clerics, such as 
Keshk and Sha’rawy, played a leading role in these debates, as well as a few members of the 
public and colleagues. They were displeased with what intellectuals, like Mahfouz and Idris 
and, most importantly, al-Hakim, began to communicate to the public. I consider al-Hakim 
fortunate in that he died of old age rather than of an extremist’s act to personally cause harm 
to him.394 Since the publication of al-Hakim’s Arini Allah in 1953, the criticisms began,395 but 
in varied degrees. They were, in my view, less apparent during Nasser’s reign (because he 
seems to have protected to some extent al-Hakim)396 than they were during Sadat’s and during 
the “awakening of Islam” movement in the 70s.397 I will speak more of the latter shortly. And 
as I previously mentioned, one cannot overlook the fact that the divide between the older 
generation of writers and the new generation of writers and intellectuals, like Al ‘alim, began 
to marginalise the old-guard intelligentsia. The attacks were on the basis that the older 
generation represent the elite class and hence, are hardly engaged in societies’ problems. This 
attitude led to frictions in the intellectual arena and, equally, affected al-Hakim’s reputation 
and readership. This was in addition to debates with clerics, which is why al-Hakim is portrayed 
as an outsider in the midst of political and social imperfections.  
                                                          
394 Intellectuals like Nasser Hamid Abu Zeid (liberalist theologian known for his project on humanistic Quran and 
hermeneutics) suffered religious persecution for his views on the Quran. He was declared an apostate (murtadd) 
by an Egyptian court, denied academic appointments and had his marriage annulled on the condition that a Muslim 
woman cannot marry an apostate (according to the hisbah principles- Islamic doctrine- stated in Article 89 and 
110 of the Regulations Governing Sharia Courts. Also Mahfouz was a victim of an attempt to kill him after the 
publication of his work Awlad Haratna (Children of the Alley), first published in 1959, which is blacklisted in 
Arab countries. Islamist Salafist spokesman, Abdel Mon’eim al-Shahat said it encourages prostitution and depicts 
God (blasphemous). Writer, Farag Foudah received threats and was killed. See on Mahfouz’s incident: 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/5/32/28575/Arts--Culture/Film/Film-critic-rebukes-media-silence-
after-Islamist-a.aspx (accessed 23/08/2014). 
395 Islamist Anwar al-Gendy criticised Ahl al-Kahf in 1932 and said that Islam knows no mythical stories or 
legends. This criticism did not affect al-Hakim’s reputation at this stage much and the work continued to be 
published and even translated to foreign languages. 
396 It is said that Nasser, to a great extent, protected al-Hakim from others who disapproved of his writings that 
criticized the policies of Nasser himself and the role of the socialist party. Nasser listened more to al-Hakim’s 
advice than the advice of other writers. It is believed that when Nasser was in university, he read ‘Awdat al-Ruht 
by al-Hakim and was affected by the book and al-Hakim’s predictions regarding the nation’s need for a leader 
who is loved by the people and who will unify them. This is said to have inspired Nasser and that he saw himself 
as this leader. See Tawfiq al-Hakim Reminisces, ed. Gamal al-Ghitani. Cairo: Supreme Council of Culture, 1998. 
P.183. 
397 According to an article by Yasser Hegazy, al-Hakim engaged in intellectual debates in the late 40s with Shaykh 
al-Maraghy of al-Azhar and with Mustafa al-Nahas, leader of al-Wafd party. And in the 70s, he engaged in debates 
with the leftist party after the publication of ‘Awdat al-Wa’y and his last debate, and the most damaging to his 
reputation, was the debate with the clerics, Shaykh Sha’rawy and Keshk, regarding matters which relate directly 
to Islamic doctrine and to the interpretation of the Quran. These began on the 1st of March 1983 with the 
publication of his series of articles in al-Ahram, Hadith ma’a Allah, and lasted for four weeks. See Hegazy, Yasser. 




 The view, however, that I would like to put forward in defence of al-Hakim is that he 
lived a life of “engagement”, not the sort of engagement described by Sartre in the strictest 
sense, but as a “responsible” equilibrist aware of his state of being in society and aware of his 
responsibilities towards “the other”. And accordingly, his freedom is ultimately restrained by 
“the sum of direct and indirect forces” that exists all around him. Let us imagine, if al-Hakim 
were alive today, what his position would be in the light of current national and international 
affairs. In Egypt, he would see a nation’s neglect of philosophy and philosophers. The few 
intellectuals whose names today shine in the media face attacks and criticisms, once again from 
clerics, and fanatics in the public eye, who persistently discredit voices other than their own. 
The attacks from clerics on writers and intellectuals, via Egyptian newspapers or on television, 
have become socially acceptable (with or without justification) to an extent where, in most 
cases, they become personal battles against one cleric and one intellectual rather than one of 
them having something meaningful to communicate.398 Other forms of opposition, which are 
hostile to unfamiliar ideas, and which may or may not add something beneficial to these 
debates, often disregard ideologies as instruments of change. What is, therefore, lacking is an 
objective intellectual arena where an intellectual or a philosopher can engage with a universal 
intellectual community, and connect with it in a meeting of minds.399 This, I believe, is one of 
the issues that al-Hakim would have addressed had he been alive today.400 
 An opposing view to one that promotes the philosopher who engages with society, is 
one that shows that a true philosopher ought to live in isolation. To clarify any 
misunderstanding, al-Hakim’s only objection to joining a political party was his belief that if 
one joins a party, one is restricted and bound by this party’s agenda and by what this party 
represents. An intellectual, he thinks, must continue to have freedom of thought enabling him 
to criticise, analyse and freely observe without prejudice or bias. Critics who accused al-Hakim 
of “living in an ivory tower”401 should see him as a philosopher who, although at times he was 
                                                          
398 See the case of journalist and satirist, Bassem Yusuf, in my next paragraphs. 
399 This is the conclusion of a survey of proceedings of the 12th Philosophical conference organised by the Egyptian 
philosophical association in the year 2000 in Cairo around the theme of “Philosophy in the Arab world”. 
400 In his Thawrat al- Shabab (The Youths’ Revolution) published in 1983, he predicts a similar revolution to that 
of January 2011 and identifies some of the social problems that affected Egyptians over the past years, such as 
illiteracy, poor education and our relationship with neighbouring countries and many others. 
401 Al-Hakim wrote a series of essays, titled “Min- il borj il- ‘agi” (From the Ivory tower) in 1943, addressing the 
absence of the role of women from the positions of power in the Egyptian society in relation to the role of the 
writer, creativity and inspiration. Critics took this title and used it against him to claim that he was living a life of 
“detachment” and isolation from society and from society’s problems, a view I strongly disagree with. 
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as retiring as a solitary writer,402 he was constantly addressing the problems of the people and 
engaged in society’s problems. If we ask, today, about the Arab predicament, our answer will, 
loosely, parallel that of al-Hakim’s in the 1950s. In a recent interview with Muhammed 
Rifa’at,403 the latter says that the problems that face the Arab world today, and in particular 
Egypt, can be resolved by introducing “empirical thought”, in the sense that we need to derive 
our knowledge from experiments and observations rather than depend solely on theory. One of 
the most important problems of the 21st century’s, Rifa’at adds, is in the rigidity of an 
educational system that does not allow for creativity or experimentation. In his view, the second 
most important problem, also interwoven with the problem of education, is religion (as it is 
understood today). In the past, religion has been used as an opposing force (with a hidden 
agenda) against the freedom of thought and the expression of ideas. Today, unfortunately, it is 
still used by influential figures and clerics, for the same purpose.404 This view corresponds with 
the views expressed by prominent intellectuals in Egypt during the past few years. For example, 
Bassem Yusuf writes: 405 
Before the 1970s, the so-called “satellite clerics” did not exist. When I was in primary 
school, I remember there were these audio cassettes sold in front of mosques. They 
were full of fatwas (religious edicts). It went something like this: “This is prohibited 
because it’s heresy. That is prohibited because it is misguiding.” And in the end, 
everything ends up in hell. Those born in the 1970s like me remember this phase. 
During our teenage years (in the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s), the current satellite 
stars were stars on cassettes. If you rode a cab or a bus or entered a shop, you would 
hear the intimidating scream of a cleric reminding you of your sins and listing the bad 
actions you are committing, which will surely take you to hell. One of the things that 
were   completely prohibited was the TV, and therefore, of course, satellite dishes. 
Those influenced by such fatwas were not only the people who returned to Egypt from 
working in the Gulf. The influence of these clerics was neither limited to the poor 
                                                          
402 See appendix 1, pp. 180-182, for rare images of al-Hakim on various social occasions with family, fellow 
intellectuals, friends and with former leaders of the country as evidence of his social “engagement”. See also 
Edward Said’s Representations of the Intellectual, Vintage books, New York. 1996. 
403 This is a prominent Egyptian author of a number of books amongst them are: most recently, a novel titled 
Unbreakable Woman, the Ivy’s dance in 2009 and a collection of poems in 1990. He is a member of Egypt’s 
Association of Book and Film Critics. This is a personal interview carried out on 21st August 2014 in Cairo, Egypt. 
(See appendix 2 pp. 196-222) Also see on M Rifa’at: http://www.maspiro.net/culture/13576-2014-06-21-16-30-
22.html. 
404 When asked about the future of the nation and of philosophy and literature, Rifa’at was hopeful that, with the 
growing hostility against the Muslim brotherhood (in the light of recent events) and recognising them as terrorist 
groups, secularization (in the sense of the separation (or even exclusion) of religion from the matters of the state) 
will become popular as a more favourable ideology over the coming years. 
405 Yousef is a political satirist whose name shone after 2011 revolution when he hosted a popular programme 
“al- Birnameg” in which he commented on current political events. The show is the first internet conversion to 
TV in the Middle East. Many people considered the show to be a step towards freedom of speech and in 2012 
John Stewart invited Yousef to talk on The Daily Show. During President Morsi’s reign, Yousef was accused of 
insulting Islam and disrupting public peace. Although he wrote a column for al-Shuruk (Independent daily 
newspaper) and was recognised by the TIME magazine as one of the 100 most influential people, his show has 
been recently terminated and complaints and accusations are currently looked at to this day by the prosecutor. 
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categories of society. Those who lived throughout this phase may remember that such 
fatwas influenced the wealthy category as well as private university students. After 
many religious channels began to make huge profit, fatwas prohibiting the TV 
disappeared. Suddenly, the TV was no longer prohibited. More than one fourth of 
Egypt’s satellite channels are religious, in which the same clerics - who used to be held 
captive of cassettes and who used to prohibit the TV describing it as a heresy – 
appear.406 
 The exploitation of religion that gradually developed over the years is one which 
supports the view that the most obvious source of barriers to many Arabs today, is the strongly 
embedded culture of religion that has been misused for personal gain.407 Back in the 1950s, al-
Hakim predicted this misuse of religion and implied that a form of a non- religious spirituality 
is what is needed. We, thereby, understand that in order for us to overcome the problems that 
face us, we should work, individually and collectively, to overcome the social, cultural, 
political and, most importantly, the intellectual, barriers set upon ourselves408. Only then can 
there be hope for freeing the Arab mind.409 Let us then ask, what has lured al-Hakim, regardless 
of the criticisms (especially those against Arini Allah (Show me God) in 1953), to producing 
his Equilibrium in 1955, which is a fusion between Arab philosophy and European 
existentialism? 
  According to Hanafi in “Al Falsafa fi’l watan al- ‘Arabi fi Mi’at ‘am” on contemporary 
Arab philosophy and the question of freedom, whilst the West predicated “Being on Reason”, 
the East (or the Arab world) predicated “Becoming Free.”410 This has been a view evident in 
my initial discussions of European existentialism in Egypt and the birth of Arab existentialism 
and, also, consequently, in the development of the doctrine of equilibrium. The French 
connection411 that roused the Arab intellectual, al-Hakim (and many others), led him to going 
                                                          
406 Yusuf, Bassem. (2013) “Tele-clerics and custom made fatwas” Cairo: al-Arabiya News. Online: 
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2013/05/24/Tele-clerics-and-custom-made-fatwas-.html 
(accessed/ 21/08/2014). 
407 This is evident after the rise and fall of the Muslim brotherhood groups and more recently, the negative stigma 
assigned to them in the Middle East and in the West. 
408 Al-Hakim seems to imply that these barriers are our own doing. See also chapter two p.109 on 
“transcendence” in the doctrine of equilibrium (to be understood as overcoming a condition and surpassing it) 
409 The proceedings of the 12th Philosophical conference suggest “breaking entirely free from the past” a view 
which al-Hakim would object to and, as expressed in his Fann al-Adab, suggests that it is necessary to firstly 
understand the past in order to progress in the future. 
410 He says “I am free, therefore I am”. See Hasan Hanafi. (1988) “Contemporary Arabic philosophy” published 
by the University of Jordan. 
411 Note that the majority of intellectuals of this period (1950s) were educated via the French system. An informal 
survey held by the Arab Association of Arab universities found that 300 Professors of philosophy in Egypt and 
Lebanon where taught philosophy at school level. 
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beyond the circumstances that might have otherwise shackled his freedom of thought. With 
this in mind, let us look at this passage: 
The philosopher who does not produce ideology is the most dangerous kind of 
philosopher, for he is simply reproducing a pre-existing ideology, one expressing (a 
pre-existing) social conflict or national interest under the guise of being a neutral 
statement about ‘Man and the World’. In doing this, his philosophy simply reproduces 
an ideology which has already served its historical purpose.412 
 The ideology of al-Hakim (as ambitious as it may seem) aims to address all the Arab 
World’s predicament. This goal raises many questions regarding al-Hakim’s success. In his 
late work Tahaddiyat Sanat Alfain (Challenges of the year 2000), published in 1980,413 he tells 
of an imaginary dialogue between his donkey, his beret and his stick.414 These imaginary 
characters echo his views and feelings towards the concept of “revolution” and “commitment”. 
While one understands this almost obsessive preoccupation with these ideas, one cannot help 
but wonder how useful al-Hakim’s discussions are, especially in our present day. In a nutshell, 
from the text, al-Hakim holds that a public let loose, without a vision for change that can be 
implemented (in present or in the near future) in order to build upon its history, is one whose 
efforts are in vain. As for the intellectual, like himself, he concludes that the Arab world has 
failed to cultivate philosophers and intellectuals of all hues. Although he opposes the idea of 
joining a specific party (and instead he found his voice via his writings, perhaps as a “half-way 
activist”), he admits that it is truly unfortunate that those who have been actors in the political 
arena have constantly over the years met with fierce opposition (and their works ignored), 
whether the opposition is from the people, society, government or from the opposing parties in 
power.415 
                                                          
412 M. A. al- Jabiri Nahnu Wa’l- Turath: Qira’at mu’asirah fi Turathina al-Falsafi (Us and Our heritage: 
Contemporary readings in our philosophical heritage), Casablanca: Arab Cultural Centre, 5th Ed, 1986. 
413 See in appendix 2 p.196 my translation of al-Hakim’s Tahaddiyat Sanat Alfain translated as Challenges of 
the year 2000. (1980) Dar Misr Press. Series of articles, see “al- thawri wal moltazim” (The Revolutionist and 
the Committed), pp. 178- 181.  
414 He began to wear a French beret and hold a stick following the fashion in France. The style of writing has 
become a fashion where he personifies and gives voice to objects in order to express his views freely. 
415 One can name a few who were assassinated as a result of their ideas; firstly, Naguib Mahfouz (Nobel Prize 
winner) was threatened by the Muslim brotherhood in the 1950s, Mahdi al-‘Amil was assassinated by religious 
fanatics in Lebanon and Hussein Meruw’weh; Sayed Qutub, fundamentalist theoretician, was executed at the 
hands of authorities in Cairo. Muhammed Baqeer was assassinated by Saddam’s regime and, from those who were 
jailed numerous times, Sa’d Eddin Ibrahim. One might also add that Badawi lived and died at the sidewalk of real 
life, as claimed in the lectures by Maqdisi on Arab Philosophy. Al-Hakim concludes his article “The 
Revolutionist and the Committed”, by asking: “are such voices mere harbingers of false dreams? Is silence in 
this case a moral option?” Perhaps this is so in the latter cases rather than in al-Hakim’s, as evident in the survival 




 Before explaining further the personal attacks on al-Hakim and his philosophy from 
clerics, I would like to take the opportunity to advance briefly a clarification of his reputation 
as a misogynist; a title assigned to him as a result of a debate with leading Egyptian feminist, 
Huda Sha’rawy (1879- 1947).416 Al-Hakim noticed the absence of the role of women from the 
positions of power in the Egyptian society (and from positions of power), and accordingly 
wrote about this. His views were inspired by the views of Qasim Amin (1863- 1903),417 who 
initiated a movement for the liberation of women. Sha’rawy (as well as Doria Shoukri and 
other feminists who played an active role like Nabawiya Moussa and Ceza Nabarawi) led this 
movement after Amin died. The speculations that arose as a result of al-Hakim’s comments in 
respect of Sha’rawy’s views are responsible for attributing the title of a misogynist to his name. 
Salah Montasser writes in al-Hakim’s Last Testimony, on al-Hakim’s behalf, that the attack 
was due to his comments on how Sha’rawy thinks that women, especially young ones, should 
liberate themselves from the chains of “servitude” and duties towards men on the basis that 
they are equal to men in everything. Al-Hakim says that those who followed Sha’rawy 
considered this to be an invitation to neglect their domestic responsibilities. “In a humorous 
manner, I wrote [presumably in his al-Ahram column] advising the modern woman to at least 
be capable of providing a simple meal for her family such as baked potatoes.”418 
 As early as 1923, as a prominent intellectual, Sha’rawy wrote detesting the traditional 
role of the Egyptian woman (as a mother or a wife) and called for her liberation from her 
“duties” and for change. Al-Hakim too blamed the traditional role of the woman and her 
absence in leading positions in the Egyptian society. He said it made the idea of heroism 
impossible.419 This claim was misunderstood by feminists who also objected to al-Hakim’s 
view that a woman has a responsibility towards her husband and her children, which should 
                                                          
416 Sha’rawy served as the head of the Egyptian women's Federation since its founding in 1923 until she passed 
away in 1947. “The exalted in Istanbul” Al-Ahram: A Diwan of contemporary life (561) Al-Ahram online. See 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/706/chrncls.htm (accessed 09/06/2014). 
417 Amin was said to be the “first Egyptian feminist” to call for liberation. He was a jurist, an activist and advocate 
for social reform during the late 19th c. He was born, like al-Hakim, in Alexandria and was a close friend of 
Muhammed ‘Abduh and Sa’d Zaghloul. It is said also that he was influenced by Darwin’s theory. See "The 
Liberation of Women and The New Woman. Two Documents in the History of Egyptian Feminism," translated 
by S. Sidhom Peterson, Cairo 2000. (First published in 1988). 
418 Hassan, Maher. “Zay al-Naharda: wafat tawfiq al-Hakim 26 July 1987” Cairo: almasry al-youm news. Online, 
2014. http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/489418 (accessed 05/03/2014). Al-Hakim wrote that “just as 
women are created to grant you things, they also take from you things. Women are not created to keep you at ease 
or to comfort you”. 
419 See al-Hakim’s selection of plays where he depicts women such as Izis, Shahrazad and Prisca. 
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come first before anything else. Although there is no documentation of Sha’rawy responding 
directly to al-Hakim, the media’s reports (mostly in national newspapers such as Al Masry al-
youm) that explain why they think he was a “misogynist” say that it is because Sha’rawy 
disapproved of his views. It is unclear whether Sha’rawy referred to him publicly as a 
“misogynist” or critics and scholars are the ones responsible for assigning him this name. 
 
(Fig. 13) The young al-Hakim with a group of French women 
It is said that what he wrote in French that day was “I admit and confess that a woman is able 
to participate in public life and enter [be a member of] the senate.” 420 
 
                                                          





(Fig. 14) al-Hakim’s handwritten confession. 
 Egyptian critics,421 since the incident between the two thinkers Sha’rawy and al-Hakim, 
began to pay attention to the representation of women in al-Hakim’s dramatic works. Early 
works such as the ‘Usfur min al-Sharq and Amam Shubbak al-tahzakir (In Front of the ticket 
office)422 they said, show the absence of love: particularly, in al-Hakim’s upbringing because 
his relationship with his mother was an unstable one which could be seen to support this idea. 
Further to this, as al-Enany points out, the failure of al-Hakim’s encounters with women and 
the fact that he delayed getting married till 1946 (people considered it due to his hostility 
towards women)423 support also others’ misconceptions about his character. Although, on the 
one hand, the latter play Amam Shubbak al-tahzakir can be seen as an example of such claims 
(i.e. an indication of the absence of love and the failure of female encounters), plays such as 
Izis, Shahrazad and the character of Prisca in Ahl al-Kahf, show, on the other hand, the 
opposite. The role of the female protagonist in these plays represents mental strength, 
intelligence, and pure love. In these narratives, they have been given an independent voice and 
are always presented positively.424 In his essay Tahta Shams al-Fikr (In the Light of Thought) 
                                                          
421 This would include, for example, Muhammed Shousha in his work Al-nisa’ fi Hayat ‘adow al-Mar’a; Tawfiq 
al-Hakim (Women in the life of an enemy of women; Tawfiq al-Hakim) published by Dar al-Nashr. See 
http://rashf.com/book/21684.  
422 This is a one act play written in French and first performed in Paris in 1926. It was later on translated into 
Arabic in 1935 by Ahmad al-Sawi Muhammed. 
423 No one knew of his marriage till journalist Mustafa Amin wrote, “We, journalists, our job is to get news from 
the Presidential palace. No one informed us of al-Hakim’s marriage.” See Taher, Salah. Ahadith Ma' al-Hakim 
(Talks with al-Hakim). Beirut: al- Sharqiyah Lel-Nashr wal-tawzi’, 1971. pp. 96-97. Also the publication of Sijn 
al- ‘Umr, al-Hakim’s autobiography, gave critics the evidence they needed in order to form views in regards of 
his relationship with women. (For example, al-Hakim spoke of his mother’s strict nature). 
424 Hence, I see no need to deduce from al-Hakim’s early upbringing, and from his relationship with his mother 
and the unhappy outcome of his first love or his other female encounters in Paris, that he was a child who lacked 
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the role of the female also represents freedom of thought and the driving force of the nation. 
He writes: 
Before a woman can be a mother or even a house-wife, she needs an education. Egypt 
is paying too high a price for having kept its women shut in their homes, for it is as 
though half of its society were just wiped out. The separation of women from life [is] 
‘a horrible crime, spiritual murder’. No artist ever created anything except in the 
shadow of a woman. Her absence from the Egyptian society is the reason that ‘Egypt 
has produced nothing yet to impress other nations.425 
 Moreover, al-Hakim also shared Amin’s view on the importance of liberating the 
Egyptian woman from any religious barriers. Amin claims that Islam (or the holy Quran) did 
not teach this subjugation.426 On enhancing a women's status in society, which Amin saw as 
something that would greatly improve the nation, he writes, "a good mother is more useful to 
her species than a good man, while a corrupt mother is more harmful than a corrupt man."427 
And, on the relationship with the West, he adds, “if Egyptians did not modernise along 
European lines and if they were 'unable to compete successfully in the struggle for survival, 
they would be eliminated.”428 These views are current in today’s Egyptian society and emerge 
as a cause for controversies in dialogues between intellectuals, feminists and fanatics and 
clerics. The question whether Egyptian women can have an authentic existence, and whether 
it is possible for Egyptian women to become modern on their own terms,429 is one that 
                                                          
love and affection or that he developed a hostility towards women. This is a hasty generalisation that was based 
on his reputation at the time than on examinations of all his works. 
425 Al-Hakim, Tawfiq. Tahta Shams al-Fikr. Cairo: Maktabat al-Adab, 1938. (Reprinted in 1960) pp. 163- 165. 
These are a series of essays written between 1935 and 1938. Also see his play, al-Mar’a al-Gadida (written 
between 1923 and 1926). 
426 In al-Ta’aduliyya wal-Islam (Equilibrium and Islam), al-Hakim supported this positon by using Quranic verses 
and hadiths. Qasim also did the same in support of his views in his work on the liberation of women. 
427 Nergis, Mazid. "Western Mimicry or Cultural Hybridity: Deconstructing Qasim Amin's ‘Colonized Voice’" 
Gale Biography. The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, pp.43-46 (Accessed 15/03/2013). 
428 This is believed to be inspired by the works of Herbert Spencer and John Stuart Mill who argued for equality 
of the sexes and believed this was analogous to the "evolution of societies from despotism to democracy”. See 
Smith, Charles D. "Islam and the Search for Social Order in Modern Egypt: A Biography of Muhammad Husayn 
Haykal" Middle Eastern Studies. New York: State University of New York Press, 1983: p. 233. 
429 Back in January, 1956, a new constitution was issued and included the clause “Men and Women are equal in 
responsibilities and duties”: this one clause meant that women can be elected to any position in Egypt and needless 
to say, of course, gaining her right to vote. Unfortunately laws were added to regulate the equality clause, laws 
that were not pro-equality between the genders: for example, women were required to prove their literacy, while 
men were not. The above clause was removed in the constitution of 2012, while another clause of equality among 
Egyptians is still there as it always was; on its own, this clause is not a guarantee of women’s equality to men. 
Since the constitution does not explicitly state that men and women are equal, new laws can be decreed any day 
banning women parts of their rights. See Alami, Mona. “Egypt Constitution will be bad news for women, activists 
say.” USA Today, 2013 (Accessed, 2014) 
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Sha’rawy directed her efforts towards addressing, and it is one that Egyptian feminists today 
are trying to answer.430   
 Finally, in a recent article, there are reports of rare personal letters that have been found 
in Paris from de Beauvoir to al-Hakim following her visit to Egypt in 1967. The letters are said 
to reveal de Beauvoir’s dissatisfaction with this conception of his hostility towards women 
which she did not think was true of al-Hakim or of his philosophy, and that, despite his 
reputation, she sees that he recognizes the need for liberating the Egyptian woman; she also 
agrees with him on the importance of the role of communication between different nations. She 
writes:  
Dear Sir and friend. We have received with great pleasure your letter which reminded 
us of the great times that we spent together and of your humor and light spirit. I am 
pleased that you liked the narrative of the journey that we made. And I am also pleased 
that, despite the enmity for women, you, like myself, are interested in the liberation of 
women which, in turn, liberates men. Sartre too sends his regards and friendship. 
Simone de Beauvoir. 431 
 It is, therefore, erroneous to use two unhappy incidences in al-Hakim’s life in regards 
to women (primarily his relationship with his mother, and his relationship with women during 
his adulthood years), as an indication of his hostility towards them. It is also erroneous to use 
the incident between him and Sha’rawy as one that is anything more than a misunderstanding 
and an expression of views and ideologies. In the doctrine of equilibrium, he says that one’s 
freedom comes with responsibility towards oneself and towards the Other. This responsibility, 
regarding the role of women, is their duties towards educating themselves, contributing 
positively to their society and, more importantly, caring for others they are responsible for, i.e. 
husband and children. Indeed, this is a traditional view, but not a misogynist one. These are the 
responsibilities that al-Hakim saw that Egyptian women cannot ignore at any price. The 
representations of women in al-Hakim’s writings should not be entirely viewed in the light of 
his unhappy encounters, as many critics have done.432 Gilbert also writes in defence of this 
                                                          
430 Sha’rawy officially launched Egypt’s feminist movement on 16th of March 1923, the Egyptian Feminist Union 
(EFU) “Itihad Alnisa’y al-masry”. She attended conferences abroad (in Turkey and Rome) and succeeded in 
establishing strong links with international feminist associations. See Sha’rawy, Huda. Harem Years: The 
Memoirs of an Egyptian Feminist. Translated and introduced by Margot Badran. New York: The Feminist Press, 
1987. 
431 This is my translation of the letters from Arabic into English. See Yusuf, Ahmad. “Auction Hall in Paris 
presents rare letters written by misogynist Tawfiq al-Hakim to two French women” Al-Masry al- Youm. (National 
newspaper online), 30th April 2014, Paris. 
432 See Hutchins’ A Reader’s Guide. Chapter nine titled A Hakim’s Islamic Feminism p 195. Hutchins writes that 
Muhammed Hamid Ali found that al-Hakim’s work gave a new space for Egyptian women in society whereas 
other scholars failed to find any indication of such freedom. 
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criticism and says that, although al-Hakim’s writings appeal to emotions, to the heart and love, 
these emotions “remain strangely unmoving.”433 To clarify, readers are intellectually engaged 
with (and perhaps are equally convinced of) “the need to give free rein to emotions,”434 but it 
is questionable whether or not al-Hakim learned to do so, or whether this was an ideal that he 
personally struggled towards.  
III. 
 In this final section of this chapter, I would like to advance an overview of the articles 
that document the accusations against al-Hakim as a heretic and a deluded writer. These are 
central to my proposition that debates between intellectuals and clerics were at their peak 
during the late 70s and that these debates had a lasting negative effect on al-Hakim in particular, 
and on his readership and on the availability of his publications. The first article which reports 
the accusations and criticisms, and influences public opinion, is titled “It is a War between 
Shaykh Sha’rawy and Tawfiq al-Hakim,”435 where Abdel-Latif claims that the debate also 
involves writer Yousef Idris. The main reason for this war is the publication of al-Hakim’s 
articles Arini Allah (1953), in which he writes: 
It is your omnipotence my lord to say “Be” and there it is. I am not asking you to annul 
a decree; I am asking you that therein be your grace. Your religion is the religion of 
grace and mercy. The noble goal of those who speak in your name is to embed in the 
hearts of the people your mercy and grace. Love for you, and not just fearing you, is 
the path to please you, but most of those who speak in your name [i.e. clerics] 
exaggerate what makes them fear you rather than conveying what makes them love 
you. On this basis, they founded Islam on the principle of fear rather than on the 
principle of love, which is not what you intend or what your prophet (peace upon him) 
worked towards and said, on your behalf: “There is no compulsion in religion”. 
Compulsion cannot be a basis on which knowledge and love are predicated. 
- What will you do with knowledge? 
Creature: I do not know, but I desire it. 
- People desire heaven and thus, worship God to enter it. 
Creature: I do not desire it. 
- You desire what God did not give the prophets or the angels.436 
 
 Clerics, led by Sha’rawy, considered the imaginary conversation with God which al-
Hakim claimed to have had to be a blasphemous act in which, in his arrogance, he gave himself 
the right to ask questions and to receive direct answers. Shaykh Sha’rawi, in response, issued 
                                                          
433 Tutungi, G. V. "Tawfiq al-Hakim and the West." Indiana University, 1966. 
434 Ibid. p. 14.  
435 Date of publication is unknown. The article is written by Anwar ‘abdel Latif and published by al-Ahram 
newspaper (digital). 
436 This is my own translation of a passage from al-Hakim’s Arini Allah, published in 1953. 
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a statement in the Islamic newspaper al- Liwa’ al- Islami demanding a meeting with al-Hakim 
and Idris, and also, Zaki Naguib Mahfouz.437 Although the latter was a prominent philosopher, 
it is unclear why Sha’rawi asked for him specifically to attend as well. The speculation is that 
Sha’rawi invited Mahfouz to also initiate a philosophical debate, and not just a religious one, 
in order to show al-Hakim the error in his ideas.438 Sha’rawi publicly clarified whenever asked 
about the matter that he called for this meeting in order to respond to al-Hakim personally with 
concrete evidence that he is deluded about God’s religion and been in error. Abdel-Latif, the 
author of the article (in siding with Sha’rawi and approving of his decision), concludes by 
saying that Sha’rawi used reason and logic in his methods of debate and dialogue with the 
intellectuals rather than issuing a direct statement accusing al-Hakim of heresy or disbelief 
which would have endangered his life.439  
 In a book review, “Sha’rawi and al-Hakim: Conflict of thought and the fundamentals 
of belief”, reviewer al-Gohairy reports that a new book (image below) had been published with 
the same title, identifying the intellectual battles of the 20th century.440 The writer of the book, 
Ahmad Mussa ‘Abada, discusses, in part one, the religious issues raised in March 1983 as a 
result of al-Hakim’s work al-Ahadith al-Arba’ah. The latter caused controversies by discussing 
the following: the relationship between knowledge and faith, the humanity of the prophets and 
the “relativity of religions” (a comment which al-Hakim made and many clerics strongly 
disapproved of). The matter soon became one of public opinion and continued to escalate and 
affect negatively al-Hakim’s reputation and literary legacy till he died. Sha’rawy, once again, 
publicly commented in the Islamic newspaper, al- Liwa’ al- Islami, on al-Hakim’s writings and 
style by saying that it is one of delusion and perversion. Additionally, in this article, it is 
clarified that Dr Zaki Naguib Mahmoud had an active role to play in the debates with Sha’rawy 
and al-Hakim and that he sided with the latter. Moreover, it is claimed that the fierce debate 
ended with a strong friendship between Sha’rawy and al-Hakim, although this friendship had 
little effect, if any, on the public’s view and the harm that was already done. It is worth noting 
that Sha’rawy’s name is not the only cleric mentioned in this article; Shaykh Muhammed al-
                                                          
437 Mahfouz wrote in 1954 a book titled The History of Western Philosophies. Publisher unknown. 
438 Note that Zaki Naguib Mahfouz wrote a commentary on al-Hakim’s supplement al-Ta’aduliyah wa al-Islam 
(1983) in which he attempts to closely link the doctrine of al-Ta’aduliyyah (Equilibrium) to Islamic doctrines. 
439 ‘Abdal-Latif, Anwar. “It is a War between Shaykh Sha’rawy and Tawfiq al-Hakim” al-Ahram. 
http://digital.ahram.org.eg/Policy.aspx?Serial=1598841 (accessed 24/08/2014). 
440 Muhammad al-Gohairy’s book review of ‘Abada, Ahmad Mussa. Al-Sharawi and al-Hakim: Conflict of 
thought and the fundamentals of belief. Garidat al-Ta’awun Press, 2012. The book is by the Islamic researcher 
‘Abada, and the introduction on the author and the intellectual is by Islamist Ahmad Bahgat. 
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Ghazali and Dr. Muhammed al- Tayib al- Nagar, were amongst clerics who were identified as 
leaders of the attacks on al-Hakim’s ideas. 
 
 Book cover designed by artist, Sayed Abdel Fattah. 
 From left to right: al- Sha’rawy and al-Hakim. 
On the left corner is an image of the book author, Ahmad Mussa ‘Abada 
  
In a second review, Muhammed ‘Abd al- Raziq wrote in the Literature and Arts 
category of the al- Matraqa webpage,441 that Raziq states that Professor Ahmad Bahgat, Islamic 
cleric and writer, claims that al-Hakim’s motive for writing a conversation with God is “love”, 
meaning the kind of love that one proclaims for the lover. It is not a crime for one to speak with 
whom he loves. However, in a conversation with God, one must be humble and show 
humiliation and respect. Bahgat adds that this is something that al-Hakim did not show in his 
dialogues or conform to in expressing his love for the divine. When al-Hakim described 
religions as “relative”, clerics objected strongly to this idea, and what made matters worse for 
his position was his claim that scientists of this temporal life, such as Einstein and Kastler,442 
would go to heaven based on their actions and not based solely on the Islamic declaration of 
faith (The Shahada). Al-Telmesany, leader of the Muslim brotherhood during this period, said 
explicitly in response to al-Hakim’s claim regarding Einstein and Kastler, that one is not a 
Muslim, or a believer of the faith, if he did not make the declaration which states that “there is 
                                                          
 441 This was published on the 22nd February 2012. 
http://www.almatraqa.com/oldsite/showstry.php?toicid=10375. 
442 This refers to Alfred Kastler (1902-1984), French physicist and Nobel laureate. He was at the École Normale 
Supérieure in Paris in 1921. In 1941, he taught at the University of Bordeaux, where he was a university professor, 
and in 1952 he was asked by Georges Bruhat to return to the École Normale Supérieure where Kastler finally 
obtained a chair. See Happer, William (1984). "Obituary: Alfred Kastler". Physics Today 37 (5): 101–102. 
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no God but Allah, and that Prophet Muhammed is his messenger.” The debate escalated and 
the criticism increased as some questioned al-Hakim’s attitude and claims and sarcastically 
asked if he had appointed himself to be a lawyer on Einstein and Kastler’s behalf, and why did 
he give himself the right to make such claims about them. The question, “Who will or will not 
go to heaven or hell?”, accordingly, became a topic of fierce discussions amongst, on the one 
hand, al-Hakim and intellectuals and, on the other, fanatics and clerics. The divisions in public 
opinion reached their peak, and some people (who claimed knowledge of the holy book and of 
Islamic history) pointed out that Prophet Ibrahim, who is considered a Muslim, did not make 
such a declaration and came before prophet Muhammed; does this mean that he will not go to 
heaven? And who is it to say that he is not a Muslim after all? 
 Prominent names were involved, besides Sha’rawy, in these debates. Al-Ghazali, Dr. 
al- Nagar, Dr ‘Asha Abdel-Rahman (known as Bent el Shate’), Dr. Muhammed Sayed Ahmad 
al-Mayser, Dr. Al Husseiny Hashem (of the Islamic research Centre), Dr Moussa Lasheen 
(Professor of interpretation and Hadiths of al-Azhar University), and Dr. Ahmad Amr Hashem 
were amongst others who objected to al-Hakim’s ideas. Besides the media attacks, they held a 
four hour session dedicated solely to discussing al-Hakim’s claims and attacking his views. 
Although one may consider this to be an event which shows the importance of al-Hakim as a 
writer, it has, socially, damaged his reputation and affected his readership in a negative way 
(i.e. the publications decreased and some of his work were either censored or intentionally 
damaged). ‘Abada, scholar and author of the book, “Sha’rawi and al-Hakim: Conflict of 
thought and the fundamentals of belief”, spent more than ten years researching the details of 
these fierce debates between intellectuals and clerics in order to present to the Egyptian 
generation today the dialogues, their implications for Egyptian thought and their importance 
within their historical context. The reassessment of these debates and publication of these 
articles, which identify the conflicts between intellectuals and clerics, are important to 
Egyptians today because of the recent events with regards to the Muslim Brotherhood groups 
and the issues raised by clerics and the public regarding (a) the role of religion and governance, 
(b) the validity and credibility of Islamic doctrine and, most importantly, (c) the 
implementation of Islam in a modern Muslim society. The latter have been raised since the fall 
of former President Morsi who represented the Muslim Brotherhood and attempted to 
implement their political agenda. The public’s opinion, as a result, is one of discontent, due to 
how Islam is now perceived in a negative light nationally and internationally, and how it was 
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used wrongly by those who claimed that they spoke in God’s name and are now declared a 
terrorist group.  
 In 2014, in an article titled “Tawfiq al-Hakim: al Katib aladhi Tahadatha ma’a Allah” 
(Tawfiq al-Hakim: The author who ‘spoke to God’),443 Fayez writes that Naguib Mahfouz 
moved from his small office in al-Ahram newspaper to a bigger one, which previously 
belonged to al-Hakim before he died in 1987.444 He adds, as much as al-Hakim’s intellectual 
legacy was at this period, it was matched by the amount of fierce criticisms from clerics as a 
result of his daring claim to have had a dialogue with God.445 This is regardless of al-Hakim’s 
testimony at the beginning of his work where he writes:  
A dialogue between us [himself and God] will not happen if God, in his grace and 
generosity, does not allow for it to be. I will form the dialogue between us with 
imagination and narrative. As you are the listener and not the one to respond, I will 
respond, using assumption, on your behalf. This is regardless my knowledge that my 
conversation with you will anger fanatics who will see my attempt daring and 
disrespectful, especially that I will speak to you without formality.446  
He continues: 
Suddenly, what was unexpected happened. I almost fainted. I heard God’s voice, or 
an imaginary one, saying: If you excel in maths and join the school of sciences, will 
you see me? This was what I heard and it was enough for me to believe that God has 
approved having this conversation with me.447 
 Amr al-Telmesany, the leader of the Muslim brotherhood group during this period, 
writes that al-Hakim had forgotten God’s statement in the holy Quran that no one speaks to 
God without a means of revelation or through a prophet whom he chooses. Al-Telmesany asks, 
“If it is the voice of the divine who spoke to al-Hakim, which one should we believe? God’s 
words in his Quran or al-Hakim’s words, this knowledgeable philosopher?”448 What al-
Telmesany is referring to is as follows: 
                                                          
443 Fayez, Sameh “Tawfiq al-Hakim: Katib tahadatha ma’a Allah” (The author who spoke to God) 26th July 2014. 
Cairo: Al- Tahrir Newspaper (digital) www. Altahrir.com/details.php?ID=53939. 
444 Mahfouz refused to sit on al-Hakim’s desk and said that he considers himself less in grandeur than the deceased 
author, so, accordingly, he sat in an opposite desk.  
445 The initial attempt to make these dialogues public were through al-Hakim’s column in al-Ahram newspaper 
where he published a series of articles with the title “Hiwar ma’a Allah” (Conversations with God) which was 
published later on as a book. 
446 Al-Hakim, T. Al-Ahadith al-Arbaah Wa-al-Qadaya al-Diniyah Allati Atharatha. Cairo: Maktabat al-Adab, 
1983. 
447 Ibid. 
448 Telmesany, Amr. “Hakadha tanhi hayhatak ya hakim?” (Is this how you will end your life al-Hakim?) Al-
Nour magazine. 9th of March 1983. 
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“And it was not (vouchsafed) to any mortal that Allah should speak to him unless (it 
be) be revelation of from behind a veil, or (that) he send a messanger to reveal what He 
will by His leave. He is exalted and wise.” Verse 51 of Surat al-Shura 
 The interpretation of this verse is that one can only speak to God either through a means 
of revelation, i.e. in a dream or inspiration, or “from behind a veil” meaning that a person hears 
God’s words and sees signs like in the case of Prophet Moses. Alternatively, the person speaks 
to God through a messenger, an angel like Gabriel or an apostle with God’s permission. Al-
Telmesany’s attack on al-Hakim is by no means justified based on his use of this verse. First, 
because, as I previously showed, al-Hakim wrote at the beginning of his work that it was an 
imaginary conversation which would have a sole voice and which answer on behalf of God 
(thus, he gives God no character or voice of his own in the narrative). And secondly, al-
Telmesany seems to be attacking al-Hakim’s daring attempt as an intellectual to do this, 
breaking from dogma and contrary to what is expected of a Muslim. Sha’rawy, like al-
Telmesany, and with sarcasm, says: 
Tawfiq al-Hakim did not reveal to us how he spoke to God. Was it a direct conversation 
or did God send him an angel? And what was the means of communication between 
them? If it was an imaginary dialogue on behalf of God, then al-Hakim did not only 
express his views and attribute them to God, but also he had limited God’s will in 
presenting it as his own. What al-Hakim’s mind wishes for God to say is what we see 
in these articles.449  
 Fayez writes that a few Muslim fanatics claimed that al-Hakim, before he died, 
expressed his remorse for what he had written in his articles. There is, however, no evidence 
of such a claim in any of the documentations around the time of al-Hakim’s death. In fact, his 
writings, from the 50s to the end of his career, show his strong belief in his doctrine of 
equilibrium and in his views regarding religion and Islam, regardless of any speculations.450 
Moreover, criticism from the clerics also arose in connection with al-Hakim’s short story “The 
Martyr”.451 Cleric Abou Ishak al-Haweny dedicated in one of his speeches in the mosque a part 
of it where he criticised the short story and described it as one written by a heretic and a 
disbeliever who is neither successful nor wise.452 Also, cleric Abdel Hameed Keshk had 
                                                          
449 Fayez, Sameh. “Tawfiq al-Hakim: The author who spoke to God” 26th July 2014. Al- Tahrir Newspaper 
(digital) www. Altahrir.com/details.php?ID=53939. 
450 See the letter by the publisher of al-Hakim’s Al-Ahadith al-Arbaah (The Four conversations) (sometimes 
translated as The Four Soliloquies with Allah) by M and A. Aly Hassan, pp.13-16. 
451 Al-Hakim, Tawfiq. Arini Allah, second story in the book titled “al- Shahid” (The Martyr), 1953. pp. 10-21. See 
chapter two p.125- p.130, my discussion of the duality between God and Satan in relation to this short story. 
452 This is a play on the meaning of al-Hakim’s name; Tawfiq (success) and al-Hakim (the wise). There is a 
YouTube video of Haweny’s speech in the mosque after Friday prayer where he talks of al-Hakim and publicly 
criticises his work and accuse him of heresy. 
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publicly voiced his criticism of al-Hakim’s ideas on national television453 and through national 
radio channels. Fayez, the author of this article, is not siding with either side, which is unlike 
other authors who documented or commented on these debates, for they always voiced their 
views on the matter. He concludes his article by saying that what is strange is that during the 
whole period al-Hakim’s name was on the rise, he was not attacked to such an extent until the 
movement of “the awakening of Islam” began to emerge in the mid-70s. Perhaps if al-Hakim 
had lived longer, we would have heard a story of his assassination as a disbeliever or worse, 
such has been the case with intellectuals killed in cold blood. Luckily, he died before witnessing 
the beginning of the “deterioration of consciousness.”454 
  In conclusion, from the criticisms above one may deduce that al-Hakim was a writer 
who went through various stages throughout his career. The accusations are too many to 
mention, but those that the public remember to this day said about him are that he was “a 
misogynist” and “a miser”. It is not implausible that people do not say openly that he was also 
accused (wrongly) of heresy out of respect for his literary legacy and the improvements he 
made to theatre and, also, to Egyptian cinema since some of his plays and novels became 
classical films loved by many such as al- Aydi al Na’imah (The Soft Hands) (in which famous 
Egyptian actor Ahmad Mazhar and legendary actress, Sabah played the lead roles). The 
criticisms in regards to Arini Allah (1953) and al-Ahadith al-Arba’ah (1983) are not justified 
on the basis that clerics used hadiths to devalue al-Hakim’s ideas without consideration that 
the framework in which he writes in is one of literature and philosophy and not religion. The 
reason for their doing so was simply in accordance with the trend of the time, which was the 
revival of Islamic dogma, in contrast with the intellectual renaissance in the period before the 
70s or, more specifically, during Nasser’s reign. The “awakening of Islam” was a movement 
that did not allow for unfamiliar ideas that are opposed to the Islamic doctrines and Shari’a 
laws. Those who led this movement overlooked the view that they were living in a modern 
society with different ideologies and different needs to that of the Islamic olden days. What al-
Hakim did was indicative of an author’s right to creativity and expression of his beliefs openly 
and faithfully without fearing criticism. His clerical opponents neither accepted the limitations 
of their prerogatives, nor did they accept that a writer or an intellectual had such rights. The 
                                                          
453 There is also a Youtube video of Shaykh Keshk attacking publicly al-Hakim on national television and accusing 
him of heresy. 
454 The writer makes reference to al-Hakim’s work Yakazit al-wa’y (The Awakening of consciousness) in order to 
say that, in his view, our present day there is a deteriorating period (post the 1970s) in all aspects: intellectually, 
socially, politically and so on. 
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personal attacks on his character were because of his close links with France, his French 
education and his travels and intellectual links with like-minded scholars. He was not afraid of 
confronting opposing views and those who found his ideas problematic. His addition to the 
book The Four conversations is a testimony were he asks “Why I am a Muslim?” and replies, 
“because of these three elements: Mercy, Knowledge, Humanity, and above all, it is because I 
declare that God is the omnipotent, the all mighty, and that Muhammed is his prophet.” With 
this statement, and his testimony that he is fully responsible for the “imaginary and narrated” 
dialogue (the questions and answers are his own and not God’s), he showed the untenability of 
















                                                          
455 Although debates such as these have encouraged authors to express their opinions, the result of such debates 
remain the same; either the author dies naturally of old age and the debate gradually come to an end with the 
author’s reputation tarnished, or the author becomes either victim to assassination attempts from different sources 
or imprisoned. It is a shame that al-Hakim experienced these attacks. See the introduction of al-Hakim’s book 
Arini Allah (Show Me God) translated into English by H. H. Mayyas, PhD. Ling. al-Azhar University, and revised 




Given the constraints outlined in the thesis introduction, this thesis alone cannot provide 
answers for the questions posed directly or indirectly at the outset or by historian Di- Capua in 
his work on Arab existentialism; such as “Who is the Arab subject? Can this subject think of 
himself or herself in a language that would be organic to his or her history? Can Arabs have an 
authentic existence, and is it possible for Arabs to become modern on their own terms?” These 
questions are of crucial importance today. Nevertheless, the thesis has gone some way towards 
identifying a specific period in which these questions were examined and were at the heart of 
intellectual debates. The thesis has also identified a possible position for Muslims today 
towards existentialism and borrowed ideas from the West that has originally Eastern roots. As 
has been shown, Tawfiq al-Hakim’s writings can be of great value to us today. His 
philosophical writings help us understand a very rich period, which contributed to the shaping 
of Egyptian thought. This thesis has attempted to explore and address the criticisms made 
against al-Hakim by examining a number of possible influences on his writings and character 
and possible ways of understanding his doctrine of equilibrium. It is not likely that by looking 
at his dramatic works alone we would be able to resolve all of the issues identified above in his 
doctrine of equilibrium. But in my view, for one to get a full understanding of his thought, one 
should consider his drama and his philosophical writings as complementary to one another.  
 The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to draw on the preceding examinations and 
analyses of al-Hakim and his writings in relation to the historical context in which he lived in 
and to summarize what I believe his doctrine of equilibrium can offer us today. Al-Hakim was 
fortunate enough to be, as part of his early education, acquainted with some of the most 
prominent figures of his time. These figures included Lutfi al-Sayyid, Taha Husayn, Mustafa 
Abdel Raziq, Naguib Mahfouz, Yusuf Idris, Hassanain Haykal, Yehia Haky and, from the West, 
Sartre, Lanzmann, de Beauvoir and many others who left their mark in the history of literature, 
philosophy, and the arts. The climate in which al-Hakim found himself in was right for the 
birth of an intellectual. Not only was the Egyptian nation experiencing a cultural and social 
transition in which education (with a focus on translations into Arabic) played a major role, but 
also the regime was clear, at least to some extent, of fanatics. As a result, we have an image of 
Egypt (from past Egyptian newspapers in al-Ahram archive between the 50s to late 60s) as a 
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thriving hub of cultural exchange and individual and social progress.456 It is unfortunate that 
the dream that Nasser and Sadat held at the beginning of their reign to reconnect Egypt with 
the rest of the world and, as the latter said, to make it “a piece of Europe”, was crushed in the 
mid-70s by the beginning of a wave of extremism.457 The intellectual renaissance that once 
thrived failed to survive the obstacles put in its way by its opponents, who channelled their 
efforts to replace gradually but steadily Egypt’s former image with what has become of the 
country today.458 Today, in Egypt, the view that is shared by a few Egyptians, (which should 
not misconstrue of Egypt’s reality or the nature of its malady), is that it is not another Islamic 
domino that is destined to fall as a result of the fight between the regime and Islamicists. On 
the contrary, the climate on Egypt’s streets is one that reflects a move towards a separation of 
religion from politics (even if it is an idea that will take many years to take effect). 
 The question “can al-Hakim’s doctrine and writings offer us something meaningful 
today?” can have different answers. First, in the case of his philosophical narratives, these raise 
the important question whether the East and the West can accept the idea that the two systems 
of thought (Eastern and Western) are not as distinct as they may at first appear. This goes hand-
in-hand with a questioning of such monolithic categories as 'Western' and 'Middle Eastern' 
which has recently been the focus of debates in university social and cultural studies 
departments.459 From the early chapters of this thesis, one realises that there were strong 
international relationships between Egypt and the West, particularly with Britain and France 
                                                          
456 On the 7th of February 1967, the newspaper issue announced a construction project whereby chalets will be 
built across Alexandria promenade in the same style as French houses. In the same issue, there is an article on the 
style and look of the Egyptian Modern woman and updates on the styles of European women. Also, there is an 
announcement that fashion designer, Ralph Lauren, will be the one to design the outfits for flight attendants of 
Egyptair. 
457 Islamist groups’ activities during the mid-70s included entering different universities in Egypt in order to gather 
students and teach them how to pray. Preaching became a growing phenomenon as they increased in number and 
began to condemn the regime and, most importantly, the secular figures in politics and culture who were branded 
heretics and apostates. The attacks extended also to hounding the Copts (a community of no less than six million 
in Egypt) and advocating an Islamic state, even if through encouraging the use of illegitimate means. 
458 It is worth noting that Modern Egypt, over the last two centuries was only governed by two regimes: First, the 
dynasty of the Albanian-born Muhammad Ali (emerged in the aftermath of the chaos of Napoleon’s invasion of 
Egypt in 1798) and secondly, the Free Officers regime (Nasser and Sadat). No one could have predicted that the 
Islamists groups’ would fulfil their goal of reaching power, first, by the appointment of former President Morsi 
and by their persistent role in politics and shaping Egyptian society and culture (i.e. through their access to 
airwaves and print media in order to influence the masses). Today, “beyond the modernity of Cairo and 
Alexandria, away from the glare of publicity, the running war between the police and the Islamicists degenerated 
into the timeless politics of vengeance and vendettas, an endless cycle of killings and reprisals.” Ajami, Fouad. 
“The Sorrow of Egypt: A tale of two men” Cairo: Foreign Affairs. September/October Issue, 1995.  
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/51401/fouad-ajami/the-sorrows-of-egypt-a-tale-of-two-men. Accessed 
2014. 
459 This has been raised as a topic of research in the interdisciplinary conference titled “Writing beyond borders” 
held on 20th September 2013 at the Language and cultures’ graduate school at Manchester University. 
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(during President Nasser’s era and to some extent during President Sadat’s). One also comes 
to grasp that this relationship was not only a political and economic one, or about an exchange 
of education (i.e. scholars sent abroad in an exchange of knowledge programmes), but also that 
Egyptian society was adaptable and accepting of the rapprochement between cultures. This 
was not only between the Egyptian and the French culture, but also between Egyptian and 
American or Japanese cultures. Evidence of this, broadly speaking, can be found in newspaper 
images in al-Ahram newspaper. These images, mostly adverts and announcements, show not 
only the link between Egypt and the West, but also highlight the extent of Western influences 
on Egyptian thought and lifestyle. Although the majority of these adverts are naturally in 
Arabic, some are in English and advertise foreign products and services by international 
companies who are cooperating with national ones. Al-Hakim’s writings are a product of their 
time and they show that reconciliation between the two cultures, Eastern and Western, in the 
fields of literature and philosophy is not only possible but also natural and necessary. 
 To clarify the latter proposition, first, al-Hakim used in his play Ya Tali’ al-Shajara a 
familiar Egyptian folklore song (with the same name) to present Western ideas, namely those 
of the theatre of the absurd. In other words, his protagonists were faced with the futility of the 
tasks they were participating in and yet, in their struggle, they found in life’s absurdity and its 
meaninglessness a purpose to live for. The play was staged in Egypt and despite criticisms and 
the fact that the play was not successful, it is known today as an important attempt to introduce 
the Egyptian public to a new genre that was once unknown and now is familiar. Another 
example that shows a consolidation between cultures is al-Hakim’s adaptations of Greek plays. 
Greek culture has a long history in Egypt and many translations have been made over the 
centuries from Greek into Arabic and vice versa. When al-Hakim chose to rewrite two plays, 
Bernard Shaw’s Pygmalion and the tale of King Oedipus (al-Malik Udib), and to present them 
to the Egyptian public, his main interest was to introduce ideas and beliefs he admired from 
different cultures. His aim was to present these ideas in an experimental manner in his own 
writings. These ideas were: love of art and beauty, love of knowledge, and the search for the 
truth. These, broadly speaking, are common recurrent themes in the history of Islamic 
philosophy as well as Western philosophy. These particular ideas, adopted and developed 
accordingly, became underlying themes in his plays and philosophical narratives. This was not 
all: the doctrine of equilibrium shows us that, for al-Hakim, a discussion of these ideas can 
shed light on some of the problems that face us in modern societies and show us the value of 
our struggles. This is al- Hakim’s positive approach towards realising that we live in a “tragic 
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existence” whereby one’s course in life can change or be affected by a sum of forces that are 
all out of one’s control. And thus, he suggests adapting the belief that even if we do not manage 
to resolve any of our troubles in life, or reach the goals that we set for ourselves, the journeys 
or the experiences we go through are, worthwhile. The constant struggle in life in order to 
achieve a goal (sometimes unknown) and the search for artistic perfection is at the heart of al-
Hakim’s doctrine of equilibrium. The message that one gradually comprehends throughout his 
writings is that struggle is an integral part of one’s life story. It is necessary for progress 
because, without struggle, one will not be able to discover one’s strength. 
  Secondly, the existential dilemma that interested al-Hakim and that was inspired by 
debates emerging in the midst of Arab existentialism and, later on, movements like socialism 
and pan-Arabism for example, began with the quest to find an explanation for the status of the 
human being in his society and his status in his universe. The quest for purpose and meaning 
occupied al-Hakim’s mind along with the search for an Arab identity in the light of the different 
ideologies of his time. This period was seething with an unprecedented variety and range of 
ideas. Al-Hakim was affected by some ideas more than others and by 1950, he was ready to 
make some suggestions about what he felt were the primary problems facing human beings. It 
was as if al-Hakim was living between two worlds: on the one hand, he experienced the changes 
in Egyptian society, from an intellectual renaissance that was to a great extent liberal and open 
to the West, socially and culturally, to a rather conservative society; and on the other hand, he 
experienced the changes in thought in the West and in people’s attitudes. To clarify the latter, 
the different views debated by existentialist philosophers related to the issues of freedom and 
the meaning of life. Although the consensus among these philosophers was that there is a 
meaning in life, they differed in their answer to the following questions. Is there inherent 
meaning the universe? Can we create real meaning ourselves? Is the pursuit of inherent 
meaning possible? Is the pursuit of created meaning possible? And finally, can we solve the 
problem of meaning by creating our own? Al-Hakim, like Sartre and de Beauvoir believed that 
there is a meaning in life, but he agreed more with Kierkegaard that we have to have “faith” to 
believe so, and al-Hakim added that we must not forget the limits of our knowledge as human 
beings. All we can do is to attempt to create meaning for ourselves, regardless of the absurdity 
and meaningless of our lives; we can solve the problem of meaning by creating our own and, 
at the same time, acknowledging our limitations. One may ask: Is existentialism a possible 
position today for a Muslim? The answer to this question depends on, I believe, how long the 
“Islamization” of the Egyptian society (which gained ground since the 1970s and is now 
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affected by the aftermaths of the 2011 revolution and the rise and fall of the Muslim 
brotherhood) begins to diminish. The hope is that with the misuse of religion over the past 
years, a non-religious spiritually is formed and through it, individuals and the society as a whole 
can find a way to address key issues that would liberate the Egyptian society from old shackles 
which has hindered the intellectual and social progress over the past years. 
Tawfiq al-Hakim’s writings began to present a distinct and particular approach to 
modernity. The two worlds concerned al-Hakim and he formed an image for modern man as 
one who is growing anxious of his own safety. Regardless of modern man’s vast triumphs, he 
fears his own destruction. In the West, a few writers have taken a similar approach after WWII 
according to which a halt to materialism and a spiritual regeneration are demanded. The latter 
was based not so much on traditional Christianity as on a vague mysticism of the oriental type 
that had been popularised. The encounters with great figures led to developments in al-Hakim’s 
writings which show that the distinction between cultures is man-made. His encounter with 
Sartre and de Beauvoir and their friendship opened up a new dialogue which was needed during 
this time and necessary for a thriving intellectual scene. Discussions about the extent of human 
freedom and the force of circumstances were crucial for al-Hakim, as for Sartre, in that they 
introduced the former to Western thought and showed the latter the Eastern reservations about 
the idea of one’s freedom as absolute. 
 The role of the intellectual, accordingly, as al-Hakim held it to be, should be 
unconstrained. He was embracing the good and the bad in other cultures, observing and 
reflecting. After President Nasser, he feared the antipathy of conservative Muslims who began 
to play an active role in society and shape the minds of young intellectuals. He, however, 
continued to write which he expressed in his autobiographical works was his sole defence 
mechanism. He added to the Eastern philosophy a new dimension by showing Egyptians the 
Other’s perspective. The same can be said of Sartre who was meeting different influential 
figures of his time. One should, therefore, applaud both authors for promoting, directly or 
indirectly, a conception of borderless thought which aimed to pave the way for further global 
connections between countries and a “borderless” thought. Al-Hakim’s adaptations from Greek 
mythologies such as Pygmalion and al-Malik Udib, and those from the Pharaonic era, such as 
his play Izis, inspired him to produce engaging plays and short stories. His use of Egyptian folk 
tales and stories from Western literature (such as Goethe’s Faust) show a perfect example of a 
cultural rapprochement that is both innovative and engaging.  
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 Did the writer overshadow the philosopher in al-Hakim’s case? Perhaps. According to 
Shamroukh,460 al-Hakim’s philosophical narratives, after the 1960s and after the controversy 
created by the publication of Arini al-Allah and the consequential debates involving clerics, 
suffered a lot: in terms of both the works’ publications and readership. Some of al-Hakim’s 
readers were affected by the controversy and formed a negative view of him and his work. The 
timing with which this happened couldn’t have been worse. The Islamic movement had already 
launched its agenda which entailed an attack on anyone who would question their beliefs (or 
demands). Sadly, the image of Egypt as a liberal society has been replaced by a more 
conservative one, accompanied by a regime that limits the intellectual’s involvement in the 
political arena, and has given Islamists more say in the country’s affairs and more importantly, 
more authority over the media, which maximises their influence on the Egyptian people. To 
answer the question, “Is there a role for the intellectual today and is there a role for philosophy 
in the Middle-East?” one must say that, since the mid-1970s, the role of the intellectual is one 
that is dictated by the regime and, more generally, by the public, (which is greatly influenced 
by the media). In the name of religion, the awakening of the Islamic movement (which rapidly 
became a global movement with connections tying Egypt to other Islamic countries) has caused 
intellectuals to fear for their safety. Today, if one attempts to say something meaningful in 
Egypt, something that might lead to positive change, or to demand one’s basic rights, the 
attacks from opponents are automatically directed at one’s character rather than at what one 
says. These criticisms are aimed at the individual in order simply to discredit and devalue him 
or her. Since January 2011, a new movement in Egyptian society has been unleashed, the 
effects of which can only be guessed at rather than predicted because, until recently, the future 
of Egypt was a marginal adjustment from the past. Will it allow intellectuals a role within the 
new regime? Will it open for itself new ways of philosophical engagements? Will there be, 
most importantly, a global intellectual dialogue from which the Egyptian can form his or her 
own identity freely and openly without prejudices? Or will this regime be another chapter in 




                                                          






 Al Hakim’s family consent form  
 Personal Images 
 Brief synopsis of Badawi’s work. 
 Translation of Al Hakim’s Challenges of the year 2000 
 Translation of Al Hakim’s The Literature of Life  













































Personal photos of Tawfiq al-Hakim 
 
A special moment with his granddaughter and grandson, Mariam and Ismail Nabil  
   













Al-Hakim amongst intellectuals 
  










Al-Hakim in Politics: 
With Former Egyptian Presidents Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak 
 
Above: With President Nasser 
Right: With President Sadat and his wife 
  
Al-Hakim with President Mubarak in the 70s and later on in the 1980s 
As the above images show, during this intellectual period, authors like al-Hakim and 
others were encouraged to voice their views and exchange knowledge in social and intellectual 
gatherings in venues around Cairo and during events held by former President Nasser during 
his reign (from 1956 to 1970). Many of these gatherings took place in Nasser’s own residence 
in Heliopolis, Cairo as evident in the images below.461 As a result, each of these authors 
developed their own interests, influences and left a mark on Modern Egyptian literature and 
philosophy in one way or the other. What was, however, visible from al-Hakim’s career was 
                                                          
461 See images in chapter one, p. 4 where Nasser plays host to Sartre and de Beauvoir. Nasser preferred holding 
intellectual events in his Heliopolis palace. 
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that, unlike others, he did not want to settle for the role of a reformer or a writer who was able 
only to discuss social, political and cultural matters. Instead, whilst questioning Egyptian 
values and culture, he made public his own ideas about familiarising Western themes and 
presented them in his writings in the form of an equilibrium doctrine. This must have been 
difficult for Al Hakim to do because he had begun to put forward his equilibrium doctrine at 
this specific period amongst a growing number of fanatics such as the Muslim brothers who 
came to rise after Nasser’s reign ended.462 Former President Sadat gave the Muslim brothers’ 
a platform463 (from 1970 to 1981) and allowed their participation in social and political affairs 
of the country. It is believed that this was his tactic to create an adversary for communism.  
Sadat’s relationship with al-Hakim was one that continued to be in decline. When al-
Hakim published The Return of Consciousness in 1974, highlighting flaws in Nasser’s policies 
and traits of dictatorship, Sadat thought that this would have been the start of their friendship. 
Al Hakim soon after began writing articles in support of students’ protests criticising Sadat’s 
policies just the same. Sadat responded by saying that Al Hakim, who was once raised to fame 
by the country, was now in his old age, deteriorating and losing his senses and leading himself 
into the abyss.464 Their relationship did not improve over the years. Perhaps, the only merit that 
Sadat contributed to, intentionally or unintentionally was his ambition to move Egypt towards 
an economic liberalization. This was implemented in the form of “the open door policy” in 
1974 referred to as infitah.465 This infitah policy was the beginning of an amicable relationship 
between the East and the West as well as intellectual exchanges and social and educational 
developments in the capital Cairo in the form of new foreign schools, an increase in 
scholarships, work opportunities abroad. These developments without a doubt benefited both 
parties. Although there were moments of political unrest and, surely doubt regarding these 
developments, Sadat’s decision was probably one of the first to have given the Egyptian people 
the opportunity to experience socially, economically and intellectually an “openness” to other 
cultures; something that many today still question and wonder if it was the right move.  
 
 
                                                          
462 Nasser was aware of the Muslim brothers’ influences and thus, during his reign, he kept a watchful eye on their 
activities until they succeeded in assassinating him. 
463 They were also responsible for the assassination of former President Sadat. 
464 Documentary in Arabic language about al-Hakim available on: (Part One) 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=BejzPWqaCuI. 
465 Sadat’s policy (or “infitah” translates to “openness”) intended to “open the universe....open the door for fresh 




Egyptian existentialist, Abdel Rahman Badawi 
This is an excerpt of Badawi’s work from Hassan Hanafi’s article in Al Ahram newspaper 
which offers insightful information on the philosopher and his work.466 
(Left) Image of the front cover of Badawi’s book, Sirat Hyatti (The Story of my life), (Middle) 
The front cover of his work (in Arabic) titled “Nietzsche: Kholasat al- Fikir al-Urubi” 
(Nietzsche:  a summary of European Thought) published in 1975, and (Right) front cover of 
his translation of Goethe’s Faust that al-Hakim read and that inspired his short-story. 
 
       
Badawi’s “Islamic Studies” is a series of books in which he undertook editing as well 
as writing, rewriting and translation. He edited and published old Arabic translations467 of 
Western and East philosophers like Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus, and texts by Avicenna, 
Averroes, al-Ghazali, al-Bastami, al-Tawhidi, Maskouiah, al-Mubbashir Bin Faek, Ibn Sab'in 
and Abu Soliman al-Mantiqi, one to name a few. He translated many orientalists’ work on 
Greek heritage in Islamic civilisation. He wrote on topics such as the perfect person, Shi'ite 
theology, Ibn Arabi’s though and the spirit of Arab civilisation. Controversial works include 
the history of atheism in Islam, humanism and existentialism in Arab thought (the latter being 
the most creative book on that topic from the view of Arab scholars because he deals with the 
issue of Western and Arab intellectual heritage). He also draws links between Hazim al-
Qartajani (Islamic philosopher) and Aristotle, probing the influences of the Sufi prostitute-
turned- Saint Rabaa al-Adawiya. He addressed constantly the Arab role in the genesis of the 
Western intellect. His work, "The Hundred Pearls," is a series which are translations of German 
                                                          
466 Al- Ahram Weekly Online, 29th August- 4 Sept. 2002, Issue No. 601. 
467 Genuine and apocryphal. 
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Romantic literature. It incorporates translations of Spanish and French literature, as well as 
occasional translations produced by him with reference to particular events and circumstances. 
Nietzsche:  a summary of European Thought covers logic, poetry and the methodology of 
research and translation. He invented a form of literary collage that combines translation with 
presentation and adaptation: Historical Criticism. It is said that this book is neither an original 
composition nor a faithful translation. In his text, he openly discusses both the pillars of modern 
(German) philosophy, i.e. Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Spengler and the various "seasons" of 
Greek thought, classifying them in the manner of Ahmad Amin's history of Islam (which uses 
the metaphor of times of day rather than that of seasons). Perhaps it is fair to say that all in all, 
he was a very active intellectual who wrote 27 titles and translated 22, which is said to be a 
slightly smaller portion of his total output. These books reveal Badawi's fascination with the 
West, especially Germany, which he considered to be the very centre of the world.  
                        












Tawfiq Al Hakim’s Tahadiyat Sanat- Alfain (Challenges of the year 2000) 
Dar Misr Press. (1980) 
Sub title: Al Thawri wal- Multazim. “The Revolutionist and the Committed” 
(Pages. 178- 181) 
 
Donkey: I hear often many words that I do not understand their meaning. A humble creature 
like myself prefers honest clear and particular meanings to words. Take for instance, the words, 
“revolutionist” and “committed” and “revolutionary” and “commitment”. What are the 
meanings to them? 
Beret answers: I explain to you. Assume for example that someone presented to you grass 
muddled with earth what will you do? 
Donkey: I will object and threw it in his face. 
Beret: But this is not enough and would not be a revolt. 
The Stick (intervened) saying: I hit him and spill his blood. 
Beret: All this would be “violence” and not revolution. 
Donkey: What is revolution then? 
Beret: Revolution is not violence, regardless of whether violence at times is needed or not. 
The Stick: Is this a riddle? 
Beret: This is so much simpler. The word’s meaning that has been mistaken with others 
conceals its true meaning. 
Donkey: And what is that? 
Beret: “Change” 
The Stick: “Objection”? 
Beret: No, objection is not revolution but merely a cause. The objections to “idols468” is not 
religion, but only a cause for it. 
Donkey: Do you mean when I object to eating the grass mixed with the earth, I am not revolting 
against it? 
Beret: Your objection only is negative. But as for revolution it is a positive action. It comes 
after objection with a vision for change. And then comes the implementation of change. 
The stick: The protestor then is not the revolutionary. The protestor may as well be the rioter. 
He will not be a revolutionary unless he has an ideology for change that can be implemented. 
If what he suggest is impossible, then his work is similar to that of his objection; namely a 
passive riot or an illusionary dream. The principle of revolution, in a nutshell, is a vision or a 
call for change that is possible to implement in a present or near future. 
                                                          
468 Meaning worshipping idols 
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Beret: Yes, in a near future because, in the far future, a vision of change that was once a dream, 
can be fulfilled. This is how we can distinguish the instrumental revolution from the revolution 
of ideas. The instrumental revolution is fulfilled in the present or the near future, whilst the 
revolution of ideas, its effects, emerge after many years. It stay in the conscious of the people 
till it dissolves, even if the instrumental revolution may have led to the latter. 
The stick: Every revolution must either be a product of a true revolution of ideas which is like 
its seeds and roots, or it will be merely like a wind that extracts every plant from its roots. 
Donkey: We now understand revolution, what is then “commitment”? 
Beret: Commitment is to hold onto something that happened, and revolution is the vision onto 
something that will happen. 
Donkey: When I hear that an intellectual, a writer or an artist is “committed”, this means he is 
holding on to (and agreeing with) a direction, an ideology or a position that has already been 
found, whilst a revolutionist, he is aspiring or seeking change that has not yet been found. 
Beret: This is true. Now you have found the answer to what you have been seeking to know. 
The stick: And now my dear friend, the donkey, what will you do when you are served the 
grass mixed with earth? 
The donkey: I will revolt of course. This productive revolt, I will demand change according to 



















An excerpt from Al Hakim’s Adab- Al Hayah (The Literature of Life) 1965  
Pages: 133- 137. Al Rad- ‘ala-Sartre (A Response to Sartre)469 
 
It was often said by Jean Paul Sartre that modern Arabic literature must reflect the struggle of 
its people and that the individual becomes his tool and progress and freedom becomes its goals. 
All of this is true and there is no debate about it. But isn’t this already the message of Modern 
Arabic literature? Here we slightly differ. 
 I will leave for my colleagues from Arab writers their right to defend their position and 
limit my talk to present solely my position. I say: From five or six years, Sartre published long 
sections in his famous Les Temps moderne of my novel Diary of a Country Prosecutor. And 
what is known in France, and internationally, is that Sartre does not publish in his magazine 
anything that does not present the goals and directions of what he sees as the struggle of the 
people (a nation), defending humanity and against tyranny, as well as calling for freedom and 
progress (i.e. social-progress). Since Sartre had indeed published in his magazine this work of 
Modern Arabic literature, this means that these goals were not overlooked or neglected. It is 
worth mentioning also that my book was written and published in Egypt and the Middle-East 
in 1937, meaning before Sartre came to fame and his doctrines became known. 
 Sartre writes today about the Algerians and blames and criticises his fellow French 
citizens in an attempt to defend the struggle of the people and the right to freedom. This reminds 
me of an incident which happened to me a couple of years ago when I travelled by train and 
witnessed the famine in parts of North Africa. Egypt rushed to send help and aid to the people 
while France blocked all the routes in order to prevent the aid reaching the affected areas. This 
left me no choice but to return to France a medal I was awarded for translating some of my 
works into French. I wrote to the French ambassador a letter objecting on the situation saying 
that France had ignored the basis for humanity and human freedom, I said:  
“What is the meaning of literature if France holds no meaning for humanity and for 
human freedom? I do not believe that any free intellectual should accept an appreciation 
from France before it can show a genuine appreciation of the two.” 
 This was published in national newspapers on the 6th of July 1948. And as a result of 
this, the French government refused granting me a visa to enter France when I wished to return 
in 1949. They did not grant me it until the Egyptian government threatened to apply the same 
policy to those who wish to visit Egypt. This happened to me, a writer whom they claim lives 
in an ‘ivory tower’. 
 What I would like to say is that the Modern Arabic literature today is on the right course. 
Perhaps, we, Arab writers, should be more content and should not ask too much of ourselves 
lest our efforts fall short. I have no doubt that we must communicate our message of progress 
and of the struggle of the people and of freedom, for the sake of our Arab nation, to a wider 
audience, with better and effective methods and finer art. Our excuse is possibly that, until this 
                                                          
469 First published 1959. 
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day, we occupy ourselves with renewing our style and artistic means of production, and 
improving and solving literary and linguistic issues. If we put an end to this stage, we will have 
plenty of time to delve into the essence of the problem. This latter stage of renovation could 
have already drained the efforts those who participate in it and contributed to it. It is, thus, 
essential for a new stage to begin where a new generation emerges and partakes in giving 
Modern Arabic literature a distinct humane approach and a valuable international meaning. 
Therefore, I urge everyone to quit occupying oneself with superficialities and to focus on what 
really matters from the world of literature in our present age.  
 The hope is in the younger generation of writers today with their awareness of the real 
goal in hand, they will be able to progress with a bigger message. The youths say that they have 
no need for style or linguistic aspects of the language as no one today follows those of Gorky 
or Sartre, but the beauty in style today is in the form and content. The young generation of 
writers have formed a new style and method which is free from tradition. Some of them have 
even mocked those who reminded them of traditional methods of writings like form, 
expression, style and content. They may be in some sense correct. It would be madness for one 
to ask of them to see things from the perspective of those before them. The nature of progress 
shows that things change and no one can ask of the new forms of literature to be bound or 
restricted by the works of olden eras such as the style of Al-Bakri, or Hefny Nasef or even, al-
Manfaloty. 
 Who writes in England today in the style of Saki470 and in France in the style of 
Schopenhauer? No one. In fact, every generation has its own style and way. Our Arab youths 
are right to object to copy the style or the method of the past generation because they have the 
right to find their own style and own path. What should not be overlooked, however, by our 
youths are the resources which are readily available to them to examine before setting off on 
their own paths. This is an important criticism which is directed at youths today. They want to 
take a short-cut and separate the past, with its valuable knowledge, from the present, and leave 
it behind. If youths today investigate first their past and examine different styles of writings, 
and spent time appreciating the poems of al-Gahez, al-Tabari, Avicenna or Ibn Khaldun, they 
can then enter a new phase, from old to new, creating their own style in their new era (with 
strong foundations based on the knowledge of past generations). Had they done so, no one 
could have criticised them. There is, in my view, no progress without the thorough investigation 









                                                          
470 Hector Hugh Munro (1870- 1916) 
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Al Hakim’s Al Ahadith al-Arba’a. Translated as The Four Conversations: 
An introduction to the book and a letter by the publisher. 











































 Chronology of selected philosophical publications in accordance with the main events 
in al-Hakim’s life. 
 Literature Review 
 Reputation and readership: Survey and summary of findings  
 Interview with Personal Interview with Mr. Muhammed Rifa’at, Assistant editor of 
October Magazine, writer, journalist and poet. 
 Personal Interview with Mr. Muhammed Shamroukh, columnist and writer at Al-
Ahram Newspaper. 
 Original Egyptian newspaper announcements of Sartre and de Behaviour’s visit to 
Cairo, Egypt and other parts of the Middle East (dates: 1st of March 1967, 22nd of 




















Al Hakim’s Life and Philosophical works  
Date Event Arabic Titles 
1898 Born in Alexandria  
1919 (Egyptian Revolution) Began writing as a result of 
political unrest 
 
1925 Travelled to Paris to study law  






Under the Sun of Thought: 
Articles 
Satan’s Era: Philosophical 
stories 
My Donkey told me: 
Philosophical articles 




Himari Qal Li 
1941 From the Ivory Tower: Short 
articles 
Min il-Burj il-'Aji 






Prepared for publication a 
number of literary projects 
begun in Paris. Started work 
as a deputy public 
prosecutor (naʾib) in the Nile 
delta area. Then became an 
official in the ministry of 
social affairs. And finally, 
resigned his position as a civil 
servant to devote himself to 
his writing. 
 
1943 The Prime of Life: 
Autobiography & Letters 
Zahrat al-‘Umr 
1945 The Art of Literature: Articles Fanna al-Adab 
                      1953 Show me God: Philosophical 
stories 
Arini Allah 
1954 Al Hakim’s Stick: Dialogic 
thoughts 
‘Asa al-Hakim 
1955 Equilibrium: Philosophical 
dialogue 
al-Ta'aduliyyah 






Between thought and art: 
Articles 
The literature of Life: Articles 
Bayn al-Fikr wa al-Fann 
 
Adab al-Hayyah 
1967 Our theatrical frame: A Study  Qalabuna al-Masrahi 
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1972 My Donkey, my stick and 
others 
Himari wa ‘asai wa al-
Akharun 
1974 A Conversation with the 
planets: Philosophical 
dialogue 
Hadith Ma'a al-Kawkab 




1983 The Four Conversations (with 
God): Religious philosophical 
dialogue 
al-Ahadith al-Arba’ah 
Unknown A Conversation with myself 
and to my reader: articles 























Western scholars such as H. A. R. Gibb, N. Barbour, K. Shoonover, F. Gabrieli, U. Rizzitano 
and G. A. Astre,471 have written a number of valuable studies on al-Hakim’s literary work, but 
very little on his philosophy. These have dealt with the work solely from the view of Arabic 
literature. This, in my opinion, is also true of what I may call recent Western scholars who also 
approached al-Hakim’s work before and after he died. I found that the works of these scholars 
did not offer me much material for examining al-Hakim’s philosophical doctrine. As for Arab 
critics, I am in debt to some more than others for giving me biographical information and some 
critical analysis of al-Hakim’s plays that I found useful. Unfortunately, some of these resources 
have no publication date or author, or are a little dated. Nevertheless, as Victor admitted in his 
thesis,472 I too found Mandur473 and Qutb’s work on al-Hakim to be valuable to my work. The 
first part of this literature review discusses El-Enany’s article on al-Hakim and his early works. 
The second part examines briefly the scholarly contributions of each of Denys Johnson- 
Davies, William M. Hutchins and Richard Long. They were some of the few who translated 
and promoted internationally some of al-Hakim’s dramatic works and achievements. In doing 
so, I was able to discover to a certain extent, via biographical material, what authors he read, 
what plays he saw and what journals or periodicals he read.  
The question is why the works of al-Hakim have proved popular in France, unlike 
England, and why al-Hakim’s works were once widely translated into many languages? My 
feeling is that al-Hakim’s philosophy is (and possibly has been for a long while) an area that 
has been intentionally avoided, if not ignored by both Eastern and Western scholars for reasons 
that I intend to discover.474Al-Hakim was a skilful writer of fiction who used his surroundings for 
inspiration. A talent perhaps that makes my task, like those before me who were interested in him, 
very difficult. The sum of bewildering ideas in its variety and wealth and range shows al-Hakim’s 
                                                          
471 These are noted in G. V.Tutungi’s unpublished doctoral thesis on al-Hakim in 1966 which is a comparative 
study submitted to the Comparative literature department at Indiana University. 
472 Doctoral thesis by G. V. Tutungi submitted in 1966 to Indiana University titled “Tawfiq al-Hakim and The 
West” as a comparative study of a few of al-Hakim’s novels. 
473 Indicated that al-Hakim was keen to imitate Shaw and Ibsen in his writings. See G. V. Tutungi’s preface (iv) 
474 My feeling at this stage is that Eastern critics avoid any discussion of Al-Hakim ’s philosophy due to past 
accusations against him, i.e. heresy, delusion and others, while Western critics avoid tackling it mainly due to the 
lack of knowledge of the language and the cultural barriers that they will have to overcome to pursue such a 
project. This is all in addition to the lack of resources, poor publication of al-Hakim’s work and finding a publisher 
for such a project. 
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hope to provide, as he mentions in one of his works, “food for all mankind”.475 The assimilation of 
ideas and ability to make what he liked his own has, without a doubt, led to many confusions and 
contradictions in his writings (and in interpreting his work). To overcome some confusion, perhaps 
his equilibrium doctrine is one that is best read as a comprehensive work of ideas rather than a 
work that argues for a single idea. This shows that he is influenced by a number of Western 
movements as well as social and political events that shaped his character over several years. 
In Davies’ The Essential Tawfiq al-Hakim (2008) it is claimed that theatre in Egypt was 
regarded as a source of a simple entertainment that was conducted in the colloquial language 
to appeal to a general audience. It was not until Al-Hakim came on the scene that recognition 
was given to the purely imaginative genres of writing like novels or short-stories.476 And whilst 
the Arabian Nights was regarded as a masterpiece of story-telling in the West, it was not 
mentioned in Arabic books of literary criticism or recognised as a work of literature in the Arab 
world. Davies concedes that thanks to al-Hakim’s efforts in Egypt, plays, novels and short-
stories were brought together as part of the modern Arabic literature and drama was included 
into the literary canon.477 It was of course unfortunate that the many plays al-Hakim wrote back 
in 1930s and 1940s were only available in print in Arabic and only a few were translated to 
French by al-Hakim himself. Although these early plays were written to be read, it is possible 
to say that the birth of professional theatre in Egypt may have begun with al-Hakim’s plays. A 
few of al-Hakim’s early plays were first staged in Cairo and other capitals of the Arab world 
in the late 1940s.478 One could possibly say that the aim of Davies’ book is to provide its readers 
with a great general introduction to an Egyptian literary pioneer more than anything else. The 
book neither claims to give readers the information in order to endeavour on a life time research 
nor does it claim to aid readers’ understanding of al-Hakim’s philosophy, his drama, or 
relationship with the West.  
 
In Hutchins’ Tawfiq al-Hakim: A Reader’s Guide (2003), on the other hand, it is 
claimed that due to the range or diversity of al-Hakim’s works, one can easily detect recurring 
themes in his writings, spiritual or social. Al-Hakim’s common approach of “picture yourself 
or what-if-you” approach, according to Hutchins, is typical of his ‘science fiction strategy’ in 
                                                          
475 I see this research as one that will appeal to a wider audience of those interested in al-Hakim’s work (i.e. 
national and international specialist scholars and students of Modern literature or interdisciplinary studies of the 
Middle East, as well as those from either disciplines; literature or philosophy, or both). 
476 The Essential Tawfiq al-Hakim (2008) Edited by Denys Johnson- Davies. AUC Press, pp. 2-3 




different types of plays. The scenarios, for instance, are as follows: a “hero is typically 
presented as an ordinary individual confronted by a thought provoking situation. The audience 
are challenged to think through the hero’s quandary with him and sense the necessity of making 
moral choices.”479 This description is typical of plays such as Food for the Millions, The 
Sultan’s Dilemma, The Tree Climber, The Fate of the Cockroach,480 and The People of the 
Cave. Even in al-Hakim’s version of King Oedipus, he explains in the play’s postscript that 
aside from the supernatural aspects, Oedipus should be seen as though he were the boy next 
door.481 Hutchins, although sympathetic, questions whether the “removal of the original or 
legendary colours of characters leaves the eternal verities pallid? Or does the mixture of truth 
with emotion or the ideal with the natural sentimentalize the classics, or, on the contrary, add 
a new dimension?”482 Both I would say are true of al-Hakim’s characters. The classic characters 
are not only romanticized in such a way that human emotions are revealed, but also such a 
technique enables readers to sympathise with, and relate to, the problems that the characters 
face. Al-Hakim was clearly aware that his audience are the ordinary every day persons from 
different paths of life who appreciate a protagonist who goes through familiar experiences and 
difficulties, and is capable of reflecting on life and show the imperfections of being human. 
Thus, Hutchins’ scepticism concerning al-Hakim’s technique is one which overlooks the 
simplicity of al-Hakim’s writings, a trait, perhaps that he, as a writer and philosopher, should 
have been commended for, not criticised.  
 
Moreover, it is very unfortunate that a few readers or critics have neglected al-Hakim’s 
work on the basis that he is an ‘easy- read’ because of his style and technique. Hutchins’ 
assessment reduces al-Hakim to the role of a representative of Islamic philosophy and/ or 
Egyptian culture. This can easily create the same kind of stereotype that Hutchins wants to 
deconstruct in comparisons between Egyptian Arab writers. Hutchins did not take into 
consideration the signs that point towards al-Hakim’s deep immersion in European literary 
tradition besides his foreign roots, his education and his foreign adaptations. These signs are 
evident more clearly in al-Hakim’s philosophical narratives of the mid-50s and in his doctrine 
than in his other writings. What a few readers and critics equally have ignored (which I consider 
                                                          
479 Hutchins William. M. (2003) Tawfiq al-Hakim: A Reader's Guide. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. p.113 
480 Recurrent themes and conflicts in this play are gender, class and as some critics claim, the political East vs. 
the West. The ontological question of the value of man's life is said to be echoing Kierkegaard and focuses on 
individualism and the idea that you are responsible for your own outcome in life. 
481 Hutchins’ endnote: “The case of a brother and a sister separated through adoption, reunited by marriage then 
charged with incest was close to the spirit of al-Hakim’s Udib (Oedipus). This was also a recurring story line in 
many Egyptian heritage and folktales.  
482 Ibid, p. 114 
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what survived throughout the years) is the relevance of al-Hakim’s underlying philosophy. On 
the one hand, I cannot entirely disagree with Hutchins that “Arab critics have excelled in 
developing strategies for understanding [al-Hakim’s works]”.483 Yet, their negligence lay not 
in misunderstanding the works as much as it did in their misreading and misinterpreting what 
al-Hakim said or intended. On the other hand, Western critics seem to have been equally 
selective in the sense that they intentionally overlooked some of al-Hakim’s works in favour 
of other works. In this connection, it must be mentioned that the ambiguity in al-Hakim’s style 
and the contradictions in his works have certainly affected the amount of scholarly work 
devoted to investigating his philosophy. The mistake on his part is perhaps that he believed 
himself to be unbound by literary techniques and common restrictions on writing with regards 
to style, form and content. His emphasis instead was on a style which portrayed aspects of 
‘ordinary’ characters who embodied various ideas and lived a life of struggle as a result of 
making moral choices affecting themselves and others.  
 
Last but not least, in Long’s Tawfiq al-Hakim , playwright of Egypt (1979) it is claimed 
that the purpose of his book is to fill a gap in British writing about the Middle East and to aid 
specialists’ understanding of an important transitional period in modern Arabic literature. Yet 
he suggests right from the beginning that al-Hakim had made his mark “by drawing selective 
inspiration from the ‘melting-pot’484 of the contemporary Egyptian stage and not by bringing 
to the light of day much that was original.”485 Long’s view strikes me as one that has been 
made in haste about such a remarkable author like al-Hakim. I have had to question the reasons 
behind Long’s view and from his preface I have concluded that although he started writing his 
book in 1962, it was not published until 1979; this means that the finished work did not take 
proper account of the intervening period. For between these dates, a number of events had 
drastically affected al-Hakim and his career. First, his reputation was affected by publishing 
his controversial works, Arini allah in 1953 and later on, in 1955, al-Ta’aduliya which 
explicitly outlines and explains his philosophical doctrine in relation to the existence of divine 
forces and questions, accordingly, the extent of one’s freedom. These works angered many 
clerics and other members of the religious establishment as well as members of the public and 
fellow writers.486  
                                                          
483 Hutchins, p. 189 
484 Also the title of one of his chapters which automatically insinuates his argument (i.e. that there is nothing 
original about Al-Hakim ) 
485 Long, Richard (1979) Tawfiq Al-Hakim, Playwright of Egypt. Ithaca Press, p. 9 
486 See chapter one for an excerpt of a letter sent to Al-Hakim’s publisher by an angry reader. Also see my final 
chapter titled “Criticisms and Misconceptions”. 
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Moreover, in 1974, al-Hakim was also criticised for publishing ‘Awdat al- Wa’y (The 
Return of Consciousness) which is a political reminiscences condemning the policies of the 
late President Nasser; as a result people accused him of disloyalty. In fact, he was honoured 
and given medals by Nasser during his reign, and he did not criticise Nasser’s character as 
much as his policies and decisions which in his view led to catastrophic economic and political 
failures.487 The critique, published after Nasser’s death, caused sharp controversy because of 
Nasser’s reputation as a charismatic hero and an intellectual who had encouraged writers to 
speak openly on all matters of the state. With this said, I, therefore, suspect that Long’s 
investigation of al-Hakim at the time was affected by the mixed reputation he had acquired 
over this period. This is not to say, however, that I am not in debt to Long’s book, quite the 
contrary. His work provided me with comprehensive information regarding influential events 
in al-Hakim’s life and early upbringing. Although Long overlooks al-Hakim’s philosophical 
doctrine and its impact on his literary career, it has helped me pin-point the exact period in 
which al-Hakim began to shift in tone and style, from drama to experimenting with 
philosophical narratives. It is a shame that Long only discussed al-Hakim’s preoccupation with 
the subject of time and place briefly in part two of his book. Instead of offering a philosophical 
analysis, he provides a synopsis of some of al-Hakim’s dramatic plays in the hope that his 
readers will be able to extract from them the recurring ideas and “philosophical themes”. The 
plays in question were Ahl al-Kahf, al-Malik Udib and Rihla ila al-mustaqbal (Journey into 
the Future). These early plays were presented by Long as ones that were given less 
consideration by the public, critics and by al-Hakim himself who admittedly doubted the future 
of his plays.488 It is noteworthy to mention that these plays, as many other plays of al-Hakim, 
were not widely in print at the time and some were altered in 1952 or completed on one of al-
Hakim’s multiple trips to France or to parts of Europe. 
 
 
 To conclude, I hope that by identifying the scholarly work on al-Hakim and some of 
his work and by showing some of the factors that were in his disfavour whether from his 
upbringing or during 1952 after Nasser’s reign ended in the early 70s, it has become clear that 
his reputation suffered and that he was, indeed, far from defending it. His ‘ivory tower reaction’ 
to his work’s rejection, his quiet character, his somehow passive stance among his cultural 
                                                          
487 i.e. “Al-Naksa” (the Arab defeat) In 1967 Israel defeated Egypt. 
488 See al-Hakim, Tawfiq. (1992) Sijn al Umr (The Prison of life: An autobiographical essay) Translated by 
Pierre Cachia. American University in Cairo (AUC) Press. 
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brothers-in-arms and his misunderstood objection that some of his best plays were designed 































                                                          
489 Ibid, p.179 
 205 
 
Reputation and readership: Survey findings and summary of results 
 
Here, I examine the author’s reputation and readership from data collated from a focused group 
survey. The results of the survey and all my findings to date are available in the following 
section. 
Al-Hakim had a very mixed reputation. He was a playwright, a novelist, a journalist, a short- 
story writer and/or reluctantly referred to as a philosopher. Not to forget having been called a 
“misogynist” and yet an advocate for women. And he had also been known to be a tight-fisted 
jurist. It is indeed difficult to pin-point all of al-Hakim’s works to one specific genre. From 
looking at my timeline, from the early 30s, he was generally regarded in Egypt as a mere 
playwright at a time when people preferred to read novels because of the greater delineation of 
characters and complex plots. “His incentive to write during this period came more and more 
from the increasing attention drawn to the theatre by plays of Farah Antun, Muhammad Lutfi 
Goma’a, Ibrahim Ramzi and Muhammad Taymur.”490 Rapidly his pen-name “Husayn Tawfiq” 
used only to conceal his identity from his parents began to be known in Cairo stage circles. It 
is unknown how his parents came to discover the truth of his identity, but their disapproval 
clearly had little, if any, effect on his writings. In fact, he had already started at the time to 
experiment with philosophical narratives in the form of philosophical short-stories and essays. 
He wrote Himari qal-li published in 1938 and Bruxa wa mushkelat al-hukm an essay published 
in 1939. In my opinion, these two books did not receive the due consideration they deserved 
neither by the public nor by critics. The reason being is due to the interest that had already 
sparked in his two novels Yawmiyat Na’ib fil aryaf (1937) and ‘Usfur min al-Sharq (1938) 
published around the same time, that critics began to see him more as a novelist.  
Regardless of the success or rejection of his works, he continued to write extensively. 
Some of his works were published, other works were never completed and some were never to 
be found. The ones that were made public exceeded 80 works of plays, novels, short-stories, 
essays and articles. Critics disagreed in their discussions of al-Hakim’s work. Muhammad al 
Sayyid is a critic who continued to consider al-Hakim to be a pioneering short-story writer and 
associated his works with the 1930s philosophic school of writing that saw the role of the story 
as an expression of philosophic thought more than anything else.491 Whereas critics who 
continued to consider him more of a dramatist argued that he should have been awarded the 
Nobel Prize for his contribution to Egyptian modern literature before he passed away in 1987. 
                                                          
490 Long, Richard (1979) Tawfiq al-Hakim, Playwright of Egypt. Ithaca Press, p. 8. 
491 Hutchins, William. M. (2003) Tawfiq al-Hakim: A Reader's Guide. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 
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Although this is recognition of al-Hakim’s efforts, it is unfortunate that till our present day his 
reputation and readership, nationally and internationally, is still affected by the negative social 
stigma affixed to him and his philosophy. This of course was due to the controversial contents 
of the following publications: Arini Allah (1953), al-Ta’aduliya (1955), Hiwar ma’ al-kawakib 
(1974), al-Ta’aduliya wal-Islam (1983) and Al Ahadith al-arba’a (1983). These works 
expressed openly what many saw and continued to see as unconventional and highly 
controversial ideas regarding Egyptian social norms, customs and more importantly, Islamic 
faith. As a result, al-Hakim was accused by clergymen and religious establishments of heresy, 
misguidance and delusion and the majority of his books were banned. Al-Hakim, as a 
consequence, wrote in response to many criticisms in his introduction to the latter work that he 
had revisited his writings in order to check the validity of the religious versus that he had used 
to support his claims. He argued that the verses that he had relied on and used in his works 
(mainly in al-Ta’aduliya wal-Islam published 1983) were all valid and they have been widely 
used and were also available in many religious texts. This was the first time that he directly 
addressed clergymen and critics in order to clarify his position and the validity of his quotations 
and truths behind his claims. He wrote in response in 1983 also that it is always a shame that 
“clergymen want to have the sole authority in shaping the minds of the nation based on their 
own readings, education and agendas. They do not accept an outsider’s observation or opinion 
on matters that concern religion and its progress in a changeable time.”492  
Although he responded to a few criticisms in his writings, there was no doubt that his 
readership has been negatively affected by latter philosophical publications more than others. 
From looking at my own translation of an excerpt from Gamal al-Gheitany’s book, Tawfiq al-
Hakim Reminisces,493 below, published by the Supreme Council of Culture in 1998 and only 
available in Arabic, we are given an account of the public and colleagues’ reaction to the 
author’s philosophical works published in this period. I speculate that the controversy was at 
its peak after the publication of the al-Hakim’s last philosophical work, Al Ahadith al-arba’a 
published in 1983. This is due to the book’s content. Al-Hakim had explicitly claimed to have 
had a conversation with God, something which the public found outrageous and blasphemous. 
The work was shunned by religious establishments and banned, like many others, from 
publication due to what it showed from the author’s boldness in addressing religious issues. A 
particular comment, mentioned in Gheitany’s book, was that the general public and others were 
                                                          
492 My translation of an excerpt from al-Hakim’s book Al Ahadith al- arba’a (The Four Conversations), 1983. 
493 Gamal El-Gheitany was a writer and a friend of al-Hakim since 1959 as mentioned in his preface of his book, 
Tawfiq al-Hakim Reminisces. Cairo: Supreme Council of Culture, 1998. P.183. 
 207 
 
also shocked at “the extent of Al-Hakim’s imagination”. Little did al-Hakim know at the time 
he published the work that his daring attitude and courage to question all that is unknown would 
be so unwelcomed by many. The excerpt below was, therefore, one of many examples of 
hostility and critic which the author received. The scale of controversy and attacks on the author 
after his last philosophical publication was indeed unimaginable. I can only hope that my 
readers will be able to sense the strain on the author and the shock expressed by colleagues, 
critics, clergymen and, of course, the general public, to whom al-Hakim angered. 
 
Many letters arrived for al-Hakim after he was accused by Shaykh Muhammed Metwaly 
al-Sha’rawi (of al-Azhar University) of “heresy and delusion”494 Most of these letters 
wondered what had happened to al-Hakim. With good intentions, the correspondents 
expressed their sincere remorse to what had affected al-Hakim in his final years of his 
life. Some letters expressed their belief in al-Hakim’s strong faith and denied the 
possibility of a Muslim, like al-Hakim, disbelieving another Muslim. Many of these 
letters also reached the publisher who was al-Hakim’s sole publisher495 at the time since 
the 30s. The publisher, in response, decided to publish four pages of clarification titled 
“al-Hakim’s Islam” with every copy of al-Hakim’s work. These pages aimed to entail 
clearly al-Hakim’s relationship with religion, his intentions and the extent of his 
directions and ideas. With the enlightenment that came with 1919 revolution, al-Hakim, 
like others, saw the holy Quran as a source of both, divine and humanely knowledge, 
as well as source of literature and thought that one should take inspiration from. Books 
like Muhammed written by Dr. Haykal and On the Margins of the Prophetic Biography 
by Dr. Hussein and Muhammed, The Human Prophet by al-Hakim, were all dependent 
on versus from the Quran and hadiths. 
 
Today, in Egypt and Middle Eastern countries, al-Hakim’s reputation as an author is 
known amongst specific social groups such as students, intellectuals, academics and the older 
generations who may have studied Arabic literature and drama or came across the author’s 
works out of sheer interest. Although there is an apparent trend of intellectual youths who have 
read one or two of al-Hakim’s works out of interest or as part of education, they still seem to 
be a minority, perhaps due to the fact that many of the author’s works have not been available 
for a very long period in print. This shows that there is an opportunity to revive al-Hakim’s 
philosophical work in order for the majority of the public to have access to and enjoy reading. 
As Egypt has recently been undergoing vast social, intellectual and political changes since 
January 2011 revolution, introducing al-Hakim and his philosophical doctrine both, nationally 
and internationally, will allow all those who wished to investigate his doctrine or his 
                                                          
494 The exact word in Arabic is (Ed-lal) “اضالل”. It carries within it all the following meanings: misguidance, 
diversion from true religion, delusion due to old age and fabrication. 
495 I believe his sole publisher was his son-in-law, Muhammed Ali Hasan of al-Adab Press who died in 1985. 
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philosophical works in an exchange of ideas which may form a kind of an intellectual 
revolution. It is vital, of course that the author is presented in an unbiased light contrary to his 
past reputation and with clarifications on his doctrine and approach to his work. This will, 
accordingly, shed light on fundamental aspects of his doctrine in relation to the Egyptian 
society and Islamic faith as well as trends or shifts in attitudes towards the West. Moreover, 
both Eastern and Western scholars will be able to have access to English translations of the 
author’s philosophical text, Equilibrium, which will enable them to have a better grasp of the 
doctrine and other philosophical works’ contents.  
Besides, what I also concluded from my survey is that some of Tawfiq al-Hakim’s 
dramatic works were known to those who have been keen on reading them out of cheer interest 
and not just as part of receiving an Egyptian education. Unfortunately, although some Egyptian 
universities and schools try to keep one or two of his books, usually a work of drama, on their 
Arabic literature curriculum, not many continue to do so and students do not pay enough 
attention to the importance of the work or even make note of the author’s identity. In fact, I 
have asked whilst in Egypt some of the younger generations if they were familiar with the 
author’s name. And to my disappointment, the majority of those I asked did not know much 
about the author, whereas others remembered coming across one or two of his works. Those 
who named a few of his work indicated that they may have had to read one of his books as part 
of a university course. Al-Hakim’s books that made it on the shelves of Egyptian bookstores 
such as Al-Diwan496 bookstore, for instance, were four particular books: The Essential Tawfiq 
al-Hakim (2008),497 al-Hakim’s play Ahl al Kahf (The People of the Cave) 1933,498 Al-Hakim’s 
novel Yawmiyat Na’ib fil Aryaf (A Diary of a Countryside Prosecutor) published in 1937)499 
and his autobiographical fiction ‘Awdet al-Ruh (The Return of the Spirit) 1933. Although at the 
first instance one may think these works are sufficient to spark readers’ interest-apart from 
Davies’ book- these few selected works can only provide readers with a general introduction. 
Readers will, therefore, miss out on the opportunity of comprehending the extent of Al-
Hakim’s progression of thought from the early 30s to the period before his death in the late 
80s. Also, readers will not be able to realise the importance of the texts given the context they 
                                                          
496 http://www.diwanegypt.com/ 
497 By Denys Johnson Davies published by The American University in Cairo (AUC Press), Egypt. 
498 Translated to English by Mahmoud El Lozy and published by ELIAS Press, (See 
http://www.eliaspublishing.com/other_books/cave.html). 
499 Also referred to as The Maze of Justice, published in English by Saqi Books and reprinted in 1985. 
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were published in. It is only recently that Dar al-Shorouk Press500 had begun a project of 
reprinting some of al-Hakim’s selected works in hope of reviving his narratives and keeping 
the Egyptian theatre heritage alive, just as al-Hakim desired.501 
I can only assume that the reason why some of al-Hakim’s works have been neglected 
was due to the lack of encouragement from tutors, parents, publishers, bookstore owners and 
perhaps from also educational establishments as a whole. It is true that the systems in place do 
not allow for students to learn more about their own literary heritage. Not to mention the limited 
resources and the inaccessibility of al-Hakim’s work over the past years and, of course, in our 
present day. This kind of negligence is not a modern phenomenon, but has been a flaw in the 
Egyptian educational systems for centuries. Al-Hakim personally commented about this issue 
in his critic of his Egyptian education in comparison to the education he had witnessed in the 
West. He wrote, “School did everything to make literature distasteful to me and to make me 
afraid of language. It set before me the most loathsome (from point of meaning and thought) 
of Arabic books, the most difficult in language and composition and the least suitable for 
introducing a budding spirit to the beauty of creation.”502 It is a shame that still to our present 
day this view is shared by the younger generations in Egypt and, perhaps also is a view shared 
by those who were fortunate enough to experience and compare, like al-Hakim, between 
different educational systems, such as governmental schools with rigid curriculum in contrast 
with private schools with a lenient approach of mixing ideas and traditions from international 








                                                          
500 An independent Egyptian publishing house established in 1968 by Muhammed al-Mo’allem, one of the 
founding fathers of modern publishing in Egypt and the Arab World who started his publishing career in 1942. 
(See http://www.linkedin.com/company/dar-al-shorouk). 
501 Muhammed Salmawi, President of the writers’ union of Egypt (See http://Muhammed 
salmawy.com/cv_en.htm) comment on Dar al-Shorouk Press project of reprinting Al-Hakim’s works. 
www.Shourouk.com. 
502 Long, Richard (1979) Tawfiq Al-Hakim, Playwright of Egypt. Ithaca Press, p.5. 
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Summary of the Survey 
The methodology used in this survey was to collate date from a focused group of respondents 
who took part in the survey by following a link in order to answer a set of closed ended 
questions. Respondents also had the opportunity to leave a comment or a clarification if they 
wished.  
The link to the survey [https://www.surveymonkey.com/analyze/?survey_id=45877922] was 
posted on the 3rd of November 2013 on a social network website. By end of Dec 2013, the 
respondents have reached 25 respondents. Friends and family were encouraged to share the 
link and/or post it on their own social media page in order to maximise the range of responses 
in terms of age groups, backgrounds, professions and regional areas. It is worth noting here 
that a question that would have explicitly identified the respondents’ location or country of 
birth have not been included in the survey. The reason being is because I felt that finding out 
where the respondent resided or country of birth was not as essential as knowing the year in 
which respondents were born in and how much they knew about the author and his work. The 
objectives of the survey aimed to identify the following: 
 The age group of readers. 
 The author’s general reputation, familiarity and how he is identified in our present day. 
 The scale of readership within the period that he had been actively publishing in, i.e. 
from the 1940s to late 1980s.  
 The extent of readers’ knowledge and awareness of his works in general and his 
philosophical narratives, in particular. 
 The target audience today. 
The data collated showed two main age groups; those born from 1966 to 1980 and those 
born from 1980 to 1993. The general consensus was that the majority of respondents identified 
Al-Hakim as an author, a writer, an intellectual or a thinker. Only one respondent have 
explicitly referred to the author as a “philosopher” whereas another respondent referred to the 
author as “a modern intellectual”. Only a handful of respondents referred to the author as a 
novelist and were able to mention a few of the iconic novels that he had written, such as 
Yawmiyat Nai’b fil aryaf (1937) and ‘Usfur min al-Sharq (1938). The majority of respondents 
identified Al-Hakim as a playwright and showed familiarity with the author’s works by 
mentioning his iconic plays such as Ahl al- Kahf (1933), al-Malik Udib (1949), Masir Sirsar 




The survey showed that responses have only differed slightly from one another. First 
of all, although a few respondents identified al-Hakim as a novelist, they have only mentioned 
in their comments the author’s collections of short-stories such as Laylat al Zifaf published in 
1966, besides two of the author’s plays that were also mentioned before by other respondents, 
these were al-Malik Udib and al-Himer. Secondly, it was surprising to find out that ‘Awdet al-
Ruh published in 1933, was only mentioned once by one specific respondent who was born in 
the year 1975. Although the book has been widely publicised and has been in print as one of 
the author’s major novels, it was not mentioned by other respondents. Therefore, it was clear 
to me from these responses that respondents were unclear about the author’s genres. And in 
order for them to show their familiarity with the author or his works, they have simply 
mentioned the books that they had come across, read or seen regardless of its genre. This, of 
course, have revealed how some works have been widely available more than others and also, 
raises the question of who determines the works that appears on the shelves of libraries and 
bookstores and on what basis is the selection process. 
Moreover, al-Hakim was referred to by one or two respondents as an advocate for 
emancipating women because although he was known to be a “misogynist” for many reasons, 
he wrote in 1956, as part of a collection of plays titled al- Masrah al munawa’ (The Diverse 
Theatre), a book titled The New Woman. It is believed that this book has given the Egyptian 
advocate Qasim Amine the idea of campaigning for women rights in Egypt. Al-Hakim was, of 
course, not as explicit about his views as Amine was, perhaps due to the negative stigma and 
social pressures he had already suffered during this period. Nevertheless, one cannot deny that 
al- Mar’a al-gadida (The New Woman) was the first work of its kind by al-Hakim to have 
identified explicitly that there was indeed a need to explore women’s status in the Egyptian 
society. Respondents who were not familiar at all with al-Hakim’s works or his name were 
mainly those born in the latter group identified above. I can only assume that the reason for 
their unfamiliarity with the author was due to the religious controversies and negative publicity 
that was assigned to his philosophical doctrine which seem to have tarnished to a certain extent 
his general reputation, as well as the availability of his publications in print, especially in the 
last few years and in the period right before he passed away. Besides, on a personal note, al-
Hakim was also stereotyped by some critics and fellow writers to be tight fisted with money. 
One respondent identified him as a “stingy” writer in one of the survey questions. This was a 
trait that the author himself strongly denied on many occasions and members of his family and 
close friends disagreed with and defended him. 
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To conclude, it has become apparent from this survey that it is not a difficult task for 
one to determine the extent of readers’ knowledge and awareness of al-Hakim’s works in 
general and his philosophical narratives, in particular. Respondents who showed knowledge 
and awareness of al-Hakim’s works mentioned the following iconic works that were all indeed 
in print for a long period, mainly because they are a work of fiction, theatre or drama. Here is 
a list of the works mentioned:  
 Novels: Yawmiyat Nai’b fil aryaf (1937) and ‘Usfur min al-Sharq (1938) 
 Plays: Ahl al-Kahf (1933), al- Malik Udib (1949), Masir Sirsar (1966) and al- Himer 
(1975) which was the last collection of plays published by al-Hakim before he 
abandoned writing plays and theatre.  
 Short-stories collection: Laylat al-Zifaf (1966).  
These works, to conclude, show that audience’s familiarity with Al-Hakim is one that 
is shaped by preconceptions and what publishers or bookstore owners direct them towards 
reading. A philosophical work evidently is, and sadly continues to be, a work that is avoided 
by the majority of the general public. And even though one could clearly see through the results 
of the survey that although al-Hakim is known today to the majority as a writer/author, and 
only to the very few as a philosopher, there is still a need to highlight, as well as clarify, his 
reputation as a philosopher in a positive manner. To clarify this further, in the survey, there 
were no mention of any of al-Hakim’s philosophical narratives or even a mention of his 
doctrine of equilibrium which I believe was the main cause for the relapse in his literary and 
philosophical career. The ban on his works caused the works to vanish swiftly from the 50s to 
the 80s. And the works continued to be no longer in print till recently. I, of course, appreciate 
and applaud the efforts of publishers such as Dar al-Shorouk who endeavour to reprint the 
author’s works in a kind of an intellectual movement. The general public today, of all ages, 
will not only benefit from a thorough investigation of al-Hakim’s works of all genres, but also 
from reading major philosophical works such as Equilibrium and others. Luckily, the aim of 
this research is to encourage a reinvestigation of the philosophical doctrine alongside the 
dramatic works in addition to providing a clear explanation of Al Hakim’s influences and the 





Al-Hakim Survey: Respondents: 24 of 24 
Q. 1 Do you know who Tawfiq al-Hakim is? If (Yes) briefly say who he is in a few words  
 Answered: 24  
 Skipped: 0  








Comments(17) Showing 17 responses  
Writer, jurist  
11/6/2013 1:31 AM View respondent's answers  
One of the greatest and famous Egyptian writers  
11/4/2013 9:13 PM View respondent's answers 
A writer  
11/4/2013 11:41 AM View respondent's answers  
Very famous Egyptian writer and philosopher  
11/4/2013 8:26 AM View respondent's answers  
Writer  
11/4/2013 1:53 AM View respondent's answers  
Writer, stingy (?);  
11/4/2013 1:39 AM View respondent's answers  
A great writer / thinker / novelist  
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Answer Choices – Responses – 
11/2/2013 8:20 PM View respondent's answers  
He is great Egyptian writer  
11/2/2013 8:20 PM View respondent's answers  
Egyptian author  
11/2/2013 7:59 PM View respondent's answers  
Writer  
11/1/2013 2:08 PM View respondent's answers  
Writer  
11/1/2013 2:06 AM View respondent's answers  
An Egyptian author and playwright  
11/1/2013 1:55 AM View respondent's answers  
ات شهور (retirw suomaF :noitalsnarT)ك  ب م
11/1/2013 1:42 AM View respondent's answers 
Writer, philosopher and modern Egyptian intellectual 
11/1/2013 1:41 AM View respondent's answers 
Writer and advocates for emancipating women 
11/1/2013 1:27 AM View respondent's answers 
An Egyptian writer 
11/1/2013 1:22 AM View respondent's answers 
Read about him while studying Arabic but can't remember 
much 
10/31/2013 8:57 PM View respondent's answers 
 
Q. 2 Have you heard of Tawfiq al-Hakim before?  
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 Answered: 24  
 Skipped: 0  







Total Respondents: 24  
  
Q. 3 Have you read any of Tawfiq al-Hakim's books? If (Yes) mention it please in 
"comment" sections  
 Answered: 24  
 Skipped: 0  











Answer Choices – Responses – 
Showing 9 responses  
Yawmiyyat  na’ib fil Aryaf (Diary of a Countryside Prosecutor) 
11/6/2013 1:31 AM View respondent's answers  
I'm sorry. I can't remember  
11/4/2013 5:34 PM View respondent's answers  
‘Awdat al-Ruh , Ahl al-Kahf  (The Return of the Spirit, The People of the Cave) 
11/4/2013 2:03 AM View respondent's answers  
Masir Sirsar (The Fate of a Cockroach) 
11/4/2013 1:39 AM View respondent's answers  
ب  لك أودي م ير، ال حم اف، ال زف لة ال ي يم، ل ك ح  حمار ال
Translation: Al-Hakim’s al-Himer (The Donkeys), Laylat al Zifaf (The Wedding Night), al- 
Malik Udib (King Oedipus) 
11/2/2013 8:20 PM View respondent's answers  
  "بيدوا كلملا" و "فهكلا لها"
Translation: Ahl al-Kahf (The People of the Cave) and al-Malik Udib (King Oedipus) 
11/1/2013 1:55 AM View respondent's answers  
اف, عص ي األري ب ف ائ يات ن وم شرق ي ور ال  ف
Translation: Yawmiyat Naib fil- Aryaf (The Diary of a Countryside Prosecutor) and ‘Usfur 
min al-Sharq (Bird from the East) 
11/1/2013 1:42 AM View respondent's answers  
I think I read all his plays, books and novels. I read ‘Usfur min al-Sharq more than 10 times.  
11/1/2013 1:41 AM View respondent's answers  
Al ‘abqaryat  Translation: The Genius, or Intellectuals 




Q. 4 If you have read his books, was it part of your education or out of interest?  
 Answered: 21  
 Skipped: 3  







I have not read any  
19.05%  
4  
I have not heard of him or his works ever before  
19.05%  
4  
Total Respondents: 21  
Comments(0) 
 
Q. 5 Would you be interested to know who he was?  
 Answered: 21  
 Skipped: 3                        







Don't care  0%  
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Answer Choices – Responses – 
0  
Total Respondents: 21  
Comments(3) 
Showing 3 responses  
I know him  
11/4/2013 2:03 AM View respondent's answers  
I would not seek out information about him but might read it if I came across it by chance  
10/31/2013 8:57 PM View respondent's answers  
I don't know  
10/31/2013 12:47 PM View respondent's answers  
 
Q. 6 Have you ever noticed al-Hakim's books in a bookstore? If yes, mention which 
bookstore and where.  
 Answered: 24  
 Skipped: 0                  











Answer Choices – Responses – 
Showing 8 responses  
Al-Diwan Zamalek  
11/6/2013 1:31 AM View respondent's answers  
Al-Diwan, Cairo  
11/4/2013 5:34 PM View respondent's answers  
I don't remember  
11/4/2013 11:41 AM View respondent's answers  
rT)   ر  (anslation: Manyجري
11/2/2013 8:20 PM View respondent's answers  
Al-Diwan Bookstore  
11/2/2013 8:20 PM View respondent's answers  
In Cairo; Al-Diwan & Dar al-Shorouk  
11/1/2013 1:55 AM View respondent's answers  
I bought most of his books published by the original publisher (Maktabat Misr- Egypt Press) 
more than 15 years ago.  
11/1/2013 1:41 AM View respondent's answers  
Multiple book stores and libraries in Egypt  
11/1/2013 1:27 AM View respondent's answers  
 
Q. 7 Have you ever searched for his books in a library? And did you find any? Mention 
below.  
 Answered: 24  
 Skipped: 0  
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Didn't find any  
0%  
0  
Total Respondents: 24  
Comments(2) 
Because I used to read for another writer  
11/4/2013 9:13 PM View respondent's answers  
I searched for it in UC system libraries and was excited 
to find a good collection of his short plays.  
11/1/2013 1:41 AM View respondent's answers  
 
Q. 8 Are you male or female?  
 Answered: 24  
 Skipped: 0  









Answer Choices – Responses – 
Total 24 
 
Q. 9 In which year were you born?  
 Answered: 23  
 Skipped: 1  
Showing 19 responses  
1966                     10/31/2013 12:47 PM View respondent's answers  
1968                      11/2/2013 8:20 PM View respondent's answers  
1970                      11/2/2013 8:20 PM View respondent's answers  
1971                      11/1/2013 2:08 PM View respondent's answers  
1973                      11/2/2013 7:59 PM View respondent's answers  
1975                      11/4/2013 2:03 AM View respondent's answers  
1978                   11/6/2013 1:31 AM View respondent's answers 
1980                      11/4/2013 11:41 AM View respondent's answers 
1980                      11/1/2013 1:41 AM View respondent's answers  
1981                      11/1/2013 1:27 AM View respondent's answers  
1982                      11/4/2013 8:26 AM View respondent's answers  
1982                      11/1/2013 1:16 AM View respondent's answers  
1982                      10/31/2013 8:57 PM View respondent's answers 
1983                      11/4/2013 8:15 AM View respondent's answers  
1985                       11/1/2013 1:55 AM View respondent's answers  
1985                    11/4/2013 9:13 PM View respondent's answers 
1986                       11/4/2013 1:53 AM View respondent's answers  
 222 
 
1986                       11/1/2013 2:06 AM View respondent's answers  
1989                       11/1/2013 1:42 AM View respondent's answers  
1990                       11/1/2013 1:29 AM View respondent's answers  
1992                    11/5/2013 3:27 AM View respondent's answers  
 1993                     11/4/2013 1:39 AM View respondent's answers  
Copyright © 1999-2013 SurveyMonkey 
**************** 
 
Personal Interview with Mr. Muhammed Rifa’at 
Assistant editor of October Magazine, writer, journalist and poet 
Date: 21st August 2014 
Cairo, Egypt 
 
1. What can you tell me of Nasser’s reign and the intellectual arena at the time? 
Nasser was an intellectual leader. He used to read a lot and he also subsidised books so that 
they are affordable to all. I remember a book once cost me only 60 piasters. Although Nasser 
provided a platform for intellectuals to debate and engage into the matters of the state, 
underlying this, the political arena only had one voice, that of the socialist party. Nasser was 
one who did not like someone to disobey him. When his reign came to an end, some Arabic 
films showed how people were threatened, kidnapped and tortured by the secret services. He 
may have allowed some intellectuals to speak their minds more than others, such as in the case 
of Tawfiq al-Hakim. It is said that once al-Hakim spoke badly of a few of Nasser’s policies 
and the ‘Nasserists’ heard of this. When they complained to the President, he told them not to 
intervene and to allow al-Hakim to say whatever he wished. The reason for this lenience is 
believed to be due to Nasser’s admiration for al-Hakim whom he considered to be like a “god-
father” to him. It is said that when Nasser was in his youth, he had read al-Hakim’s ‘Awdet al-
Ruh (The Return of the Spirit) where al-Hakim had written of a leader who will lead the people 
and be loved by them. Nasser have been inspired by al-Hakim’s words. 
2. What about Sadat’s reign? 
Sadat was not as an intellectual as Nasser was. And although he did not play a major role 
intellectually, he was keen to implement his “open door” policy only for economic gain. When 
Nasser died, it is said that Al-Hakim fainted and when he recovered, he gave a speech, although 
he was not accustomed to talk in public much, and said “today, the nation has lost a true hero”. 
Soon after that, al-Hakim published ‘Awdet al-Wa’y (The Return of Consciousness) criticising 
Nasser and Nasser’s policies. This caused a negative stir amongst Nasserists and those who 
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saw Nasser as a hero. Al-Hakim was, thus, criticised as being two-faced and a hypocrite. In 
this book, he reveals his views in regards of Nasser’s policies, his tactics which led the nation 
to defeat in 1967, to an extent where he described Nasser’s rule as one that ended in a form of 
a “dictatorship”. In my view, this is a common problem that we tend to fall into; namely that 
every ruler who comes into power, erases the heritage and any merits of the one who reigned 
before him. This is a habit that has reoccurred since the Pharaonic era. Nasser, although allowed 
(to some extent) intellectuals to debate, he seems to have done so in order to mask his ways of 
“dictating to” or “guiding the” nation (in Arabic Tawgeeh). And by the way, Nasser himself 
wrote a book titled The Philosophy of Revolution which he made public. 
3. Did you hear previously of Al-Hakim’s equilibrium doctrine? 
Yes, I have. I know that it is a doctrine of “mediation”, meaning a mediation between what is 
borrowed from the West and what is take from the East (in order to form a some sort of merge). 
This is a common problem that I think writers at his time struggled with as shown in al-Hakim’s 
‘Usfur min al-Sharq (A Bird from the East) published during his time in France. The idea of 
consolidating ideas from the East and the West seems, to me, impossible because if one takes 
these ideas, from either tradition, one takes them with a set of other ideas or ideologies that one 
cannot overlook. They come, in my view, as a package, you cannot be selective. 
4. Did you know of Sartre’s visit to Egypt in 1967? 
Yes, I think I came across a document of some sort in the past where Yousef Idris wrote about 
their visit.  
5. What do you think of the opposition that Al-Hakim faced in the period close to his 
death? 
The opposition became explicit in the late 70s, although it was present to some extent much 
more before that. With the “awakening of Islam” movement and other strict religious 
movements in parts of the Middle East, al-Hakim’s position became worse. One of the leading 
clerics who attacked al-Hakim’s philosophical work and ideas was Shaykh Sha’rawy.  
6. Do you see a role for philosophy today in Egypt? 
Yes, there is a role for philosophy in Egypt. There are prominent intellectuals today in Egypt 
who engage in various debates regardless of restrictions put upon them from the government 
or from the public etc. This was not the case before the revolution and still to some extent there 
are indeed social and political “barriers” on the intellectual. But society, during the last few 
years, has really changed in Egypt and I am hopeful the change that will happen in the next 
few years, will also be for the better. It is true that you can find in Egypt today groups of people 
with similar ideologies forming closed groups everywhere, meaning that you can find the 
fanatic, the atheist, the existentialist, the socialist, the liberalist, the Marxist and so on. Today, 





7. Is there room today for al-Hakim’s philosophical ideas? 
Yes, it is important for us today to focus on introducing “empirical thought” (in Arabic, Al Fikr 
al Tagreebi) to students of all ages in order to nurture their creativity and talent. The sort of 
education that focuses on one ideology or one specialisation alone or area of study, is one that 
is not aiding the development and progress of the individual in his or her society. For example, 
we send to Kuwait and other parts of the Golf area our best doctors and architects, but what 
about the majority of students who learnt subjects other than medicine and engineering? What 
about those who learnt Business, Accounting or Literature, what will become of them and what 
opportunities are there for them in Egypt (as well as abroad)? I see that education should 
introduce new ways which can give students new ideas and help them think, criticise and 
analyse and form their own opinions than be dictated to what to think and what to do. 
*************** 
Personal Interview with Mr. Muhammed Shamroukh   
Al-Ahram Newspaper columnist and writer  
Date: 6th September 2014 
Cairo, Egypt 
 
1. What can you tell me of about Tawfiq al-Hakim? 
He is a great author who belongs to the school of realism. He was influenced by many things 
as a result of the vast translation movement of the mid-19th century. Those who influenced 
Tawfiq al-Hakim where: Al ‘aqad, Taha Hussein and Ahmad Lotfi al-Sayid. He was interested 
in the French literature and the arts. His trip to Paris in 1925 allowed him to develop this interest 
and he was influenced by what he heard and saw there.  
 
2. What can you say about Al-Hakim as “the father of the theatre of the Absurd”? 
Al-Hakim introduced this genre for the first time to Egypt. Albert Camus’ theatre of the Absurd 
was particularly presented in al-Hakim’s play Ya tali’ al-Shajara (The Tree Climber) which is 
inspired also by a song from the Egyptian folklore with the same title. This attempt (introducing 
the theatre of the absurd) was, in my view, not successful in Egypt. It reminds me of the films 
of Yusuf Shahin in the Egyptian cinema; no one seems to understand them.  
3. What do you know of Al-Hakim’s equilibrium doctrine? 
The equilibrium doctrine is al-Hakim’s attempt to compete with the philosophers of his time 
or in other words, to produce for himself a philosophy. In my view, it did not win him a place 
amongst them. He is after all a columnist, a dramatist and people did not understand what his 
philosophy is about. He was unable to fulfil his aim of becoming a philosopher. The 
Equilibrium in my view is an ideology of “response” to others. In al-Hakim’s case, the writer 




4. What is the relationship between Sartre and al-Hakim? 
There is no relationship. Sartre’s existentialism was founded on “individualism” and we, in the 
East, do not support this concept; it does not appeal to the Eastern mind. Also, the denial of 
god is an idea that is prohibited in the East. For the West, this denial is not a source of anxiety 
for the West like it is for the East. The Hippie movement of the 1960s that was driven by 
existential thought became familiar to Egyptians and this movement did not also appeal to us.  
5. What do think of Al-Hakim’s Arini Allah (Show me God) published in 1953? 
I read the work very briefly when I was still in University and I witnessed the fierce attacks on 
al-Hakim. He first introduced the work in a series of articles published in al-Ahram newspaper 
and no one supervises the work of an author as prominent as him. His work goes straight to 
print without supervisions. Al-Hakim retreated from his position and admitted that he was 
wrong to do so (i.e. to impersonate God in a conversation) I am not sure but I think the person 
in charge of al-Ahram at the time was Ali Hamdi al-Gamaal. 
6. What do you think is the future of Philosophy in Egypt today? 
Philosophy is a subject in the museum of history. It has become part of our heritage. 
7. Do you see any hope for intellectuals in Egypt? 
We are in a very critical stage. I think the 21st century man is one who is dependent on 
technology. He has lost his freedom to technology and became its slave. We have no privacy 
and no individuality today. Facebook and other applications have stolen these from us. We 
have been chained willingly by technology. I wrote once an article entitled “A Spy in my 
Pocket” (Gasous fi gayby) where I spoke of how google and Youtube have taken everything 
that was once private and made it public. I feel I lost my freedom to technology. And the ethics 
that I use to know were altered. For example, I find it scandalous that one calls a person who 
burned one of Egypt’s treasures; that is the Institute of science, a hero. How did he become a 
hero? Ethics changed accordingly with the change in modern societies. We gave our freedom 
and identity to the “cooperation”. Our culture has become one of consumerism and a culture 















Source: al-Ahram Microfilm (archive) Original Egyptian newspaper announcements of Sartre 
and de Behaviour’s visit to Cairo, Egypt and other parts of the Middle East. 
 
 
Front page of al-Ahram Newspaper: (Heading) Jean Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir in 
Cairo (24th of February, 1967) 
Translated text: Arrived to Cairo, at half past ten in the evening, the French prominent writer 
and philosopher Jean Paul Sartre and the French writer Simone de Beauvoir accompanied by 
Claude Lanzmann, executive editor of Sartre’s Les Temps Modernes. The guests were met at 
Cairo airport by Tawfiq al-Hakim, member of the managerial board of al-Ahram Newspaper 
and some of the prominent intellectuals and a few of al-Ahram team. Sartre, de Beauvoir and 
Lanzmann left Paris at six in the evening (local time) to arrive in Cairo after four and a half 
hour journey. The writers, who were invited by al-Ahram, will spend two weeks in Cairo. Their 






(Above) Published on the 24th of February 1967 in al-Ahram newspaper is an article titled 
“Sartre and Existentialism: a non-philosophical explanation of the doctrine, its influences and 
origins”. This was written by Pierre Sharpie503 and summarised by Dr. Hussein Mo’ness. The 
content of this article is difficult to read because it is only available on microfilm but my 
speculation is that it gives a brief summary of Sartre’s philosophy and the main concepts that 
he addresses in a simplified manner in order for the everyday Egyptian to understand it. 
 
(Below) al-Ahram article published in “Women and Home” section of al-Ahram newspaper on 
26th of February 1967 titled “The Second Sex female Philosopher in Cairo”. The article talks 
of de Beauvoir’s career and companionship to Sartre and their philosophy with a focus on a 
brief synopsis of her book, The Second Sex.   
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